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Turkmenistan President Saparmurat Niyazov (known as Turkmenbashy, or “father of 
Turkmens”), the longest-serving leader in post-Soviet space, has ruled his country 
with increasing repression and megalomaniacal idiosyncrasy over the past decade.  
Under Niyazov’s rule, alternative political parties have been banned, non-official 
religions persecuted, and free media outlets closed.  State institutions, subsumed by 
the expansive presidency, are characterized by constant personnel purges and an 
arbitrary management style, and have become increasingly dysfunctional.  Grandiose 
marble state buildings, large museums and golden presidential statues dominate 
Ashgabat, Turkmenistan’s capital. Socioeconomic indicators, however, are at low 
levels, and poverty and unemployment have reached new highs. 
 
Niyazov has formulated, transmitted and imposed a new Turkmen national program 
as a method of political legitimation. This “pseudo-ideology” has been elaborated 
since independence in a series of texts published under the president’s name—
Niyazov’s quasi-spiritual works are required reading throughout all levels of 
education in Turkmenistan and are heavily propagated through official mass media 
and cultural associations. 
 
This thesis seeks to understand the forms that the legitimation program has taken, 
Niyazov’s methods of propagation, and the ways in which the regime’s program 
resembles those of similar historical regimes.  Turkmenistan, which appears to closely 
approximate the ideal type of a sultanistic regime (as defined by Juan Linz), is 
described in this thesis with reference to cases of sultanistic leadership from the post-
colonial period in sub-Saharan Africa. This thesis examines in turn Niyazov’s use of 
official ritual and symbolism, media and education, historical revision, and 
architecture to secure normative compliance. Historical references help to 
contextualize a discussion of Turkmenistan, an often-overlooked country in post-
Soviet Central Asia, but one that promises to grow in strategic importance due to its 
geopolitical location and bounty of natural resources. 
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Despite a large literature discussing political developments in post-communist 
countries following the collapse of the Soviet Union, relatively little systematic work 
has been done on political developments in the post-Soviet state of Turkmenistan.1 
Scholars have, to a large extent, investigated the role of political institutions in 
political and economic transitions in new democracies, as well as the effects of 
institutions on the development of the political and social spheres in post-communist 
societies in particular. Discussions of institution-building and civil society 
development speak very little to the political conditions in the most repressive of the 
Central Asian states, which, due to the absence of true institutionalization, might be 
better discussed with reference to the literature on personal rule.  
Central Asia’s most extreme example of a personalist regime, that of 
Saparmurat Niyazov in Turkmenistan, represents strongman rule at its most 
eccentric– Niyazov’s personality cult, which has become increasingly embedded over 
the past decade, has effectively removed Turkmenistan from much of the academic 
literature on development and state building. Niyazov (known as Turkmenbashy, or 
“father of Turkmens”), the longest-serving leader in post-Soviet space, has ruled his 
country with increasing repression and megalomaniacal idiosyncrasy over the past 
decade, earning international notoriety and winning himself a spot among the world’s 
most repressive dictators.2 With just a few exceptions, discussions of Central Asian 
political developments or democratization include Niyazov’s regime as just a 
                                       
1 The most recent work published in the West dealing in detail with Turkmenistan was Adrienne 
Edgar’s book Tribal Nation: The Making of Soviet Turkmenistan (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2004), which explores the Soviet nation-building efforts in Turkmenistan during the early years 
of Soviet rule. Regarding Turkmenistan’s political situation, the most significant work written outside 
of Turkmenistan has been S. Demidov’s 2002 book, Postsovetskii Turkmenistan (Moscow, Natalis), 
which deals with changes under Niyazov’s regime. Cummings and Ochs provide a chapter on 
Niyazov’s regime as an “inglorious semi-sultanism” in Sally Cummings, ed., Power and Change in 
Central Asia (London and New York: Routledge, 2002).  
2 Freedom House, “Turkmenistan” The World’s Most Repressive Regimes (2003), pp. 79-83. See also 
Reed Tucker, “5 Tyrants,” Esquire Volume 140, Issue 2, p. 110 
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footnote. Serious considerations of political life in Turkmenistan are generally put off 
for a day when Turkmenistan in fact possesses something resembling a vibrant 
political life.3   
Turkmenistan is located at the southernmost frontier of the former Soviet 
Union, bordered by Iran and Afghanistan to the south and Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan 
to the north. Its western border lies along the Caspian Sea, and Caspian oil and 
extensive natural gas reserves provide much of the current regime’s funding and also 
increase international interest in this country. The shadow economy and pervasive 
political corruption, however, have deterred many foreign investors for the time 
being.  Niyazov’s regime has banned all political opposition, eliminated independent 
media outlets, and forcefully propagated a national narrative that is intertwined with a 
cult of personality almost unparalleled in the contemporary period. 
There are very few academic studies of Turkmenistan, particularly in the 
West, largely because of the constraints placed upon researchers in this very tightly-
controlled country.  Some interesting historical work has been done since the 
independence of Turkmenistan from the Soviet Union—although they do not directly 
contribute to my study of the contemporary political climate in post-Soviet 
Turkmenistan, these historical studies lend context to the discussions of Turkmen 
identity formation today.  Of particular note is a study by Adrienne Edgar, Tribal 
Nation: The Making of Soviet Turkmenistan, published in 2004—Edgar describes in 
great detail some of the early nation-building efforts in Turkmenistan during the first 
decades of the Soviet Union.  As I will explain in a later chapter, the efforts of the 
                                       
3 As it stands, decision making is completely at the discretion of the president, who has become 
increasingly erratic in his edicts—in August 2004 alone, he decreed that all learner drivers must pass a 
16-hour course on his spiritual guidebook Ruhnama to gain a drivers license; that television presenters 
should wear less makeup; to ban chewing tobacco; and to give a $43 million contract to build an ice 
palace and funicular railway outside of Ashgabat, the capital city. See International Crisis Group Asia 
Report No. 85 for more details. 
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Niyazov regime to construct a particularly “Turkmen” identity have their roots in the 
early Soviet efforts—in style if not entirely in content.  The most significant scholarly 
essays on Turkmen politics have been S. Demidov’s book Postsovetskii 
Turkmenistan, which discusses in some detail the political, economic, and cultural 
programs of the Niyazov regime, Sally Cummings and Michael Ochs’ chapter on 
sultanism in Turkmenistan in Sally Cummings, ed., Power and Change in Central 
Asia, and Annette Bohr’s chapter “Independent Turkmenistan: From Post-
Communism to Sultanism”, in Sally Cummings, ed., Oil, Transition and Security in 
Central Asia, which provides a discussion of the evolution of authoritarianism in this 
post-Soviet state with particularly reference to sultanism and the social context in 
which it has historically developed.  It is with this line of inquiry that this thesis 
begins—my intent is to explore the question of sultanism in Turkmenistan and 
particularly to dive into the historical methods with which sultanistic regimes 
propagate and continue themselves to assess the extent to which the sultanistic regime 
typology is salient in examining developments in modern Turkmenistan. 
Although they will not contribute to the literature on democratic consolidation, 
analyses of personalist regimes are valuable in themselves for adding to an 
understanding of non-democratic governance, and for their contribution to an 
understanding of the fledgling processes of legitimation and institution building prior 
to political transition.4 In order to assess these issues in the context of Turkmenistan, 
it is important to first understand what kinds of non-democratic regimes have taken 
shape in Central Asia. An appropriate theoretical beginning for this inquiry may lie in 
the literature on personalist regimes, and particularly discussions of the development 
                                       
4 Or, as may prove to be the case, in the total absence of a transition to democracy which is not only 
not inevitable, but highly unlikely to occur in the short term for Turkmenistan (discussed later). 
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and maintenance of neo-patrimonial and sultanistic rule.5 The richest discussions of 
personal rule on a large scale exist in the literature on political developments in post-
colonial Africa, which uses Weberian concepts to examine legitimacy in the context 
of newly independent states. 
This paper will draw on the benchmark concept of sultanism in describing 
Niyazov’s regime in Turkmenistan. While sultanism’s definition is expanded upon in 
the following chapter, the following five points briefly introduce this regime type— 
• Sultanism is the most obviously personalist of the types of non-democratic 
rule; 
• Sultanistic rule is characterized by the weakness of traditional and legal-
rational legitimation, and the lack of ideological justification—although 
sultanistic leaders tend to create so-called “pseudo-ideologies”, after their rise 
to power, to give the appearance of a mission;  
• A sultanistic ruler exercises unrestrained power at his own discretion; 
• Loyalty to the ruler is generally motivated by a mixture of fear and rewards to 
regime supporters and; 
• Outwardly, sultanism features a pronounced cult of personality and a tendency 
towards dynasticism.6 
Following a discussion of personal rule as a system and regime typologies more 
generally, this thesis will specifically consider methods of legitimation in personalist 
regimes, introducing a number of concepts that will form the basis of a subsequent 
analysis of political legitimacy in post-Soviet Turkmenistan. The role of Niyazov’s 
                                       
5 See John Ishiyama, “Neopatrimonialism and the prospects for democratization in the Central Asian 
republics,” in Sally Cummings (ed) Power and Change, p. 43; also H.E. Chehabi and Juan J. Linz, 
Sultanistic Regimes (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998). 
6 See Chehabi and Linz, Sultanistic Regimes, and chapter 1 of this thesis for more detailed definitions 
and applications of the concept. Sultanistic rulers also generally monopolize certain economic 




personality cult in the process of legitimation will be discussed, as will the content of 
presidential tomes and state- disseminated media, the process of “Turkmenization,” 
and the role of rites, ritual, and public space in legitimating the rule of Turkmenbashy. 
The thesis will consider the use of ideology or pseudo-ideology as a tool for gaining 
normative compliance, focusing on the political dynamics of a cult of personality, 
educational systems under sultanism, and the roles of media and official ritual in 
obtaining a domain consensus. Following this discussion, the idea of “invented 
tradition” and the revision of national histories are considered as a foundation for 
nation building in new states. Finally, the thesis will analyse and consider symbols of 
power, and particularly architecture and urban design of capital cities as factors of 
regime legitimation.   
This study has three objectives: 1) to situate the case of Turkmenistan in a 
comparative context, particularly discussing the behaviour of Niyazov’s regime with 
reference to historical examples of sub-Saharan African personalism; 2) to examine 
the role of so-called “pseudo-ideology” in the legitimation of sultanistic regimes; and 
3) to examine different elements of the legitimation effort, namely, media and 
education, historical revision, and architecture and public space. Turkmenistan’s 
regime exhibits qualities that correspond to the typology of sultanistic rulership, 
lending it a familiarity that should help scholars and policy-makers in considering the 
future of this little-understood country. Additionally, an exploration of Niyazov’s 
methods of ideological legitimation will lend insight not only to Turkmenistan’s 
contemporary constructed culture, but also to the perspectives and views of a new, 
younger generation raised under Niyazov’s regime. Sultanistic pseudo-ideology—
while not considered an ideology in the traditional sense of the word—can in fact 
infiltrate and shape daily life in significant ways, both explicit and implicit. In so 
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doing, sultanistic pseudo-ideology becomes a method of control, not secondary to but 
parallel to fear and the threat of force. The current political climate in Turkmenistan 
precludes an academic assessment of the extent of societal acceptance of the regime’s 
doctrine; however, in this case, compliance—and not belief—is in practice the most 
important factor. The content and methods of the regime’s programme of legitimation 
will comprise the focus of the thesis. 
The methodology of this thesis is comprised of a textual analysis of regime-
issued literature from Turkmenistan combined with fieldwork conducted on two 
separate visits to Turkmenistan in 2003 and 2004.  The methodological core of this 
project is a close, interpretive reading of official texts and state-issued daily 
newspapers from Turkmenistan, drawn from the period following Turkmenistan’s 
independence in 1991 until 2003—including a day-by-day content analysis of the 
newspaper Neytralnyy Turkmenistan over that time period to assess the growth of the 
cult of leadership in the media.  The major Turkmen-language periodicals issued in 
Turkmenistan include Turkmenistan, published six times a week; Watan, published 
three times a week; Galkynys, a weekly that is the mouthpiece of the ruling party (the 
Democratic Party of Turkmenistan); and Turkmen Dunyasi, a monthly that is the 
organ of the Ashgabat-based World Turkmen’s Association.  Other Turkmen-
language papers include Adalat (Justice) and Edebiyat we Sungat (Literature and the 
Arts).  The Russian-language Neytralnyy Turkmenistan is published six times a week.  
My inquiry is supplemented by other primary sources drawn from different domains 
such as presidential speeches and interviews, policy decrees, biographies and 
pamphlets.  Because they are so heavily controlled by the state, however, readings of 
these texts in Turkmenistan are useful for discerning the official and acceptable state 
line and, importantly, preferred metaphors and images in support of the regime’s 
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created ideology.  My project concerns official attempts at legitimation—therefore, 
the state line on issues is the object of study.   
These textual analyses are invaluably supplemented with discussions and 
interviews with university students and professors in Turkmenistan, interviews with 
representatives of international organizations and diplomats, and visits to school 
classes.  Fieldwork in Turkmenistan helped to contextualize and collect documents, 
although many informal interviews with Turkmenistani citizens were conducted—the 
realities of research in Turkmenistan prohibit conduction of regimented or 
representative interviews as a technique.  During the course of researching this thesis 
I visited Ashgabat, Mary, Bayram Ali, Dashoguz, Derbasa and Erbet desert villages, 
and the mountainous Nohur region along the Iranian border. 
Areas of Legitimation Under Sultanistic Regimes: Outline of Study 
An examination of the idea of sultanistic rule, which stems from Weber’s 
concept of patrimonial rule, provides a context in which to consider Niyazov’s regime 
in Turkmenistan.  This concept has been expanded primarily in works on personal 
rule, and largely in studies of post-colonial African regimes. In order to gain a more 
extensive understanding of sultanistic rule, chapter one provides a literature review on 
post-colonial personalism and the more recent works conceptualizing the sultanistic 
regime type. A discussion follows on the ways in which Niyazov’s regime in 
contemporary Turkmenistan closely conforms to this paradigm; over time, this regime 
has exhibited high levels of personalism as well as other qualities of neo-patrimonial 
rule or sultanism. 
The second and third chapters will help to situate the case of contemporary 
Turkmenistan in a comparative context. Descriptive chronologies facilitate a cross-
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regional comparison of governance in post-Soviet Eurasia and post-colonial Africa. 
Studies of post-colonial African personalism lend a certain amount of insight to the 
cases of sultanistic or personalist rule that exist in post-Soviet space and may provide 
clues as to the lasting effects of these systems of rule in the event of regime change.7  
 The fourth chapter expands on the idea of political legitimation under 
sultanistic regimes. Sultanistic regimes are distinguished from totalitarian regimes and 
other dictatorships in part by the absence of true ideology. Generally, scholars have 
asserted, sultanistic regimes are characterized by the development of a sort of pseudo-
ideology, which is perhaps not widely believed and serves as mere window dressing 
for their regime.8 The absence of a genuine guiding ideology, the factor which best 
distinguishes it from totalitarianism, drives sultanistic leaders instead to incorporate 
pseudo- ideologies into their regime; that is, to invent ideologies to substantiate their 
rule. Much more salient than true ideological backing in cases of sultanistic rule is 
force or the threat of force, imprisonment or penalty—that is, general fear keeps the 
population in check. Because the leader acts outside of the rule of law, generally no 
legal limits inhibit his capability to punish those who betray his regime, and the 
acquiescence of the older generations tends at first to be based on this fear. Fear, 
however, is only part of the picture. Younger generations, and even older generations 
over time, become inundated with the pseudo-ideology of the sultanistic regime and 
may, in the absence of external contact and information freedom, come to internalize 
some of the pillars of the regime’s historiography and worldview. Through constant 
exposure to symbols, rhetoric, culture, and history of the regime, people are socialized 
to believe what they see, and over time may in fact begin to lose points of 
                                       
7 Of course, this comparison can only go so far—the social, economic, and historical contexts in Africa 
and Central Asia probably have as many significant differences as insightful similarities, and scholars 
must not confuse comparison of regime type and governing style with comparison of the countries as a 
whole, which is not salient. 
8 See Chehabi and Linz, Sultanistic Regimes 
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comparison. Finally, sultanistic regimes often arise in contexts that support their 
sustainability, where populations are not familiar with liberal democratic principles, 
perhaps have a history of domination by strong-handed rulers, and expect little more 
from their political systems. Political legitimation under sultanism is not just a 
peripheral issue; it lies at the heart of the regime’s perception of itself, its citizens’ 
perceptions of it, and also international critiques of the system.   
Sultanistic rulers make no effort to conceal the highly personalized elements 
of their regimes, and one of the defining features of sultanism is a pronounced cult of 
personality. Sultanistic rulers tend to be prolific authors of inspired volumes of 
philosophy and even poetry, and their constructed pseudo-ideologies sometimes bear 
the ruler’s name. This type of legitimating doctrine often “exalts the nation’s ancient 
glories and draws on an ‘invented tradition’ to demarcate the nation from its 
neighbors....”9 A highly developed personality cult should not be confused with 
ideology in its real sense. Cults of personality in states with unformed national 
narratives offer leaders the opportunity to “construct or remake national history and 
identity and, moreover, to reach in to that construction in order to furnish his own 
authority in the present, and fashion his own perceived place in its destiny.”10  
Pseudo-ideologies and deeply entrenched cults of personality do hold political 
significance. Lisa Wedeen, in her book Ambiguities of Domination explores the 
political implications of Asad’s cult of personality in Syria, arguing that although the 
regime’s rhetoric is often unbelievable and at times patently absurd, Asad’s cult 
remains politically effective because it is a strategy of domination based on 
                                       
9 ibid., 14 
10 Michael Denison, “Are They Laughing At Us?” Strategies of Compliance and Resistance to the 
Leadership Cult in Contemporary Turkmenistan, Leeds University, p. 11. A cult, in this sense, can 
generate “a national space within and beyond the confines of the state in which the ruler becomes 
indivisible with the state’s identity, history, and future.” (Denison, 11)  
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compliance rather than legitimacy.11 The cult of personality functions as a 
disciplinary device, and it plays many roles: it “produces guidelines for acceptable 
speech and behaviour; it defines and generalizes a specific type of national 
membership; it occasions the enforcement of obedience; it induces complicity by 
creating practices in which citizens are themselves ‘accomplices,’ upholding the 
norms constitutive of Asad’s domination; it isolates Syrians from one another; and it 
clutters public space with monotonous slogans and empty gestures, which tire the 
minds and bodies of producers and consumers alike.”12  
 In addition to, and indeed in support of, his cult of personality, Niyazov has 
constructed a set of symbols, slogans, and oaths to represent his power. A regime’s 
control and manipulation of the symbolic world can be a powerful instrument of 
legitimation and demonstration of power. Ritual, which is defined as “a stylized, 
repetitive social activity which, through the use of symbolism, expresses and defines 
social relations,” is of central importance in Niyazov’s regime legitimation.13 In 
Turkmenistan, ritual is often found within the context of holidays created in the 
period since independence. The literature on ritual largely concerns its social control 
function, although Christel Lane, in her analysis of Soviet ritual, cites also the 
capacities of ritual to “express and canalize individual emotions... and to satisfy 
aesthetic needs through utilizing and uniting the creative arts in ritual form.”14 Many 
forms of political rule have sought legitimacy through encouraging expressions of 
popular consent. Considerable effort is invested into the mobilization of mass support 
for regime activity through rallies, demonstrations, marches, and plebiscites.15 The 
                                       
11 Lisa Wedeen, Ambiguities of Domination: Politics, Rhetoric, and Symbols in Contemporary Syria 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1999), p. 6 
12 Wedeen, 6 
13 Christel Lane, The Rites of Rulers (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), p. 11 
14 Lane, 19 
15 A. Heywood, Political Ideas and Concepts (Houndmills: Macmillan, 1994), p. 98 
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iconography of the state is expressed visually in flags, stamps, coinage, and currency; 
textually it can be explored in anthems, oaths, and pledges of allegiance. Theatrically, 
as Young writes, “the state represents itself in resplendent ceremonial: inaugurations 
and coronations, parades displaying its military might, rituals of national 
commemoration.”16  
The recurrence of particular political slogans, metaphors, and images raises 
questions about the nature of political legitimacy in a given cultural context. Michael 
G. Schatzberg, in his study of eight central African states, explores the language of 
politics and legitimacy, and the power of metaphor and imagery in new states.17 In 
examining the cultural logic of legitimacy, he argues that political legitimacy in many 
African cases rests on the tacit normative idea that the relationship between ruler and 
citizen parallels the relationship between father and child. This reflects a pervasive 
(though largely unarticulated) conception of the political realm and the nation as a 
highly idealized family. This imagery and language of father and family, pervasive in 
many parts of the developing world (and indeed, in personal regimes throughout 
history), seems to strike a resonant cultural chord in Turkmenistan as well. If it is true 
that familial imagery forms part of a culturally valid comprehension of political 
legitimacy in Africa, such rhetoric and imagery might play a similar role in post-
Soviet Turkmenistan.  
The fifth chapter considers the ways in which sultanistic leaders, and Niyazov 
in particular, construct national narratives and write national histories—– as George 
Orwell reminds us, “Who controls the past, controls the future: who controls the 
                                       
16 Crawford Young, The Colonial State in Comparative Perspective (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1994), p. 34  
17 Michael G. Schatzberg, Political Legitimacy in Middle Africa: Father, Family, Food (Bloomington 
and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2001) 
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present controls the past.”18 This topic has been discussed to some extent in 
consideration of post-colonial Africa; as Tanella Boni writes, “regimes have their 
writers in the same way that the Kings of Europe once had jesters and the Chiefs of 
pre-colonial Africa their griots and storytellers.”19 Eric Hobsbawm defined the term 
“invented tradition” broadly as “a set of practices, normally governed by overtly or 
tacitly accepted rules and of a ritual or symbolic nature, which seek to inculcate 
certain values and norms of behaviour by repetition, which automatically implies 
continuity with the past.”20 Generally, tradition is invented by regimes in response to 
novel situations– although this practice is common to almost all polities at various 
times, it occurs with greater frequency “when a rapid transformation of society 
weakens or destroys the social patterns for which ‘old’ traditions had been designed, 
producing new ones to which they were not applicable... in short, when there are 
sufficiently large and rapid changes on the demand or the supply side.”21 This was 
certainly the case at the time of the Soviet Union’s collapse, which left the successor 
states with the task of filling the void left by the withdrawal of Marxism-Leninism as 
the legitimating ideology. The invention of tradition goes hand-in-hand with historical 
revision in creating a national narrative with the leader at the center of the nation’s 
past and future. 
Nationalist historiography is a tool of most new regimes, because it forms one 
of the most important pillars of nationalism and is connected with the very definition 
of nation. Historiography acquired an important role in the post-Soviet successor 
states after the fall of the Soviet Union. Because the history writing process within 
                                       
18 George Orwell, 1984 (New York: Signet Classics, 1950), p. 36 
19 Tanella Boni (an Ivory Coast novelist), cited in Dominic Thomas, Nation-Building, Propaganda, 
and Literature in Francophone Africa (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2002), 
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20 Eric Hobsbawm, “Inventing Traditions,” in Hobsbawm and Ranger, eds. The Invention of Tradition. 
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the Soviet Union was strictly controlled, academics anticipated a huge deviation in 
the content and style of history writing in post-Soviet space. To an extent, this 
occurred—topics were considered in different ways by the newly independent 
regimes—but history is still being interpreted by regimes to serve their purposes, and 
in Central Asia we see a revision of history on a large scale. In Turkmenistan, there 
have been many historical constructions and revisions—from oral histories and 
travelogues to the Tsarist period, then the Soviet period, and now by the post-Soviet 
regimes. Even within these periods, large discrepancies and revisions occurred. 
 In constructing a national narrative, regimes tend to recraft the nation’s history 
and also to reject the “other”, thereby strengthening the nation’s identity through 
contrasts. History has been an important tool for nationalists since at least the 18th 
century—when museums and textbooks, nonexistent in previous centuries, began to 
play a role in the construction of identities in Europe on a wide scale. The idea of 
national history came after the idea of the nation, which was based on the concept of 
ethnic community—and an important element of an ethnic community tended to be 
some sense of common memory, along with common myths of origin, culture, 
solidarity, language, religion, and other characteristics. A national history is a tailored 
discourse to institute a particular historical memory and its corresponding 
“amnesia”—that is, ignorance of unattractive pieces of the past. This is a common 
tool of regimes to provide legitimacy for integrated territory, taking history as a 
unifying force.22  
Architecture, another forum for expressions of power, forms the subject of the 
sixth chapter. Crawford Young discusses the importance of architecture and symbols:  
States tackle the task of transforming their mundane reality 
                                       
22 Touraj Atabaki lecture at Central European University, course “History and Nationalism in Central 
Asia,” Budapest, July 2005 
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into symbolic splendour with remarkable ingenuity. In the 
monumental architecture of their capital cities, states affix the 
signature of power. These often magnificent structures evoke 
awe and admiration and encode the core values of the polity: 
the evocation of classical Greece with its democratic overtones 
in the United States Capitol building; the opulent splendour of 
the absolutist monarchy in the Palace of Versailles; the remote 
majesty of Imperial China in the Forbidden City of Beijing; the 
despotic power of the state in the fortress towers of the 
Kremlin.23  
 
In his book Architecture, Power, and National Identity, Lawrence Vale explores the 
interplay among architecture, culture, and politics in several postcolonial states.24 Not 
merely architecture, but also the design and layout of public space, can be significant 
as a reflection of various political agendas, and nowhere is this more visible than in 
the construction (or reconstruction) of capital cities. Capital cities are generally where 
political life meets urbanism, and the layout of such cities can say a lot about the 
methods of a regime’s control. Colonial rule transformed many cities (for example, in 
British Egypt or French Morocco) from traditional urban settings to cities that lent 
themselves to a Western European conception of space—broad boulevards, central 
capital complexes (in the case of Cairo) or side-by-side traditional and colonial cities 
(as in Morocco) have come to represent the methods of colonialism as forwarded in 
agendas of architecture and urban design. 
 In newly independent countries emerging from periods of colonial 
domination, observers note not only the legacy of the colonial power in the design of 
urban centres, but also the actions taken by the new regimes in the post-colonial 
periods. In many cases, the new regimes adopt the old cities in their present state; 
sometimes they are altered quite significantly; in other cases, we see the abandoning 
                                       
23 Young, Colonial State, 34 
24 Lawrence Vale, Architecture, Power, and National Identity (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1992) 
1 Robert H. Jackson and Carl G. Rosberg, Personal Rule in Black Africa: Prince, Autocrat, Prophet, 
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of the old colonial capital and the creation of a new capital city in an entirely different 
location, either atop an existing town or the building of a capital from scratch. All of 
these approaches speak to the motivations and intentions, and maybe also the 
resources and priorities, of the post-colonial regime, and studying the location and 
development of capital cities in post-colonial states involves the peeling back of the 
layers of historical governance and design and the analysis of each layer as a 
representation of political control. 
 Through these varying levels of analysis, this thesis aims to enrich the 
academic understanding of post-Soviet Turkmenistan, in particular the methods of 
legitimation under its current sultanistic regime. References to historical regimes in 
post-colonial Africa will not only situate Turkmenistan in a rich comparative context, 
but hopefully will also further the general comparisons between the two regions as 
part of other scholars’ ongoing research, notably on dysfunctional authority across 
post-colonial space. It is my hope that scholars and policymakers alike will attempt to 
better understand the political climate and its lasting effects on society in this under-
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Before tailoring this discussion to Turkmenistan, conceptual clarity must proceed 
from a review of the relevant literature on the nature and types of non-democratic regimes. 
This chapter will review the major contributions to the body of work on regime typology, 
including the ideal typification of totalitarianism, post-totalitarianism, authoritarianism, and 
various forms of personalism including patrimonial rule and sultanism. The analysis of 
regime type in Turkmenistan will draw particularly on the literature exploring political 
developments in post-colonial Africa.  
Experiences of the African states that emerged from the withdrawal of the European 
powers in the mid-twentieth century can lend a huge amount of insight to scholars of 
contemporary Central Asia. While colonialism in Africa and the period of Soviet rule in 
Central Asia differed in many ways, these experiences share certain characteristics that 
make cross-regional comparisons useful. Most significantly, both sub-Saharan Africa and 
Central Asia emerged from periods of foreign domination as newly independent states 
charged in many cases for the first time in their history with the construction of systems of 
self- governance on a national level.  
In their study of personal rule as a system, Robert Jackson and Carl Rosberg suggest 
that in general, “personal regimes may be thought of as typical of transitional periods, when 
one institutionalized order has broken down and another has not yet replaced it.”1 Clearly, 
however, not every state undergoing political transition is subject to the caprices of 
personalist governance—what makes the difference? Jackson and Rosberg suggest that a 
“pertinent condition for personal rule may be an absence of a relevant and viable 
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institutional tradition in the political life of a state.”2 In Africa’s post-colonial period, the 
absence of unifying indigenous institutions left politicians with “the task of governing with 
their personal power and authority.”3 This thesis will examine if, and why, the same was 
true for Turkmenistan as it emerged for the first time as an independent state in 1991. 
Regimes, and in the case of personalist regimes, the ruler, are of central importance 
to this thesis. In Turkmenistan, as in many other countries in the developing world, 
strongman politics appears as “a fascinating kind of politics, perhaps the most fascinating– 
as Machiavelli showed in The Prince– for it is largely contingent upon men, upon their 
interests and ambitions, their desires and aversions, their hopes and fears, and all other 
predispositions that the political animal is capable of exhibiting and projecting upon 
political life.”4 Specifically of concern are the elements of personal rule that are central to 
legitimation efforts — nationalism and national identity as they factor into the formulation 
of state ideology. Here, certain terms used throughout this thesis will be clarified—terms 
that are often interchanged and confused in discussions of systems of governance.  
• Leadership. This study concerns political leadership and leadership mechanisms, in 
a broad sense. While no single definition of political leadership exists, many of 
them include ideas of power, personality, environment, behaviour and roles, and 
institutional structures. For the purposes of this thesis, it is useful to view leadership 
in terms of a “regime,” a concept discussed in turn. Answers to the questions of 
leadership involve inquiry into a regime’s methods and degree of social control and 
mobilization, ideological or other claims to legitimacy, political and administrative 
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3 ibid. 
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structure and level of pluralism, and discussion of the goals it seeks to attain. 
Academic distinctions have been made between leaders and power-holders (or 
office-holders),5 but here, this definition will suffice: leadership operates in a 
different way than the holding of an office; “It is a form of power– a special form of 
power... since it is exercised by one individual over a large group and, in the case of 
the national political leadership, over a very large group. Leadership is therefore an 
intrinsically highly inegalitarian relationship.... One can therefore define national 
political leadership as the power exercised by an individual to push members of the 
polity towards action in a particular direction.”6 Blondel has developed a two-
dimensional typology of political leadership according to the scope for change in a 
polity and the extent to which leaders seek change.7 Leadership should also be 
conceived of with regard to the type of relationship between a leader and a society; 
this aspect will be discussed below with reference to Max Weber’s typology of 
legitimate rule.  
• Regime. This chapter will outline various typologies of non-democratic regimes 
with particular regard for those that exhibit characteristics of personal rule. As we 
will see, particularly in the literature on post-colonial Africa, scholars define 
“regime” in various ways. In discussions of personal rule, the terms “regime” and 
“leadership style” are often used interchangeably, resulting in conceptual confusion. 
                                       
5 Burns, 1978, cited in J. Blondel, Comparative Government: An Introduction (London: Prentice Hall, 1995), 
p. 289 
6 Blondel, 290, emphasis in original 
7 Other typologies of leaders will follow in my discussion of the literature on African personalist regimes; 
Blondel’s category of “Paternalists/Populists,” which includes Bismark, Stalin, the Shah, and many Third 
World leaders, is the most useful for my inquiry, although it does not draw the finer distinctions that can be 
found in Linz and Stepan’s classification of non-democratic regimes and Jackson and Rosberg’s 
categorizations of personal rulers in Africa. 
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The term “regime” is generally taken to describe the rules of the political game, its 
institutions, and its relations with the broader society– regimes are “typically less 
permanent than states but more permanent than governments.”8 Measures and 
policies pursued in the name of a regime are not necessarily congruent with state 
interests. This thesis adopts Juan Linz’s widely applied definition of a regime as 
“the patterns of allocation, use, and abuse of power in a polity.”9 Under Linz’s 
conception, regimes may be understood in terms of power, institutions, leaders and 
legitimacy. Regime change can be said to have occurred when “The legitimating 
ideology and basic rules of the political game were altered in fundamental ways,” as 
in a process of revolution, decolonization, or in less dramatic ways.10 
• Power. The question of the nature of power is a “crucial category for political 
theory, yet it is a very elusive one.”11 Power can be conceived of as an ability to 
achieve a desired outcome (often referred to as “power to”), or as a relationship or 
the exercise of control by one person over another (or, as “power over”). Max 
Weber defined power as “the probability that one actor within a social relationship 
will be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance, regardless of the 
basis on which this probability rests.”12 For the purposes of this thesis, power is 
taken to be the capacity to make decisions that are in some fashion binding upon 
                                       
8 Sally Cummings, Power and Change in Central Asia (London and New York: Routledge, 2002), p. 3 
9 H. E. Chehabi and Juan J. Linz, “A Theory of Sultanism 1: A Type of Nondemocratic Rule,” in Chehabi and 
Linz, ed., Sultanistic Regimes (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998, pp. 3-25), p. 10 
10 Crawford Young, The African Colonial State in Comparative Perspective (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1994), p. 41 
11 Cummings, 3-4 
12 Also in Michael Schatzberg, Political Legitimacy in Middle Africa: Father, Family, Food (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 2001), p. 39 
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others.13  
• Authority. Power is often thought of together with authority. In its broadest sense, 
authority is a type of power; “it is a means through which one person can influence 
the behaviour of another.”14 There is a distinction between the two, however—
whereas power can be defined as the ability to influence the behaviour of another, 
“authority can be understood as the (legitimate and accepted) right to do so. Power 
brings about compliance through persuasion, pressure, threats, coercion or violence. 
Authority, on the other hand, is based upon a perceived ‘right to rule’ and brings 
about compliance through a moral obligation on the part of the ruled to obey.”15 
Max Weber, whose sociology of legitimate authority forms the basis for many 
contemporary discussions of personalist rule, treats authority as a form of power. 
Authority, in his view, is “legitimate power,” or power cloaked in legitimacy. Under 
this view, “a government that is obeyed can be said to exercise authority, even 
though that obedience may have been brought about by systematic indoctrination 
and propaganda.”16 Even in this Weberian sense, however, authority can be 
distinguished from various manifestations of power. Heywood writes, “If authority 
involves the right to influence others, while power refers to the ability to do so, the 
exercise of power always draws upon some kind of resources. In other words, 
power involves the ability to either reward or punish another. This applies whether 
                                       
13 “Influence”, by contrast, is taken as “the ability to affect the content of these decisions through some form 
of external pressure, highlighting the fact that formal and binding decisions are not made in a vacuum.” (A. 
Heywood, Political Ideas and Concepts (Houndmills: Macmillan, 1994), p. 79) 
14 Heywood, 86 
15 ibid. 
16 In Heywood, 86 
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power takes the form of pressure, intimidation, coercion or violence.”17 Weber’s 
influential categorization of types of authority is discussed in detail below.  
• Institutions. States and regimes alike are generally understood and classified with 
some reference to the institutions that comprise them. The classical understanding 
of institutions, as “impersonal system[s] of rules and offices that effectively bind the 
conduct of individuals involved in them,” has evolved in political science,18 and 
Blondel suggests that the generic term “institution” can be taken to describe the 
elements of a political system, such as legislatures, parties, or groups. He writes, 
“The political system operates essentially through and by institutions; they are in 
effect the pieces of the machinery.”19 For the purposes of this thesis, an institution is 
best understood as a combination of rules and behaviour, allowing for a separation 
between the concepts of abstract institutions and realized institutions, a useful 
dichotomy for an analysis of personal rule. Whereas many personalist non-
democratic regimes have abstract institutions (constitutions, assemblies, and so on), 
few abide by these written rules. When the term “institutions” is used here with 
reference to Turkmenistan, it refers to the idea of these abstract institutions. As 
Jackson and Rosberg write of Africa, in Turkmenistan too “the formal rules of the 
political game do not effectively govern the conduct of rulers and other political 
leaders in most places most of the time. Insofar as African rulers follow rules, it is 
only after they have been changed by the ruler or oligarchy in question to suit his or 
their personal-political convenience. But rules of expediency are not, patently, rules 
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of institutional government.”20 The question of whether institutionalization can be 
said to exist in states with systems of highly personalized rule will be addressed 
below. 
• Legitimacy. Legitimacy, often defined simply as “rightfulness,” is crucial to the 
distinction between authority and power.21 The concept of political legitimacy is a 
complex one, and generally is used descriptively to indicate acceptance by the ruled 
of the ruler’s authority. Legitimacy is “the quality which transforms naked power 
into rightful authority; it confers upon an order or command an authoritative or 
binding character, ensuring that it is obeyed out of duty rather than because of 
fear.”22 Weber, again, presents one of the most influential conceptions of this term: 
he takes legitimacy to refer to a belief in the “right to rule.” In this understanding, 
“providing its peoples are prepared to comply, a system of rule can be described as 
legitimate.”23 This differs markedly from moralistic considerations of legitimacy 
that suggest a clear, objective line to divide legitimate and illegitimate forms of rule. 
David Beetham, in The Legitimation of Power, addresses the question of how 
legitimacy is brought about in order to take legitimacy out of the hands of the 
powerful (where, it is argued, Weberian conceptions had placed it). He proposes 
three conditions for legitimacy of power: first, the exercise of power according to 
established rules; second, the justification of these rules under shared beliefs of 
governors and governed; and finally, there must be an expression of consent on the 
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part of the governed.24 Legitimacy should not be confused with legality, although 
the two ideas are connected. Blondel writes, “Cases abound of legal regimes which 
are not, or have ceased to be, legitimate because they no longer enjoy support: 
tsarist Russia at the time of the First World War is an example. There are also 
regimes that enjoy support without being legal, or at any rate without yet being 
legalized.... In most situations, however, legality helps to increase legitimacy 
because many will support the political system for the reason that it is legal.”25 
Legitimacy might take the form of legality, political integration (that is, the support 
given by institutions and groups such as political parties), and popular support. 
Legitimacy stems from individual support, whether direct or indirect, passive or 
active; in Blondel’s conception “where positive and passive support exceeds 
negative reactions, the regime can be said to be relatively legitimate; the greater the 
difference in favour of positive support, the higher the amount of legitimacy. 
Blondel suggests that coercion might also be a basis of legitimacy, and that coercion 
and support must been seen in combination– historical examples of dictatorship, 
according to Blondel, demonstrate that “coercion can be a substitute for support in 
many circumstances despite the claim that dictatorships might not be viable.”26  
• Legitimation. Useful in examination of Turkmenistan is the concept of 
legitimation. Legitimation, an idea that will be explored in some detail for the 
Turkmen case, is “the idea of creating legitimacy artificially.”27 Under Beetham’s 
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conception, legitimacy is only conferred upon regimes that rule with popular 
consent; however, there is general agreement that many, if not all, regimes “attempt 
to manufacture legitimacy by manipulating what their citizens know, think or 
believe. In effect, legitimacy may simply be a form of ideological hegemony or 
dominance.”28 Legitimation is one of the backbones of a state—as Gramsci notes, 
“even though its hegemony serves a ruling class, others generally defer to the state’s 
power and consent to its authority because its domination is clothed in some 
legitimating ideology. The generally diffused image of the state includes affective 
symbols, legitimating myths, a theory of its origins, processes, and ultimate ends.”29 
Crawford Young considers legitimation to be a primary component of the 
operational code of the state. He writes, “Weber with good reason places patterns of 
legitimation at the core of his notion of the state; absent this property, the state is in 
a condition of extreme vulnerability. Hegemony is rendered credible by the visible 
possession of superior force. However, coercion may well be conceived of 
metaphorically as a gold reserve underpinning the currency of power. If constantly 
employed, the reserves are emptied in short order, and rapid devolution of power 
itself soon follows.”30 In its most basic form, legitimation is developed through 
official propaganda and state ideologies—Young writes, “Ideology as an expression 
of the ultimate aims and final source of authority plays a critical role…. The 
common theme is an interwoven corpus of ideas that provide a vision of the future 
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and a yardstick for measuring the present.”31 Other methods of legitimation will be 
discussed below with particular reference to personalist regimes. Turkmenistan’s 
current regime has undertaken a comprehensive program of legitimation, 
propagating a well-developed pseudo-ideology to provide justification for its power.  
This program will form the subject of inquiry for this thesis. 
Totalitarian, Post-Totalitarian, and Authoritarian Regimes: Ideal Types 
Regime classification is a useful academic tool; typologies bring to light patterns 
that emerge from various types of leadership. Political regimes in the contemporary period 
have been generally classified first as authoritarian or democratic, and then classified as a 
subtype of one or the other of these. Regime type is separate from efficacy of governance– 
various types of political regimes can perform equally well (or equally poorly) on policy 
matters such as economic growth, the distribution of income, and the provision of public 
services. Indeed, the extensive literature “probing the effects of regime type on policy 
performance reaches no firm conclusions about whether political democracy promotes or 
inhibits economic growth and income equality.”32 In the modern context, non-democratic 
regime types generally take the form of a dictatorship by a political party or a military, 
rather than leadership of a chief or monarch, and these regimes have been the focus of large 
amounts of inquiry in the mid- and late-twentieth century.33 This chapter proceeds with a 
review of some of the literature on descriptive theories of ideal typical non-democratic 
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regimes as chosen by Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, namely totalitarianism, post-
totalitarianism, and authoritarianism—their fourth ideal type is the idea of sultanism.34 This 
prompts a discussion of Linz’s concept of “sultanism” and its place in the literature on 
personal rule more generally.  
The mass of literature on non-democratic regimes in the twentieth century has its 
roots in the study of totalitarianism, an extreme form of one-party rule that emerged in 
various forms in Europe during the 1920s-1930s. Hitler and Stalin are the preeminent 
examples of totalitarian dictators in the twentieth century, and arguably history’s only true 
examples of totalitarianism (although Mussolini is included in some accounts).35 As Barry 
Rubin writes in his work on modern dictatorship, “Although dictatorship is a very old form 
of government, these... regimes, with their regimented parties, mass rallies, concentration 
camps, and passionate promotion of hatred, represented something quite different from the 
forms of government of most states since the first civilizations were established by the 
empires of kings and generals. Before the twentieth century, political legitimacy in tightly 
controlled societies was generally through conquest, inheritance, or religious authority. 
However, under the twentieth-century fascist and communist systems, new modes of 
mobilization produced even more effective ways to obtain and keep power in a modern 
                                       
34 Linz and Stepan’s ideal types are one set among many; debates about how best to classify political systems 
are unsettled in the literature. Jean Blondel, to cite another comprehensive classification scheme, cites 
egalitarian-authoritarian, traditional inegalitarian, and authoritarian-inegalitarian political systems as three 
types of illiberal rule. Dictatorship, he suggests, is a regime without sufficient support that needs to rely on 
coercion. For my purposes, Linz and Stepan’s system of classification is instructive as it places particular 
emphasis on personalized rule in the sultanistic form, a more nuanced approach to the idea of “dictatorship”. 
Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, 
South America, and Post-Communist Europe, (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1996) 
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context.”36 The study of totalitarianism became prominent in Western political science by 
the 1950s, incorporating not only the fascist ideologies of Italy and Nazi Germany, but also 
the Soviet regime. Hannah Arendt, Carl J. Friedrich, and Z. K. Brzezinski were among the 
first major theorists of totalitarianism, claiming that this form of government was a quite 
novel and total form of dictatorship.37   
Linz and Alfred Stepan have selected four aspects of regimes that they use to 
categorize their four ideal-type regimes: pluralism, leadership, ideology, and mobilization. 
Their rubric of classification allows for ease of comparison among various forms of non-
democratic regime. Under totalitarian regimes, the official party has a complete monopoly 
of power both by law and in practice, and there exists no economic, social, or political 
pluralism. There is “no space for second economy or parallel society.”38 Totalitarian 
leadership demonstrates a large degree of unpredictability and exercises power with 
undefined limits; it is often in its early stages a charismatic leadership, and recruitment to 
the high ranks depends on commitment and success at earlier stages within the totalitarian 
party organization. As Arendt and Linz emphasize in earlier works, totalitarian ideology is 
a distinguishing characteristic of this regime type. Under a totalitarian regime, there is an 
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distinctive structural feature, for Arendt, is the functionally indispensable leader figure– the Stalin or Hitler. 
Carl J. Friedrich and Z. K. Brzezinski’s 1956 Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy, a more detailed and 
widely applicable theory than Arendt’s original work, described totalitarianism as “an extreme, ideologically 
driven and terror-ridden form of dictatorship. The regime’s ideology is the ultimate source of the goals that 
the totalitarians seek to attain through a political, social, cultural and economic revolution. (Quoted in 
Brooker, 14)” They claim that character of totalitarian dictatorship could be found in a syndrome of six 
interrelated features: an ideology, a single party, typically led by one person, a terroristic police, a 
communications monopoly, a weapons monopoly, and a centrally-directed economy.    
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“elaborate and guiding ideology that articulates a reachable utopia,” one that lends 
legitimation and a sense of mission to individuals and groups within the regime and 
society.39 This ideology forms the basis for an extensive popular mobilization into a variety 
of state-created organizations that emphasize active citizenship. The concept of totalitarian 
regime– as an ideal type– has enduring utility. European totalitarians, many suggest, may 
never return as such; however, a study of totalitarianism holds lasting lessons for political 
science. Rubin has written that the European totalitarian leaders (particularly Hitler and 
Stalin) inspired “modern dictators” in the Third World.40 The point, for modern dictators, 
was that leadership should not be based on repression and fear alone– although totalitarian 
rulers used those tools with “previously undreamed of efficiency.”41 Political success 
required “material benefits, pride in national strength, and a sense of legitimacy to a sizable 
proportion of the population.”42  
After Stalin’s death in 1953 the utility of the classification “totalitarian” came into 
question. Soviet-type regimes no longer conformed strictly to the totalitarian model, and the 
number of countries that were attempting to create totalitarian regimes was in decline. This 
change created conceptual confusion.43 There appeared to be a new regime type emerging 
from the routinization, decay, or elite fears of a totalitarian regime. The distinctive features 
of post-Stalinist polities, namely the fact that the systems more closely resembled 
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bureaucratic politics than pluralistic politics, prompted Linz and Stepan to construct a 
distinctive post-totalitarian regime type. They justified creation of a new category “because 
on each of the four dimensions of regime type– pluralism, ideology, leadership, and 
mobilization– there can be a post-totalitarian ideal type that is different from a totalitarian, 
authoritarian, or democratic ideal type.”44  
Under a post-totalitarian regime, Linz and Stepan argue, there is a much more 
“important and complex play of institutional pluralism within the state” than under 
totalitarianism.45 Social pluralism also reaches a more significant level– this might be 
evidenced by the underground dissemination of samizdat literature during the post-Stalin 
Soviet years. Limits to this pluralism, particularly in the political realm, distinguish it from 
growing pluralism under an authoritarian regime. In the category of leadership, also, post-
totalitarianism can be distinguished both from totalitarianism and authoritarianism. Post-
totalitarian leadership remains restricted to the revolutionary movement; however, there is a 
greater level of bureaucracy, supplanting the charismatic nature of the totalitarian leader. 
Ideologically, a post-totalitarian regime is still officially guided by the revolutionary 
ideology, which is very much a part of the social reality. There is, however, a waning 
commitment to the utopian vision as compared with totalitarianism in its pure form. There 
is, Linz and Stepan suggest, a “shift of emphasis from ideology to programmatic consensus 
that presumably is based on rational decision-making and limited debate without too much 
reference to ideology.”46 As a result of the weakening of the state ideology, there is 
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simultaneously a “Progressive loss of interest by leaders and nonleaders involved in 
organizing mobilization. Routine mobilization of population within state- sponsored 
organizations to achieve a minimum degree of conformity and compliance. Many ‘cadres’ 
and ‘militants’ are mere careerists and opportunists. Boredom, withdrawal, and ultimately 
privatization of population’s values become an accepted fact.”47 The wide array of regime-
sponsored institutions that once served as mobilizational vehicles, still dominate 
associational culture, but they have lost intensity. Membership may continue due to its 
obligatory nature, but it will no longer generate popular enthusiasm.    
     
The seminal work on authoritarianism, Linz’s 1964 article, “An Authoritarian 
Regime: Spain,” described the distinctive nature of the authoritarian regime type, a concept 
that dominated late twentieth-century comparative politics. Linz defined the regime type as 
describing political systems with “limited, not responsible, political pluralism, without 
elaborate and guiding ideology, but with distinctive mentalities, without extensive or 
intensive political mobilization, except at some points in their development, and in which a 
leader or occasionally a small group exercises power within formally ill-defined limits but 
actually quite predictable ones.” In his study of Spain, Linz gave prominence to military 
dictatorships, suggesting that the military enjoys a privileged position under most 
authoritarian regimes.    
The authoritarian classification has widespread utility. Whereas before scholars had 
focused on the democratic and totalitarian typologies, in the mid-twentieth century it 
became increasingly apparent that more regimes were authoritarian than were totalitarian or 
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democratic combined. Authoritarian regimes were thus the “modal category of regime type 
in the modern world.” In addition, authoritarian regimes were not necessarily in transition 
to a different type of regime. As Linz’s studies of 1950s and early 1960s Spain 
demonstrated, the four distinctive dimensions of an authoritarian regime– limited pluralism, 
mentality, somewhat constrained leadership, and weak mobilization– could “cohere for a 
long period as a reinforcing and integrated system that was relatively stable.”48 
Authoritarianism is taken as a predominant category– Linz and Stepan write, “it turns out 
that more than 90 percent of modern non-democratic regimes would have to share the same 
typological space– ‘authoritarian.’”49  
Linz provides a description of the four characteristics of authoritarian rule in some 
detail. First, limited political pluralism meant that the existence of some groups with some 
independent political influence is a crucial element of authoritarianism–there is often some 
room for “semi- opposition”. There is often extensive economic and social pluralism, which 
had its roots in society before the regime’s establishment.50 Second, the authoritarian 
regime has a leader (or sometimes a small group) whose power falls within predictable 
norms: there is a tendency for “the regime to co-opt much of the leadership from groups 
that have some power, presence, and legitimacy that does not derive directly from the 
regime itself. Indeed, powerful fragments of the pre-existing society have often captured 
the authoritarian regime. In some authoritarian regimes, even access to top positions can be 
established not by political loyalties as much as by some degree of professional and 
technical expertise and some degree of competition through examinations that are open to 
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the society as a whole.”51 Generally, an authoritarian regime does not find legitimation in a 
guiding ideology; indeed, a significant feature of authoritarianism is the absence of an 
elaborate legitimating ideology, although Linz suggests that authoritarianism does have 
distinctive mentalities.52 Generally, mobilization is absent or present at very low levels at 
most points in the regime’s development. Most authoritarian regimes “never develop 
complex, all-inclusive networks of association whose purpose is the mobilization of the 
population.”53 Authoritarian rule, a concept used to describe many contemporary non-
democratic regimes, seems to fall short in capturing the essence of Turkmenistan’s current 
regime, which is much more leader-centric, leaves less room for opposition and pluralism, 
and allows for more eccentric, discretionary decision-making.  
Personal Rule: Weber and Modern Adaptations  
Linz and Stepan’s final regime type, sultanism, falls under the broader classification 
of personalist regimes that will form the core discussion of this thesis. Max Weber, in his 
sociology of leadership, introduced concepts that have continued relevance today. 
Particularly salient are his considerations of charismatic and patrimonial domination, which 
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have suggested points of departure for many scholars of personalist rule and 
patrimonialism. Both H. E. Chehabi and Linz, who have compiled the most comprehensive 
collection on the sultanistic regime type, and Robert Jackson and Carl Rosberg, who 
developed a typology of personal rule in sub-Saharan Africa based largely on leadership 
style, to a large extent draw upon Weber’s typology of legitimate domination. This section 
will first outline Weber’s original concepts, then trace the ideas of patrimonialism and 
sultanism as they have been developed by Linz and separately by scholars of African post-
colonialism.  
Weber’s Typology of Legitimate Rule   
In his sociological and political writings, Max Weber provides a series of 
typological and analytical concepts that are useful in “understanding contemporary political 
systems, particularly those in transition from tradition to modernity in the non-Western 
world.”54 Non-democratic regimes, which form the basis of this analysis, can be considered 
legitimate regimes if we accept Weber’s contention that “political legitimacy is grounded in 
the beliefs of those who are governed. If the masses believe that their rulers are legitimate, 
for whatever reason, then those rulers are legitimate.... Weber argued that, even when 
democratic procedures for legally removing an incumbent are absent, some political 
regimes are still regarded as legitimate by their populations.”55 Weber, in discussing how is 
it that a leader can give a command and have his actions carried out, classified claims to 
legitimacy in the exercise of authority. With the exception of enslavement, he asserted, 
                                       
54 Juan J. Linz, Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000), p. 
144-145 
55 Cummings, 15 
PERSONAL RULE, NEOPATRIMONIALISM, AND SULTANISM 
 44 
people entered into one of three kinds of leader/follower relations– that is, three types of 
political legitimacy: legal- rational, traditional, and charismatic.  
Legal-rational or bureaucratic legitimacy rests on a belief in the legality of patterns 
of normative rules and the right of those elevated to authority under such rules to issue 
commands.56 In this ideal-typical leader/follower relationship, the leader is subject to strict 
and systematic discipline and control in the conduct of the office. Rules regulate the 
conduct of an office, and administrative staff is separated from the owners of a means of 
production.57 The advantages of this type of legitimacy, wrote Weber, lie largely in the 
system’s capability to attain the highest degree of efficiency, and its tendency toward 
levelling social classes. Legitimacy that is based on charisma rests on belief in the 
extraordinary powers or qualities of a leader, devotion to the specific and exceptional 
sanctity, heroism or exemplary character of an individual person, and of the normative 
patterns or order revealed or ordained by him. Weber defined charisma as “a certain quality 
of an individual personality by virtue of which he is set apart from ordinary men and treated 
as endowed with supernatural, superhuman, or at least specifically exceptional power and 
qualities.”58 Weber’s third type, traditional authority, rests on an established belief in the 
sanctity of immemorial traditions and the legitimacy of the status of those exercising 
authority under them. Under this system, legitimacy and power are handed down and can 
be exercised in arbitrary ways. Offices are held by virtue of traditional status and through 
patrimony, and promotion is by the arbitrary grace of the chief. Obligations of obedience 
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under this system are based on personal loyalty (kinship, slaves, or dependents), and the 
traditional exercise of authority is only limited by resistance aroused in the subjects.59  
Weber’s original typology, written close to his death in 1920, was very concerned 
with the personalist aspect of rule– although none of Weber’s three types in particular was 
labelled “personal”. However, “he pointed to how the impersonal nature of the legal-
rational type of legitimate rule contrasted with the personalist nature of the other two 
types.”60 Weber, in his discussions of leadership, defined two basic subtypes of personal 
rule: charismatic and traditional-personal domination. In the case of the patrimonial subtype 
of traditional legitimacy, “obedience is owed to the person of the chief” or monarch, and in 
the case of charismatic legitimacy the leader is obeyed by virtue of personal trust in him.   
Patrimonialism, a term which recurs in contemporary literature on sultanism and 
personal rule, is in Weber’s conception a subtype of the traditional type of legitimate rule. 
A patrimonial system is defined as any form of political domination or authority based on 
personal and bureaucratic power exerted by a royal household. It applies in situations where 
power is formally arbitrary and administration is under the direct control of the ruler.61 In 
an oft-cited passage, Weber explains,  
Patrimonialism and, in the extreme case, sultanism tend to arise 
whenever traditional domination develops an administration and a 
military force which are purely personal instruments of the master.... 
Where domination is primarily traditional, even though it is exercised by 
virtue of the ruler’s personal autonomy, it will be called patrimonial 
authority; where indeed it operates primarily on the basis of discretion, 
it will be called sultanism.... Sometimes it appears that sultanism is 
completely unrestrained by tradition, but this is never in fact the case. 
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The non- traditional element is not, however, rationalized in impersonal 
terms, but consists only in an extreme development of the ruler’s 
discretion. It is this which distinguishes it from every form of rational 
authority.62  
Neopatrimonialism in Sub-Saharan Africa  
Weber’s concept of patrimonialism has been adopted and expanded by 
contemporary scholars seeking to describe modern personalist regimes, particularly in the 
literature on post-colonial Africa, a prominent feature of which is the intense and pervasive 
personalization of politics. However, parts of Weber’s classification of patrimonialism as a 
type of traditional rule has been problematic for scholars– for example, is it possible to 
classify a first-generation regime as a type of “traditional” rulership drawing on “traditional 
legitimacy”? In his study of African regimes, Aristide R. Zolberg loosened the concept of 
traditional legitimacy to describe, “a legitimacy based either on the notion ‘this is how 
things have always been’, or on what he termed a ‘past-orientation’– such as the official 
party’s past glories.”63 Tradition, in Africa, need not refer exclusively to pre-European 
kingdoms and tribal customs. He writes, “Many political institutions created during the 
colonial period have become, in the eyes of living men, part of the natural order of things: 
district commissioners, provincial commissioners, commandants and governors are offices 
hallowed by times; the African occupants of these offices derive their authority from the 
fact that they are legitimate successors to the original charismatic founders.”64  
Patrimonialism was separated from traditional legitimacy altogether by Guenther 
Roth, who suggested that there might be two types of patrimonialism– traditionalist 
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patrimonial regimes (for example, the Ethiopian monarchy in the 1960s) and personal rule 
“on the basis of loyalties that do not require any belief in the ruler’s unique personal 
qualification.” Roth’s detraditionalized, personalized patrimonialism is labelled “personal 
rulership” and he claims it to be based on personal loyalties linked to material rewards and 
incentives.65 Personal rulership, he emphasized, is separate from both charismatic and 
legal-bureaucratic leadership in the Weberian sense: “personal patrimonial regimes differ 
from charismatic rulership in that the patrimonial ruler need have neither personal 
charismatic appeal nor a sense of mission; they differ from legal-rational bureaucracies in 
that neither constitutionally regulated legislation nor advancement on the basis of training 
and efficiency need be predominant in public administration.”66 Roth additionally adopted 
Weber’s term “sultanism” and used it to described the “highly centralized variant of 
personal governance” that allows a ruler maximum discretion in almost every aspect of 
leadership.67  
There has been a strong tendency towards the emergence of patrimonial, personalist 
regimes in newly independent states. Roth’s conception of patrimonialism, however, left 
open the question of the uniqueness of patrimonialism in new states (as opposed to 
patrimonialism as a trend in established regimes, whether totalitarian or pluralistic). 
Patrimonial structures, and the personalization of office, may occur with some frequency 
under many types of regime; however, the structures of governance in new states may give 
staying power to such regimes. Jean-Claude Willame, in his study of patrimonial politics in 
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the Congo, draws attention to the variance in types of structure in industrialized states, 
versus those in newly formed states. He writes,  
In developed countries, established political and governmental hierarchies, 
advanced industrial organizations, and sophisticated communications 
networks all combine to produce a highly integrated society by which the 
effects of patrimonialism are quite easily diffused. In the new nations, 
patrimonialism implies not only personalistic leadership in government, 
but a type of social relationship that makes itself felt everywhere. This 
relationship arises where authority is dispersed, the scope of government 
activity limited, and intense power politics often the only channel of social 
mobility.68  
  
In contemporary political science the term neopatrimonialism has held greater 
conceptual currency than patrimonialism. Patrimonial systems are those in which the chief 
executive maintains his position “through personal patronage, rather than… law.”69 
According to Gero Erdmann, the simplest way to define neopatrimonialism is as a mixed 
system, where elements of “patrimonial and rational-bureaucratic rule co-exist and are 
sometimes interwoven.”70 Michael Bratton and Nicholas Van de Walle highlight that “the 
characteristic feature of neopatrimonialism is the incorporation of patrimonial logic into 
bureaucratic institutions.” Under a neopatrimonial system, unlike a patrimonial system, 
there is recognition of some difference between the private and public spheres. In practice, 
however, they are still not separated– meaning that two systems, the patrimonial system of 
personal relationships, and the legal-rational one of the bureaucracy, exist in parallel 
(although the patrimonial system may penetrate and deform the logic of the legal-rational 
system).  
                                       
68 Jean-Claude Willame, Patrimonialism and Political Change in the Congo (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 1972), p. 3 
69 Ishiyama, 43 
70 Gero Erdmann, “Neo Patrimonial Rule: Transition to Democracy has not Succeeded” D+C Development 
and Cooperation (1):8-11), 2002, p. 8 
PERSONAL RULE, NEOPATRIMONIALISM, AND SULTANISM 
 49 
The concept of neopatrimonialism has become central to analyses of politics in the 
developing world and particularly in sub-Saharan Africa. Bratton and Van de Walle write:  
Insofar as personalized exchanges, clientelism, and political corruption 
are common in all regimes, theorists have suggested that 
neopatrimonialism is a master concept for comparative politics, at least 
in the developing world.... We make a finer distinction– namely, that 
although neopatrimonial practices can be found in all polities, it is the 
core feature of politics in Africa and in a small number of other states, 
including Haiti, and perhaps Indonesia and the Philippines. Whereas 
personal relationships occur on the margins of all bureaucratic systems, 
they constitute the foundation and superstructure of political institutions 
in Africa. As a result, scholars of African politics have embraced the 
neopatrimonial model, or they have analysed the same general 
phenomena under related theoretical labels, including ‘personal rule,’ 
‘prebendalism,’ and the ‘politics of the belly.’71  
 
Africanists have adopted this characterization in one form or another, although they 
have developed many different subcategories of personalist leadership in Africa. In their 
book, Personal Rule in Black Africa, Jackson and Rosberg, drawing on Weber, define 
personal rule as a form of rule that is dependent upon people rather than institutions, “a 
system of relations linking rulers not with the ‘public’ or even with the ruled, but with 
patrons, associates, clients, supporters, and rivals, who constitute the system.”72 It is 
“inherently authoritarian” in its monopolization of power and can arise in civilian and 
military regimes alike. In their descriptive theory of African personal rule, Jackson and 
Rosberg outline four types of personal rule: Princely, Autocratic, Prophetic and Tyrannical. 
Princes and Autocrats are portrayed as representing opposite ends of a continuum that is 
“marked by the absence of political religion or ideology and the presence of an almost 
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exclusive preoccupation with questions of personal power.”73 Whereas the Prince is 
prepared to rule in collaboration with oligarchs and follows an incipient constitutionalism, 
the Autocrat is unwilling to share power and has a greater freedom to exercise his will; he 
“commands and manages; the country is his estate; the ruling apparatus is ultimately his to 
deploy and direct.”74 The Prophet, generally a proponent of African socialism, rules by 
charisma and mission; he is rare and revolutionary, and exercises power in the service of a 
higher goal or authority, whether an ideology or a moral community.75 Jackson and 
Rosberg’s final ideal-typical ruler, the Tyrant, represents a type of leadership in itself and a 
residual type of rule that any of the others might deteriorate into; in a tyranny, “not only 
legal but also all moral constraints on the exercise of power are absent,” producing the 
most arbitrary and brutal form of rule.76 
Jackson and Rosberg’s work, while insightful and descriptive, has been challenged 
on two fronts: first, their classification seems to be based more on leadership style than 
regime type; second, their claim that personal rule is non-institutional rule has met with 
criticism from scholars who now assert that even the most personalist systems of rule have 
entrenched their own versions of institutions. On the first point, Paul Brooker and Chazan 
et. al. have specific critiques. Brooker writes that personalism is more a style of leadership 
than a regime type– “Personal rule has occurred in many modern dictatorships and is not 
confined to any particular variety, whether party or military, totalitarian or authoritarian, 
rightist or leftist. The presence of personal rule is usually viewed as being only a secondary 
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or supplementary feature of a regime, not as a basis for classifying it as a personalist type 
of non-democratic regime.”77 Institutionalization, as Huntington has described, is the 
process by which “organizations and procedures acquire value and stability.”78 Jackson and 
Rosberg have argued that the rampant personalism of political systems in the developing 
world precludes a discussion of institutionalization or of neo-patrimonial institutions. Their 
work suggests that it is useless to speak of laws or rules when in Africa, “the rulers and 
other leaders take precedence over the formal rules of the political game: the rules do not 
effectively regulate political behaviour, and we therefore cannot predict or anticipate 
conduct from a knowledge of the rules... the state is a government of men and not of 
laws.”79 Bratton and Van de Walle, however, have suggested that neopatrimonialism and 
personalism have themselves become institutionalized patterns of rule. They write, 
“Neopatrimonialism does undermine formal rules and institutions, and it may be true that 
in the despotic tyrannies of a small number of leaders like Idi Amin or Macias Nguema, 
politics becomes almost entirely arbitrary and unpredictable. Nonetheless, we argue that 
when patrimonial logic is internalized in the formal institutions of neopatrimonial regimes, 
it provides essential operating codes for politics that are valued, recurring, and reproduced 
over time.”80 They write, “the broad routinization of an established set of behavioural 
norms and procedures is testimony that neopatrimonial practices are more than the 
idiosyncratic expressions of individual leaders.”81 They highlight three political 
institutions, admittedly informal, that have been predictable and stable in African neo- 
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patrimonial regimes: presidentialism, clientelism, and state resources. Thesis ideas take 
shape later in this thesis. 
Bratton and Van de Walle take neopatrimonialism to be a master concept, and 
describe four types of neopatrimonial regime: personal dictatorship, military oligarchy, 
plebiscitary, and competitive one-party system. In drawing these distinctions, they 
determine whether the following of the national strongman in a given case is broadly or 
narrowly mobilized (using the question of participation in Robert Dahl’s terms) and 
analyse the plurality of political associations within the governing institutions (in other 
words, competition).82 Of interest in this review of sultanism is the concept of personal 
dictatorship–what they call “the quintessence of neopatrimonialism.”83 This type of 
neopatrimonial system has a highly exclusionary politics– the strongman generally rules by 
decree and “existing ‘participatory’ institutions cannot check the absolute powers of the 
chief executive. Further, the regime seeks to destroy even the semblance of political 
competition by eliminating all opponents to the ‘big man’, often physically.”84 The 
executive under this regime type seeks to weaken other political institutions and transform 
them into instruments of his personal political will.85  
Naomi Chazan et. al. have formulated yet another categorization scheme for African 
regimes, based on the relations between the government and the society and the types of 
norms and rules that exist. The intent of rulers, they claim, is far less significant than the 
principles guiding their exercise of power. Six types of regimes that have emerged in 
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Africa in the postcolonial period are administrative-hegemonic, pluralist, party-mobilizing, 
party-centralist, personal-coercive, and populist. These regimes vary according to several 
criteria, including “the structure of the relationship between the administrative, the 
political, the coercive, and the legal apparatus; the degree of elite cohesion; the extent of 
societal exclusion and/or inclusion; rules and modes of social-governmental interaction; 
spheres of operation; longevity of institutional arrangements; and workability.”86  
Shared Characteristics of Neopatrimonial Regimes 
No matter which scheme of classification is employed, there appear to be several 
characteristics that are developed to some extent by all of these Africanists as central 
features of African neopatrimonialism: clientelism, patronage, and corruption, at varying 
levels. As Jackson and Rosberg write, “ The study of personal rule is an approach that 
highlights important features of African politics that other approaches play down or neglect 
altogether: clientelism and patronage, factionalism, coups, purges, plots, succession crises, 
and similar characteristics and dynamics of institutionless government.”87 Chazan develops 
the ideas of patronage and clientelism as a means of maintaining the political centre in 
African regimes, calling patron-client and patron-patron relations the most common form 
of political exchange in the postcolonial period. Jackson and Rosberg present clientelism as 
comprising patronage and loyalty. The substance and the conditions of the patron-client 
chains are the intermingling of these two factors: “first, the resources of patronage may be 
regarded as the motivation for the personal contracts and agreements of which patron-client 
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ties consist; and second, the loyalty, which transcends mere interest and is the social 
‘cement’ that permits such ties to endure in the face of resource fluctuations.”88 
Clientelism, they suggest, is most likely to emerge in countries where the state is weakly 
institutionalized and highly personalized, and society is pluralistic with a particularistic 
culture.  
Political fragmentation is another characteristic of neopatrimonialism. As Bratton 
and Van de Walle write, “Neopatrimonial regimes are characterized by rapid turnover of 
political personnel. To regulate and control rent seeking, to prevent rivals from developing 
their own power base, and to demonstrate their own power, rulers regularly rotate 
officeholders. Moreover, few rulers tolerate dissent; they typically expel potential 
opponents from government jobs, from approved institutions like ruling parties, or even 
from the country itself.”89 Jackson and Rosberg term this type of personnel rotation 
“purges and rehabilitations”– to purge is “to remove from an organization persons accused 
of being disloyal to the organization or ruler or undermining his authority or the unity of 
the regime... Purges may be concocted, as it were, to justify a removal for which there are 
no grounds other than the ruler’s or some other important leader’s displeasure.”90 
Rehabilitation, then, is restoring these outcasts to political membership in the political 
monopoly.   
Endemic corruption is another defining element of a neopatrimonial regime and is 
an extremely widespread phenomenon in Africa. Political and administrative corruption are 
related to systems of patronage. Corruption constitutes an “important means by which 
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individual wants and needs in a personal regime can be satisfied; it is a black market mode 
of conduct quite consistent with personally appropriated government yet fundamentally at 
odds with state rules and regulation, whose violation or evasion corrupt conduct entails.”91  
Linz and Stepan on Sultanism  
Of all these classifications of different types of regimes exhibiting features of 
neopatrimonialism, several roughly overlap, and correspond with the final regime type 
described by Linz and Stepan: sultanism. Jackson and Rosberg’s “autocrats” and “tyrants,” 
Chazan’s “personal-coercive” rulers, and Bratton and Van de Walle’s “neopatrimonial, 
personal dictatorships” are not identical, but tend to describe the same group of rulers. By 
and large these rulers correspond to Linz’s ideal type of sultanism (more appropriately 
neosultanism, first described with regards to Latin American regimes). The African cases 
which most closely fit Linz’s description are Jean Bedel Bokassa in the Central African 
Republic, Mobutu Sese Seko in Zaire, Francisco Macias Nguema in Equatorial Guinea, 
Hastings Kamuzu Banda in Malawi, and Idi Amin in Uganda.92 Nguema and Amin, 
however, present cases where the typical enrichment of the ruler and his family was not so 
significant as under an ideal-typical sultanistic regime, while “arbitrary rule and destruction 
of society” were.93 Descriptions of these regimes, under which “all policy dictates derive 
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directly from the personal dictator” and “all of society is viewed as the personal fief and 
private domain of the dictator,” closely correspond to what Linz calls sultanism.  
Sultanism, Linz and Stepan’s final regime ideal-type, is a term connoting “a generic 
style of domination and regime rulership” that draws on Weber’s conceptualization of 
traditional rule and extreme forms of patrimonialism and personalism.94 The concept of 
modern sultanism (or neosultanism, an adaptation of Weber’s original concept) was 
introduced to the comparative politics discourse by Linz in 1975. He developed a virtual 
typology of patrimonial personal rule as a categorization of certain non-democratic regimes 
that seemed distinct from both totalitarian and authoritarian regimes. Of the four systems of 
personal rule he outlines, “modern sultanism was the most obviously personalist... and 
Linz’s conception of modern sultanism could be used to describe a type of personalist 
dictatorship that did not readily fit into other categories.”95 In their more recent work, 
Chehabi and Linz present a more formal categorization of sultanism– under their 
description, a sultanistic regime is characterized by the “weakness of traditional and legal-
rational legitimation and the lack of ideological justification.”96 The ideal type of a 
contemporary sultanistic regime can be constructed as follows: it is based on personal 
rulership, but loyalty to the ruler is motivated not by his embodying or articulating an 
ideology, nor by a unique personal mission, nor by any charismatic qualities, but by a 
mixture of fear and rewards to his collaborators. The ruler exercises his power without 
restraint, at his own discretion and above all unencumbered by rules or by any commitment 
to an ideology or value system. Sultanism is one step beyond a neo-patrimonial regime– 
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the circle of clients is narrower and the discretion of the ruler more extensive under 
sultanism.97 According to Chehabi and Linz, true patrimonial systems are limited by 
tradition, whereas in modern sultanistic ones the scope for arbitrariness is much wider, 
while the greater development of the state apparatus means that bureaucratization is more 
advanced. “Sultanistic leaders do not conceal the highly personalistic nature of their rule. 
Outwardly this personalism has two facets: a pronounced cult of personality around the 
leader and a tendency towards dynasticism.”98  
Sultanism as an Ideal Type 
To demonstrate its points of departure from Linz and Stepan’s three other ideal 
forms of non-democratic rule (totalitarianism, post-totalitarianism, and authoritarianism) 
discussed above, sultanism is described here using their four regime characteristics. Under 
a sultanistic regime, economic and social pluralism is subject to unpredictable intervention 
from the ruler– no group or individual is free from the ruler’s exercise of despotic power. 
There is no rule of law and very low levels of political institutionalization. The polity in 
effect becomes the “personal domain of the sultan,” a domain marked by the absence of 
rule of law and low levels of institutionalization. Under sultanism there may be extensive 
economic and social pluralism, but political pluralism is almost never present because 
political power is so directly entwined with the ruler. However, as Linz and Stepan write, 
the “essential reality in a sultanistic regime is that all individuals, groups, and institutions 
are permanently subject to the unpredictable and despotic intervention of the sultan, and 
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thus all pluralism is precarious.”99  
Leadership under a sultanistic regime is highly personalistic and very arbitrary, 
operating free from legal-rational constraints. Leaders are unencumbered by ideology and 
public compliance to their rule is based on a mixture of fear and rewards. The position of 
regime officials derives from their “purely personal submission to the ruler.”100 No guiding 
ideology exists, and sultanism is marked by an absence even of the distinctive mentalities 
found under authoritarian rule. In place of ideology, however, there is a “highly arbitrary 
manipulation of symbols... [and] extreme glorification of ruler.” There may be a created, 
leader-centric pseudo-ideology; this, however, may not be believed by the ruler’s staff, 
subjects, or observers in the outside world.101 Mobilization occurs routinely within state-
sponsored organizations in order to present some degree of popular conformity or 
compliance, but this false mobilization generally fosters boredom and withdrawal, and 
“ultimately privatization of population’s values becomes an accepted fact.”102  
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To maintain power, sultanistic regimes rely on a mixture of fear and rewards for 
regime supporters.103 Sultanistic regimes penetrate societies very unevenly. There is no 
continuous political mobilization and therefore for the public, there is no sense (real or 
imagined) or participation in social and political life. While there is a need for the 
sultanistic ruler to “forge alliances with civil society and build coalitions,” effectively, a 
sultanistic regime’s social bases are clientelistic and restricted to associates, family 
members, and cronies.104  
Monopolization of certain economic resources gives sultanistic rulers greater 
freedom to act. Combined with the system of cronyism, this creates huge economic 
corruption and what has been called the “kleptocratic” state. Sultanism may involve 
arbitrary takeovers of property, and “The personalistic use of power for the essentially 
private ends of the ruler and his collaborators means that the country is run like a huge 
domain. The boundaries between the public treasury and the private wealth of the ruler 
become blurred.”105 In the long run the personalism and corruption of the political system 
negatively affects economic development. 
 Sultanism and neopatrimonialism provide very relevant frameworks and contextual 
literature for consideration of political developments in post-Soviet Turkmenistan. The 
discussions of neopatrimonialism in sub-Saharan Africa after the departure of colonial 
powers in particular has broadened the concept and may provide one of the most useful 
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starting points to understand the nature and behaviour of personalist regimes in Central 
Asia. The following chapter will discuss some of the factors that contribute to the rise and 
continuance of sultanistic regimes, and then discuss in some detail the features of historical 
















When Linz wrote his 1975 article reintroducing the concept of sultanism, the 
regime of Rafael Trujillo in the Dominican Republic was the archetype of sultanistic 
regimes. Since then, scholars have confirmed the applicability of Linz’s paradigm to 
various regimes across regions, including some not mentioned or not yet existent in 
1975. Crawford Young and Thomas Turner classified Mobutu Sese Seko’s regime in 
Zaire as a personalist patrimonial state that resembles Linz’s concept of sultanism. 
Terry Karl characterized the regimes of Juan Vicente Gomez and Marcos Perez 
Jimenez in Venezuela as sultanistic, and Chehabi explored how the Shah of Iran’s 
sultanism contributed to the Islamic revolution. The concept was applied to local 
politics in the Philippines by John Thayer Sidel, and to Ferdinand Marcos’s rule by 
Mark Thompson. Stepan and Linz categorized Ceausescu’s Romania as typifying a 
post-totalitarian sultanism.1 In their 1998 account of theories and examples of 
sultanistic regimes, Chehabi and Linz compiled accounts of sultanistic regimes 
throughout the 20th century, namely those in Latin American and Asia, including 
Jorge I. Dominguez’s essay on Cuba’s Batista regime, John A. Booth on the Somoza 
regime in Nicaragua, and an analysis of the Haitian Duvaliers by David Nicholls.2  
Most of these regimes belong to the past, and sultanism is popularly conceived 
as anachronistic. The number of sultanistic regimes and regimes with pronounced 
personality cults has indeed declined over the past two decades, largely due to the end 
of the Cold War. Michael Denison writes, “With the exception of Cold War era hold-
outs such as the regimes of Colonel Mu’ammar Gadaffi in Libya or Kim Jung Il in 
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North Korea... and a small handful of long-standing African leaders such as Omar 
Bongo in Gabon and Gnassingbe Eyadema in Togo, leadership cults appear to be, in 
fashion parlance, ‘out’– a kitsch reminder of a different era.”3 The end of the US-
Soviet struggle has diminished the strategic value of propping up personal rulers, and 
democratization has become the jargon of the day. Does the concept of sultanism, 
then, still hold value in understanding regimes today? Chehabi and Linz write, “Sadly, 
the answer is yes.”4 Brooker, in his work on non-democratic regimes, writes of the 
continuing significance of non-democratic regime theory for today’s scholars of 
comparative politics, noting that “Although the world has entered an ‘age of 
democracy’, non-democratic regimes continue to be of more than just historical 
interest to students of comparative government and politics.”5  
Sultanistic Regimes in the African Context 
Sultanism has proven to be a useful label for several 20th century personalistic 
regimes. Its application to various regimes has allowed the concept to escape the 
criticism often levelled against inductively derived concepts– that they lead, in 
Pareto’s words, “from facts to concepts, and from concepts back to facts.”6 Post-
colonial Africa, the genesis of much of the academic work on personalist rule, is a 
historical context rife with examples of regimes that approximate sultanism.  
Although in Chehabi and Linz’s book on the theory of sultanism, no chapters 
are specifically devoted to examples of African regimes, African examples receive 
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much attention in the theoretical chapters in the book’s first half, the chapters written 
by the editors. In a review of Chehabi and Linz’s contribution, Young affirms the 
merits of the ideal type of sultanism in historical discussions of post-colonial African 
regimes; aside from the four regimes highlighted by Chehabi and Linz as African 
examples of sultanism—Amin’s Uganda, Bokassa’s Central African Republic, 
Nguema’s Equatorial Guinea, and Mobutu’s Zaire, Young mentions Morocco’s 
authentic sultan, King Hassan II, and suggests that “other possible nominees might 
include Libya, Togo, Malawi (under Hastings Banda), Kenya (under Daniel arap 
Moi), and Cameroon (under Ahmadu Ahidjo and Paul Biya), in addition to Abacha in 
Nigeria.”7 
Studies of sub-Saharan Africa provide useful tools for students of personalist 
rule more generally, and an emerging dialogue is forming on the utility of a 
comparison between Africa and post-Soviet Eurasia. In a recent work edited by Mark 
R. Beissinger and Young, regional specialists consider the growing relevance of 
comparing nations in the post-Soviet space with the African cases to draw lessons for 
transition and development. Systematic paired comparison of Africa and Eurasia, they 
suggest, helps scholars understand “the state crises that have engulfed these two 
regions: their origins, their similarities, the ways in which they interact with interstate 
relations and with the global processes of change... the effect of state crises on salient 
social divisions such as cultural difference and gender, and some of the pathways 
potentially leading out of crisis that are suggested by experience.”8 They argue that 
despite different historical trajectories and cultural contexts, there are powerful and 
compelling similarities in contemporary situations that render comparison useful. 
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They particularly highlight the “dysfunctions of authority” across the two regions.9 A 
significant body of academic experts, both Africanists and scholars of post-Soviet 
space, now find this comparison thinkable– in a recent essay on neopatrimonialism, 
John Ishiyama writes, “To a large extent, the Central Asian states that emerged from 
the carcass of the Soviet Union appear to be much like the African states which 
emerged from the collapse of European colonialism.”10   
While it falls beyond the scope of this thesis to detail the rise and fall of each 
of the examples of African rule that have approximated the sultanistic model, a brief 
outline of the major features of some of these regimes will better contextualize 
discussions of Turkmenistan’s current government under Niyazov. This thesis will 
explore some of the ways in which sultanistic regimes in post-colonial Africa have 
behaved in order to better analyse the ways in which Niyazov’s regime operates—and 
whether it mirrors or departs from historical models. All this is done in the hope that 
the so-called “erratic” and “unpredictable” tendencies of Turkmenistan’s regime can 
become more understandable, and perhaps more predictable. While the situation in 
Turkmenistan by no means parallels every feature of the post-colonial African 
experience,  regime typologies exist to aid comparison. If any clues can be garnered 
to aid in understanding contemporary Turkmenistan, then the rich literature on 
personal rule will be the place to begin. The similarities may in fact be more 
instructive than the differences, and these similarities may give scholars a better 
understanding of what to anticipate in Turkmenistan.  
Of interest below is the diversity in circumstance and situation among the 
                                       
9 Beissinger and Young, 6 
10 John Ishiyama, “Neopatrimonialism and the prospects for democratization in the Central Asian 
republics,” in Sally Cummings, ed. Power and Change in Central Asia (London and New York: 




post-colonial African sultanistic regimes.11 They have arisen in a variety of post-
colonial contexts, from under different colonial powers and in different areas of 
Africa. Some are military leaders, but not all; some are the first leaders of their 
independent countries, and some the second. Some demonstrated extremely high 
levels of violence and brutality, while others are more subtly eccentric and less 
violent. As Decalo writes, “The precise personality idiosyncrasies of each leader 
manifest themselves in diverse particularistic concerns once the leader is in power; 
but in all instances the modality of rule is the same.”12 No matter what their 
circumstance of political gain, or how bizarre their personal eccentricities, the 
following leaders can all be said to approximate Chehabi and Linz’s ideal type of 
sultanism. 
Mobutu Sese Seko’s Zaire 
 
 One of the most oft-cited examples of African sultanism is found in the 
Congo, in the regime of Mobutu Sese Seko. Born Joseph-Desire Mobutu in Lisala (in 
what was then the Belgian Congo), he joined the Force Publique (the Belgian 
Congolese army) in 1949, rising to the rank of sergeant major. He left the military in 
1956, going to work as a journalist and editor, and in 1958 joined the nationalist 
MNC, the Mouvement National Congolais. After independence was granted in June 
1960, he became part of the new government as the state secretary for defence (the 
new government was a coalition between Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba and 
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President Joseph Kasavubu, who became involved in a struggle for power). In 
September 1960 a coup d’etat overthrew Lumumba in support of Kasavubu. Mobutu, 
a key figure in the coup, was rewarded with rapid promotion within the military. In 
1965, Mobutu (then Lieutenant General) seized power from President Kasavubu 
following another power struggle (between Kasavubu and his prime minister, Mose 
Tshombe). Mobutu, declaring himself president for five years, quickly centralized 
power, putting down a coup attempt in 1967, and was “elected” to the presidency in 
1970.  
 Mobutu began a drive for Africanization, an anti-European, pro-African 
cultural awareness program13, under which he named the country the Republic of 
Zaire in October 1971, and renamed himself Mobutu Sese Seko Nkuku Wa Za Banga 
(“The all-powerful warrior who, because of his endurance and inflexible will to win, 
will go from conquest to conquest, leaving fire in his wake”) in 1972. His cult of 
personality became deeply entrenched over time-- Jackson and Rosberg write, “The 
glorification of Mobutu has accompanied his efforts at increasing the cultural and 
economic independence and stature of Zaire. The image of himself and the conception 
he wished to project of the Zairian state became increasingly indistinguishable: a cult 
of ‘Mobutuism’ was matched by a program of Zairian ‘authenticity’; the power and 
fame of the ruler were pursued parallel with a dramatic gamble to enhance the wealth 
of the economy while at the same time a diplomacy calculated to appeal to other 
African and Third World leaders was promoted.”14 They posit that “In Mobutu’s bid 
for national glory, three stratagems stand out: his encouragement of the cult of 
Mobutuism, his promotion of his political party as the central political agency of the 
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state, and his pursuit of cultural and psychological decolonization represented by the 
policy of ‘authenticity.’”15 
 Economically, Mobutu’s regime was considered a massive kleptocracy. 
Initially, Mobutu nationalized all foreign-owned firms, forcing out European 
investors, which precipitated a huge economic decline, prompting Mobutu’s 1977 
campaign to woo back foreign investors. He was in need of external military aid as 
well, to repulse attacks in the Katanga province by rebels based in Angola. Despite 
problems, he gained re-election in 1977, as the sole candidate standing for the 
presidency. He increased his personal fortune, which in 1984 was estimated at US $4 
billion, mostly in Swiss banks.  
 Due to economic problems and domestic unrest, Mobutu in mid-1990 agreed 
to lift the ban on political parties and appointed a transitional government meant to 
lead to elections, although he retained substantial powers. Factional divisions led to 
the creation in 1993 of two governments, one pro- and one anti-Mobutu (this one 
headed by Laurent Monsengwo and Etienne Tshisekedi). Mobutu appointed Kengo 
Wa Dondo as prime minister. Mobutu was overthrown in the war known as the First 
Congo War, which was an incursion of Tutsis into Zaire’s eastern regions, who joined 
forces with locals opposed to the president; in May 1997 the forces, following failed 
peace talks, captured Kinshasa, and Zaire was renamed the Democratic Republic of 
Congo. Mobutu went into temporary exile in Togo, then moved to Morocco, and 
Laurent-Desire Kabila became the new president. Mobutu died in September 1997 in 
Rabat, Morocco, from prostate cancer. 
 Mobutu’s regime closely approximates the definition of an ideal typical 
sultanistic regime. During his reign, he became increasingly arbitrary and self-
                                       




sufficient in his exercise of power. He took care to balance his bases of support and 
his external allies and donors, and constructed a pseudo-ideological program known 
as Mobutuisme to justify his rule to the public. Mobutu’s was an exceptionally 
personalized regime and therefore has been often classified as both neopatrimonial 
and sultanistic. 
Jean-Bedel Bokassa’s Central African Republic 
 
 Jean-Bedel Bokassa (1921-1996) was the president and Emperor of the 
Central African Republic from January 1966 until his overthrow on 20 September 
1979. Born in Bobangi, Moyen-Congo, in the Central African Republic (then part of 
French Equatorial Africa, known as Oubangui-Chari), Bokassa was the son of a 
village chief, but was orphaned at the age of six, and became a career soldier, joining 
the Free French Forces and becoming a sergeant major by the end of World War II. 
By 1961 he had become a captain, and he left the French army in 1964 to join the 
Central African Republic army, gaining a high position and the chieftaincy of the 
armed forces partly due to his familial ties to President David Dacko (his cousin) and 
Dacko’s predecessor Barthelemy Boganda (his uncle). Bokassa was also 
automatically placed in command of the nascent Central African forces on the eve of 
colonialism in Equatorial Africa, in the “absence of alternate or more suitable 
Oubangui-Chari officers in the demobilized French Colonial armies.”16 
On the first of January, 1966, Bokassa took advantage of the country’s 
economic turmoil to overthrow the autocratic Dacko in a swift coup d’etat, assuming 
power as President and head of the country’s only political party, the Mouvement 
pour l’evolution sociale de l’Afrique Noirse (MESAN). Abolishing the constitution 
                                       




that had been adopted in the mid-1950s, Bokassa began to rule by decree. Decalo 
writes, “After he seized power in Bangui, Bokassa ruled the CAR as his personal 
fiefdom. . . he became increasingly idiosyncratic in his policies.”17 An attempted coup 
in the spring of 1969 gave Bokassa the impetus to further crack down on opposition 
and consolidate his power. In 1972 he declared himself President for Life, and 
survived another coup attempt in late 1974 and an assassination attempt in 1976.  
Bokassa’s vanity played a large role in his style of governance. Those in his 
entourage “encouraged his flights of imagination, flattered his vanity, and even 
concocted projects to appeal to his pride. State policy became an extension of 
Bokassa’s ego as the distinctions among the state, the presidency, and Bokassa as an 
individual became blurred.”18 He frequently shuffled cabinet ministers and his 
methods of rule encouraged inertia and governmental paralysis. Decalo writes, 
“Bokassa’s every fancy and idiosyncrasy—however irrational or infeasible—became 
state policy.”19 His cult of personality quickly became entrenched, with his picture 
adorning every wall and textbook and many public works bearing his name. Political 
prisoners were many, as were magnanimous amnesties, as well as arbitrary 
executions. Bokassa’s thirteen years of control in the Central African Republic rested 
on three factors—first, France’s direct and indirect support for the regime; secondly, 
Bokassa’s control of the security services and support from the civil service; and 
finally, the socioeconomic and political void in Bangui that retarded the formation of 
sources of opposition. 
Bokassa played former colonial power France off against its neighbours to 
secure international funding for his regime. In late 1969 he became a Marxist after 
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visiting Brazzaville, and initiated a pro-Eastern foreign policy in 1970. When no 
material benefits poured in, he retreated back to a Western bent. After meeting with 
Libya’s Qadhaffi, Bokassa converted to Islam, changing his name to Salah Eddine 
Ahmed Bokassa, calculating the assurance then of ongoing Libyan monetary aid. 
However, “when disillusioned by Qadaffi’s lack of generosity, Bokassa and his court 
casually reverted to their original faith.”20 
In late 1976, Bokassa’s imperial ambitions began to take shape. According to 
Decalo, “the idea of proclaiming himself emperor stemmed from Bokassa’s adoration 
of pomp and splendour, and out of his desire to imitate Napoleon Bonaparte, an 
individual he particularly admired and identified with.” 21 He dissolved the 
government, replacing it with the Conseil de la Revolution Centrafricaine, then 
declared the republic a monarchy, the Central African Empire, issuing an imperial 
constitution. He converted back to Catholicism and crowned himself Emperor 
Bokassa I on 4 December 1977 in a lavish ceremony sometimes referred to as le 
grand folie, which was financially backed by the French and drew on Napoleonic 
examples. Bokassa spent over $20 million on the coronation, which was 
disappointingly not attended by any of the invited foreign leaders.  
In the new Empire, suppression of opposition remained widespread, and 
torture was reportedly also very common, with Bokassa allegedly participating 
personally in many beatings. Despite international criticism, France still supported 
Bokassa, with French President Valery Giscard d’Estaing remaining a friend of 
Bokassa’s, and a companion on hunting trips and recipient of personal gifts. By early 
1979, however, French support for the regime began to erode after a massacre of 
civilians, prompted by rioting in Bangui. In April 1979, a number of students were 
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arrested for protesting the requirement of donning expensive, government-mandated 
school uniforms, and around 100 were reportedly killed. Former President Dacko, 
gaining French support and using French troops, led a successful coup in September 
1979 while Bokassa was away in Libya.  
Bokassa’s regime shares many of the features of sultanistic regimes—from his 
excessive personal wealth to his lavish spending and construction of palaces, chateaux 
and hunting parks. To a huge degree, Bokassa’s was a highly personalized style of 
rule, and his regime featured him as the central and dominant player, coming to a 
pinnacle in his coronation as Emperor of the Central African Empire. His short-lived 
conversion to Islam demonstrates his reliance upon external donors but also his lack 
of guiding ideology, while his population was meant to ascribe to his version of the 
national’s glorious imperial path. From his relationship with the military to his 
grandiose spending schemes, Bokassa is another African ruler who closely 
approximates the model of sultanism provided by Chehabi and Linz. 
Idi Amin’s Uganda 
 
 Idi Amin (1925-2003), one of Africa’s most brutal and violent examples of 
post-colonial leadership, is another leader closely approximating the model of a 
sultanistic regime. Born in 1925 in Koboko county (the distant Sudanic fringe 
periphery of Uganda), Amin was also from a military background, having joined the 
King’s African Rifles of the British colonial army as a private in 1946, rising to 
lieutenant rank despite a lack of schooling. An accomplished athlete (champion 
swimmer and boxer), he developed a reputation for cruelty from his time in the 
military, but rose through the ranks, reaching sergeant major before being made an 




After independence (in October 1962), Milton Obote, the first prime minister of 
Uganda, rewarded his loyalty by promoting him to captain in 1963 and deputy army 
commander in 1964. 
 Amin’s rise to power came following a scandal in 1965 in which Obote and 
Amin were implicated in a deal to smuggle gold, coffee and ivory out of Congo, 
which put Obote on the defensive—he promoted Amin to chief of staff, and declared 
himself the new president, forcing Mutesa II (the previous president) into exile in 
Britain. Amin began the recruitment of members of his own tribe into the army, also 
attracting many Muslims from his area of the West Nile into northwest Uganda. 
Relations between Amin and Obote grew tense, and Obote put Amin under house 
arrest, and then demoted him in the army. Believing that his arrest was imminent, 
Amin seized power in a coup on 25 January 1971 (assisted by Rwandan exiles, 
targeted as enemies by Obote) while Obote was away in Singapore, and declared 
himself the new president. Initially, Uganda and the international community 
welcomed Amin; he freed many political prisoners, disbanded the Secret Police, and 
promised elections within months. However, many foreign journalists perceived him 
as a somewhat eccentric leader, fond of racing cars, boxing, and Disney cartoons.  
 The comic façade hid a brutal leadership style, however; shortly after his rise 
to power, Amin established killing squads to hunt down remaining supporters of 
Obote and much of the intelligentsia. Military leaders who did not support him were 
often beheaded. From his exile in Tanzania, Obote attempted to take back power—
sending in military invaders without success. Amin’s retaliation was to purge the 
army of certain tribes, and ethnic violence encompassed the whole of the army and 
spread to civilians as well, as Amin’s paranoia grew. The Nile Mansions Hotel in 




first year in office, 10,000 people had died; this number reached 250,000 before Amin 
was ousted from office.  
 Despite his military qualifications, Decalo writes, “Amin’s Uganda was not a 
military dictatorship but a personal dictatorship headed by the chief of staff. Uganda 
became the personal fiefdom of a brutal despot, within which there was no semblance 
of law and order, established administration, or set of policy guidelines. This was a 
tyranny where personal whims dictated policy, expertise played no role in 
government and administration, the economy was but a source of plunder for the 
ruling elite, and foreign policy was rooted in the whims and biases of the paramount 
leader.”22 Amin became increasingly erratic over the years of his rule. He donned 
dozens of medals from World War II, having his tunics specially lengthened to fit 
more medals, and granted himself a number of official titles, for example: “His 
Excellency President for Life, Field Marshal Al Hadji Doctor Idi Amin, VC, DSO, 
MC, Lord of All the Beasts of the Earth and Fishes of the Sea, and Conqueror of the 
British Empire in Africa in General and Uganda in Particular,” and, bizarrely, “King 
of Scotland.” His paranoia and suspicious nature grew after each of 22 known 
assassination attempts and attempted coups against him; as a result, Amin was 
constantly switching plans and motorcade routes, rotating conjugal visits to wives and 
mistresses, and driving different cars. Decalo writes, “Unfamiliar and impatient with 
the intricacies of government and administration, Amin ruled in the style of an 
oriental potentate… government by whim or gut-reaction became the norm… The 
state treasury became an extension of his private coffers.”23 In late 1972, following an 
alleged dream in which God spoke to Amin and instructed him to expel all Asians, 
Amin gave Uganda’s 70,000 Asians 90 days to leave the country, and deported those 
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who remained to the countryside. He severed diplomatic relations with Israel and with 
Britain four years later. In 1972, Amin turned for support to Libya and the Soviet 
Union. 
 In the late 1970s, Amin attempted to cover up an army mutiny while at the 
same time ordering an invasion of Tanzania with the help of Libyan troops. Tanzania 
began a counter-attack, and in April 1979 Amin was forced to leave his capital, 
Kampala, and the Tanzanian army took the city with the assistance of Ugandan exiles 
and Rwandan guerrillas. Amin fled to exile, first in Libya and then Saudi Arabia. He 
died in Saudi Arabia on 16 August 2003 and was buried in Jeddah. 
 While Amin’s regime stands out for its severe brutality, at its core it 
functioned in many of the same ways as the other regimes that are deemed sultanistic. 
Amin, a ruler with highly centralized, personalized authority, ruled with an iron fist 
and as a solitary figure. He dominated his cadres and used the systems of cronyism to 
his advantage. His cult of personality was manifest and his grabbing of lofty titles for 
himself serves as an example of the role of patriarchal paternalism at work in Uganda, 
a feature that is salient in most of the sultanistic cases considered here. 
Francisco Macias Nguema’s Equatorial Guinea 
 
 Equatorial Guinea’s first post-colonial leader, Francisco Macias Nguema 
(1924-1979), can be classified as a leader with strong sultanistic tendencies. Born in 
Oyem in the Woleu Ntem province of Gabon in 1924 to a much-feared sorcerer, 
Nguema was raised in Nyasanyong in the district of Mongomo.24 Under Spanish 
colonial rule, he rose to the position of Mayor of Mongomo, and later he served as a 
member of the territorial parliament—the Spanish, hard-pressed to find loyal allies 
                                       




within the country’s ethnic Fang elite, found him to be an essentially apolitical and 
trustworthy collaborator, which helped to advance his career. He was elected 
president before independence in 1968. During his presidency, his country gained the 
nickname “the Auschwitz of Africa” and became notorious for political executions 
and virulent anti-Spanish radio speeches. 
 Nguema acted to marginalize all possible opponents, imprisoning, starving 
and executing the country’s pre-independence prime minister, Bonifacio Ondo Edu 
shortly after his rise to power. Other officials passed away or reportedly “committed 
suicide” while in detention camps and prisons. Human rights violations were rampant 
under Macias Nguema’s regime, and caused the exodus of over one-third of the 
country’s population to neighbouring countries. His actions while in power were 
almost entirely punitive and destructive to the country and the society—nothing short 
of a reign of terror, characterized by systematic and gruesome killing. Nguema 
liquidated the entire budding political leadership of the 1960s, and the threat was so 
high that by the end of his reign, not one university graduate remained in Equatorial 
Guinea. 
Nguema’s policies were violently anti-colonialist and opposed to religion. 
Three important pillars of his rule were the United National Workers’ Party (PUNT, 
which replaced pre-independence parties), the youth group/militia Juventud en 
Marcha con Macias, and the Esangui clan of Rio Muni. Macias Nguema’s relatives 
and members of his clan controlled the military and the presidential guard, which 
were the regime’s instruments of repression. Decalo suggests that “the lengthy 
survival of dictatorship in Equatorial Guinea was rooted in (1) its ruthless use of 
terror, which pulverized the will to resist by its random arbitrariness and casual 




potential sources of opposition; (3) the complete isolation of the country from outside 
influences or scrutiny; (4) the skilful manipulation and magnification of Nguema’s 
widely attributed supernatural powers, which terrorized into immobility large 
segments of the traditional society; (5) the regime’s total control of literally all 
commodities and patronage in Equatorial Guinea, a fact that glued Nguema to his 
cohorts; and (6) Nguema’s personal and kinship network in the security forces, which 
maintained his partners in the mayhem that was ravaging Equatorial Guinea tightly 
under control.”25 
The president’s actions were often characterized externally as paranoid—
hating the educated, he banned the use of the word “intellectual” and he also 
destroyed boats, banning fishing. Nguema “Africanized” his name to Masie Nguema 
Biyogo Negue Ndong, in 1976, and demanded the same of the rest of the population 
of Equatorial Guinea. He developed an extreme cult of personality (perhaps, it has 
been posited, fuelled by his consumption of “copious amounts of bhang and iboga”), 
assigning himself titles such as the “Unique Miracle” and “Grand Master of 
Education, Science and Culture.” Macias Nguema declared himself President for Life 
in 1972.  
Like all sultanistic regimes, Nguema’s never formulated any sort of ideology 
until after his rise to power—Decalo writes, “Naïve, with only a rudimentary grasp of 
matters of state or economics, Nguema never formulated a cohesive policy, a set of 
national goals, or for that matter any developmental ideology. His ‘policy’ speeches, 
both at home and abroad, were lengthy, rambling rantings…. His world outlook—if 
he ever really had one—was ‘confused, unknown, undefined’ and his actions were… 
fundamentally, just the gut reactions of a leader accustomed to selfishly personalizing 
                                       




everything without concern for wider societal consequences.”26 His reliance upon 
witchcraft and the occult was strong: “It is indeed difficult to comprehend Nguema’s 
lengthy dictatorship in Equatorial Guinea without a proper awareness of his unerring 
utilization and manipulation of traditional beliefs and religion, including sorcery and 
witchcraft, both to prop up his ‘legitimacy’ and to terrorize the population into 
immobile submission.”27 His father was a venerated sorcerer in a society where 
ancestral worship and witchcraft continue to play a major role (despite nominal 
Catholicism)—during his reign, Nguema became something of a religious figure, with 
constant adulatory praise of the leader in the liturgy and contentions that “there is no 
God other than Macias” becoming commonplace in the churches. 
On 3 August 1979 he was overthrown by his nephew, Teodoro Obiang 
Nguema Mbasogo. He was captured, tried on grounds of genocide, and executed 
weeks later by hired Moroccan troops, because no Equatoguinean soldier would 
participate, believing the former President to have magical powers. 
Macias Nguema’s regime is another that can be accurately classified as 
sultanistic, or as sharing some characteristics of sultanism. Like Amin’s, his was a 
reign of terror, with the use of penalty and excessive force defining his style of rule in 
many ways. While this sets his regime apart to some extent, its features are still those 
of a sultanistic regime. His manipulation of witchcraft and supernatural belief formed 
the basis of his cult of personality and his legitimating doctrine, while his use of the 
security forces and his extreme isolation of the population are both features of many 
sultanistic regimes. 
Hastings Kamuzu Banda’s Malawi 
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 Dr. Hastings Kamuzu Banda (1896-1997) was Malawi’s founding President, 
and Young has suggested that his style of one-party rule is another that exhibits strong 
sultanistic characteristics—it has been described as “rule with an iron hand,” by a 
“paternalist despot”28. Banda was trained as a doctor in Scotland, and having lived in 
the United Kingdom for many years (where he developed a strong personal ideology 
of pan-Africanism), he faced problems of transition when he moved back to then-
Nyasaland. Unable to speak his native language Chinyanja fluently, Banda needed an 
interpreter to conduct his business. He campaigned against the Central African 
Federation, which dissolved in 1963 and led the country to independence as Malawi. 
Banda became Prime Minister in February 1963 and President in 1966 when Malawi 
was declared a republic. In 1971, he declared himself President for Life. Over the 
course of his one-party rule, Banda accumulated at least US $320 million in personal 
assets.  
 Banda’s edicts and instructions, based on his personal desires, set the national 
standards, and he required demonstrations of loyalty bordering on servility. The 
official regime slogan was “Unity, Loyalty, Obedience, and Discipline”. Banda was 
considered the Ngwazi (conqueror or champion) of Malawi, a man with exceptional 
valour and achievement. He was President for Life and the sole manager of the state, 
making all of the important political appointments and frequently rotating government 
ministers “in a manner calculated to remind them of their total dependence upon his 
continued favour. His rule is absolute insofar as no important jurisdictions of law or 
policy—including the courts—are secure from his intervention or meddling.”29 
Jackson and Rosberg wrote in the early 1980s that “the ‘royalism’ of Banda’s 
presidency was cultivated by slogans such as ‘Kamazu knows best,’ by extensive 
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display of his portrait in the press and elsewhere, by public demonstrations that 
celebrate his comings and goings, by popular songs in his praise, and by the 
celebration of Kamazu Day, which has replaced the Queen’s Birthday as an annual 
occasion of national festivity…. Observers have been struck by the extent to which 
Banda has encouraged the cultivation of royalism: ‘Within the ‘Malawi tribe,’ the 
position Banda had come to hold was like that of one of the old Maravi kings, 
complete with divine right and absolute authority. So, at least, he saw himself, and so 
he wanted to be seen.’ In addition, the trappings of chieftaincy have been put to use—
for example, Banda carries traditional staffs of authority (such as the fly-whisk) and 
his entourage is ‘preceded by a modern version of the praise-maker—a Land-Rover 
fitted with loudspeakers—and welcoming groups of undulating women symbolically 
sweeping the ground with brushwood in front of his path.’”30 
In the early 1980s, his penchant for bizarre decrees caused some amusement to 
Malawians when he banned the Simon and Garfunkel song “Cecilia” from the radio, 
at a time when his relationship with his mistress, who was named Cecilia Tamanda 
Kadzamira, was in a rocky period and he disapproved of the song’s lyrics. Banda’s 
conservatism also meant that television came late to Malawi, and was not available 
until the early 1990s. Banda instituted a dress code for all citizens—women were not 
allowed to bare their thighs and trousers were not allowed. For men, long hair was 
outlawed as a sign of dissent, and men could be seized and forced to have a haircut at 
the discretion of border officials or police. Banda established a school modelled on 
Eton, called the Kamuzu Academy, in which Malawian children were taught Latin 
and Ancient Greek by expatriate Classics teachers.  
 Finally allowing democratic elections in 1994, Hastings Banda was defeated 
                                       




by Bakili Muluzi, a Yao from the southern region of the country whose two terms in 
office were not without serious controversy. Banda died in South Africa in 1997 at the 
age of 101, and his party, the Malawi Congress Party, continued after his death. 
 While on the surface, Banda’s reign seems very different in style—less brutal 
and with less of a military bent—from Equatorial Guinea under Macias Nguema or 
Uganda under Amin, the features of the regime type are very similar. Banda’s regime 
has also been referred to as a candidate for the designation of sultanism, primarily 
because of his eccentricities in personality that he imposed upon his population 
through a series of bizarre edicts, as mentioned above. All power was derived from 
Banda who, though a more benign ruler, nonetheless isolated and suppressed his 
population to a large extent. His manipulation of cadres and imposition of a created 
national narrative, along with his relocation of the capital city, all serve to buttress 
claims that his rulership approximates the sultanistic regime type. 
African Sultanism: Criteria For Comparison 
 
 While it is clear that these cases have many differences, their backgrounds and 
the conditions in their countries do share some similarities. Similar societal contexts, 
for example, may have been preconditions for the rise of these leaders to power.31 In 
Uganda, the Central African Republic, and Equatorial Guinea, for example, growing 
economic malaise, the deflation of central political legitimacy and ongoing political 
strife underlay the rulers’ seizures of power, and the same was true to some extent of 
Mobutu’s original grab for power in the Congo. Decalo, who authored a comparative 
study of the regimes of Amin, Macias Nguema, and Bokassa, suggests that in all of 
the cases, three common vectors coalesced to produce this type of dysfunctional, or 
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sultanistic, leadership. Each of the criteria that he suggested—systemic conditions, 
behavioural contexts, and so-called “idiosyncratic variables”, played its role in the 
origin and sustaining of sultanistic regimes in the various countries.  
• Existing Systemic Conditions. Economic decay, erosion of authority, social 
division and strife, and political polarization are some of the features that have 
been prevalent across many of the cases of African sultanism explored above. 
The structural background conditions to the pending political upheavals in 
these countries generally featured an acute deflation of central authority 
coupled with, or consequent to, a combination of intense social division and 
strife, economic malaise, and political polarization.  
• Behavioural Contexts. Second, the behavioural contexts of the coup leaders 
were similar: Purely personal motivations were at the core of the coups that 
led to dictatorship. In each case, writes Decalo, “there was a clear, 
unequivocal, direct, and personal threat to the prestige, status, power, 
hegemony, and even personal security of the individual who was ultimately to 
ward off these assaults on his position by seizing power.”32  
• Idiosyncratic Variables. Finally, the “idiosyncratic variable” came into play 
and in each of the countries was similar. Amin, Macias Nguema, and Bokassa 
all had “seriously malintegrated and force-oriented personalities.”33 These 
three variables, which came together at specific historical moments-- 
“personalist power-grabs by maladjusted and malevolent leaders in a societal 
context of intense division and a legitimacy void” may go a long way toward 
explaining the roots of aberrant personal dictatorship in Africa, an idea which 
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will be explored further, and with reference to a greater cross-section of 
sultanistic regimes and literature, in the following chapter.34  
Interestingly, many of these conditions—as will be shown below, existed in 
Turkmenistan at the time of independence and shortly thereafter, as Turkmenistan’s 
post-communist regime degenerated into a sultanistic one. Turkmenistan, losing the 
apparatus of communist rule, experienced a deflation of central authority at the top of 
the system, and an economic crisis at the same time. The assault, if we can consider it 
such, on the political position of Niyazov was one that threatened to take away his 
credentials and position if he did not move to consolidate his power in the absence of 
legitimacy derived from his position within the Communist Party apparatus. The 
idiosyncratic variable, as well, is easy to identify in Niyazov’s case—he lost his 
parents at a young age and was raised in a Soviet orphanage, and many psychologists 
would explain aspects of his behaviour as relating to a personal need to feel loved, 
respected, and part of a larger national family. Additionally, Niyazov suffers from 
health problems and, some posit, from substance abuse as well, which may partly be 
the cause of his erratic behaviour.  
Sultanistic Rule in Central Asia 
The post-Soviet states of Central Asia present an interesting contemporary 
area of examination for students of patrimonialism. Hopes that the USSR’s collapse 
would lead to democratization of its successor states have been dashed—nowhere 
more so than in Central Asia, “where the first decade of independence has been 
marked by strong authoritarian presidentialism.”35 The Central Asian regimes, while 
covering a spectrum of non-democratic control from authoritarian to sultanistic, have 
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recently been characterized by Ishiyama as “neopatrimonial authoritarian regimes.” 
Ishiyama’s classification of ‘neopatrimonial’ distinguishes the Central Asian 
republics from other types of authoritarian regime, and especially from corporatist 
regimes: “while the latter are characterized by the existence of an organic ideology of 
national unity and attempts at direct political mobilization along controlled 
bureaucratic channels, in neopatrimonial systems personal patronage, rather than 
ideology or law, buttress personal authority.”36 While not taking on an analysis of 
post-Soviet governance, Chehabi and Linz suggest that “Parts of the former Soviet 
Union could conceivably fall victim to sultanistic tendencies. The persistence of 
nomenklatura control, coupled with the absence of an entrepreneurial class, has 
engendered an intertwining of political and economic power that could well lead to 
sultanism if a leader emerges who has the requisite qualities to raise himself above the 
party apparatus. Belarus’ president Alexander Lukashenko seems to be on the way to 
becoming such a dictator, as is Turkmenistan’s Sapamurat Niyazov.”37  
Niyazov’s regime, indeed, presents a fascinating case of a contemporary 
neopatrimonial, personalist regime that closely approximates Linz’s conception of 
sultanism. While Central Asia is a region rife with personalism, “The entwinement of 
the growing cult of personality and the process of nation building distinguishes 
Turkmenistan from its neighbours,” and that invites examination under the theories of 
sultanism.38 “Although personality cults of a paler hue are in evidence in 
neighbouring Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, it is Niyazov, or Turkmenbashy the 
Eternally Great as he is officially known, who has most determinedly confounded the 
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profile of new post-Cold War nation-state architects.”39  
Under Niyazov’s repressive rule, only his political party legally exists, free 
media is outlawed, non-official religions are persecuted and the population is 
increasingly isolated. State structures and governmental institutions are increasingly 
dysfunctional as a result of frequent personnel reshuffling and a megalomaniacal, 
idiosyncratic style of presidential rule. The economy, despite a promising natural 
resource reserve, is struggling as foreign investors and private business are unable to 
operate in such a corrupt environment and state-run enterprise dominates all lucrative 
sectors. Grandiose marble buildings dominate the capital, Ashgabat, and 
beautification projects persist, funded by the potentially lucrative oil and gas sector, 
yet poverty and unemployment have reached mass levels. Ishiyama, drawing on 
Bratton and Van de Walle, suggests that Turkmenistan could be labelled a 
“personalist dictatorship.”40 While not perfectly matching the definition, Niyazov’s 
regime in Turkmenistan closely approximates Linz’s ideal type of a sultanistic 
regime. 
Cummings and Ochs suggest that Niyazov’s regime is best classified as an 
“inglorious semi-sultanism.”41 While Turkmenistan shares the personalism, excesses 
and arbitrariness of traditional sultanistic regimes, there are, argue Cummings and 
Ochs, substantial differences. They write: “These conceptual categories (sultanism 
and neopatrimonialism) can be applied to Turkmenistan with partial success. On the 
one hand, they convey the regime’s extreme development of the ruler’s discretion and 
also the decay or incomplete development of modern legal-rational authority. 
However, various specific features of Turkmenistan’s reality do not comfortably fit 
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into the model. One fundamental distinction between sultanistic regimes and 
Turkmenistan immediately comes to mind: the absence of a significant, sizeable… 
military.”42 While Chehabi and Linz assert that sultanism’s unique nature lies in its 
combination of dynasticism with personalism, dynasticism is “not an option” for 
Niyazov, argue Cummings and Ochs. He was orphaned at a young age and is largely 
perceived to be estranged from his family. Rumours abounded in 2003 that his son 
Murat (residing in Austria, and helping with the family oil and gas business, he 
reportedly spends millions of dollars in casinos) may be in contact with him or may 
plan to succeed him.43 Previously, press reports had suggested that the President 
asked Murat to stay away from Turkmenistan and that he has never been mentioned 
publicly as a possible heir. Niyazov is separated from his wife, a Russian Jew who 
lives in Moscow, and his daughter lives in Israel. While traditional sultanistic leaders 
seek the support of powerful superpower neighbours to gain legitimacy, “Niyazov has 
gone to the other extreme” with his promotion of a “permanent neutrality” policy and 
his avoidance of regional initiatives.44 He has reportedly poor relations with his 
Central Asian neighbours, has particularly strained relations over the past few years 
with Moscow over issues of dual citizenship and Caspian shorelines, and has received 
criticism from the West on issues of religious freedoms and human rights.45 Finally, 
while Turkmenistan shares a feature of traditional sultanistic regimes in its possession 
of oil and gas resources, there remains a difficulty of exploiting the energy resources 
due to pipeline issues and regional relationships. 
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Since Cummings and Ochs made their characterization, however, Niyazov has 
further entrenched his personality cult. Niyazov’s growing cult of personality, from 
his adoption of the title Turkmenbashy the Great, to the renaming of calendar months 
and days, to the promotion of the moral code and history text Ruhnama, has become 
increasingly bizarre since independence and particularly over the past three to four 
years. The following analysis demonstrates that enough similar elements exist to 
suggest that sultanism is a useful benchmark concept with which to examine 
Niyazov’s regime.  
Niyazov’s Turkmenistan: Approximating Sultanism 
 Niyazov’s regime closely approximates Linz and Stepan’s definition of 
sultanism when analysed using the four factors of regime classification: leadership, 
pluralism, ideology and mobilization. Niyazov’s leadership is categorized by its 
arbitrary nature and high degree of personalism. He operates free from legal-rational 
constraints, and is unencumbered by ideology. Public compliance to his rule is based 
on a mixture of fear and rewards. There is frequent rotation of positions and the jobs 
of regime officials derive from their submission to Niyazov. In Turkmenistan, 
economic and social pluralism, where it exists, is subject to unpredictable intervention 
from Niyazov. As in Linz and Stepan’s ideal type, in Turkmenistan no group or 
individual is free from the ruler’s exercise of despotic power. No rule of law exists, 
and political institutionalization only happens at very low levels. No real ideology 
preceded Niyazov’s acquisition of power, but over the past several years Niyazov has 
created a pseudo-ideology, Ruhnama, that fills this space. State-sponsored 
organizations exist for the mobilization of the population but there is no large-scale 




characterized by its apparent apathy to supra-local structures and movements. 
Repression of free media, non-official religions and non-governmental organizations 
all stifle the development of a non-state social movement or civil society.   
Leadership 
Leadership is the most crucial of Linz and Stepan’s criteria for analyzing 
sultanistic regimes. Regime and state are all but blurred in Turkmenistan, where 
Niyazov rules by decree and personally makes most decisions about policy. 
Cummings and Ochs note that “state power and national legitimacy are fused” in the 
president, who “concentrates in his hands both key institutions of modern governance 
and supposedly Turkmen traditional institutions.”46 Parliament, judicial bodies, local 
authorities and the Democratic Party of Turkmenistan (DPT) are controlled by 
Niyazov and packed with his patrons. “Niyazov’s subsuming of the roles of state and 
regime, his unyielding conviction that he alone can and may decide how the state is 
run and how individuals live, and his intolerance of any form of dissent carry decisive 
consequences for the political system.”47 Niyazov’s domination of Turkmen politics 
can be explained by three main factors: his background in the Soviet political system; 
the political vacuum that followed the collapse of the Soviet Union; and most 
significantly, his use of brutal repression, economic control, and co-option of 
opponents to oust potential contenders.48  
Niyazov’s background is not unusual for a Soviet bureaucrat on the edge of 
empire. Born on 19 February 1940 near Ashgabat, Niyazov grew up in a worker’s 
family. Published materials make little mention of siblings, but his autobiographical 
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writings indicate two brothers.49 His father died during World War II (some sources 
suggest that he died in the Caucasus in 1943), and his mother and brothers fell victim 
to the 1948 earthquake that destroyed half the capital city. He lived for a time in an 
orphanage and then with distant relatives, leaving him unable to weave together the 
family network that is customary for a successful Turkmen career. He later moved to 
a Communist Party boarding school and later worked as an instructor at the Turkmen 
Territorial Committee of the Geological Prospecting Workers’ trade union. Some 
observers suggest that this difficult childhood goes some way to explaining his 
paranoia and instinctive distrust of those around him.50 However, lack of family ties 
was in some ways an advantage in gaining promotion under the Soviet regime, which 
did not welcome natives with strong links to clan structures and kinship groups. (The 
Party had experienced serious problems with previous republican leaders whose 
family relationships had fostered a culture of nepotism and corruption that had 
escalated to include regularly skimming profits from Turkmenistan’s cotton crop to 
divert from Moscow into the pockets of the rulers and their cronies.)  
In 1962 Niyazov joined the Communist Party and studied power engineering 
at the Polytechnical Institute in Leningrad, graduating in five years with a diploma in 
energy engineering. Turkmenistan lacked qualified specialists, and as an ethnic 
Turkmen with technical skills, Niyazov was rapidly promoted. He worked at 
Bezmenskaya power station near Ashgabat for only two years, leaving in 1970 to 
work full-time in the local Party apparatus. By the 1980s he headed the industry and 
transport department of the Turkmenistan Communist Party Central Committee, then 
became First Secretary of the Ashgabat City Party Committee. He was then invited to 
work in the CPSU Central Committee staff in Moscow. In 1985 he was tapped to 
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become Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Turkmen SSR, and by January 
1990, he had established himself as the undisputed ruler of the Soviet Republic of 
Turkmenistan by also becoming Chairman of the Supreme Soviet, “the highest 
legislative body in the republic.”51  
Niyazov is, by many journalistic accounts, a hard worker, arriving at his 
offices in central Ashgabat at seven a.m. and leaving around nine p.m. He drives 
himself to work each morning from his residence on the western edge of the capital 
city through Potemkin-style marble and gold city gates. He participates in no active 
sports, preferring chess, was the last of the CIS presidents to quit smoking, and 
reportedly enjoys reading books on history and philosophy, hunting, driving, and 
walking.52 
Niyazov’s powers of political appointment extend across all political levels– 
he appoints all members of government, and leaders of academic institutions and 
industry. The extent of Niyazov’s institutional control is evident in the selection 
procedure for state posts in Turkmenistan. Vetting and selection Soviet-style is still 
the norm for today’s Turkmen nomenklatura. Lists of suitable candidates, more often 
than not members of the DPT, are maintained by the state organ for the Preparation of 
Cadres. Many contemporary candidates at all levels of government are holdovers 
from the Soviet period– “In four of the five republican welayats the same oblast 
chairmen, who were often the first secretaries of the CPT in their oblasts, were 
(re)appointed hokim. In the exceptional case of the Ashgabat oblast, now renamed 
Akhal welayat, Jumageldy Amansakhatov, the chairman of the Goktepe raion (and 
simultaneously the first secretary of the CP in that rayon) was promoted to the office 
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of welayat hokimiyat.”53  
The bureaucracy has not experienced any real transition: Soviet-trained staff 
were the natural choice for a regime with no intention of democratizing. In the period 
following independence, moreover, a number of ministries and state committees such 
as internal affairs, foreign affairs and national security have been enlarged and the 
bureaucracy, while less in control, continues to grow. New ministries (e.g. defence 
and foreign economic relations) have been created. The expansion of the state 
bureaucracy simultaneously with its decline in power has two probable effects: “The 
first is the expansion and consolidation of a social group that owes its privileges to its 
loyalty to the Turkmenbashy. This is an important social trend for the entrenching of 
the cult of personality. The second is the reinforcement of a general perception of the 
sanctity of office.”54 The latter factor creates favourable conditions for abuse of office 
and suggests that corruption and nepotism in independent Turkmenistan are likely to 
spread more quickly than during the Soviet period.  
Niyazov keeps his entourage loyal through a mixture of fear and rewards. The 
bureaucratic elite is periodically reshuffled, even if many dismissed officials in 
Turkmenistan suffer no other serious consequences and may well be rehired in some 
other capacity. Niyazov frequently dismisses ministers on live television, and others 
have been fined for shortcomings, while the least favoured have been imprisoned. The 
shuffling of officials “hampers good governance by preventing officials from 
developing any real job competency.”55 Niyazov demands complete loyalty from his 
“nomenklatura-appointed officials and from society at large. In such conditions, it 
would be expected that the same attitude be duplicated at all levels of authority, 
                                       
53 Akbarzadeh, “National Identity,” 277-278 
54 ibid., 278 




perpetuating the culture of obedience. The stability of the cadres, therefore, is 
expected to make a positive contribution to state legitimacy and the cult of 
Turkmenbashy.”56  
Niyazov maintains tight control over Turkmenistan using security services that 
carry out his repressive dictates and crush internal dissent. The main intelligence 
outfit is the Committee for National Security (widely known by its Russian name, 
Komitet Natsionalnoi Bezopastnosti, or KNB), a latter-day version of the Soviet-era 
KGB. Until March 2002, the KNB was given absolute power over other state 
institutions to carry out its work and enjoyed immunity, with no real accountability 
under the justice system: 
It is believed to employ up to 3,000 members and a much wider 
network of informers. Its methods of control include the collection 
of compromising materials on potential opponents and blackmail, 
but it also frequently resorts to harassment, abductions, 
imprisonment, torture and assassination by special agents. The 
accumulation of compromising information is a regular procedure 
used to control all high-level state employees. Once an official has 
started to rise through the ranks, secret files which contain genuine 
or fabricated evidence of corruption, sex scandals, drug trafficking 
or consumption, are used to threaten any persons who need to be 
controlled or pushed towards decisions they refuse to make.57  
 
However, its rank-and-file agents reportedly are “disgruntled over a leadership purge 
that began in March 2002 when KNB head Mukhammed Nazarov was dismissed.”58 
Nazarov, once considered one of Niyazov’s most loyal supporters, was increasingly 
becoming known as the country’s second most powerful man, a designation that 
likely was discomforting to Niyazov.59 Some sources suggest that Niyazov believed 
Nazarov to be planning a coup. Nazarov was later sentenced to 20 years in prison, and 
between March and June 2002, many others were ousted and imprisoned including 
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the security service chief, the Minister of Defence, the Interior Minister, and the head 
of the border guard. Dozens of other KNB officers were imprisoned during the purge. 
The KNB, which was formally renamed the Ministry of National Security after the 
purge, is now headed by Colonel Batyr Busakov, a former deputy head of the 
Presidential Guard. 
The Presidential Guard, which now “appears to be the main pillar of 
Niyazov’s security, is an elite group of around 3,000 former bodyguards and security 
agents. Another internal security service, the criminal police, is controlled by the 
Internal Affairs Ministry and works with the KNB on national security matters.”60 
The Guard, led by Akhmurad Rejebev, is reportedly well-equipped and well-paid.61 It 
is an independent entity and much more than a contingent of bodyguards– this unit 
has full access to the political, economic, and financial records of the state and is 
charged with monitoring any political or economic problems that might arise within 
society or the elite.62 The Guard, considered now to be the main instrument of 
Niyazov’s control, carries out covert activities on behalf of the President and helps to 
assure his continued hold on power. 
Pluralism 
Niyazov in the post-Soviet period has used his power and image to reduce 
democratic institutions to something of a façade. In June 1992 he was elected 
president with 99.5 per cent of the vote after an uncontested campaign. In January 
1994 he “polled 99.9 per cent in a referendum to extend his period in office. In 
December 1999 the Halk Maslehaty (People’s Council) announced that Niyazov had 
been approved president for life. Modestly, he demurred, saying he would rule only 
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until 2010, the date of his 70th birthday.” According to the 1992 Constitution, 
Niyazov controls the executive branch: he is president and prime minister, and names 
all members of the Council of Ministers. His absolute power is “demonstrated in 
sessions of that body that are broadcast live on television. Niyazov sits, admonishing 
government ministers, who stand trembling along the wall, taking notes with their 
heads bowed, clearly in fear of his questions.”63  
Under Niyazov, Turkmenistan is one of that world’s last single-party states. 
The DPT is the sole legal political party and is the successor to the Soviet-era 
Turkmen Communist Party. Turkmenistan’s fifth plenum of the Central Committee of 
the CPT convened on the 18 November 1991 in preparation for the coming party 
congress. Niyazov, then First Secretary of the CPT, spoke about the urgent need to 
reform the party on democratic principles. Soon after, the twenty-fifth congress of the 
CPT became the launching assembly for the DPT, and Niyazov became chairman of 
the renamed party, which also dominates the legislature. The perestroika era saw the 
formation of opposition political parties in many Soviet republics– in Turkmenistan in 
1989, Agzybirlik Halk Kherketi (Unity Popular Movement) was formed by 
intellectuals. This small society, with a membership comprised mainly of native 
intelligentsia, was concerned with environmental issues and linguistic nationalism, 
issues that resonated with a large part of the indigenous population.64 The party was 
short-lived, however, and banned in 1990. Since then, Niyazov has faced little 
organized political opposition, and  the authorities have moved quickly to crush any 
nascent stirrings of opposition. Interestingly, and uniquely, in Turkmenistan “the 
native elite appeared to embrace almost all demands initiated by the opposition as its 
own,” a move that likely increased Niyazov’s political legitimacy in the early years 
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after independence.65  
Turkmenistan’s constitution, drafted and passed in 1992, outlines the structure 
of government.66 While the constitution provides for a bicameral legislature and 
judiciary, all these branches are in reality just a façade laid atop personal rule. Little 
political pluralism exists, and in the past several years Niyazov has created new 
organs through which to exercise and increase his political control. Niyazov, like 
other sultanistic leaders, has engaged in “constitutional hypocrisy” and created a 
veneer of democracy to gain some international legitimacy. Cummings and Ochs 
write that Niyazov “did establish Western institutions, such as a parliament, a 
government, a court system, supplementing them with allegedly traditional Turkmen 
institutions, like the Halk Maslehaty and the Council of Elders. However, having 
created these facade institutions, Niyazov largely ignores them....”67 John Anderson 
writes of the Turkmen constitution, “Although the draft included reference to a range 
of legislative and consultative bodies, from the elected Mejilis, through the appointed 
Halk Maslehaty– a body reportedly based upon the tribal assemblies of 
Turkmenistan’s past and similar bodies found in Jordan and Kuwait– to elected local 
councils, there could be little doubt where power lay in newly independent 
Turkmenistan.”68 Checks and balances are absent under this personalized regime. 
Article one of the Turkmenistan constitution depicts the country as a 
“presidential republic” and gives extensive executive powers to the president.69 Aside 
from the executive, the main organs of power in Turkmenistan are listed as the Halk 
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Maslehaty (People’s Council), the Mejilis (Parliament), the Supreme Court, the 
Supreme Economic Court, the General Procurator, the Cabinet of Ministers, and the 
presidential hakims (prefects) in the regions.70 Under the constitution, the Supreme 
Soviet of Turkmenistan became the Mejilis and the number of deputies was reduced 
from 250 to 50 (Art. 62-63). In addition, the constitution provides for the creation of 
new state organs, most notably the National Assembly (Halk Maslehaty), which 
convened for the first time in June 1992. This body, described as the highest authority 
in the republic, is presumably based on the unique historical and cultural experience 
of Turkmens. Halk Maslehaty is comprised of the Supreme Judge, the Prosecutor 
General, members of the cabinet of ministers, 50 parliamentarian deputies, welayat 
hokims, two elders from each of the 48 etraps and the President (Art. 48). The 
assembly meets at least once a year and is chaired by the President, indicating its 
position as a subservient institution.  
The president’s complete control over the Halk Maslehaty contributes to his 
exercise of absolute power. Because the Halk Maslehaty has veto rights over 
parliamentary resolutions, Niyazov can effectively override parliamentary decisions. 
The ruling party’s “stranglehold” on the Mejilis, however, has ensured absolute 
loyalty, so there is no need to override decisions. The Halk Maslehaty and the Mejilis 
rarely disagree on issues of policy. Both the Halk Maslehaty and the Mejilis are 
absolutely complacent with the wishes of the president. They also help contribute to 
the growing cult of personality, which will be analysed in some detail below. The 
legislature’s excessive promotion of the president allows Niyazov to maintain an air 
of modesty. The president regularly addresses news media officials publicly and 
“begs” them not to praise his personality. In remarks at a 13 March 2003 meeting 
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with arts and media officials, Niyazov asked them to “please stop praising me and do 
not thus tie yourselves to this praising ideology.”71 Such displays of humility, 
however, serve only to increase public praise of the president. 
In addition to constitutional governing bodies, Niyazov authorized creation of 
other institutions that draw on Turkmen culture and traditional sources of legitimacy 
to buttress his rule. Often, these bodies are for promotion of Niyazov’s cult of 
personality–allowing him to maintain a more modest image. The Council of the 
Elders (Yaqshular Maslehaty) aims to bring together the elders of all regions. It meets 
annually and is chaired by the President. The Yaqshular Maslehaty convenes in a 
different region each session, reinforcing the presidential message of national unity. 
While the assembly first convened in April 1990, over a year before the Soviet 
collapse, its full potential as a tool for nation building was utilized only after the 
collapse. The assembly has more public relations value than policy value for Niyazov: 
“In 1994 this assembly received widespread publicity and extensive press attention. 
The venue for that year’s gathering was the city of Turkmenbashy (known as 
Krasnovodsk until 1993), on the eastern shore of the Caspian Sea. The role of 
Yaqshular Maslehaty is significant in two respects. It is an expression of national 
cohesion, whereby traditional leaders of different regions publicly reiterate their 
communality and loyalty to the whole.”72  Additionally, this body reflects the 
Turkmen tradition of respect for and deference to elders, and by extension for 
Niyazov as head of the Yaqshular Maslehaty.  
A main measure of political pluralism, of course, is the existence of elections 
and level of electoral participation. In Turkmenistan, elections are farcical and serve 
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only to reinforce Niyazov’s rule– this mirrors traditional sultanism, in which rulers 
turn to plebiscites to prove democratic legitimacy. Cummings and Ochs write, 
“Indeed, Niyazov was the first to introduce the practice of referenda in post-
independent Central Asia. Elected president of the Turkmen SSR in 1990 with 98 per 
cent of the vote in an unopposed race, Niyazov had his term extended in national 
referenda in 1992 and again in 1994; in the latter case, a purported majority of 99 per 
cent of the voters approved an extension of Niyazov’s term of some office until 2003. 
These referenda... exemplified Niyazov’s exploitation and perversion of democratic 
values and practices.” In the 1992 presidential election, Niyazov was the sole 
candidate to stand and the government barred any oppositionists from mounting any 
real challenge because they announced the election only one month before voting day. 
The 1994 referendum superseded the presidential vote that had been expected to 
occur in 1997.73  
Parliamentary elections in Turkmenistan are also no more than a facade. 
International observers and Western governments reported that the 1999 
parliamentary vote was hugely flawed, with Niyazov reportedly chose all 100 
candidates and hand picked the 50 winners– although some of the candidates ran on 
an “independent” ticket, all were reportedly connected to Niyazov’s DPT. Niyazov 
held parliamentary elections in April 2003, this was reportedly conceived as an 
attempt to purge the parliament of potential bases of support for oppositionist Boris 
Shikhmuradov, who was the foreign minister when that parliament was installed.74  
Few open oppositionists are known to exist in Turkmenistan, and political 
activity is limited to the president’s party. However, Turkmenistan has an exile-based 
opposition largely comprised of former government officials who, following 
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dismissal or resignation, left Turkmenistan for Moscow or Europe. This opposition 
falls into two major camps, its division and failure to cooperate presenting large 
obstacles to its success. The first opposition camp is centred around the now-jailed 
former Foreign Minister Boris Shikhmuradov (who defected from his ambassadorial 
post in Beijing in 2001), and the other around former Soviet diplomat Avdy Kuliev. 
Shikhmuradov’s group, the National Democratic Movement of Turkmenistan (NDT), 
was held largely responsible for the November 2002 attempt on the life of Niyazov in 
Ashgabat. Shikhmuradov was arrested in December 2002 on Turkmen territory after a 
Soviet-style public confession (some observers suggest that he had been drugged to 
elicit the confession), and the Movement has suffered serious blows in the flurry of 
arrests following the assassination attempt. Formed in November 2001, 
Shikhmuradov’s NDT consists mostly of former government officials who were 
working under Niyazov in the 1990s.  
Kuliev, another former foreign minister, who now lives in exile in Moscow 
after leaving his post in late 1993, heads the United Turkmen Opposition (UTO)– this 
group consists largely of intellectuals, technocrats, and other dissidents who fled in 
the country in the early 1990s, including members of the Turkmen Communist Party 
and the short-lived Agzybirlik. The UTO has called for cooperation between 
opposition leaders, and in September 2003, Turkmen opposition groups met in Prague 
for a two day summit to discuss creation of the Union of Democratic Forces of 
Turkmenistan (UDFT), comprising Kuliev’s group, the Watan movement, the 
Renaissance socio-political movement and the Republican Party of Turkmenistan, all 
exile-based opposition groups. The summit also included participants from Turkmen 
diaspora communities in Afghanistan and Iran.75  
                                       




Public opposition within Turkmenistan, always very limited, is now 
practically nonexistent. In the early part of the period following independence, there 
was some limited public dissatisfaction with the regime. Signs of this dissatisfaction 
included May 1989 riots in Ashgabat and Nebitdag over prices, and price rises in 
1992 apparently led to a strike in Nebitdag (renamed Balkanabat).76 Over the past 
decade, however, opposition has been minimal, although during the summer of 2002 
there were reports of a women’s protest outside the presidential palace in Ashgabat, 
although the women reportedly were taken away by police immediately.  
 Treatment of prisoners and dissidents shows an absence of rule of law and a 
disregard for human rights. The judicial branch is largely a tool of presidential 
control, and dissidents are regularly jailed following trials that do not meet 
international standards. Niyazov appoints all judges for five-year terms and has the 
power to dismiss them at will. The government denies that it holds political prisoners, 
but human rights groups have documented numerous cases of imprisonment on 
dubious charges. Many cases go unreported, or people are arrested on alternative 
fabricated charges, often drug-related, or on accusations of corruption. Since the 
moratorium on the death penalty in 1999, imprisonment in appalling conditions has 
been the norm; officials are often sentenced to internal exile.  
Prior to the recent arrest of Shikhmuradov, the only high-profile political 
prisoner in jail was Mukhmatkuli Aimuradov, in prison since 1994. According to 
International Crisis Group reports, people held by the KNB are either sent to prisons 
or immediately to labour camps where mortality rates are extremely high. Prisoners in 
these camps are repeatedly beaten and tortured by guards and forced to carry out 
strenuous work in appalling conditions. An estimated 20,000 people, both criminals 
                                       




and regime opponents, are imprisoned in camps, including camps for women and 
psychiatric hospitals. In June 2005, Yolly Gurbanmuradov, Turkmenistan’s Deputy 
Prime Minister in charge of oil and gas, the chairman of Turkmenistan’s foreign bank, 
and a suspected potential successor to Niyazov, was arrested on charges of fraud and 
embezzlement and sentenced to imprisonment. 
Repression reached a new peak after the alleged assassination attempt on 
Niyazov in November 2002. The crackdown following the attempt is “evidence of a 
growing disregard for human rights and civil liberties. The conviction of opposition 
leader Shikhmuradov came after a trial that lasted less than one day and that took 
place just four days after his arrest on December 25. Moreover, Parliament intervened 
in the sentencing, imposing a life term after the Supreme Court had handed down a 
25-year sentence.”77 The government makes a practice of targeting relatives and 
friends of opposition figures as well; according to Amnesty International, at least 18 
relatives of Saparmurat Yklymov, a former deputy agriculture minister, were 
reportedly detained. The regime accused Yklymov, Shikhmuradov, and other leading 
opposition figures of “hiring mercenaries to try to kill Niyazov. All told, the regime 
may have arrested upward of 100 people in connection with the attack, international 
human rights groups suggested, although officials put the number of arrests at only 
48.”78   
Turkmenistan has maintained the Soviet tradition of strong state control over 
society. Freedom of movement is significantly restricted. All citizens are required to 
carry internal passports that note their place of residence and any movements into and 
out of the country. Under international pressure, the government officially ended the 
requirement for exit visas for Turkmen citizens on 1 January 2002, yet unofficial 
                                       





controls are still in place at Ashgabat airport, and some people have been prevented 
from leaving the country, despite having the correct visas and air tickets. “Within 
Turkmenistan, traffic police and the army check cars every 50 to 70 kilometres and 
register the names, passport details and car numbers of all travellers, whether 
Turkmen or foreign. Increasing checks on foreigners entering the country were 
introduced in December 2002, and visas made even more difficult to obtain. Social 
control and the overwhelming dominance of the cult of personality are only possible 
because they are backed by a huge security apparatus, which uses repression to block 
any opposition to the regime.”79 A tight exit visa regime was reinstated for a time, 
starting in March 2002, and on 22 June 2002, Russian citizens living in Turkmenistan 
faced losing either that citizenship or their jobs and property when Turkmenistan 
unilaterally withdrew from its Dual Citizenship Agreement with the Russian 
Federation.  In summer 2003, Turkmenistan adopted an amended constitution that 
centralized control of all three branches of government in just the Halk Maslehaty.80  
Ideology 
Turkmenistan, one of the least developed and most dependent of the Soviet 
republics, was unprepared for the collapse of the USSR in 1991. Economically, it was 
hugely dependent on subsidies from Moscow, and its leadership was used to fulfilling 
orders from Moscow, not developing independent policies. When independence was 
proclaimed (somewhat reluctantly) on 27 October 1991, some time after all the other 
Soviet republics, there was little certainty about what an independent state of 
Turkmenistan might look like, with no real tradition of statehood. Niyazov has 
attempted to fill the vacuum left by the withdrawal of Soviet power with a newly 
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found sense of nation- and statehood. However, the lack of any national tradition of 
statehood allowed Niyazov to construct the idea of a Turkmen nation around his own 
personality and background. In the early 1990s, this was accepted and even welcomed 
by many Turkmen intellectuals because it was perceived as a necessary element of 
nation-building, akin to Kemal Ataturk’s actions in Turkey in the 1920s. 
Turkmenistan’s post-Soviet pseudo-ideology could be characterized as Turkmen 
nationalism fused with Niyazov’s person. 
Cummings and Ochs note that, “Personalism, buttressed by an extensive cult 
of personality, is a second essential attribute of sultanism. In Turkmenistan the 
president defines and characterizes the Turkmen polity.”81 The so-called ideological 
vacuum left after the Soviet collapse created the space for a cult of personality: “In 
weak, young states with limited cultural cohesion and an unformed national narrative, 
a personality cult grants a leader the opportunity to construct or remake national 
history and identity... A cult transmits an ideology and spiritual terrain through culture 
and invented tradition in order to overlay internal disunity and allay external 
threats.”82 Niyazov’s cult of personality has become increasingly entrenched over the 
past decade and now leaves virtually no part of the country untouched. The past three 
to four years have witnessed a particularly dramatic intensification of the cult. 
Essentially, what Niyazov has achieved is a state imposed Turkmen identity centred 
on his own personal image. Lack of alternative sources of information and the ever-
present nature of his personality cult ensure that for a portion of the population this 
cult of personality serves as an effective means of social and political control. The 
cult of personality revolves first, around Niyazov himself, second, around his family 
members, particularly his parents, and thirdly, around his books and particularly his 
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landmark moral and spiritual code for Turkmen, Ruhnama. As Denison writes, “The 
personality cult in Turkmenistan represents far more than the realization of one 
individual’s megalomaniac fantasies. Rather it possesses political substance and 
purpose. The cult has, in fact, a dual strategy: first, it functions as a mechanism to 
enforce compliance to the regime; secondly, it is deployed to advance a serious 
political project aimed at forging a national consensus around a shared identity, 
ideology and historical meta-narrative, mediated through Niyazov’s image, in order to 
construct a national space for Turkmen to relate to each other and the outside 
world.”83  
A giant golden statue of Turkmenbashy revolves slowly in central Ashgabat, 
showing the way to the sun from dawn to sunset. His name and image are on each 
central square of major cities and large villages. Niyazov’s portraits cover public 
buildings and large billboards across the country, and also are on books, newspapers, 
bottles of alcohol and food packaging. The leadership cult is transmitted through a 
“variety of media: through public spectacles and concerts, national television, radio 
and the official press, slogans and portraits in public spaces, art and architecture, on t-
shirts, bumper stickers and vodka bottles.”84 The slogan Halk, Watan, Turkmenbashy 
(People, Nation, Turkmenbashy) is everywhere. Towns, regions, asteroids, and plants 
have been named after him. Even television provides no escape: a golden profile of 
Turkmenbashy revolves constantly in the upper right-hand corner of the screen. In 
order to assert his image as irreplaceable, he had thousands of portraits of himself 
with white hair replaced with one in which he sports newly dyed pitch-black hair, 
following a successful heart operation.  
In 2001 Niyazov codified the new ethics of the Turkmen nation in a spiritual 
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guide, called the Ruhnama (Spirituality, or Book of the Soul). This 400-page volume, 
allegedly authored by Niyazov, is a compilation of Niyazov’s personal history, folk 
sayings, and the history, philosophy and traditions of the Turkmen nation as 
interpreted by Turkmenbashy.85 The principal agenda of the book is to legitimate 
Niyazov’s regime and place it at the pinnacle of the historical quest of the Turkmen 
for independent statehood.  Denison suggests that Ruhnama is an attempt to deliver 
compliance through “a presupposed, prepolitical consensus that fuses political 
community, national ideology and government policy, thereby implicitly denying any 
space to alternative prescriptions of governance or policy.”86 Ruhnama contains a 
rather loosely structured mixture of Turkmen genealogy, history, personal reflection, 
“charming homilies and moral injunctions,” and is undoubtedly “intended to be a 
spiritual if not directly religious text.”87 The book has been declared on a par with the 
Koran and the Bible for its moral value, and has become a key element of daily life in 
Turkmenistan. In schools and universities, students spend hours studying and 
discussing the Ruhnama to become model Turkmen citizens. Similarly, every work 
unit must organize public discussion groups at least once a week to discuss and make 
use of the philosophy contained in the Ruhnama. Since 2001, argues Denison, the cult 
of personality has moved farther away from Niyazov and increasingly centres on the 
book of Ruhnama itself. Pictures of Ruhnama, indeed, are ubiquitous in 
Turkmenistan, and the regime seems intent on making it a national obsession. A new 
park in Ashgabat pays homage to the book itself and features a large pink-and-green 
statue of the book, which opens on national holidays to reveal pictures of national 
heroes. 
                                       






While Niyazov’s cult of personality is the most predominant feature and 
element of the new pseudo-ideology, there are other elements, particularly the attempt 
to define a new Turkmen nationalism that promotes unity and consensus, 
downplaying tribal and regional discord. In addition, Niyazov has promoted a state-
sponsored version of Islam as a strategy for preventing the growth of radical Islam in 
Turkmenistan, a strategy that has been adopted by leaders throughout the region. 
Turkmen nation building in the period following independence has hinged on 
two major themes: linguistic nationalism and Turkmenization, and the revision of 
Turkmen history, with a particular emphasis on national unity and cohesion, and 
rediscovering a past of glory and greatness. At first the expression of a national 
identity that had been overshadowed by the Soviet identity, Niyazov’s policies of 
Turkmenization have accelerated very rapidly in recent years. Russian and Uzbek 
schools have been closed and minority rights have been taken away. Traditional 
Turkmen dress and headdress is promoted and mandatory in schools for children of 
all nationalities. For a foreigner, it costs $50,000 USD to marry a Turkmen citizen. 
According to media reports, the genealogy of senior officials and their spouses is 
checked for three generations to ensure high moral standards.88 In tune with the policy 
of “linking national sovereignty and the role of Turkmenbashy, the new constitution 
and its provisions for the ‘revival’ of alleged traditional designations and structures 
are attributed to Niyazov’s personal ingenuity. The policies of the state, decreed by 
Niyazov, are claimed to be in conformity with ancient Turkmen traditions.”89  
A large part of this policy of Turkmenization, particularly in the immediate 
post-Soviet period, was linguistic nationalism, which Kuru has asserted is “the main 
                                       
88 Interfax, 1 August 2000 




pillar of Turkmen nation building.”90 The Turkmenistan constitution renamed 
political institutions: “the regional administrative division (oblast) and its subdivision 
(raion) are renamed welayat and etrap (Art. 80). Administrative organs have shed 
their Russian designations and been given the vernacular title of hokimiyat. All local 
administrators in welayats and etraps, known as hokims, are constitutionally 
appointed by the President (Art. 81).”91 Since then, it has been difficult to go to 
school or get a job if you do not speak Turkmen. When Shikhmuradov was fired from 
his post as foreign minister, Niyazov cited as a reason for his dismissal his poor 
knowledge of Turkmen. Niyazov himself did not really know Turkmen but had to 
learn it in the years immediately following independence.  
The government of Turkmenistan has tried to cultivate a religious image for 
itself as part of the national revival. Kuru suggests that there are two reasons behind 
this policy: “First, Islam has been a significant part of national identification in 
Turkmenistan since the Soviet period... Second, having a good Muslim image became 
a source of legitimacy for rulers and symbolizes their respect for national identity.”92 
Like many of the Central Asian leaders, Niyazov took a highly publicized hajj to 
Mecca with his cabinet of ministers in 1992. He has spent huge amounts of state 
funds to construct large mosques and religious buildings, including a large mosque in 
Goktepe called Haji Saparmurat Turkmenbashy and in 2003, Central Asia’s largest 
mosque in Niyazov’s home village of Kipjak. Turkmenistan, home to only four 
mosques under Soviet rule, had 318 operating mosques by 2003. Many of these, 
however, seemed primarily aimed at glorification of the state rather than meeting 
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religious needs, and copies of Ruhnama sit side-by side with the Koran.93 Niyazov 
frequently issues public statements in support of Islamic scholarship; in one television 
segment, for example, he stated that, “If you start to research the period when the 
Islamic religion was introduced in Turkmenistan, then you will be convinced that it 
was the Turkmen nation who defended and preserved the Islamic religion. They 
waged wars not to conquer other lands but to defend and protect their faith. They 
defended the Islamic religion during the Crusades. We are not sure whether the 
Islamic world knows about the merits of the Turkmens to protect purity of the Islamic 
religion.”94  
Niyazov has designed a number of official religious structures to control and 
oversee the national religious revival. The major body of the government is the 
Council for Religious Affairs (Gengesh in Turkmen, or CRA), under Niyazov’s 
control. Describes as an intermediary organization, this office is in control of all 
registered religious organizations. It is chaired by a prominent Imam from the 
Goktepe mosque, and the three deputy chairmen are the Mufti of Turkmenistan, the 
head of the Russian Orthodox Church, and a government representative.95 While the 
Constitution theoretically guarantees religious freedom, all religion outside of the 
government’s control is severely restricted in practice, with the exception of two 
officially registered groups, Sunni Muslims and Russian Orthodox. In 1991, a Law on 
Freedom of Conscience and on Religious Organizations was passed to guarantee 
freedom of religious belief, but this law requires registration of all religious 
organizations with the Justice Ministry. In 1995, it was amended to require at least 
500 members of any registered religion to live in any locality in which they hope to 
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gain legality. A recent International Crisis Group report on religion suggests that, “In 
practice, this means that – unlike Sunni Muslims and Russian Orthodox believers – 
members of the Armenian Apostolic, Baptist, Pentecostalist, Seventh-Day Adventist, 
Jehovah's Witnesses, Baha’i and Hare Krishna churches are unable to register and are 
therefore severely persecuted. Naturally, any Muslim community wishing to establish 
an independent congregation is similarly outlawed.”96    
As part of the campaign of national revival, Niyazov has promoted the 
dissemination of Turkmen culture through entertainment and dress, above any sort of 
foreign influences. He has outlawed foreign arts like ballet and opera, instead 
promoting Turkmen national folk song and dance. He has forbidden the wearing of 
long hair or beards, and children are required to wear national dress in schools. In 
2001, Niyazov said of history and culture: “During the 70 years of the Soviet Union 
we have learnt a lot about cultures, we know great Western classics, we are familiar 
also with Shakespeare, French writers, many composers, but we do not know the 
origin of Turkmens, we do not know our writers.”97 In April 2001, citing India and 
China’s national theatres, he said, “A nation cannot present itself as cultured people 
by introducing another (foreign) art. We must study our national culture, we must 
create our national theatre.”98  
Mobilization  
The population of Turkmenistan receives a mixture of promises, gifts, and 
repression from the Niyazov regime, which seeks to induce compliance through a 
meshing of fear and rewards for regime supporters. “In order to convince the 
population, the Turkmen state has provided its citizens with free use of gas, electricity 
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and water since January 1993, merely a symbolic gesture, since gas and electricity 
payments were token during the Soviet era. Another widely publicized, but 
unfulfilled, promise is the free distribution of bread by January 1997, even though 
Turkmenistan is dependent on imported grain from Russia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan 
and was experiencing bread shortages in 1995.”99 There are regular presidential 
pledges to double wages and to improve standards of living. In early 1999, he 
promised to double wages throughout Turkmenistan by 1 December 1999, increasing 
all wages over two years to improve quality of life and national wealth.100  
Media, including television, radio and newspapers, are among the most 
important modes of propagation of presidential policy in Turkmenistan. Media in 
Turkmenistan are, according to Freedom House, among the most tightly controlled in 
the world. When not issuing government statements, the three state television 
channels broadcast concerts of Turkmen folk dancing and songs devoted to 
Turkmenbashy. On the main television news programme, Watan Habarlar Geplesigi 
(national news), there is “almost no news except for the President’s declarations or 
activities. The programme starts with a good wish and prayer for Turkmenbashy. 
When speaking about the president, the TV and radio commentators use epithets, such 
as compassionate, merciful and esteemed.”101 The regime owns and controls nearly all 
print and broadcast media. Criticism of Niyazov is prohibited, and the president uses 
the press to help shape the cult of personality.102 In a public speech, Niyazov stated 
his views on the role of the television programming: “We should arrange musical 
shows, games, different programs on TV and radio in order to influence the mind of a 
person who has just come home from a job and having a pleasant rest. We cannot 
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evoke the spirit of people with unpleasant songs of any singers.”103  
Recent years have seen an even greater tightening of controls upon media. In 
2002, the government confiscated a print run of a Moscow-based paper, 
Komsomolskaya Pravda, because of an article describing the situation in 
Turkmenistan. Cable television was also banned in 2002 after a Turkmen journalist 
fled to Moscow in July and aired footage of poverty in Turkmenistan. Russian and 
foreign language newspapers are not readily available in Turkmenistan. Among the 
few non-state news sources available to Turkmenistan’s population are the U.S.-
funded Radio Liberty and the Russian Mayak radio station, although these too are 
beginning to lose ground due to operational obstacles from the Turkmen state. In 
March 2004, two RFE/FL correspondents were arrested and detained by the Turkmen 
National Security Ministry (MNB) as part of a campaign of harassment against 
RFE/RL Turkmen Service Members. Ashyrguly Bayryev and Rakhim Esenov were 
arrested, the latter under charges of instigating “social, ethnic, and religious hatred” 
under Article 177 of the Turkmen criminal code. These arrests followed the 
September and November 2003 abductions of RFE/RL correspondent Saparmurat 
Ovexberdiev in Ashgabat.104 Satellite television is very widespread in Turkmenistan 
and still legal, although expensive for the local population. There have been 
suggestions of a government attempt to outlaw satellite television, however, and 
programs from Russia are reportedly censored by a special commission before airing.  
Cinema does not exist in Turkmenistan. The film industry is another (albeit 
weak and unemphasized) arm of the propaganda mill in Turkmenistan. 
Turkmentelekinofilm, the creative arts group, in 2001 was charged with releasing six 
additional episodes of the television production entitled “Turkmenbashy– Our 
                                       
103 Ashgabat Television Channel One, 3 April, 2001 




Protector.” This is a sequel to the 19-episode series “Turkmenbashy– My Serdar 
(Leader)”. The new film is “based on a script written by Kakamurat Balliyev, the 
Turkmen President’s Press Secretary, in honour of the 10th anniversary of 
Turkmenistan’s independence. The plot centres around an American lady journalist 
who arrives in Turkmenistan. Won over by Turkmenbashy’s thoughts and ideas, by 
his book Ruhnama, she expresses a deep interest in the history of the Turkmen nation 
and culture, the truth of which was hidden during the Soviet era.”105  
Print media is yet another source of government propaganda. The major 
Turkmen-language periodicals include Turkmenistan, published six times a week; 
Watan, published three times a week; Galkynys, a weekly that is the “mouthpiece of 
the ruling Democratic Party of Turkmenistan”; and Turkmen Dunyasi, a monthly that 
is the organ of the Ashgabat-based World Turkmen’s Association. Other Turkmen-
language papers include Adalat (Justice) and Edebiyat we Sungat (Literature and the 
Arts). The Russian-language Neytralnyy Turkmenistan is published six times a 
week.106  
 Turkmenistan has only one Internet service provider, which is state owned 
and controlled very strictly. There are filters on opposition sites, and email is believed 
to be intercepted by the security services. “State-owned Turkmen Telecom has been 
the sole Internet service provider since 2000, when the government revoked the 
licenses of all five private Internet providers. In any case, Internet access is 
prohibitively expensive for most Turkmen.”107 Most Turkmenistan citizens do not 
have access to the Internet and, where they do, sites are locked or access is 
prohibitively slow.108 
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NGO participation is very low in Turkmenistan even relative to its repressive 
neighbours. Although the database of Washington-based Counterpart Consortium lists 
138 NGOs in Turkmenistan, in reality far fewer are operational. NGOs face serious 
obstacles to operation especially in light of a recent crackdown on their activity; new 
regulations allow almost total state control over NGO funding, activity, and even 
property. NGO leaders have been harassed and threatened by authorities. Authorities 
have banned all public events and have suspended many NGOs. Only NGOs 
dedicated to environmental protection, student issues or minorities exist, and analysts 
believe that the new law is intended to break this independent network of public 
organizations, leaving only state-sponsored groups such as the Women’s Union, the 
Youth Association and the Veterans’ Association in place.109  
Education “is crucial both to indoctrinate national imagination and feelings 
and to maintain social control.”110 Education in Turkmenistan is declining in quality 
and in quantity, and educational institutions are largely used to deliver and ingrain 
regime propaganda. Freedom House reports, “schools are increasingly being used to 
indoctrinate students rather than teach them liberal arts, math, science, vocational 
skills, and foreign languages.”111 A series of presidential decrees have decreased the 
amount of schooling at all levels available to Turkmen students and placed further 
restrictions on study abroad opportunities.   
There are many state-sponsored organizations designed to mobilize citizens 
behind issues of national identity and to build and encourage national culture. One 
such organization, the National Revival Movement, was launched in January 1994. 
According to Akbarzadeh, “This Movement is treated just like other state organs and 
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is composed of 50 etrap hokims, five welayat hokims, 53 ministers and deputy 
ministers, seven regional Imams and a number of state functionaries. President 
Niyazov is firmly in control as the chairman of the Movement and is aided by his 
deputy Onjuk Musaev, first secretary of the DPT.”112 Other state institutions that are 
designed to further nation building are the National Administration for Study, 
Protection and Restoration of Historical and Cultural Monuments and the World 
Turkmen Humanitarian Association. The National Management was formed in July 
1994 to implement Niyazov’s earlier decree. “The roots of the Humanitarian 
Association, however, may be traced back to the Soviet era, when the organization 
was a propaganda tool for influencing neighbouring states via their Turkmen 
minorities. Most Soviet republics had such associations. But the Soviet collapse 
suddenly conferred great importance on this institution. The October 1991 session of 
this association was celebrated with pomp and ceremony, with President Niyazov 
welcoming Turkmen guests from foreign states to the ‘land of their forefathers.’”113  
This chapter has described some of the major attributes and the chronologies 
of the cases of sultanistic rule from post-colonial Africa that will hopefully provide 
some insight into the behaviour of Turkmenistan’s current regime. From the brutal 
reigns of Amin and Macias Nguema to the relatively benevolent but eccentric 
personalism in Hastings Banda’s Malawi, these African regimes all share 
characteristics that place them squarely in the category of sultanism, as the concept is 
set forth by Chehabi and Linz. Turkmenistan’s regime under Saparmurat Niyazov, it 
is relatively clear, also closely resembles this typology. It will be instructive, in 
seeking to understand the regime’s actions and to make prognoses for the future of 
Turkmenistan, to consider it with reference to historical examples of similar types of 
                                       





regimes. Comparison with, or at least a reference to, these examples from sub-
Saharan Africa is instructive not only for its use in deconstructing Turkmenistan’s 
current political climate, but also in forwarding the growing comparison between 
Africa and Central Asia on a regional level in the literature on political developments. 
The next chapter will lay out one major element of that comparison—the historical 
conditions that may have contributed to the rise of dysfunctional authority and 












Although comparisons between sub-Saharan Africa and Central Asia are 
accepted now by many regional specialists,1 differences—from cultural traditions to 
indigenous economies—between these regions can seem glaring. This chapter 
considers those conditions shared by these regions that lend themselves to the 
emergence of personalist leadership. In order to explore these comparatively, it is 
necessary to isolate some of the factors that appear to be common in cases of 
sultanistic rule. The debate between structural and contingent explanations here is 
very salient but unresolved—while intensely personalized leadership almost 
tautologically depends on the actions of the strongman, there seem to be contexts that 
can be more or less conducive to the emergence of sultanism. The origin of this most 
personalized form of rule in most cases can be traced to a combination of personal, 
strategic, and macrostructural factors. 
Personality Factors 
  The emergence of sultanism, a regime type predicated on the intense 
personalization of power, obviously cannot be explained by structural factors alone—
at best, certain conditions might be favourable to the rise of sultanism in a given 
country. It is tautological that “personality of the ruler is a key element in 
understanding a sultanistic regime.”2 Especially where institutions and participatory 
political cultures are weak, the personality of a ruler plays a tremendous role in his 
                                       
1 See, for example, John Ishiyama, “Neopatrimonialism and the prospects for democratization in the 
Central Asian republics,” in Sally Cummings, ed. Power and Change in Central Asia (London and 
New York: Routledge, 2002), Mark Beissinger and Crawford Young, eds., Beyond State Crisis: 
Postcolonial Africa and Post-Soviet Eurasia in Comparative Perspective (Washington DC: Woodrow 
Wilson Center Press, 2002), G. Gleason and Susan Buck, “Decolonization in the Former Soviet 
Borderland: Politics in Search of Principles,” PS: Political Science and Politics 26(3): 522-525, and 
David Moore, “Is the Post-in Postcolonial the Post- in Post-Soviet? Towards a Global Postcolonial 
Critique,” PMLA 116(1):111-128 
2 H.E. Chehabi and Juan J. Linz, “A Theory of Sultanistic Regimes 2: Genesis and Demise of 





rise to power and his style of governance. As Rubin writes of Africa, “There are few, 
if any, innate reasons why Uganda did not have the good fortune to produce a 
Nyerere or Tanzania did not just happen to have an Idi Amin instead.”3 Personality, 
or Decalo’s so-called “idiosyncratic variable”, makes a difference. 
  The study of personality in leadership presents certain difficulties. As Blondel 
writes, “there are still many controversies around the concept of personality itself, 
since personality refers to what is permanent, and yet slowly changing, in the 
characteristics of an individual.”4 There is no fully accepted definition of personality 
or list of attributes that would constitute a personality, though “one can suggest a 
number of elements which seem important, such as energy, courage, or intelligence.”5 
Leadership, overall, seems to be associated with many aspects of human personality, 
and psychologists have tried to determine the traits that might be more or less suited 
to leadership of different types, with several positive correlates. Some analyses from 
the 1930s and 1940s focused on the idea of pathology in leadership, due to questions 
of imbalance in the personalities of some national leaders. Specific attention has been 
paid to revolutionary leaders, and examination of the personal and situational 
conditions for the rise of revolutionaries have shown a variety of common traits—
vanity, egotism, narcissism and nationalism among them. 
  Personal factors, for the discussion of contemporary sultans, can be 
subdivided into the categories of personal calibre and personal prestige. Calibre is 
“based in turn on personal attributes that are found in varying degrees and 
combinations: self-confidence, political shrewdness, ruthlessness, ideological 
dexterity, oratorical brilliance, administrative ability and effort, military or party 
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leadership skills—and luck.”6 While there is “no simple biographical and 
psychological portrait of the ideal-typical sultanistic ruler,” some traits are found in 
these types of leaders with more frequency than others.7 Personally, sultanistic 
leaders tend to be shrewd, morally unscrupulous, distrustful, and vindictive. Many 
have demonstrated a capacity for deceit and womanizing, as well as streaks of 
personal cruelty.8 Any individual who alone rises to supreme power shares an 
obsession with power itself. Many future sultanistic leaders share a background of 
limited education, socially marginal upbringings, and upward mobility through 
accidental channels.9 As Bailey writes, “their origins very often seem to reveal 
marginality rather than central and secure belonging in a group.”10 Difficult 
childhoods and even the experience of being orphaned is shared by several of the 
leaders discussed in this thesis, leading to speculation about the innate need for a 
feeling of acceptance and love, even national reverence, to replace a personal void.  
Whatever the actual personality, attaining and maintaining power in the 
contemporary era requires at least a facade of charismatic legitimacy if, as in the case 
of sultanism, legitimacy is not found in traditional or in legal-rational bases. A 
principal device for control, beyond repression and material satisfaction of the 
population’s needs, is some type of charisma, which may include media-induced 
charm. Bailey writes: “if in his actual person the leader has all the magnetism of a 
withered carrot, that is of no significance if he can afford to pay advertising experts to 
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put him across to the mass as sprightly and inspired.”11 Creating charisma can entail 
the creation of cults of personality or pseudo-ideologies to attempt justification of a 
sultan’s rule. When real charisma is absent, a leader “must nourish in others the 
illusion that he is gifted with superhuman talents.”12 Bailey refers to two relevant 
styles of leadership that sultanistic leaders may aspire to, at least on the surface: 
numinous, wherein a leader has superhuman capacities and inspires literal devotion, 
and familial, when a population reveres the leader like a parent.13 Bailey’s 
“numinous” style is particularly interesting to the discussion of personality cults– the 
leader conveys the impression that he is divinity and holds powers and capacities 
beyond those of ordinary people. The leader, according to Bailey, finds clear 
advantages in the numinous style-- the relationship of leader-follower is transferred 
unambiguously to “the realm of the supernatural, where, by definition, anything is 
possible and doubting is a sin. Moreover, the remoteness of such a leader removes the 
risk of over-familiarity which attends the familial style.”14 Numenification is not a 
quality of an individual in the same sense that charisma was in Weber’s conception– 
numenification is not a quality at all but a strategy, “the adoption of a style intended 
to create or enhance charisma.”15    
Personal prestige, the second category of personal factors, is based on the 
celebrated attributes of the ruler– attributes which may be heralded for their 
contributions to significant and celebrated events in the country or regime’s history, 
such as struggles for national independence. The same attributes, however, “may also 
be celebrated in the sense of being glorified by the regime’s propaganda– which is 
likely to present exaggerated or even fictitious accounts of attributes and 
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contributions, often advertised and promoted by the glorifying personality cult.”16 
The term “personality cult” describes a “propaganda/ indoctrination campaign 
glorifying the regime’s leader and making extravagant claims about his personal 
attributes and the manner in which they have contributed to the successes of the 
regime and country.”17    
Strategic Factors  
Another, related, category of explanatory factors in regime emergence are 
structural attributes that strengthen a leader’s personal position within a regime– such 
as “control over public powers that are legally absolutist or very extensive.”18 
Brooker suggests that these structural-strategic factors are more important than agent-
centric explanations in describing the rise of sultanism.   
Rubin has suggested that modern dictators distinguish themselves from 
“traditional” dictators by their reliance on technique rather than ideology. In his view, 
the twentieth century saw “progress in the art of dictatorship” as leaders of third 
world regimes learned from the techniques of other dictators.19 He suggests that many 
elements of modernization have hindered dictatorship as it was practiced in the past 
and necessitated development of new techniques of authority for modern dictators. 
The old bonds of patriarchal loyalty, Rubin asserts, have been disrupted– aspects of 
modern economies and societies in terms of education, communication, and 
urbanization have had a tremendous effect on strategies of rule. He writes, “There are 
fewer peasants who unquestionably accept an all-powerful landlord’s authority. 
Migration to cities and access to radio or schools give the peasants and middle class 
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new ideas and experiences. The fixed nature of power and the inevitability of existing 
social arrangements become subject to challenge and doubt.”20  
Bailey, in his book on leadership, highlights the organizational structures that 
a leader needs to control in order to successfully promote his program. He touches on 
the concept of social capital in his discussion. “The dispositions of followers are 
obviously connected with the formal organizations through which their lives are 
regulated. . . Therefore if the leader can shape organizations, he should be able at the 
same time to shape dispositions and eventually the actions of his subordinates.”21 
Organizational arrangements, he argues, are a necessary but not sufficient factor in a 
leader’s control. “No leader, save in the most rudimentary situations, can effectively 
control subordinates without organizational arrangements, but he cannot effectively 
control them by organizational means alone.”22  
Government officials and members of the leader’s entourage, recognizing the 
precariousness of positions, grapple for the favour of the ruler in order to stay in 
power. The staff is generally chosen directly by the ruler, and their positions derive 
from personal submission to the ruler. As a result, officials have little job security, no 
independent status, and can be appointed and dismissed at will.23  
A leader’s control of the military and/or official party apparatus is a structural 
factor that strengthens the leader’s position. Military control helps to safeguard him 
from all civilian as well as military attempts to overthrow him. “Leadership of the 
party provides him with some kind of control organization which may also have (1) a 
coup-deterring role, by potentially mobilizing civilian opposition to military 
intervention, and/or (2) a significant electoral role if his public office formally 
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requires an occasional electoral charade. Therefore the strength of this leadership 
position over the military or party can be crucial.24 Sultanistic leaders often take care 
to prevent military coups by maintaining divisions within the military and promoting 
espionage between branches to protect themselves– some leaders have private 
militias for this reason; in addition, leaders make use of secret police forces.25 Family 
members often play a prominent role in sultanistic regimes; personalism and 
dynasticism in combination, Linz has suggested, are unique to sultanism.26 There 
may be supplementary structural attributes, such as private militias, secret police 
organizations, or “the regime leader’s use of family members and people from his 
locality, tribe, sect, or other minority group to fill high-security posts.”27  
 These personality-related characteristics, however, are more contingent 
explanations and are not as useful for comparative purposes—discounting side-by-
side biographies, which can be interesting if not altogether revealing. I turn to more 
structural explanations for the rise of intensely personal leadership to search for 
shared features of the African and Central Asian experiences—with the 
understanding, of course, that they can be no more than one piece of the puzzle in the 
explanation, for not all of the regimes in post-colonial African nor in Central Asia 
have experienced the degree of personal rule that the cases of sultanism demonstrate 
is possible. 
Macrostructural Factors 
  Chehabi and Linz have examined some of the external conditions that can 
favour the emergence of sultanistic regimes. These range from economic 
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development and natural resources to historical legacies. Cummings calls these 
macrostructural factors and highlights the relevance of possession of easily 
exploitable resources whose production is in the hands of one or a few enterprises, 
substantial doses of foreign aid, interest by foreign actors in ‘order’ which maintains 
the existing regime, and persistent crises of sovereignty. The two categories of 
explanatory variables are macrostructural-resource and macrostructural-cultural 
factors. 
  On the resource side, sultanistic regimes are not inevitable outcomes of 
socioeconomic structures, but historically there have been structures that have helped 
to facilitate the emergence of such regimes. Rentier states, for example, “in which the 
regime is not bound by tradition (unlike the oil monarchies of the Arabian peninsula) 
are thus more vulnerable to sultanization.”28 Economies based on oil, sugar, and 
copper have historically been particularly vulnerable, and massive doses of foreign 
aid or loans can encourage corruption, especially unconditional aid. Technological 
innovation, moreover, may prolong the life of some sultanistic regimes. Continuity of 
sultanistic regimes can require ‘certain modernization of transportation and 
communications as well as of the military and police organizations and some civilian 
administrations, to provide funds to sustain the rule and prevent threats to it.”29  
A country’s historical political experience might be relevant for the 
emergence of a sultanistic regime. Blondel writes, “By and large, a dictatorial 
government is likely to come to power when conflicts among institutions and groups 
are such that no accommodation can be found because political integration is low.”30 
Chehabi and Linz suggest that sultanistic regimes might emerge in conditions where 
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a country has suffered persistent crises of sovereignty in their political 
development—that is, where “throughout their contemporary history their 
independence was ambiguous and often not respected by more powerful 
neighbours.”31 This has been especially true of Central America and the Caribbean. 
There is a tendency for cases of sultanism to lie in strategically sensitive areas, a 
factor which accounts for infringements on sovereignty by foreign powers. Chehabi 
and Linz write, “Prolonged crises therefore seem to be a favourable but not sufficient 
precondition for the appearance of sultanism.”32  
  In the same way that crises of sovereignty might precede sultanism, colonial 
legacies might also favour personalism. It is in some sense the “very retreat of foreign 
power that favours sultanism, since the foreign power leaves behind a partially 
modernized administrative and especially military apparatus that enables the ruler to 
concentrate power in his hands.”33 Historically, the legacies of colonialism in sub-
Saharan Africa favoured the emergence of personalist regimes. The arbitrary drawing 
of borders left the newly independent states with few common pre-colonial 
traditions—that is, no form of traditional legitimacy. The colonial governments—
under which the emerging elites in the new states were socialized into politics—were 
authoritarian governments almost by definition; this is a history that is quite different 
from those of Asia and the Caribbean (areas that have also had rampant 
personalism).34 These colonial states “in most cases created entirely novel institutions 
of domination and rule. Although we commonly described the independent polities as 
‘new states,’ in reality they were successors to the colonial regime, inheriting its 
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structures, its quotidian routines and practices, and its more hidden normative 
theories of governance. Thus, everyday reason of state, as it imposed its logic on the 
new rulers, incorporated subliminal codes of operation bearing the imprint of their 
colonial predecessors.”35 The search for identity of emerging young states might be a 
precondition favourable to personalism. 
  If culture can be said to correlate at all with sultanism, traditional and non-
complex populations might be best suited to true sultanistic rule. Chehabi and Linz 
suggest that “The isolation of the rural masses, their lack of education, and their 
poverty are probably necessary to ensure their passive submission out of fear 
combined with gratitude for occasional paternalistic welfare measures made possible 
by a modicum of development.”36 Religiosity, Bailey argues, may correlate with 
popular readiness to accept a sultanistic leader’s assertion that he is divine. He writes, 
“If a disposition to accept charisma can be culturally induced, then it must be easier 
to arouse such feelings in a population that has a firm and unquestioning belief in the 
divine hand than in one that is down-to-earth, maturely sceptical, devotedly scientific 
in its readiness to question or devotedly irreverent, and truly convinced that, barring 
accidents, persons are masters of their fate and captains of their souls.”37  
  Each of these factors—personality of the ruler himself, strategies that the ruler 
employs to maintain power for his regime, and macrostructural conditions—historical 
and demographic—plays a role in the origin and continuance of sultanistic rule in 
certain parts of the world. While personality factors, best left to those who theorize 
issues of psychology and leadership, may be the largest factor in a leader’s sultanistic 
character, macrostructural and strategic factors form the basis of this inquiry. This 
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chapter will consider just one common macrostructural factor—historical legacy and 
experience of colonial rule—as experienced in sub-Saharan Africa and Turkmenistan, 
and the bulk of this dissertation will examine the strategic use of propaganda and 
pseudo-ideologies as legitimating discourse buttressing sultanistic regimes in these 
regions. 
Historical Legacies: The Creation of States in Africa and Central Asia 
This chapter focuses on one of the macrostructural conditions for the 
emergence of sultanism—historical political legacies. Historical political legacies, as 
Chehabi, Linz, and Cummings have suggested, may provide one facet of the 
explanation of the emergence of sultanistic rule, and the nature of a colonial state in 
particular might shape the character of the subject state as it gains independence. 
Transitions from certain types of colonial rule in particular might provide a 
transitional period in which sultanism is more likely to emerge given the appropriate 
actors: Jackson and Rosberg suggest that in general, “personal regimes may be 
thought of as typical of transitional periods, when one institutionalized order has 
broken down and another has not yet replaced it.”38 In his study of the African 
colonial state, Young advances the idea that “a retrospective examination of the 
African colonial state can illuminate some of the frailties of its postcolonial successor 
and perhaps even suggest avenues of escape from its more burdensome legacies.”39 
Although we often refer to the independent polities—both in post-colonial Africa and 
post-Soviet Central Asia—as “new states”, this may be a misnomer; while the states 
are independent for the first time, “in reality they are successors to the colonial 
regime, inheriting its structures, its quotidian routines and practices, and its more 
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hidden normative theories of governance. Thus, everyday reason of state, as it 
imposed its logic on the new rulers, incorporated subliminal codes of operation 
bearing the imprint of their colonial predecessors.”40  
Chehabi and Linz suggest that African sultanism should be conceived as 
resulting from a “degeneration of authoritarianism,” that is, from the degeneration of 
the authoritarian colonial state. They point to two particular colonial legacies in 
Africa that favoured the rise of personal rule: “First, these states’ arbitrary borders 
meant that each state’s population was a culturally heterogeneous mix of peoples with 
no common pre-colonial traditions, and so at independence the young states started 
out with few remnants of political legitimacy. Second, colonial government was by 
definition authoritarian government, and it was under this form of rule that the new 
states’ elites were socialized into politics.”41 In Africa’s post-colonial period, the 
absence of unifying indigenous institutions left politicians with “the task of governing 
with their personal power and authority.”42 In many cases, this was a matter of 
adopting and adapting the colonial state structure and patrimonialising it—making a 
discussion of colonial legacies indispensable to the study of post-colonial regimes.43 
Berman comments, “From colonial intrusions and African responses emerged the 
unique linkage under colonialism between bureaucratic authoritarianism, patronage 
and clientelism, and ethnic fragmentation and competition. The continuity of these 
institutions, power relations and identities in post-colonial states has shaped the 
particular character of state-society relations in Africa and the ‘politics of the 
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belly’.”44 The experience of Africa differs from that of the Caribbean and Asia– two 
other areas of post-World War II decolonization– in several ways; namely, in the 
Caribbean, “responsible self-government preceded independence by many years,” and 
in Asia pre-colonial state traditions survived European imperialism.46  
Although the African colonial experience, as Young has emphasized in his 
book The African Colonial State in Comparative Perspective, was unique in many 
ways, the elements that specifically favour personalism were shared by another region 
that experienced decolonization late in the game– the states that emerged from Soviet 
Central Asia. While I do not suggest that these regions are anywhere near identical in 
terms of their pre-colonial identities, colonial experiences, or moves toward 
independence, enough similarities exist between the experiences of the two regions to 
render comparison instructive. In his comparison of post-colonial Zaire and pre-
revolutionary France, Thomas Callaghy cites Zolberg’s call for a comparative 
approach to political studies: “I believe that a promising approach consists of 
comparisons at a middling level of generalization between units that are not extremely 
diverse, such as contemporary African states themselves, or between them and 
historical states (in Europe and elsewhere) in which somewhat similar conditions 
prevailed.”47  
There are some major differences in imperial legacy between Africa and 
Central Asia that should be noted from the outset, and to a large extent each region 
has its own set of problems stemming from the version of imperial rule imposed on its 
population. In particular, “the relatively more industrial and highly educated character 
of post-Soviet societies imparts a somewhat different dynamic to politics in that 
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region than what obtains in African societies less advantaged in these respects. In 
spite of the extreme parastatalization of African economies and the rise of would-be 
integral states on the African continent in the 1970s, the scope and effectiveness of 
state activity in the Soviet Union on the eve of its demise far exceeded that of most 
African states or their colonial predecessors.”48 Additionally, there are differences in 
the nature of the territorial boundaries drawn, issues of citizenship under the imperial 
state, the nature of the imperial state’s ideological project, and the role of the settler 
populations, not to mention the nature of independence.  
However, the similarities in the colonial experiences between these two 
regions deserve exploration, particularly in light of the very similar types of problems 
that have plagued the regions in their periods of independent statehood. Beissinger 
and Young discuss many of these shared problems that, while not unique to Africa 
and Central Asia, have in combination come to represent the “glaring consequences of 
the crises of the state” that were “most conspicuous in world politics in the 1990s.”49 
These include high levels of corruption, the criminalization of state and economy, 
disintegrating human services and high levels of cultural tension. Economically, 
indicators have declined significantly and infrastructures have deteriorated– the 
decline of official economies has been matched by the rampant spread of shadow 
economies and barter. And, most significantly for this discussion, these regions 
exemplify the dysfunctions of authority that can arise from transition periods– each 
region has experienced a “vacuum of purpose and agenda in the wake of the collapse 
of pre- independence transformational projects... [and] the rapaciousness and venality 
of elites, who have stolen the assets of formerly Weberian states.”50 The experience of 
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both regions shows that “predatory and incoherent political authority is fundamentally 
incompatible with democratic governance”, and also with economic development.51 
In both Africa and Eurasia, “the state’s ubiquitous and pervasive presence can be 
juxtaposed with its limited capacity for enforcing rules or generating legitimacy.”52 
This chapter will outline some of the similarities between the pre-
independence experiences of Africa and Central Asia.53 In all cases, the era of 
domination left residues that confine and control the contexts for political action in 
the independent states. The chapter will explore the methods of rule in colonial and 
Soviet periods—including the demarcation of boundaries, the assertion of political 
authority, participation of native elites, economic exploitation, and social engineering. 
A brief survey of the nature of the colonial and Soviet periods will be instructive in 
later chapters dealing with the nature of governance in post-colonial countries in these 
two regions.  
The imperial legacies of the two regions are “crucial to contextualizing the 
analysis.”54 As Jeffrey Herbst writes, the “analysis of the creation of many third world 
states is, by necessity, intertwined with accounts of European imperialism and 
colonialization.”55 With some African exceptions (for example, Ethiopia), neither 
region had experienced modern statehood in the pre-independence period, and 
therefore their experiences under the imperial powers were critical in shaping political 
identities and society and conditioning their emergence as modern states. As Dominic 
Lieven writes, “Attempting to compare the aftermath of these twentieth-century 
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empires is a complicated business.”56 Highlighting certain features of the regions’ 
pre-independence experiences and the ways in which these experiences shaped the 
political values, structures and assumptions of actors in the period following 
independence are is central to this comparison.  
David Moore, in an article comparing post-Soviet Central Asia with 
postcolonial regions elsewhere in the world, considers “how extraordinarily 
postcolonial the societies of the former Soviet regions are, and… how extraordinarily 
little attention is paid to this fact.”57 He offers this description of the African colonial 
experience:  
A historically rich and important set of cultures, of great 
diversity and sometimes little unity, sub-Saharan African 
before the arrival of Europeans has a long history of 
independence, though at times internal strife there is great. 
Then, an external colonization or imperial control begins at the 
borders and extends into the centre. Indigenous governments 
are replaced with puppet control or outright rule. African 
education is revamped to privilege the colonizer’s language, 
and histories and curricula are rewritten from the imperium’s 
perspective. Autochthonous religious traditions are suppressed 
in the colonial zone, idols are destroyed, and alternative 
religions and nonreligious ideologies are promoted. The 
colonized areas of Africa become economic fiefs….Economic 
production is undertaken on a command basis and is geared to 
the dominant power’s interests rather than to local needs. 
Local currencies, if they exist, are only convertible to the 
metropolitan specie. Agriculture becomes mass monoculture, 
and environmental degradation follows…. Oppositional 
energies are… channelled through forms including mimicry, 
satire, parody, and jokes.58 
 
The description he offers applies reasonably well to the post-communist states of 
Eurasia, and especially to Central Asia—a region that was subject to Russian 
domination for over a century.   
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Despite different ideological motivations, as Beissinger and Young write, 
“both Soviet communism and European colonialism in Africa represented the high 
point of the tide of state power that swept the world in the early twentieth century, and 
both experiences involved attempts to impose a new social order through force.59 
Lieven, in his comparative study of empires, reminds us that the long-term impact of 
imperial rule depends on many factors, such as its “longevity and the extent to which 
it penetrates, transforms or destroys the societies and cultures over which it rules.”60  
Legacies are best understood as enduring social relationships and not simply 
transitional phases. The legacies of European colonialism in Africa and Russian and 
Soviet power in Central Asia are significant. In Africa, “the nature of the colonial 
state provided a procrustean bed that determined the character of its postcolonial 
successor to a far greater extent than expected by the independence generation of 
scholarly observers of Africa.”61 Anti-colonial nationalism in the transitional period 
soon gave way to the emergence of a new set of elites concerned with reproducing 
power in the boundaries of the sovereign state. “The enduring force of the 
reproductive logic of state power imprinted on the postcolonial polity the bureaucratic 
authoritarian heritage of its predecessor, paradoxically reinforced by more expansive 
ambitions of state expansion as the presumed agency of transformative 
development.”62 In Central Asia as well, historical legacies have shaped the current 
political and social situation. The conquest by the Russian tsars and the imposition of 
a new ideology by the Soviets after 1917 introduced modernity and the idea of 
statehood to the region, concepts that were compounded by the Soviet system of 
ethnic federalism.  
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The Creation of States, and Nations 
One of the basic similarities between the states of sub-Saharan Africa and 
Central Asia is the fact of their formation and demarcation by outside powers. 
Politically, the effects of the pre-independence experience in each region were 
profound. Having no experience of modern statehood, the emerging states in both 
regions took on the physical boundaries imposed by the imperial power, and in many 
cases appropriated the bureaucratic structures and constitutional features of that 
power. Beissinger and Young highlight as an important political similarity “The 
unusual penetration of pre-independence state power... its relatively recent imposition 
of bounded political order on complex multicultural populations; [and] its absolutist, 
coercive character....”63 
The idea of the modern state took root late in the game in Africa and Central 
Asia. The imperial conquest of Central Asia was nearly simultaneous with the 
beginning of the rapid colonial expansion in Africa in the late nineteenth century. The 
timing of the development of states in these regions is significant, because statehood 
at the time was conditioned by the historical context. Beissinger and Young write, “In 
contrast to western Europe, where the modern state evolved over centuries, and unlike 
Latin America, where the modern state emerged in the early nineteenth century after 
three hundred years of colonial experience, in both Africa and Eurasia the modern 
state emerged relatively late and largely at a time when belief in the transformative 
power of the state was at its height.”64 Periods of state formation in these regions, 
then, were underscored by the grand transformational projects of the imperial powers, 
which were rooted in late-19th and early 20th century Western civilization.  
The territorial boundaries drawn by the imperial powers in both regions have 
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survived into the contemporary period. While in both regions imperfect borders were 
imposed by imperial powers, the territorial grid inherited from colonial Africa was 
much more arbitrary than the somewhat ethnically correct Soviet borders, which were 
designed to roughly coincide with national divisions. As Anthony D. Smith writes, 
“Perhaps the main common feature of... colonial systems was the obvious, but 
nevertheless basic, fact of territorial definition.”65 Lieven writes, “By one reckoning 
7,000 independent polities existed in pre-colonial Africa. Creating viable, modern 
political units was, therefore, bound to be a nightmare. As elsewhere in the world, 
neighbours were likely to be traditional enemies who did not take kindly to being 
united in a single state. The colonial-era borders were the product of bargains between 
the European powers, not of local ethnic or economic realities.”66 Unlike in Africa, in 
Central Asia, Stalin’s divisions were guided by an assumption that recognized 
nationalities deserved their own political-territorial units. In this way, “Central Asia is 
unlike most of Black Africa, where state boundaries had minimal ethnic or historical 
legitimacy, and were derived above all from the continent’s division among the 
European powers into spheres of control. The Soviet ethnographers who attempted to 
create homogeneous nations out of the tribes and statelets of Central Asia made a real 
effort to follow ethnic logic and at least had only a single political master.”67 Conflicts 
reflecting the incongruence of borders and national populations still occur, however, 
in the post-Soviet period.  
Although in most cases the imperial era in Africa lasted less than a century, it 
was a decidedly transformative stage in African political development. “The colonial 
state in Africa,” writes Young, “lasted in most instances less than a century– a mere 
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moment in historical time. Yet it totally reordered political space, societal hierarchies 
and cleavages, and modes of economic production. Its territorial grid–whose final 
contours congealed only in the dynamics of decolonization– determined the state units 
that gained sovereignty and came to form the present system of African polities. The 
logic of its persistence and reproduction was by the time of independence deeply 
embedded in its mechanisms of internal guidance.”68 Even African social identities 
were restructured, and sometimes ethnicities and tribal ties were invented, in the 
colonial period by European colonizers, who drew on pre-colonial social character.69 
The African continent was effectively partitioned by European powers 
between 1884 and 1914.70 From 1875 to 1900, in an “extraordinary moment of 
imperial enthusiasm, a veritable collective intoxication of colonial expansionism set 
in.”71 In 1884-85, during the Berlin Conference on the partition of Africa, European 
powers agreed amongst themselves the ground rules for the partition, and the moment 
of conquest ended with the outbreak of the First World War.72 The rules of the 
colonial game were straightforward: a colonial power must obtain ownership of a 
territory that would be legally binding within the European system, by proving 
“effective occupation”–this could be proven by obtaining treaties that were signed by 
African leaders.   
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The Nature of Colonial Rule 
 
The imperial powers in both Africa and Central Asia (at least the Soviet 
regimes) had a depth and “embeddedness” that, according to regional scholars, set 
their experiences apart from those of other colonized regions. The depth of state 
penetration in these regions, according to Beissinger and Young, is unmatched in 
modern times. Because of its ideological project, Soviet state penetration exceeded 
that of the European colonizers. However, “in both Africa and Eurasia, modes of 
domination effectively permeated and totally reordered their respective societal 
hierarchies in a modernist image, leaving behind embedded legacies touching 
multiple domains of everyday life within the modern sector of society: the structure of 
the economy, the nature of state institutions, systems of class stratification, and 
patterns of interface between state and society.”73  
The autocratic nature of the imperial state is a point of comparison that will be 
significant in considering transitions and post-colonial situations. In both contexts, 
paternalism became embedded in the internal operative codes of the state—something 
that shaped modes of governance in the post-colonial period. Beissinger and Young 
point to the “critical role played by violence as a tool of social transformation and 
control, as well as the general trajectory of pre-independence state authority in the 
years leading up to independence–away from coercive state practice and toward more 
localized forms of bureaucratic authoritarianism.”74 This state brutality reached its 
height in Central Asia during the Stalin years, when purging of native cadres and 
collectivization became elements of political and social control, as well as a 
contributing factor to the achievement of economic goals. In Africa as well, autocracy 
was the essence of the colonial state. A quick extractive hegemony was established in 
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Africa due to the highly competitive and swift nature of the imperial expansion. 
Although governance in Africa varied under different colonial powers, the form of the 
state at its root was the same—centralized and hierarchical, and arguably a pure 
model of the bureaucratic authoritarian state.  
In Africa, care must be taken to distinguish between the varying methods of 
administration of the different colonial powers. As Young writes, “The political 
cultures and state ideologies of the colonizing polities were not identical.”75 The 
colonial legacies in the new states also varied. Despite differences, however, all of the 
colonial states were marked by the centrality and dominance of the executive arm and 
its bureaucratic apparatus, “and the coercive monopoly that it possessed throughout 
the territory.”76 In general, European powers ruled through structures and 
intermediaries that they put in place in Africa—“for rule to have substance, African 
collaborators were indispensable.”77 In general, according to Callaghy, there are more 
corporatist strands in the French and Belgian colonial traditions than in the British 
tradition of indirect rule.78 
French rule most closely approximated direct administration, granting each of 
its colonies its own governor, budget, and (after 1946) elected assembly. The French 
policy of assimilation provided that “African subjects could theoretically achieve the 
status of... citizens if they fully embraced French culture, and in so doing fulfilled a 
variety of requirements, including achieving fluency in the French language, 
converting to Christianity, obtaining at least a high school education, and becoming a 
property owner.”79 Belgian colonial administration was also “extremely centralised 
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and subject to close European supervision, with executive power remaining firmly in 
the hands of the administration; chiefs were absorbed into the administrative 
organization at the lower levels. Belgian rule was also strongly paternalist, and sought 
to arrest social and political change through the creation of a materially prosperous 
and contented people, educated to the primary level.”80 The British colonies 
experienced a less centralized form of rule. British rule “not only kept in place, by in 
many cases strengthened, a myriad of traditional forms of leadership within their 
colonies.”81 Mamdani and others have argued that all European colonialism in Africa 
was actually a form of indirect rule, regardless of how the power characterized itself, 
and Berman suggests that “the most important political relationship in the colonial 
state was the alliance between European district administrators and the chiefs of 
administrative sub-divisions and village headmen beneath them.”82 
The subversion of state power, and economic resources, toward personal ends 
in Africa and Central Asia can be traced to similarities in the pre-independence 
experiences – “forms of behaviour and modes of alternative authority that, while 
differing in the two contexts, grew increasingly central to the political process in the 
wake of independence. For Africans and Eurasians, pre-independence state power 
constituted a distant and alien other to be simultaneously feared, milked, and 
deceived–a cause for distrust, self-protection, and booty. These widespread attitudes 
and forms of behaviour naturally continued into the post-independence period.”83 
Colonial administration in Africa, according to Berman, was an attempt to create in 
the African context a modern idealized version of traditional aristocratic authority in a 
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state, and a hierarchically ordered society.84 The colonial states created entirely new 
political arenas and structures, within and through which all other socioeconomic and 
cultural changes took place; therefore, it is a natural starting point for inquiry.85
 However grand the legitimating discourse, the colonial presence in Africa was 
marked by authoritarianism and brutality, along with, in the early years, sharp 
declines in health indicators that caused further death and despair for the subject 
populations. According to one estimate, “Central Africa lost at least one-third and 
perhaps one-half of its population during the first phase of colonial state rule.”86 The 
authoritarian political legacy permeated all aspects of life– as Griffiths writes, “a 
coercive apparatus of police and military forces was... created in every colony with 
the intention of ensuring local compliance with colonial rules and regulations.”87  
Social Engineering Projects 
 
The extensive engineering of society amongst the subject populations by the 
imperial state for the purposes of modernization and control is another similarity 
between the African and Central Asian cases. Not only did the colonial power 
establish borders and physical parameters for post-independence political activity, but 
they also created new cultural understandings and structured behaviour—a lasting 
legacy of the colonizing power. Along with the drawing of borders, “Applying their 
own taxonomic logic of ‘state simplification’ to complex, multicultural societies, both 
the African colonial and Stalinist states embarked on comprehensive cultural 
classification projects.”88 Features of these programs included internal passports, 
language reforms, the writing of new national histories and the creation of national 
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In Africa, the introduction of European economic and political structures 
prompted a modernization project that served the interests of the colonial powers and, 
the colonial powers often believed, were to the benefit of the local populations as 
well. Social Darwinian notions of racial superiority underscored the European 
colonial projects in Africa; the idea of Africa savagery was ingrained in territorial 
governance. Young writes, “Such a premise gave natural rise to the conclusion that 
the new colonial regime, no matter how harsh and extractive, was axiomatically 
beneficial to the African subject.”89 Modernization brought far-reaching changes to 
the social structure in African regions; the introduction of Christianity, educational 
systems and literacy campaigns, new medical technology and intensive urbanization 
and other more general technological and cultural influences transformed society. The 
notion of “trusteeship” underscored most forms of colonial rule in Africa, and in 
general the colonial state fostered a belief in the civilizing mission toward the native 
population. As Smith writes, “an educational ideology, in which the territory was seen 
as a trust to be developed and fitted for ‘mature’ self-government, could also be used 
to justify both the retention of the colony and, should it prove burdensome later, its 
eventual disposal.”90  
Colonial economic extraction policies and forced labour contributed to 
changing demographics. While the colonial powers concentrated on economic 
extraction—the removal of valuable diamonds and minerals—African men provided 
the manpower. Urbanization thus proceeded through force and forced labour (with 
tribal chiefs and traditional authorities, given quotas to fill, leading villages towards 
the cities), the appropriation of land by the colonial authorities, the creation of land 
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squeezes amongst the Africans and prompting emigration, and the imposition of head 
taxes, which had to be paid with the currencies earned through urban work.  
As Berman writes, “The social construction of modern forms of ethnicity in 
Africa is coterminous with the development of the structure and culture of 
colonialism. The structural characteristics of the colonial state, an apparatus of 
authoritarian bureaucratic control, and of the colonial political economy, based on 
African cash-crops and wage labour in capitalist commodity and labour markets, 
radically, albeit only partially, transformed the structural and spatial organization of 
African societies.91 All of these elements of colonial rule were strong in both the sub-
Saharan African and Central Asian regions—and produced lasting legacies that may 
be important in conditioning the post-colonial political climate. The following 
sections will give some historical detail of the effects of colonial rule in Turkmenistan 
to provide a stronger background for examination of its post-colonial political 
climate.    
The Historical Experience of the Turkmen 
 
The people today known as Turkmen have a long history that can be traced to 
large groups of Turkic peoples inhabiting the territory of present-day Mongolia and 
southern Siberia. In the eighth century a large group of Turkic tribes, referred to in 
historical sources as the Oghuz Confederation, migrated west into the Syr Darya basin 
(present-day Kazakhstan) and areas around the Aral Sea. Scholars suggest that the 
main events in the process of ethnic formation of the Turkmen occurred in the ninth 
and tenth centuries, when “the invasion of Oghuz Turkic nomads from the east 
resulted in their intermixing with the ancient seminomadic Iranian tribes.”92 By the 
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tenth century large elements of the Oghuz had migrated south into areas of present-
day Turkmenistan and had adopted Islam, and the term “Turkmen” appeared in Arab 
chronicles.  
The earliest known Oghuz Turks (in the pre-Seljukid period) had a system of 
governance that differed in some respects from other Turks of the time. There were no 
khans—instead the ruler was known by the more modest tile of yabghu. The Oghuz 
tribes lacked any centralizing element and unity was “alien to the 10th century 
Oghuz.”93 Because of a lack of unity, V. V. Barthold suggests that the Oghuz yabghu 
ruled only in name. Ethnographers believe that in the early stages of ethnic 
development, the Turkmen were governed by a military tribal democracy. The elders 
of matrilineal clans regulated commune life, and “the legitimacy of power was 
determined by the personal qualities of the chieftains and their responsibility to the 
commune.”94 Political decisions that held significance to local populations were made 
at a general meeting of the men by a simple majority voice vote (women being 
traditionally barred from political life). Issues of tribal importance were debated at so-
called maslakhats (councils of clan elders and warlords), and a council of elders 
elected the supreme tribal leader. These early structures have significance even today; 
as Safronov writes, “The Turkmen society remains to this day based largely on 
neighbour and commune relations; clan and tribal solidarity; influence of the yashuli 
(elders); worship of holy sites, and belief in magic, superstitions, and rituals 
reminiscent of witchcraft.”95  
Geiss has defined the type of political order that existed among the Turkmen 
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prior to the Russian conquest “acephalous”.96 This, he writes, is a type of organization 
that  
lacks both leaders and staff of authority. It is politically 
decentralized and based on a community of law. Order is 
maintained and enforced by all able-bodied members of the 
community who pursue rightful force, feud, and resistance 
to restore the communal order whose rights and claims are 
perceived as having been harmed. In many tribal societies, 
feud and strife are often widespread, since every tribesman 
sues for his claims and does not hesitate to enforce them. 
Thus frequent raids were not undertaken arbitrarily, but 
were linked to customary law which shapes legal 
community structures. Political representation does not 
exist in acephalous political communities, since political 
decisions need the consent of its members and cannot be 
ascribed. Medieval lordship over lands and segmented 
tribal societies is based on acephalous political community 
structures.97  
 
Turkmen tribes did not develop powerful authority roles for adult males, authority 
being neither hereditary nor able to be taken by military force wealth or religion. 
Turkmen society, like other tribal societies, was founded on principles such as respect 
for tribal elders. Geiss writes, “Turkmen village elders could enjoy some communal 
authority and get involved in cases of dispute between family groups. Distinguished 
elders were regarded both as heads of the forefather groups and headmen of the obas 
who represented their group to the outside. In this way, heads of strong forefather 
groups could also ‘lead’ sub tribal groups. The office of the group yashuly did not 
imply any special privileges and authorizations, however. The headman had no power 
to make decisions or to fix obligations of the group, but he depended on its consent. It 
was the maslakhat, the elders’ assembly of one or more forefather groups, which 
deliberated and decided about economic, penal and political matters of the oba. The 
consenting decision of the maslakhat represented the condensed public opinion of the 
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group which balanced the usurping ambitions of single tribesmen.”98  
Military leadership among the Turkmen was not equated with political 
authority. Although military chiefs (serdar) commanded great loyalty and respect, 
power ceased after raiders had divided the booty and returned to their own 
communities.  
 Because of this lack of political authority, Turkmen used to say “that they 
were a ‘people without a head’ and admitted that they did not want to have one, since 
among them every one was his own master.”99 Instead of political sovereigns, 
Turkmen tribes tended to follow certain set principles to maintain order—the 
principles were known as däp or adat. A basic principle of däp was the political 
equality of simple tribesmen, elders and chiefs. Due to this equality, decisions had to 
be built on the consent of the group. Decisions of the maslakhat (and not of a single 
leader) were authoritative, since the assembly represented the mutual consent of the 
group. Nobody dared to disobey the common decision of the maslakhat.  
The nomadism of the Oghuz Turks is a feature that explains many of the 
persisting cultural traditions. Soucek points to the nomadic-sedentary distinction as a 
salient feature of Inner Asian anthropology: “until recently, it was a world of two 
distinct ways of life: that of the pastoral nomad, and that of the sedentary 
agriculturalist or urban dweller.... a concomitant feature is that the nomad has in 
historic time been mostly Turco-Mongol, whereas the sedentary was either an Indo-
European or else the Turkicized descendant of Indo- Europeans.”100 The Turkmen 
have long been portrayed as nomads, but many factors, including the ecological 
diversity of the territory that they inhabited, historically determined the degree of 
                                       
98 ibid. 
99 ibid. 




nomadism practiced. While most Turkmen were categorized as charva (nomad), some 
were referred to as chomur (settled); however, there was no clear historical division 
between the two groups. The aridity of the territory generally inhabited by the 
Turkmen tribes precluded an entirely pastoral nomadic lifestyle.101 In fact, many 
Turkmen have long engaged in farming as well as in stock-breeding and some have 
occupied formerly settled oases– such as the Tekke at Merv– and based their 
livelihoods on a mixed economy.   
The economy of the nomadic Turkmen rested largely, but not entirely, on 
pastoralism. It combined in various degrees stockbreeding, agriculture, crafts, trade, 
war and, near the Caspian Sea, fishing. Turkmen lived mainly in yurts and depended 
mostly on herding and hunting; even those who cultivated land dwelled in traditional 
portable yurts.102 The diet of the Turkmen showed similarities to that of other 
nomadic groups.103 Pilau, the standard oasis dish, was often made of barley rather 
than rice and cooked only with fat and perhaps wild carrot; pieces of meat and dried 
prunes were added only on special occasions. The oasis regions enjoyed melons and 
fruits, which they dried for year-round use, and those living along the Caspian 
incorporated fish into their diets. Narcotic use was widespread amongst the Turkmen 
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tribes, a trend that would continue, and worsen, through the period of Russian rule.104  
The Turkmen tribes were notorious warriors, known for their military prowess 
and mobility.105 As Bregel writes, “The military prowess of Turkic and Mongol 
warriors was due to their supreme horsemanship, archery, and physical fitness 
produced by training that usually began in early childhood and formed one of the 
basic conditions of the nomadic way of life, but also by a sense of solidarity and 
cohesion, based on their social system, that surpassed that of the armies of the 
sedentary population. Thus the military importance of Turko-Mongol peoples of 
Central Asia was inseparable from their nomadic way of life and social organization. 
When both began to be eroded in the course of sedentarization, military prowess 
inevitably declined.”106  
Turkmen violently resisted the attempts to subdue them by the various rulers 
of Khiva, Bukhara, and Persia; between battles, Turkmen fighters were hired as 
mercenaries by these states in wars against each other.107 Additionally, they launched 
aggressive campaigns and raids against “unbelievers”, attacking mainly Persian Shi’a 
Muslims but also Russian Christians, when the opportunity arose. During these raids, 
Turkmen captured goods, horses, and people– prisoners were ransomed when 
possible (generally this was the more profitable alternative), taken as domestic slaves 
or sold in the slave markets of Bukhara or Khiva. Because of their mobility and 
paramilitary lifestyle, the Turkmen nomads of Central Asia for some time enjoyed an 
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advantage over their western and southern sedentary neighbours.108 However, the 
military advantage of the nomads over their sedentary neighbours “started to wane as 
early as the sixteenth century and disappeared in the eighteenth– a result of the rise of 
a powerful centralized Russia equipped with firearms, and of a China that likewise 
was beginning to use cannon and to rely on armies, which only a populous, sedentary 
state could maintain.”109  
Tribalism was a major feature of Oghuz Turkic life, and remains an important 
dynamic in the lives of contemporary Turkmen. Nomadic society was structured 
along tribal and kinship lines, and rivalries or open hostility existed between various 
tribal groups. As Soucek writes, there was no sense of unity amongst the Turkmen as 
a whole, and “the more immediate loyalty was to the extended family or clan.”110 
According to both written and oral sources, there were originally 22 Turkmen tribes 
(and two others associated with them), all of which traced their origin to a mythical 
progenitor named Oghuz Han. Some of these ‘original’ tribes survived into modern 
times, while others disappeared or merged with other peoples.  
Genealogical relationships have played fundamental roles in shaping Turkmen 
society since the inception of the Turkmen as a distinct ethno-cultural group.111 The 
major tribes at the time of the Russian conquest were the Yomut, with a territory 
extending eastward from the Caspian Sea; the Goklen, living along the Atrek River on 
the Persian border; the Salor, who were the eastern neighbours of the Goklen, also on 
the Persian border; the Saryk, whose territory extended along the Murghab River into 
Afghanistan; the Tekke, the largest tribe today, who occupied the Merv (Mary) oasis 
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in the mid-nineteenth century; and the Ersary, just north of Merv.”112   
The structure of the Turkmen tribes has evolved somewhat over time but the 
basic units remain the same. As Tyson and Saparova write, “A taypa usually denotes 
an ‘ethnic group’ or ‘tribal group’ composed of a tribe proper plus other small 
‘outside’ communities or social classes that can be associated with it. Taypa includes 
an acknowledged hierarchy of clans and groups and the use of a ‘tribal’ name such as 
Tekke, Yomut, Ersary, etc. According to some scholars, the designation tire may be 
used in a similar but more exclusive way, referring to ‘tribe’ in the sense of the ‘tribe 
proper,’ without including the newer groups that have come to be associated with it. 
Each of the larger tribes may be further divided into as many as five branches 
(bolyum), each having its own name, with further divisions into clans and other 
smaller descent groups. Members of a ‘clan’ (urug) traditionally are associated with a 
specific territory and a shared or acknowledged common ancestry from a ‘recent’ 
figure. Still smaller descent groups, of ‘subclans,’ are known as tire, oba, kowum or a 
host of other terms according to tribal dialect. In most cases the translation for these 
terms is ‘clan’ as well.”113  
Oghuz Turks were also strongly influenced by the various religious currents 
spreading through Central Asia. Pre-Islamic rituals and systems of belief have 
influenced the contemporary religious culture of the Turkmen to a large degree. The 
Oghuz Turks practiced a combination of Zoroastrian, shamanistic, and Buddhist 
rituals, elements of which are observable in Turkmen culture even today. The 
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introduction of Islam to the Turkmen brought also a new set of cultural traditions; 
these combined with pre-Islamic rituals to produce the type of Islam still widely 
practiced in Turkmenistan today. Central Asians are by and large Sunni Muslims of 
the Hannafi sect. (In cities like Bukhara and Samarkand and Tajikistan, Shia Muslims 
comprise part of the populations; in the Gorno-Badakhshan region of Tajikistan, the 
Ismaeli sect led by the Aga Khan is followed.) Although Islam first appeared in 
Central Asia 1400 years ago, it was not until the ninth century that it gained a steady 
following in the region.114 In Khorasan, Transoxania, and Khwarazm, Islam was 
victorious by 750 when the Abbasids (the second major Islamic dynasty) had taken 
power. After their conquest of neighbouring territories, in 651 A.D. the Arab armies 
entered Khorasan (including today’s southern Turkmenistan). From that moment, 
Islam began its “march across the entire region– a march that was by no means 
unconditionally triumphant or unimpeded.”115 Neither sedentary nor nomadic tribes 
inhabiting the region were in a hurry to accept Islam– where the religion took root, it 
absorbed elements of traditional shamanism, Zoroastrianism, and other pre-Islamic 
native beliefs. It is unclear exactly when Islam was adopted by the Oghuz Turks. The 
Oghuz in the pre- Islamic period were pagans, as were most other Turks during the 
pre-Seljukid period. However, qams (shamans) and the idea of a central or main deity 
(tengri) “do seem to have played a role in their spiritual orbit.” Islam probably had 
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gained currency amongst the Turkmen by the early 11th century– by 1003, the Oghuz 
yabghu had converted to Islam.  
One major influence upon the Turkmen version of Islam has been Sufism, a 
mystical movement that spread through Central Asia in the late Middle Ages.116 Sufis 
were those men who first took steps to bridge the chasm separating individuals from 
the God of the Koran.117 Sufism, which involved elements of mysticism, placed larger 
emphasis on the compassionate nature of the deity and “created an elaborate and 
multifaceted system of practices to approach the no longer awesome Deity as a 
reassuring Friend.”118 Sufis in Central Asia eventually founded a number of tariqas 
(religious orders, from the Arabic tariqa, or “path”). Unlike orthodox Islam, Sufism 
did not reject native practices such as nature worship. Sufism appealed to the nomadic 
Turkmen precisely because of relative liberalism; it allowed for a fusing of Islamic 
dogma with traditional Turkmen beliefs. These practices, however, aroused hostility 
from proponents of orthodox Islam. Rituals led by ishans (local Sufi leaders) 
incorporated old traditions like music, chanting, dance– traditions heretical to 
orthodox Muslims. “Such practices obviously clashed with the precepts of classical 
Islam as taught by Arab preachers.”119 But among the Turkmen, “Islamic law (the 
shari’a) ultimately failed to subordinate native common law (the Adat).”120 While 
Sufi sheiks (top Sufi clerics) almost never publicly officiated at religious ceremonies, 
they enjoyed much greater respect than the mullahs [in Turkmen society]; this attitude 
might be attributed to the Turkmen’s traditional worship of ancestors, a veneration 
that was also extended to the Sufis as descendants of ancient religious dynasties.   
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Russian Rule: The Conquest and Subordination of the Turkmen 
 
Incorporation into the Russian empire came late to Turkmen territory, as 
Turkmen tribes offered some of the fiercest resistance to Tsarist armies, finally 
capitulating through a combination of tribal bargaining and military defeat only in the 
1880s. The Russian conquest, however, brought with it the first real exposure to 
European culture. While Russian rulers largely allowed traditional Turkmen culture to 
exist parallel to Russian groups on their territory, after 1917 the Bolsheviks undertook 
a ruthless and massive social, economic and cultural restructuring. Both the Russian 
conquest and the Soviet experiment “fundamentally altered notions of personal and 
collective identity.”121 Shahrani has called these periods a “form of colonial 
experience” that has had “distinctive, powerful legacies and lasting transformative 
effects upon the region, its peoples and cultures.”122 While not successfully destroying 
traditional loyalties, the Soviets did provide a new set of identities that were laid atop 
the traditional social structures.  
Russia’s expansion into its contiguous territories, writes Young, was 
“indistinguishable from colonial conquests by other powers.”123 The Tsarist state, 
however, “cloaked its relentless expansion in an incorporative imperial idea: the 
autocracy was ruler of ‘all the Russias’ (Rossiiskaia Imperiia). The czar was not 
russkii but vserossiiskii imperator. Thus, although Turkestan was ruled through 
indigenous intermediaries in a manner resembling colonial administration elsewhere, 
it was viewed as a simple administrative unit of the state.”124 Young writes, “The 
sheer mass of the Russian state, with its huge standing army and pervasive 
bureaucracy, endowed it with a potent capacity for dominating its periphery, 
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reinforced by the contiguous patterns of its expansion.”125 One of the early 
motivations for expansion was security– for example, the nineteenth-century “great 
game” between Britain and Russia is the name given to the struggles of these powers 
for conquest in Central Asia’s steppes and mountains.    
Russian encroachment upon Central Asian territory spanned centuries, but the 
Turkmen tribes were among the last to submit to foreign domination. Turkmen tribes 
did not submit as a whole but different tribes offered different levels of resistance. 
The most intense conflicts took place in the 1870s and 1880s, culminating in the well-
known battle at Goktepe where some 15,000 Turkmen died.126 In contrast, the Yomut 
tribes voluntarily accepted Russian rule, and the Ersary offered sporadic resistance 
but on the whole cooperated. The Tekke, the largest in population of the Turkmen 
tribes, put up the stiffest resistance.127 Under Russian rule, the region became known 
as the Transcaspian military district. A new railroad linked Turkmenistan to other 
Central Asian cities, and modest industrial development took place.    
Russian migration to the territory of contemporary Turkmenistan also 
increased during this time; however, the cultures of Russians and Turkmen largely 
coexisted without influencing each other, at least compared with the later 
Sovietization. Russian colonizers, motivated by geopolitics, made few systematic 
attempts to redefine the Turkmen social structures, although limited attempts at 
educational reform and the fostering of a national consciousness were undertaken. 
Christianity remained the religion of the colonizers, and there were few attempts to 
convert the Turkmen. Unlike in other regions incorporated into the Russian Empire, 
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as Safronov writes, “The two cultures and religions coexisted in parallel worlds, as it 
were, with virtually no points of contact. A Tsarist administration governed the 
Russians in the Transcaspian Territory, while Turkmen mainly followed the laws of 
Turkmenchilik (their ancestors).”128 The Russians only made limited attempts to 
reform traditional loyalties: “Having annexed Central Asia, the Russians did not 
attempt to change the Turkmen’s way of life but left the qazi (Muslim judge) courts 
and the Adat and shari’a law intact. On the whole, this approach was not consistent 
with the Russian government’s practice in its earlier colonies, which had been to 
establish more-or-less standard forms of administration and legal procedure. In 
Central Asia, the local population was granted full autonomy in matters of religion 
and law.”129  
One of the major changes under Russian rule had both economic and social 
dimensions– the Russians abolished slavery in Turkmenistan, thus removing a central 
element of Turkmen economic life and spawning in some cases large-scale societal 
anomie. As Bacon writes,  
Once Russian forces had subdued these impassioned fighters, 
the government moved to abolish slavery and the raids for 
slaves which had been an integral part of Turkmen life. This 
deprived the tribesmen of an important source of income. In 
the oases occupied by Turkmens, it placed a new burden on 
the women, whose labour replaced that of slaves in 
cultivating the fields. The cessation of slave raids resulted in 
the impoverishment of the Turkmens. It also deprived many 
men of their chief interest in life. Henry Moser, who travelled 
among the Turkmen in 1881, not long after the second battle 
of Goktepe, commented on the number of men who were 
turning to alcohol and opium. Some Turkmens were drawn 
into the Russian cotton complex and, after 1905, into Russian 
or Jadid (reform Muslim) schools. A majority, however, 
continued their tribal way of life as best they could.130  
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The disruption in the Turkmen economy, followed by the destructive battle at 
Goktepe, contributed to the suppression of the Turkmen that continued into the Soviet 
period. 
The Soviet Experiment in Turkmenistan: Drawing Borders, Defining Ethnicity 
 
The advent of Soviet power in Turkmenistan came about with little 
involvement from the Turkmen themselves. In the years immediately prior to the 
revolution and until some two decades after, conflict and uprisings characterized the 
Turkmen-Russian/Soviet relationship. The most notable struggle involved anti-
communist Turkmen groups in armed resistance to Soviet power. As a result, the 
Soviets did not actually take full control of Turkmenistan until the 1930s.131  
Regardless, from the outset Soviet domination effected many fundamental 
changes among the Turkmen—they were forcibly sedentarised and their property was 
collectivized; Soviet-Russian cultural and political norms became dominant; and, 
Islam as a cultural-political force was greatly weakened. In many respects, “Soviet 
rule was the definitive experience for the formation of the modern... identity. It was 
responsible not only for the radical transformation of contemporary society, but also 
for the comprehensive reinterpretation of the past– the cultural legacy as well as the 
historical chronicle– in accordance with the determinist philosophy of Marxism-
Leninism.”132 Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone writes, “Soviet impact and legacies cover 
a broad spectrum including physical change caused by economic and environmental 
policies, demographic change resulting from migration and social policies, and –less 
tangible but perhaps more important–socio-political change which has affected 
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patterns of social and political behaviour and value systems, and has left strong 
institutional and psychological legacies.”133  
At the national level, a major legacy of Soviet rule was the creation of the 
conception of ethnicity among the Turkmen. Through the 19th century, as we have 
seen, Turkmen identities were almost exclusively tied to local clans or tribes, and the 
religious community. The Soviet delimitation of Central Asia was in part politically 
motivated; Moscow, in creating nations, imposed a system of controls on ethnic 
groups. Political motivations included an underlying fear of the Bolsheviks that a 
broader, more inclusive Central Asian identity might threaten the Soviet state in 
transnational adherence to pan-Turkic or pan-Islamic trends. However, as Gregory 
Massell has explained, the national delimitation was also an important instrument of 
Soviet social engineering at the level of poly-ethnic integration.134  
Lenin viewed nationalism as a development associated with the early period of 
capitalism; in practice, however, he supported claims to national self-determination 
(believing that a true Marxist society would see the dissipation of nationalism and the 
rise of proletarian internationalism). With the establishment of socialism, he 
envisioned sblizhenie (coming together) and eventual sliyanie (merger) of the 
proletariat of different nations.135 As Suny writes, “the party’s commitment to Lenin’s 
notion of national self-determination and its establishment of a pseudo-federal 
administrative system—the first in the world with territorial units based on 
ethnicity—worked to consolidate, rather than erode, ethnic and national cohesion.”136 
Korenizatsiia (nativization) was the name given to the policy, introduced in 1923 and 
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reflecting Lenin’s fear of Great Russian chauvinism, of promoting the training and 
development of native personnel rather than Russian or Russified elements in society, 
as well as promotion of local languages and culture. Accepting Lenin’s position, 
Stalin as People’s Commissar for Nationalities developed a definition of nation 
(natsiya) separate from that of the people (narod). Stalin considered nations to be 
based on common languages, united territories, shared economic life, and a shared 
psychological outlook, together with a common culture.137 This was reflected in his 
policy of national delimitation, and Central Asians among others were grouped 
together strategically to form nations based loosely on these principles. Where 
commonalities did not previously exist, they were created by the Soviet regime. 
Under Tsarist and more forcefully under Soviet rule, ethnic labels were pinned 
on the previously unaffiliated populations, which gradually accepted these groupings 
as Soviets attempted to suppress the old forms of group identification on more local 
levels. Central Asia in the 1920s was delimited into five republics: Kazakhstan, 
Kirgizia, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan; each group was given its own 
written language, flag, system of administration, and constitution. More than just 
creating ethnic groups, Soviet leaders laid the groundwork for eventual ethnic clashes 
by drawing borders without regard (or with calculated regard) to ethnic and linguistic 
divisions. This created both multi-ethnic communities and communities dominated by 
minority ethnic groups. 
The creation of national literary languages and the alphabet reforms of the 
early Soviet period were carried out both for symbolic reasons and practical purposes 
of indoctrination and mass communication; this was an important part of the creation 
of national identities in Central Asia. The language policies reflected Soviet fears of a 
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pan-Central Asian identity developing, as well as fears of the Central Asian nations 
relating closely to their Muslim neighbours.138 Soviets had their reasons for not 
accepting the languages and alphabets already in use in Central Asia. “The Pan-
Turkic language of Gaspirali was rejected because of its potential effect of drawing 
peoples of Turkic speech together in opposition to Russians. The several national 
literary languages written in Arabic script were rejected because a broad educational 
program based on that script might be expected to open doors to the thinking of 
Persians, Arabs, and other Muslims rather than to the ideology of Soviet Russia. 
Soviet policy was therefore to develop new literary languages, a different one for each 
narodnost, ethnic group, which would retard or prevent the growth of Pan-Turkic 
sentiment and would permit an orientation toward Russian ideas.”139 By banning 
some languages and promoting others, Soviet planners controlled the power and 
positions of different ethnic groups.  
For the most part, in the early years of Soviet rule, Central Asians continued to 
identify most strongly with their religious groups, regions, tribes, and other intra-
ethnic groups. However, over time the national identities began to seep into the 
popular consciousness through educational reinforcement and official policies. After 
Lenin’s death, Stalin’s concerns about the level of indigenization among the non-
Russian republics caused a dramatic policy shift toward greater centralization, cultural 
Russification, and the repression of non-Russian national elites. The delimitation a 
decade earlier, however, had already begun to shift popular identity. Paradoxically, 
“the economic and social changes launched in the Stalin era—industrialization, 
urbanization and the spread of educational opportunities—far from obliterating 
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national identities and loyalties, served to strengthen them. The emergence of modern 
urban elites in the national republics, in which the cultural intelligentsia occupied a 
dominant and prestigious place, provided critical leadership in the process of national 
revival in subsequent decades.”140 As Suny writes, “even as nationalist expression 
was stifled and ethnic traditions eroded by Stalinism, the consolidation of nationalities 
in the non-Russian regions and republics continued. The non-Russian nationalities not 
only survived Stalinism, but emerged with new strengths—national intelligentsia’s 
higher rates of literacy, more urbanized and informed populations…. Rather than a 
homogeneous Soviet people, the Soviet form of modernization produced coherent, 
consolidated, conscious nationalities firmly established in their own national 
territories.”141  
Central Asian Experience Under the Soviets 
The Soviet system created a nomenklatura in Central Asia and used local 
Soviet leaders to promote Moscow’s policies in the region. “Muslim political elites 
encompassed primarily local functionaries of the state and party bureaucracies. But 
the roster was much broader, because leadership positions in all social and cultural 
organizations were also a part of the nomenklatura system. Members of the elite had 
to be fluent in Russian, although knowledge of the language was less essential at the 
local level (in the administration of rural rayons, for example, and in kishlaks) than it 
was at the republic level. Also, it was more important within the party bureaucracy, 
since it was heavily penetrated by the functionaries of the CPSU central committee 
(rotated between the centre and the periphery) than in state offices or in social 
organizations. Political leaders were sometimes recruited from the broader-educated 
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strata. Some acquired Russian in the military service, others through education– 
frequently technical education, especially in agricultural tekhnikums. Information 
available indicates that many came from rural backgrounds, and most had retained 
strong ties to the traditional local and regional kinship structures. Although the 
relationship was never explicitly acknowledged, it was clear from constant criticism 
in Soviet sources of family compacts (semeistvennost’) and “localism” 
(mestnichestvo)– which allegedly led to widespread corrupt practices and short-
circuited the system of central controls– that traditional kinship organizations have 
deeply penetrated the Central Asian nomenklatura system, just as the nomenklatura 
system has deeply penetrated Central Asian society.142 Politically ambitious youth had 
only one road available to them to gain power and privilege. But as a member of the 
nomenklatura, a young Muslim was forced to compromise and adapt: “The essential 
condition was the subordination to Moscow’s leadership. In time the most able and 
successful of Central Asian political leaders found patrons at the source of power 
which gave them leverage vis-à-vis Central Committee control agents stationed 
locally.... Local leaders usually gained greater leverage when there was a struggle for 
power in the centre. In the last two decades of Brezhnev’s rule, Central Asian leaders 
became a part of the leader’s patronage network, and in exchange for loyalty and 
support for his policies were given a considerable measure of power in their 
republics.”143 
Muslim political elites in Central Asia continued to act as bridges between 
Moscow and the indigenous populations, but therefore had an ambiguous position and 
were not fully trusted by either side– this led to the creation of local patronage 
networks. Their positions required that they implement policies that were largely 
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resented at a local level– success in this was the precondition for political survival. 
However, in order to successfully implement these policies, they needed to mobilize 
the local constituency. This led in most cases to the creation of local patronage 
networks: “The way out of this conundrum was the creation of local patronage 
networks for the distribution of spoils in return for services rendered. The networks, 
based largely in traditional kin and regional connections, had several uses: they 
mobilized the constituency when required; they facilitated the falsification of the 
indicators demanded in policy fulfilment by the central leadership and served to 
bypass control agents send from the centre, as well as to cover tracks. They 
distributed rewards to supporters and punished enemies. Last but not least, they 
created for the leaders a political power base, which gained in importance as the 
power of the centre was eroded and local interests and demands came to play a major 
role.”144  
Brutality was a hallmark of Soviet rule in Central Asia. The transformation of 
Turkestan was undertaken in many (often devastating) waves, and forcible 
modernization had brutal consequences for local populations. “Challenged by a 
widespread, badly organized, but strongly motivated anti-Bolshevik Muslim 
resistance movement, the basmachi, the Soviet Russians defeated the opposition by 
about 1924 through a combined strategy of withholding food from the starving 
Muslim population and of applying massive military force. By 1925 the peoples of 
Central Asia had lost all traces of political autonomy, and Central Asian politics and 
economics were managed from Moscow and by Russians and/or Russified natives 
loyal to the Soviet Russian regime.”145 In practice, Soviet nationalities policy 
balanced force and concessions; “It was necessary to establish at least the semblance 
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of independent nationhood among the titular peoples of the Soviet republics in order 
to give credence, however superficially, to the notion that the Soviet state constituted 
a voluntary union of free nations, and thus was qualitatively different from colonial 
empires. This resulted in a policy of dual emphasis– of identification with the Soviet 
state and with the national group–which was to shape the cultural, political and 
economic life of all the Soviet peoples.”146 Gail Lapidus highlights what she calls the 
“ambivalent character of Soviet policy” toward nationalities: “On the one hand, the 
Soviet state was both figuratively and literally a nation-destroying empire, striving to 
eradicate the distinctive histories, cultures, economies, and societies of its constituent 
parts in the name of a universalistic ideology which treated national identities and 
loyalties as an atavistic as well as threatening political phenomenon. Yet ironically 
enough, the very decision to construct a federal system on the basis of ethno-
territorial structures simultaneously encouraged a process of nation building in which 
the republics—however arbitrary their origins and boundaries, and however limited 
their powers—came to represent a genuine repository of identities and attachments 
that would take on real importance when the old centralized structures began to 
erode.”147 Bialer describes this duality: “on the one hand it granted to formed nations 
cultural autonomy, territorial integrity, and symbols of nationhood; on the other hand 
it insisted on the supremacy of the central state and government and strove for a state 
of affairs where national separateness and ethnic identity would ultimately wither 
away.”148  
Soviet Social Engineering in Central Asia 
Central Asian Muslims in the early twentieth century were viewed by the 
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Soviets as a terribly backwards population. In 1923, Stalin described his view of the 
social situation in Central Asia: “the present position in Turkestan is the most 
unfavourable and alarming one. The picture is one of cultural backwardness, a 
devastatingly low percentage of literacy, isolation of the state apparatus from the 
language and life of the peoples of Turkestan, a devastatingly slow rate of 
development.... Turkestan as it is now is the weakest point of the Soviet regime. The 
task is to transform Turkestan into a model Republic, into the outpost of revolution in 
the East.”149  
The degree of change attained by the Soviets in Central Asia results from a 
combination of factors that made Central Asia particularly “ripe” for Sovietization at 
the time. First, that the project of Sovietization and industrialization took place within 
the context of a totalitarian state. In that context, “not only were the necessary human 
and material resources mobilized as and when required, but a unanimity of purpose 
was achieved through the exercise of the tools of mass manipulation–namely, 
regimentation, censorship, persuasion and terror.”150 Also, the Soviets were able to 
achieve a high degree of mobilization in the early years because, in spite of hardship, 
a sense of optimism and pride in the construction of a socialist society was truly 
tangible in many regions. That the only points of reference available and the only 
educational curricula were state-sanction provided a valuable opportunity for 
indoctrination. Finally, “those who were categorically opposed to the new order took 
the age-old nomad option of flight, moving in their thousands, with families, tents and 
flocks, across the still open borders into China, Mongolia, Afghanistan and Iran.”151 
All these, taken together, demonstrate the particular context in which the Soviets were 
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able to attain a high degree of change. The most important step of the Soviets for their 
project of social engineering was their early resort to force, through collectivization 
and purges of the elite, which cleared the way for their project and eliminated a 
potentially explosive source of resistance.  
Not all converts to Party ideology, particularly in Central Asia, were won over 
by ideology and rhetoric; under the Soviet regime, dissenters were brutalized, creating 
a climate of terror that frightened some and destroyed others. Programs of 
collectivization, de-kulakization, and industrialization had heavy human costs, and 
neighbours were turned against each other in the Party’s campaigns to weed out 
counterrevolutionary forces. By the second decade of Soviet rule, as historian Stephen 
Kotkin writes, “The revolutionary dream for a world of abundance without 
exploitation had become an enslavement of the peasantry and a forced, headlong 
expansion of heavy industry, with millions of people called upon to sacrifice….”152 
Shahrani writes, “The possibility of any challenge to Soviet installed power was 
minimized through a systematic series of purges, liquidations and decapitations of 
potential or actual native leaders, and as a result no credible opposition was ever 
allowed to emerge.”153  
In the Soviet purges, Central Asian beys were viewed in much the same way 
as were kulaks. Along with religious leaders, tribal and communal leaders in the 
1920s were prosecuted for association, no matter how indirect or limited, with 
perpetrators of “crimes related to custom in their habitat,” including the murder of 
unveiled women.154 These impoverished peasants and nomads were classified as 
“backward,” “unconscious,” and “irresponsible,” as “blind followers of religious and 
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communal leaders, as ignorant pawns who were merely used, urged on, and incited to 
fanatical acts by class-enemies of the Soviet regimes.”155 While elite and leaders 
fitting these categories were subjected to Soviet show trials, property confiscation, 
deportation, and death, the masses of peasants guilty of custom crimes were given 
“educative” penalties.156 In Turkmenistan, victims of the Soviet purges included not 
only tribal elite and clergymen, but also new “Soviet Turkmen” working in local 
administration– it was this group that suffered the heaviest losses in 1937-38. 
Kaisygyz Atabaev, the First Chairman of Turkmenistan’s Council of People’s 
Commissars, and Nebirdai Aitakov, the Chairman of the Central Executive 
Committee of Turkmenistan, were arrested on charges of “bourgeois nationalism” in 
those years, and the total number of victims from the new Soviet Turkmen elite in that 
period ran into the thousands.   
The purges had great effects, both short- and long-term. In the short term, they 
eliminated leaders whose places were not easily filled, even with the implementation 
of korenizatsya policy between 1921 and 1934. Olivier Roy claims that it took 20 
years after the 1937 purges for the system to stabilize to some degree.157 The purges, 
intended in part to “frighten and shock the population, to break them and to check the 
possibility of popular opposition,” in fact did just that, clearing the grounds for a 
dramatic modernization drive that would aim at the restructuring of identity on 
several levels.158 Some of the more long-term effects on traditional structures of 
loyalty will be discussed below.  
Modernization: Creating New Loyalties 
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The Soviet modernization of Central Asia was carried out on many levels. To 
overcome the backwardness that made Central Asia a revolutionary weak spot, the 
Soviets attempted to eliminate traditional loyalties (namely, clan and tribal 
associations) and replace them with ethnic and class identities. Soviet policies were 
also aimed at destroying traditional family structures through the emancipation of 
women and the introduction of new methods of education. While social capital did 
take new forms during the Soviet period, partly as a result of these policies, the 
continuation of traditional structures, and the new forms of social capital themselves, 
remain significant features of the social landscape of contemporary Turkmenistan. 
Central Asia under Soviet rule experienced a huge degree of modernization. 
Akiner writes, “in effect, the region was wrenched out of Asia and thrust into 
Europe.”159 Local traditions were repressed or destroyed, and new national identities 
created to take the place of clan and tribal groups. This process was severe in Central 
Asia, in part due to the external imposition of new structures on local populations, and 
in part to the extremity of the imposing Soviet ideology. The populations of Central 
Asia, underdeveloped both socially and economically, were not the industrialized 
proletariat classes described by Marx. In addition, they were relatively integrated on a 
local level, thus lacking in large, politically experienced and alienated groups. Massell 
appropriately observes, “The drama of modernization in Soviet Central Asia thus 
arose from a huge gap between the social structures existing and those envisioned; 
from the lack of significantly disintegrated structures ready-made for refashioning; 
and from great verve and urgency on one side and a deep imperviousness to 
manipulation on the other.”160  
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Undermining Local Structures: the Kolkhoz as a Basis of Identity 
To support their policies of identity redefinition at the national level, Soviet 
leaders worked to undermine traditional structures at the level of the clan, village, and 
family. Tribal and clan allegiances were viewed as a characteristic of a chronically 
backwards people and an obstacle to the revolution in Central Asia. The 
collectivization drives were part of this redefinition of identity; a kolkhoz member 
was expected to identify most closely with those with whom he lived and worked. 
Under the system of kolkhozi, the individual was forced to associate with his 
collective. Collectives were the basis for a citizen’s administrative existence– internal 
passports, basic social services, housing, and travel were all conducted through the 
system of kolkhozi.161 These new cultural divisions were expected to “induce 
desirable forms of social mobilization and political participation among the 
minorities, erode parochial orientations, and promoted socio-cultural and economic 
homogenization as well as political integration of the Soviet multi-national state.”162  
Despite Soviet attempts to do away with existing loyalties, however, the 
collectivization process itself proceeded largely along traditional lines. Turkmen 
kolkhozi were typically centred around existing villages or tribes, and attracted 
extended families and sometimes even entire clans.163 Because of these trends, the 
social structure of the Turkmen was reinforced by collectivization, rather than 
destroyed; some have suggested that the formation of kolkhozes on traditional tribal 
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territories has actually strengthened tribalism. “The sense of kinship remains so strong 
in the kolkhoz that nonkin, who are usually skilled personnel such as bookkeepers and 
truck drivers, remain outsiders.”164 Whereas the nomadic lifestyle separated kinship 
groups during the winter migrations, “the modern kolkhoz centre brings together 
many kolkhozniks during the winter months, and children, old people, artisans, and 
others for a longer period each year.”165  
Because clan and familial ties continued, so too did old feudal relationships, 
which were merely transplanted into the socialist system and re-composed to fit the 
new administrative structures. Although each village housed a party cell, most 
governance at that level was informal self- organization, around a council of elders 
composed of notable community figures. The council of elders retained such 
significance in Turkmenistan that the Soviet administration officially revived it at one 
point, hoping that the elders might use their huge influence to advance Soviet aims.166 
“The kolkhoz head is normally also chief of his tribal kin group, and the aqsaqal–
head of the extended family– is a person of importance.... almost universally children 
are trained from earliest childhood to respect their elders.”167  
Undermining the Family: The Emancipation of Muslim Women  
Another aspect of Soviet social reordering was an undermining of traditional 
order through the destruction of values, customs, relationships, and roles upon which 
family structures were based. The traditional role of women in Muslim society was 
perceived by the Soviets as the most backward of the traditional practices. According 
to Massell, Muslim women were seen as a structural weak point in the traditional 
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order, and “through that weak point, it was thought, particularly intense conflicts 
could be engendered in society and leverage provided for its disintegration and 
subsequent reconstitution.”168  
Whereas Soviet gender policy in Central Asia is generally known for its 
symbolic “unveiling” practices, these were restricted mainly to the sedentarised 
populations of the Uzbek and Tajik territories. For a long time, in fact, tsarist Russian 
officials and then Soviet planners considered that there was a “nomadic exception” in 
Central Asia; that is, since nomadic women were generally not veiled under 
customary practice, they were therefore relatively liberated compared to their regional 
neighbours.169 Although travellers and Soviet planners alike heralded the independent 
spirit of the Turkmen women, especially those of the Tekke tribe, the situation of 
women in Turkmenistan was not one of liberation: “In Turkmenistan, women faced 
burdens deriving from Islamic law as well as from the customary law of a patriarchal 
society. Like other Central Asian women, Turkmen women carried the burden of 
preserving their family’s honour, since shame would taint the entire family of a 
woman who engaged in sexual activity outside marriage. Women were expected to 
play a smaller public role than men, show modesty in public and before strangers, and 
obey their parents and husbands. The Turkmen also accepted various aspects of 
Islamic law that were disadvantageous to women; polygamy was permitted (although 
uncommon) and men had the sole right to initiate divorce. In some spheres, such as 
inheritance law, Turkmen custom was less advantageous to women than Islamic 
law.”170 Turkmen society was very patrilineal; in a family, lineage depended entirely 
on male offspring; sons also provided a source of labour and expanded the family as 
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they reproduced and married. Daughters, whatever their individual value to a family, 
had no role in the passing of family traditions and were lost to their families when 
married.  
In the mid-1920s, however, the Zhenotdel (Communist Party Women’s 
Committee) changed their policies towards nomadic women in general and 
particularly Turkmen women. Reversing policies and declaring that the Turkmen 
women were as much if not more oppressed than their neighbours in Uzbekistan 
where the symbolic unveiling campaigns had provided a lot of support for communist 
policies on family and gender, the Zhenotdel undertook a massive campaign in 
Turkmenistan. Lacking something like a veil to base the campaign on, Soviet general 
policy in Turkmenistan focused on legal reforms and the outlawing of such traditional 
family practices as bride prices, polygamy, and yashmak, the Turkmen tradition 
wherein a newlywed bride is forbidden to speak in the presence of her in laws for a 
certain period of time following marriage. But they found this less of a rallying point 
than the veil in other societies. The problem was that yashmak was very different 
from veiling in its social significance.171 “Yashmak was not simply a form of female 
seclusion, but part of a cultural system revolving around notions of shame and respect 
for seniority. Extremely complex rules of deference and avoidance regulated relations 
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within a Turkmen household.”172  
The Repression and Persistence of Central Asian Islam  
As discussed above, pre-Soviet social networks in Central Asia had rested 
largely upon religious structures. For many citizens in Central Asia, Islam is the main 
component of self-identity, even more than regional and linguistic affiliations and 
even ahead of familial and tribal ties. Safronov has noted that through the Soviet 
period, “Islam remained one of the chief indicators of the Turkmen’s social self-
identification.”173 Islam has also historically been the main force for social and 
political organization in the region, at least until the early years of Soviet rule.  
The Bolsheviks brought with them a new ideology intolerant of established 
religious faiths, and undertook an attack on Islamic practice in the region. Although 
all religions were antithetical to Soviet communism, Islam was viewed as particularly 
backward and reactionary and as a threat to Soviet rule, largely because of the history 
of the Basmachis and other rebellious Islamic groups. Soviet policies were 
devastating to Central Asian Islam. Leaders converted mosques into workshops and 
banned religious ceremonies and services. After a brief period of religious 
appeasement policies during World War II, when Stalin established four Islamic 
spiritual directorates to allow Moscow to control the Muslim population, religious 
oppression continued. The last anti- Muslim campaign came under Gorbachev; his 
program of perestroika pitted Islam as “the enemy of modernization and a rallying 
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point for anti-Russian feelings amongst Central Asia’s ethnic groups.”174  
Rashid writes, “Islam played a key role in sustaining the clan, regional, and 
ethnic solidarity amongst the people of Central Asia.”175 Unofficial Islam continued 
throughout the Soviet era. Community donations allowed illegal mullahs and fakirs to 
carry religious rites. Well-organized Sufis produced widely-circulated samizdat 
literature, and even within Communist parties, some officials personally hired 
mullahs to perform Islamic rites for births, deaths, and weddings. Women, by serving 
and maintaining the Sufi shrines, played a large role in the sustenance of Islam 
throughout this period. The “explosion” of Islam at the time of independence, then, 
was due to the fact that “Islam had never disappeared, not even during the worst 
repression of the Soviet era. The more the Soviets tried to stamp it out, the more it 
spread throughout Central Asia as an act of ethnic and regional as well as religious 
resistance.”176 
In practice, virtually every Turkmen Communist Party official followed adat 
(or däp) law in his private life, celebrated the traditional religious holidays in a semi-
secret fashion, and circumcised his sons. As Safronov writes, “Whenever a party 
official was persecuted for religious practice, the charges were, as a rule, a pretext to 
settle personal scores or to topple a rival in the struggle for power. The Muslim 
customs, traditions, and way of life on the whole remained unaffected by Soviet rule, 
and the values of adat law remained largely intact. Soviet officials did not make any 
serious attempt to eradicate the Muslim way of life and tribal-clan relations. Even 
when authorities launched such campaigns from time to time, such moves usually 
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brought no results.”177  
Education and Urbanization  
Under the Soviet system, educational reforms from the tsarist period continued 
and expanded to a great extent. Soviets introduced modern forms of education to the 
region to take the place of traditional Islamic education, a practice not always 
immediately accepted by residents. The Soviet campaign for mass literacy and 
education was highly successful– Soviet policymakers reached their goal of full 
literacy in Central Asia by the early 1940s, a remarkable change from the seven 
percent rate of literacy in 1926. Beyond literacy rates, the Soviets succeeded in 
creating a large network of schools, including boarding facilities for rural-based 
students. The shift from an orally transmitted culture to book-learning and widespread 
literacy fundamentally changed the outlook of the Turkmen. As Akiner has written of 
the Kazakhs, “within scarcely more than a generation, a people whose world had 
formerly been bounded by the limits of personal experience suddenly found their 
horizons infinitely expanded. Knowledge was no longer strictly related to the struggle 
for survival: it now served to make sense of a larger, more complex society.”178 
Literacy facilitated political indoctrination by opening channels for ideological 
propaganda; it also heightened a sense of national identity since “as terms of reference 
widened, so, too, it became both possible and necessary to locate the community in a 
broader spatial and chronological framework. At school, legend was replaced by 
‘proper’ scholarly histories, furnished with the confidence-inspiring paraphernalia of 
dates, statistics and references; maps traced precise contours and specific geographic 
                                       
177 Safronov, “Islam,” 80 





Many consider urbanization to be a positive legacy as a form of 
modernization, along with industrialization. Roy argues, however, that there was 
actually a low rate of urbanization because there was not much emigration to the 
north or rural migration to towns.180 Because there was no architectural tradition, “the 
psychological impact of the new constructions in concrete, steel and glass was far 
greater here than in settled regions. The broad, asphalted streets and solid, multi-
storied buildings, emblazoned with huge symbols and slogans, proclaimed the 
dawning of an age that self- confidently, brashly, rejected the fragile, uncertain 
existence of the past.”181  
The Bolsheviks sent Russian cadres sent into most of the USSR’s non-Russian 
territories (except Armenia and Georgia), where they were privileged and remained 
power proxies for the Moscow-based leadership. Large-scale migrations, beginning in 
late 1920s, shifted the region’s demography to the lasting disadvantage of indigenous 
peoples, radically changing the population distribution. Although this was even more 
pronounced in Kazakh and Kyrgyz territories, where at independence titular 
nationalities found themselves to be minorities in their homelands, Russian migration 
was also a large factor in Turkmenistan. According to Rakowska-Harmstone, the 
“peak” of colonization “was reached by the end of the 1950s and was reflected in the 
1959 population census. Russians and Ukrainians living in Central Asia numbered 7.2 
million people (6.2 million Russians and 1 million Ukrainians), an increase of 5 
million over 1920, and they accounted for almost one-third (31.5 percent) of the 
population of the five republics.”182 Urbanization has a dark side as well– in many 
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cases it leads to social deviance; economic and political discrepancies are more 
visible in cities, producing mounting discontent. Many Soviet citizens expressed 
material dissatisfaction and frustration through a host of prevalent social problems, 
including low work productivity, high turnover and absenteeism, and rising 
alcoholism. Under many conceptions, these social pathologies became central to the 
image of the Soviet system. Dissident Vladimir Bukovskii remarked that to him, 
proletarian culture was “no mystical secret, but drunkenness, brawling, knife fights, 
obscenity, and chewing sunflower seeds.”183 In the second Novosibirsk Report in 
1983, Tatiana Zaslavskaia reported that the inert society needed to free itself from 
lethargy and alcoholic stupor. This form of discontent in part arose from the 
inflexibility of the system: Soviet society had achieved a high degree of education and 
modernization, but there were not enough jobs for the population, leaving skilled 
workers with dull work and poor living conditions. One Soviet citizen, M.F. Kharkov, 
wrote to Gorbachev to tell of her son, who was “a high-class specialist, yet he lives 
like a tramp.”184 Turkmenistan in particular developed serious social problems and 
was the only Soviet republic with a recognized problem of narcotic addiction.185 
Formation of Turkmenistan’s Party Elite 
 
During the Soviet era, Turkmenistan’s elite was socialized into the political 
system in an authoritarian, Soviet style, entailed the creation of a highly Russified 
intelligentsia and political elite.  As Al-Bassam writes, “During the 1930s, the 
Turkmen intelligentsia was most active in demanding political autonomy and a new 
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language policy.  But, as early as 1926, Turkmen made up less than a third of their 
national intelligentsia.”186 This was probably due to the resistance from some ethnic 
Turkmen to Communism—although Turkmen did participate in the Bolshevik 
Revolution, even Soviet sources admitted the “continued existence and activity of 
nationalist organizations in Turkmenistan through the 1920s and 1930s…. Soviet 
policies resulted in open rebellion in 1928-32; two ministers of the Turkmenistan 
government were charged with supporting the rebels and with seeking the 
establishment of an independent Turkmenian State under British protection.”187 
Soviets purged native Turkmen from intelligentsia and governing structures as early 
as 1934, eliminating must of their already-limited influence on politics, and then 
purged the Communist Party of many native Turkmen.  Bohr writes, “Soviet 
authorities began purging Turkmen intellectuals on a large scale in 1934, soon 
widening the purges to include Turkmen government leaders.  In 1937-38, the 
chairman of the Turkmen Supreme Soviet, Nederbai Aitakov, was executed, and with 
him perished the last of a generation of Turkmen nationalists.”188 Purging governing 
structures of ethnic nationals allowed the Soviet authorities to limit the potential for 
native resistance, a continuing fear in part because of the Basmachi revolts that the 
Turkmen participated in through the early decades of the Soviet Union. 
 Following de-Stalinization, the political climate liberalized to a certain extent, 
however, Turkmenistan did not experience rapid political development—as 
elsewhere, Turkmen began slowly to call for a reinstitution of ethnic Turkmen to 
governing positions.  These native Turkmen who were in a position to fill these 
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political slots had gained prominence and some personal wealth through the 
establishment of deep patronage networks—often based on previously existing tribal 
connections but sometimes spanning ethnic groups.  Al-Bassam writes, “Progress 
under Khrushchev and Brezhnev was slow,”189 and the event with the greatest level of 
impact in Turkmenistan was the Uzbek cotton scandal, which instigated in Uzbekistan 
as well as in neighboring republics such as Turkmenistan a major purge to rid the 
party of corrupt officials and undermine local patronage systems created by cotton 
monoculture.  Patronage networks were widely used as a mechanism for 
consolidating power and wealth in Soviet Turkmenistan.  As Bohr writes, “While 
making outward displays of fealty and appearing to comply with the norms set down 
by officials in Moscow, however, many Turkmen political leaders were in fact 
managing clan-oriented fiefdoms involving massive amounts of embezzlement and 
graft.”190  
Following World War II, political power in the non-Russian republics slowly 
began to shift back to native elites—although these elites were more Russified than 
their predecessors. Murat and Simmonds write of the famous “Babayev Affair” in the 
late 1950s, when leading Communist Party members in Turkmenistan argued that 
leading posts in Turkmenistan should be held by Turkmen and that other nationalities 
should only hold these posts when qualified Turkmen candidates could not be 
found—this led to a “purge and reshuffling at the time of the entire Party and 
government apparatus in the republic.”191 
Beginning in the mid-1960s, there was a series of articles in the local press in 
Turkmenistan, authored by native Turkmen—likely with the backing of the 
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republican elite in that republic—which “called for an end to Turkmenistan’s serving 
primarily as the Union’s supplier of cotton and other raw materials and for greater 
local economic diversification, the development of a policy of economic self-
sufficiency—in short, for altering the thrust of the republic’s economic growth from 
serving primarily the needs of the central Soviet government to responsiveness to 
local needs.”192 Murat and Simmonds reported in 1975 that this sentiment continued to 
be expressed in local press organs.193  Rakowstra-Harmstone wrote in 1975, “the 
ethnic elites have ascended in the republics’ power structure, giving the Moslems the 
national leadership they have not had since Stalin’s purges.  Although still relatively 
small, the elites are growing rapidly, the result of the baby boom and of a mass-based 
local language educational system.”194 
The formation of Turkmen elite under the Soviet Union, similar to elite 
formation in colonial Africa, involved cooptation which interacted with and was 
aimed at spontaneous and self-interested actors within indigenous society.195  As 
Beissinger writes, “The recruitment of collaborators from indigenous society usually 
leads to considerable change in the indigenous social structure.”196 As in Africa, 
Soviet policies of cooptation involved significant restratification within non-Russian 
society.  “Cooptation of non-Russians produced a type of ‘layering’ phenomenon, in 
which intragroup differences were used to buffer or support a broader system of 
intergroup stratification.  This pattern of stratification, as opposed to the pillarization 
and segmentation common to consociational politics or the strict horizontal cleavages 
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characteristic of ethnically closed social orders, was long characteristic of Soviet elite 
recruitment in the non-Russian territories.  Its consequences pervaded local political 
processes in the republics.”197  
Despite some political mobilization by local ethnic Turkmen elite, by the 
1980s Turkmenistan was still considered the most conservative and even backward 
area of the Soviet Union.198 At the end of Gorbachev’s rule, Turkmenistan was highly 
dependent, economically and politically, on the center.  The Turkmen Communist 
Party leaders was a highly Russified group of elites who had weak connections to the 
majority of the mostly rural population. 
Because of their republic’s socioeconomic situation, the Turkmen communist 
party enjoyed several advantages over other former Soviet states.  First, as Al-Bassam 
points out, “the effects of perestroika did not penetrate deep into Turkmen society.”199  
Therefore, Communist Party elites were better able to protect themselves from the 
fallout associated with Gorbachev’s reforms.  These elites were self-styled patrons of 
their national cultures, and benefactors of the new architecture and transformation 
from Russian to their own national languages, a role played by opposition leaders in 
other republics.  A cultural deference to authority among the rural population that was 
naturally conservative provided another advantage for Turkmenistan’s elite at the 
time of independence.  The intelligentsia in Turkmenistan was small and had trouble 
articulating the interests of society and mobilizing people, therefore this group was 
not an instigator of reform.  The state controlled the mass media and was able to play 
upon perceived threats, from ethnic and tribal strife and violence between citizens and 
the state, that they could demonstrate occurring in other former Soviet republics.  
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Beissinger adds, “the low level of mass mobilization in Central Asia can partly be 
explained by the lack of organization of counter-elites in the region, due in part to the 
absence of dissident tradition.”200 As a result of these factors, Niyazov’s regime, like 
other Central Asian regimes after the fall of the Soviet Union, became a 
“nationalizing” regime.201  
Transitions From Colonial Rule     
As Lieven has highlighted, in comparing colonized regions it is necessary not 
just to look at the type of colonial rule but also at the decline of the empire and the 
way in which it declined. Struggle, or the absence of struggle, in a transitional 
situation can condition the early years of an independent state. He writes, “What 
forms de-colonization takes can have a big impact on the newly independent country 
and its political system. Independence can result in anarchy and in revolutionary 
upheavals in a society and its values, or at the other extreme it can appear to make 
very little difference to everyday lives or even the local structure of power. The latter 
is likeliest if power is ceded graciously by former imperial masters to local elites 
created and protected by the imperial regime itself.”202  
Gregory Gleason and Susan Buck, considering the Central Asian states, find 
striking parallels with sub-Saharan Africa, and suggest adopting African 
decolonization as a model for studying Central Asian post-Soviet political 
developments. They write,  
If this decolonization process is adopted as the model for the 
new states of Central Asia, it is clear that some of the patterns 
are similar, some different. As in many decolonized areas, the 
national boundaries of the Central Asian states are artificial 
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structures, adopted primarily for the convenience of the 
metropole, but no pre-existing national identities were 
associated with these states. As in many decolonizing areas, 
there were nationalist movements stirring, but political 
opposition was not the key to change, and no powerful, 
charismatic, heroic leaders were swept into power with a moral 
mandate. Like most decolonizing areas, there was a stratum of 
metropolitan settlers in privileged positions, but those 
privileges were not associated with private property and did 
not offer any advantages after independence. Like most cases 
of decolonization, the metropole had grown reliant, if not 
dependent, on a flow of raw materials from the colonies, but 
Moscow had also extended its basic physical infrastructure of 
communication, energy, transportation, and scientific research 
to these areas in such a way that both the centre and the 
periphery were vulnerable to dislocations.203 
 
Central Asia and Africa’s transitional periods differed considerably. 
Beissinger and Young write, “To be sure, both regions were buffeted by similar 
international pressures of change: global waves of democratization; international 
norms of self-determination; and pressures for economic restructuring. Yet the paths 
taken toward independence and to state crises were diverse.”204 In Central Asia, there 
was no struggle; in fact, in most cases independence had to be forced onto these 
states, the leaders of which were reluctant to leave the Soviet Union. Lieven suggests 
that securing independence in this manner may have deprived the regimes of some 
level of legitimacy, but also that “with the exception of Tajikistan, their societies have 
avoided the trauma and upheaval of revolution and war. Their rulers are political 
bureaucrats, not generals, revolutionaries or demagogues.”205  
Africa’s independence came mostly as the result of peaceful transfers of 
power in the 1950s and 1960s. The Second World War, scholars contend, acted as a 
catalyst and speeding along economic and social changes that arose out of the nature 
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of the colonial systems themselves.206 Moore writes, “independence comes, across 
Africa, all at once. Yet though resistance has been continuous throughout the colonial 
period, as periods and places of intense struggle have alternated with quieter times 
and times of great repression, in ways the newfound freedom is less won than handed 
over. External forces, world forces, or forces internal to the colonizing powers seem 
responsible for the sudden change. There is no moment of full satisfaction…. Not 
surprisingly, the newly independent African states are often underprepared for self-
rule.”207 Lieven writes, “Most of Black Africa did not gain independence or thereby 
acquire legitimacy by revolutionary war.”208 Devastating wars did occur in Africa, 
though primarily only in the Portuguese colonies and the Belgian Congo– in these 
cases, Lieven suggests, violence “occurred in part because independence was granted 
in a great hurry and with almost no political preparation. The newly independent 
African states very easily became the targets for regional and other factions which 
sought to capture them for their own material benefit. When these countries possessed 
valuable commodities this increased the lure of political power, the scale of 
corruption, and the total destruction of any sense of citizenship or community.”209  
In both Africa and Central Asia, however, “the newly independent states were 
not entirely new. Rather, they were fragments of pre-independence state authority, 
whose bureaucracies, resources, debts, informal relationships, and official privileges 
were handed over almost intact to new governing elites. Even those governing elites 
were not entirely new, as most had been schooled under the previous regime; in the 
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former Soviet Union, many were even the previous regime’s rulers.”210 Beissinger 
and Young write, “The everyday deontology of administrative operation silently 
assimilated the habits, routines, mentalities, and hidden normative codes of the 
colonial state [in Africa].”211 In this way, “Although the era of formal colonial 
occupation in Africa came mostly to an end in the 1950s and 1960s, the habitus 
embedded by the colonial state remained and amalgamated dialectically with the 
state-building and power-reproduction imperatives of the postcolonial successor 
elite.”212 The post-colonial elite in Africa were, as Post reminds us, “the products of 
extremely complex patterns of interaction between traditional societies, evolved over 
many centuries, and the forces set in motion by colonial rule.”213 In the aftermath of 
colonial rule, African elites “did not inherit a clean slate… they took over particular 
structures of central and local government, systems of law and education. They 
assumed responsibility for the direction of economies which had been developed in 
particular ways to meet particular demands during the colonial period. The first few 
years after independence were marked by the attempt to gain full control of this 
inheritance, and more especially to use the structures of government to tackle the 
problems of economic development.”214 
Rulers of the new states in innumerable ways sought “visible demarcation 
from the colonial past to establish the authenticity of... rule.”215 Quick reform of the 
instruments of socialization, from school curricula to pledges, oaths, and symbols, 
began in the period following independence in order to foster a sense of nationalism. 
As in postcolonial Africa, “post-Soviet leaders also sought in many cases visible 
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symbolic and substantive demarcation from the communist past. New national 
histories and symbols were quickly substituted for the old, and the post-communist 
projects of transition (from plan to market, from communist autocracy to fledgling 
democracy, from colonial subject to nation) became central elements of the 
legitimating discourse of power in most former republics.”216  
In Africa, colonial legacies became embedded in post-colonial states partly by 
inertial force. To continue past practices is the default option for new state agents and 
officials. However, Africans were actively involved to some extent in the 
continuation, or decision to adopt colonial boundaries and practices. Beissinger and 
Young comment, “The first imperative of the ruler is the reproduction of power, and 
the search for a monopoly hold on the instruments of rule soon seemed indispensable 
for these purposes. In the 1960s and 1970s, this seemed to require the positioning of 
the dominant party as the sole occupant of political space and the subordination of the 
infrastructures of representation created by the terminal colonial state. The colonial 
state legacy of incontestable authority, clothed in the radical language of anticolonial 
nationalism, had natural attractions.”217  
This combination– the internal logic of the colonial state, combined with the 
need to create legitimacy in the period following independence, in the African case 
fostered the emergence of what Young has called the integral state. The integral state 
had “enlarged ambitions of transforming society according to its blueprint,” and it 
attempted to act “directly on civil society.”218 In Young’s vision, an integral state 
exhibits perfected hegemony, that is, the unrestricted control of the state over civil 
society. The achievement of this type of state “requires not only the autonomy from 
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civil society achieved through comprehensive instruments of political control but also 
a suzereignty, if not monopoly, extending over social and economic vectors of 
accumulation.”219  
Young develops further his conception of an integral state, which to my mind 
bears resemblance to the systems of personal rule and regime developed in my first 
chapter. He writes, “Building on the exclusionary principle of the colonial state, the 
integral state sharpens the line between state and society by proposing a 
comprehensive apparatus of domination. The subject is a passive citizen, whose civic 
obligations are enacted through public rituals of allegiance: support marches, applause 
for leaders, unanimous plebiscite votes for the ruler. Civil society is organized into 
party-structured ancillary organizations, which are mechanisms of surveillance and 
control rather than participation and voice.”220 Africa has seen various examples of 
states attempting to achieve this type of domination in the period following 
independence. There arose in many countries a “moment of illusion, when the state 
appeared on the verge of achieving a comprehensive and perfected hegemony over 
society.”221  
 Of course, historical experience cannot be the only factor in the rise of 
personalist government, but it may be an instructive one. Although personalist rule 
has been prevalent in Central Asia since the fall of the Soviet Union, it certainly has 
not been everywhere as deeply embedded, or as extreme, as in the case of 
Turkmenistan.  Other factors—personality-based, structural and macrostructural—are 
certainly at work in the formation and embedding of extreme personalist rule in post-
colonial contexts. 
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 The following chapters will explore more specifically the nature of rule under 
sultanistic regimes—particularly, aspects of legitimation under the regime of Niyazov 
in post-Soviet Turkmenistan. Where appropriate, examples from the African historical 
experience will help to contextualize consideration of Turkmenistan’s current 
leadership. While sultanism’s origins are complex and multi-faceted, the attempt of 
sultans to construct extravagant pseudo-ideologies as window-dressing for their rule 
seems to be a common aspect of the regime type.  
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New states emerging from periods of colonial rule “all confront or have 
confronted the necessity of legitimating themselves before their people.”1 Political 
regimes that lack strong popular support struggle to create legitimacy in various 
ways– through fear and intimidation, corruption and bribery, and political patronage, 
in addition to ideological indoctrination. Ricoeur, reflecting on Weber, writes, “Every 
system of [political] leadership wants its rule to be granted because its authority is 
legitimate. It is ideology’s role to legitimate this authority.”2 While Niyazov’s regime 
does work through coercive channels, this chapter concerns his regime’s methods of 
obtaining normative compliance from its subjects. As Schatzberg writes, “Dominance 
is most easily achieved and most effectively implemented when people accept and 
internalize the state’s ideological myths.”3 It is, as Callaghy writes, “a battle of belief, 
and one that relies heavily on Machiavelli’s concern with illusion creation and 
manipulation.”4 In Turkmenistan, this consists primarily in the formulation and 
propagation of an artificial, controlled doctrine that attempts to establish the right of 
the regime to rule.  
African cases of patrimonial rule have generated a literature concerning types 
of legitimating doctrine and methods of propagation employed by regimes emerging 
from colonial situations. This literature, along with isolated works on Middle Eastern 
and other regimes, provides a good framework for consideration of the Turkmen case. 
As colonial rule fell in Africa, the new states emerged with serious problems of 
forging new identities at the social and at the individual levels. Political elites were 
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“faced with the problem of changing their countries from colonial, economically and 
socially underdeveloped, culturally backwards and ethnically and linguistically 
divided entities into politically independent, modern nation states. They therefore had 
little option but to try and create a powerful political religion which would unite tribal 
factions on the basis of a new loyalty and legitimate the new central authority.”5  
Patrimonial regimes generally adopt legitimating packages that permit the 
strong personal ruler, or sometimes the ruling group, wide discretion in decision 
making because “limiting ideological commitments are few and unspecific, and it 
facilitates major and repeated changes in policy direction and the co-option of 
opponents.”6 Often, under sultanistic regimes, the pseudo-ideology will be so closely 
intertwined with the personal ruler that it will bear his name—such as “Jean-
Claudism” in Haiti in 1978, Ferdinand Marcos’ book An Ideology for Filipinos, and 
Les Grandes Textes due Mobutisme in Zaire in the 1970s.7 Pseudo-ideologies that are 
adopted are “usually an eclectic and often haphazard blend of ambiguous, fluctuating, 
and often derivative legitimating formulas that attempt to give the impression of being 
an ideology. In fact, however, they lack coherence, complexity, and clear articulation 
of specific assertions and explicit commitments.”8 In Africa, they contained jumbled-
together elements of socialist beliefs, ritual symbols and organizational practice and 
of indigenous traditional communal and aesthetic culture.  
Whatever the mixture, the conglomerate is held together by a leadership cult, 
elevating the “leader of the liberation period into a figure who is at one and the same 
time a man of the people and a superhuman prophet and saint. He is said to know the 
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needs of the people, show them the new way and guide them towards an idyllic 
future. Identification with this leader provides both social and personal meaning, 
facilitates the restructuring of basic attitudes and motivation and justifies the 
privations and upheaval endured for the sake of a bright future.”9 These cults of 
personality often form the fabric of the national ideology, or in some cases even 
supplant the ideology and become the only real official doctrine. Intertwined with the 
ideas of political religion and familial metaphors (portraying the ruler in one case as a 
saint, in the next as a father), cults of leadership are strong in most sultanistic regimes. 
Denison writes, “In weak, young states with limited cultural cohesion and an 
unformed national narrative, a personality cult grants a leader the opportunity to 
construct or remake national history and identity and, moreover, to reach into that 
construction in order to furnish his own authority in the present, and fashion his own 
perceived place in its destiny. A cult… generates a national space within and beyond 
the confines of the state in which the ruler becomes indivisible with the state’s 
identity, history, and future.”10  
The aim of these pseudo-ideologies is not to promote a moral concept or 
political doctrine per se—one of the hallmarks of a sultanistic regime is that these 
ideologies maintain some combination of “political quiescence, social 
submissiveness, passive resignation, or popular acceptance of the prevailing political 
situation,” and thereby preserve access to the state’s rewards.11 Although the content 
of patrimonial legitimating doctrines varies by case, there are certain themes found 
commonly across cases. This section discusses new nationalisms, political religion, 
and patriarchal patrimonialism, all salient in African cases as well as in Turkmenistan.  
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Common Elements of Pseudo-Ideologies 
Nationalism 
A common element of nearly all of these legitimating doctrines is an intense 
strain of nationalism and calls for national unity from above. In states emerging from 
a period of colonization, particularly, elites are “almost always intensely 
nationalistic.”12 Nationalism is promoted in part to reduce the likelihood of ethnic 
separatism, unrest, or secession. Schatzberg writes, “Given the artificial and culturally 
plural nature of most African countries, it is not surprising African leaders almost 
universally embrace ideologies of nationalism and nation-building. Briefly put, those 
who control the state incessantly preach the main task of all citizens is to build the 
nation.”13 As a corollary, leaders often regard any sub-national identities as threats to 
nation building. This nationalism, then, can take the form of a positive doctrine of 
unity or the discriminatory prohibition of various ethnic associations and violations of 
minority rights. 
African regimes took different approaches to the construction of concepts of 
post-colonial nationalism. Young and Turner write, “State doctrine (in post-colonial 
Africa) must constitute a civil society, and construct an ideological organic 
relationship between civil society and the state. The primary means for accomplishing 
this goal is to transform the idea of nationalism from an anti-colonial rejection of 
alien rule into a positive assertion that the human collectivity enclosed within the 
territorial boundaries of the state is a historically ordained community, and not a mere 
accidental juxtaposition of individuals or microgroupings of residence and descent.”14 
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In Africa, regimes adopted different types of nationalist symbols—while some rulers 
fully embraced traditional symbols and relics of pre-colonial periods, others adopted 
Western style clothes and symbols as elements of their nationalist doctrine, to show 
what was perceived as a modernized and advanced civilization.  
Political Religion 
Under sultanistic regimes, although ideologies are conceived after the leader’s 
rise to power, the doctrines often seem to grow in importance as time passes. 
“Modern political leaders come to recognize quickly, however, that no ordinary 
ideology can prevail for long in the face of obvious discrepancies between theory and 
practice. A more powerful symbolic force, less rational, although it may include 
rational ends, seems necessary to them.”15 In such state-created doctrine, as Lane 
writes, “There is a notable tendency... [for a state] to create its own holy scripture, 
traditions, ritual attributes, saints and its holy places of pilgrimage.... holy in the sense 
that... they are given a timeless importance and are considered as part of the 
unalterable order of things.”16 Here, this tendency will be referred to as political 
religion. This pseudo-religious dimension is sometimes explicit, but more often is 
implicit, attaching the timelessness and sacred respect of religious figures to 
contemporary political leadership in a manner that harkens back to absolutist claims 
of divine right to rule. 
Under doctrines of legitimacy that approach political religions, the state and 
the regime take on sacred characteristics. These characteristics become essential to 
maintaining community solidarity—for example, there might be persistent attacks on 
particular enemies, whether internal opposition or general threats such as capitalism 
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or neo-colonialism. Independence is seen as a natural rebirth, and the “agent of rebirth 
is normally any individual… who, as the leader of the political movement, is midwife 
to the birth of the nation. Sometimes this is expressed in songs and chants and other 
times in political prayers.”17 A major characteristic is the cult of leadership 
surrounding an individual with characteristics of revealed truth. Apter writes, “There 
are similarities between political religions and church religions. There are saints and 
villains. There are prophets and missionaries. To each individual the possibility of a 
political calling replaces the possibility of a religious calling. There is mysticism and 
authority.”18 
Bringing sacred elements to political regimes enhances the regime’s security. 
Apter writes,  
Endowing their roles with sacred elements makes their 
authority stronger and the regime more secure. Moreover, 
since everything is known about the leaders, their past, their 
family, their daily routine, they can hardly be remote and 
distant. Quite the contrary, they characteristically remain 
friendly and fraternal. If such familiarity is not, however, to 
result in disrespect for authority, the sacred role needs to 
utilize familiarity and turn it about. The public comes to be 
grateful for the spreading of the sacred largesse, and are 
purified by the divine. They see that the ‘Man of the People’ 
remains with the people, but they never confuse him with 
ordinary men. Authority then becomes stabilized in the role 
of the Leader and his manipulation of power, and 
friendliness is a token of majesty.19  
Patriarchal Patrimonialism 
Perhaps even more salient in the cases considered here is the notion of father 
and family applied to leader and nation as part of the legitimation campaigns in new 
patrimonial post-colonial states. As Callaghy writes, the “Father of the People” is the 
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ideal for leadership under patrimonial governance.20 “Political theorists and 
ideologues in various historical epochs and places have invoked metaphors of the 
family to define the terms of political membership. Political narratives often displace 
the emotionally charged, immediately meaningful relationship of family life onto the 
more impersonal, remote, and abstract relations between rulers and ruled or among 
citizens.”21 This ideological motif is one that can help legitimize, or at least make 
slightly more palatable, some of the nastier aspects of political life under sultanistic 
regimes. Political leaders can “portray stern measures taken against segments of the 
population as paternal discipline rather than political repression.”22 Leaders often 
justify political directives and policies on the grounds they will be good for the larger 
national family. 
The invocation of familial metaphor may or may not be an attempt to 
encourage feelings of love and kinship for a ruler, and populations may never in 
reality feel this kind of connection. There is no evidence in most cases that this 
“rhetoric signals the externalization of unconscious fantasies. Instead, family 
members operate in the official narrative to represent the regime’s idealized relations 
of domination and membership and to specify the form of public obedience” in a 
given country.23 The aim of the familial metaphor in political rhetoric is that citizens 
should behave as if they were children and the president was their father. They should 
“fear, revere, and honour him with their deference. They should also act as if they 
loved him and were willing to sacrifice for him. And if called upon publicly, they 
should not embarrass him or disgrace the community he heads, but rather behave as if 
they were extensions of him, capable of emulating his qualities and of making him 
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Familial metaphors work with nation-building ideologies particularly in 
societies where traditional kinship groupings remain an important organizing unit—
true both of sub-Saharan Africa and Turkmenistan. “The images of father and family 
are so pervasive because they strike a resonant and deeply embedded cultural chord. 
In other words, they form part of a culturally valid and largely implicit 
comprehension of the limits of political legitimacy based on a complex and largely 
unarticulated moral matrix of legitimate governance derived from an idealized vision 
of patterns of authority and behaviour within the family.”25 Familial imagery is 
attractive because it speaks to psychological needs for security and a desire for 
intimacy between rulers and ruled. This type of imagery can also mask exploitatively 
unequal flows of resources with “authoritarian overtones, aspects mentioned earlier in 
the context of paternal ‘generosity’ and the resultant ‘debt’.”26  
Enforcing Compliance, Not Belief 
 Approaches to the subject of ritual and ideology that treat discourse and 
rhetoric as independent variables producing different political outcomes are not 
perfectly suited to analysis of pseudo-ideology under sultanism. Importantly, the 
legitimating doctrines of sultanistic regimes do not generally mobilize citizens in the 
same way that totalitarian ideologies, for example, do. Under sultanism, successful 
rhetoric and symbols may not produce real charisma for the regime, or attract popular 
loyalty—however, they can still be effective ways of attaining compliance, in two 
ways. First, official rhetoric and imagery can operate as forms of power in their own 
rights, by enforcing obedience and sustaining the conditions under which regimes 
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rule. Secondly, real loyalty and belief need not exist for a legitimating doctrine to 
serve a purpose—the appearance of belief alone is a very useful tool for a sultanistic 
regime. Backed by fear and intimidation, even a poorly executed ideology may have 
lasting effects on a population. In the Syrian case, Wedeen studied the cult of 
leadership surrounding Asad and found that even when a political regime fails to 
convince the population of its outlandish claims, it can succeed in creating emotional 
ties between leader and followers. This approximates the situation in Turkmenistan 
closely—Wedeen writes, “If only by dint of repetition, everyone is fluent in the 
symbolic vocabulary of the Syrian state, which has become a hallmark of Asad’s 
regime.”27  
Niyazov’s cult and the ideology of Ruhnama is a strategy of domination that is 
largely based on compliance, but there is also an element of real belief, particularly in 
the younger generation, that might truly help to buttress Niyazov’s rule—a factor 
enhanced by the country’s increasing isolation. Fear of reprimand or harsh 
punishment is the most significant factor in forcing compliance, while education is the 
most prominent way of inculcating the new system of belief in youth. 
Turkmenbashy’s regime, like others employing similar tactics, is “powerful because 
[it] can compel people to say the ridiculous and to avow the absurd.”28 The 
similarities between post-Soviet Turkmenistan and post-colonial African countries 
with regard to ideology reflect their similarities in historical moment—these states 
face the dilemma of simultaneously building an effective state and fostering a sense of 
nationhood—building an effective state “requires the regime to enforce its political 
dominance, while generating support from a broad constituency and cultivating a 
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sense of national membership.”29 
Exemplar Pseudo-Ideologies: Mobutuisme and Authenticity in Zaire 
An instructive example of sultanistic pseudo-ideology in Africa is found in the 
case of Mobutu’s Zaire. Mobutu’s formal, explicitly propagated ideologies were 
Zairian nationalism, Authenticity, and Mobutuisme.30 One of the major elements of 
Mobutu’s state-building strategy was the establishment of what Callaghy calls a 
domain consensus, in his case, a “political religion built around the presidential 
monarch– a set of legitimizing principles and new definitions of authority and identity 
used in an attempt to diffuse ethnic identity and traditional authority as foci of 
political action.”31 Mobutu’s legitimating doctrine, along with those of many of his 
contemporaries and also Niyazov’s in Turkmenistan, was less a consistent and formal 
ideology than a blend of eclectic elements and myths. Mobutu’s ideology combined 
several ambiguous legitimating doctrines, including notions from liberal democracy, 
revolutionary populism, and even socialism. Above all, however, it was organic-
statist in orientation and drew on traditional African notions of “community, equity, 
authority, and power, particularly pre-colonial concepts of kingship, chiefship, and 
the ‘big man.’”32 This eclecticism, which is also seen in other patrimonial African 
states and in Turkmenistan, results partly from the competing legacies of pre-colonial 
and colonial periods.  
Zaire’s major legitimating doctrines, known as Authenticity and Mobutuisme, 
were constructed and propagated from above, first in a series of decrees and then 
continuously through official symbols, ritual, rhetoric and educational programs. The 
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official doctrines were not constructed until well after Mobutu’s rise to power. In the 
early 1960s, Mobutu’s regime began by emphasizing themes such as order, control, 
discipline and work—representing the need for a move away from the disorder of the 
first five years of independence.33 Between 1967 and 1970 there was a change in the 
tone of the political rhetoric, and themes emerged such as the need for a love of work, 
economic independence, agricultural recovery—“Let’s roll up our sleeves”, 
“authentic nationalism” and a struggle against tribalism, vigilance, support for 
Mobutu and the MPR, and return to the land.  
Mobutu’s Zaire is an excellent example of a regime manufacturing 
compliance through a legitimating doctrine that became something of a political 
religion. Callaghy writes, “The core of Zairian absolutist domain consensus doctrines 
is a political religion that specified and glorifies the role of the ‘new prince’, Mobutu 
Sese Seko, who saved Zaire from disintegration and chaos. It is a monarchical 
religion. Underneath florid twentieth-century revolutionary language, the key 
absolutist concepts of divine right, ruler sovereignty, and raison d’etat are clearly 
evident.”34 Religious symbolism is employed to justify the exercise of unlimited 
personal discretion by the ‘monarch’ in order to achieve the higher purposes of the 
state, which are divinely inspired. “Using both sacred and secular ideas, the Zairian 
political religion merges traditional African notions of kingly or chiefly power and of 
the state with concepts from Christianity and Roman law, both imposed by the 
colonial state, to depict Mobutu as an instrument chosen by God and the ancestors to 
bring peace, unity, dignity, and prosperity to Zaire.”35 He was known as “Messiah,” 
“Liberator,” “Helmsman,” and “Guide.” Mobutu had a hymn written for himself, 
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Djalelo, known as “Hymn to the President.”  Teachers at religious schools in Zaire 
were required to present the administration in a religious light, a requirement that 
became taxing and alienating in the later years of the regime. One of N’Gambwa’s 
respondents said, “Sometimes it was like asking a Catholic to teach that Mohammed 
was the only true Savior and Islam the only true religion. We were required to present 
Mobutu as our Prophet and the MPR our religion.”36  
 Familial metaphor, along with allusions to chieftainship and traditional social 
groupings, became a backbone of Mobutu’s rhetoric. Mobutu was known both as the 
“chief” of the Zairian village and as le pere de la nation (father of the nation). 
N’Gambwa writes, Naipaul writes of Mobutu, “He is citizen, chief, king, 
revolutionary; he is an African freedom fighter, he is supported by the spirits of the 
ancestors…. He has occupied every ideological position and the basis of his kingship 
cannot be questioned. He rules; he is grand; and… he is at once loved and feared.”37 
This imagery helped produce public tolerance for policies that harmed citizens. Any 
sacrifices resulting from these policies were considered necessary for the good of the 
national family and a vital part of nation building.  
Turkmenistan: Niyazov’s Ruhnama 
In Turkmenistan, a distinct pseudo-ideology has emerged that centres on the 
presidential personality cult and Niyazov’s guiding books Ruhnama and, recently, 
Ruhnama II, which extol a nationalist interpretation of the history of Turkmenistan 
and outline a moral code for its citizens. The extent to which Ruhnama is glorified 
and the extreme elevation of the president make Turkmenistan another case in which 
state-propagated political religion is taking hold, complete with holy symbols, heroes, 
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temples, texts, ritual and holidays. Additionally, the concept of patriarchal 
patrimonialism rings true in Central Asia as in sub-Saharan Africa—like Mobutu and 
other African sultans, Niyazov is known as the Father of the Nation (the translation of 
Turkmenbashy) and presents himself as both a benign father figure and an 
omnipresent disciplinary symbol. 
 The central tenet and name of Niyazov’s legitimating doctrine is Ruhnama—a 
concept which did not predate his regime and in fact was not introduced officially 
until more than a decade after independence. Niyazov first announced the program of 
Ruhnama in mid-1999, although the official manuscript of the book was not published 
for another two years. In June 1999, Niyazov held a meeting with Turkmenistan’s 
scientific and cultural leaders and media directors to discuss the problem of 
Turkmenistan’s “spiritual revival”. He proposed creation of a “desktop book of every 
Turkmenistani… to perform the role of a kind of moral guide through life for each 
family and for the entire people and the state as a whole.”38 His vision of the 
Ruhnama concept at that time was a program encompassing the “entire wealth of 
spiritual experience of the people (reflected) in their contemporary history.”39  
 The first themes of Niyazov’s ideological legitimation efforts centred around 
the idea of “national revival”. The choice of term, instead of the more common 
“Nation-building” was important in itself—Niyazov wanted to stress a return to the 
pre-Soviet customs and ways of the Turkmen nation, which itself is a huge 
construction—prior to the Soviet Central Asian delimitation in 1924, no Turkmen 
nation existed as such and certainly not one that was united or settled. National 
revival constituted part of Niyazov’s national program, the “Strategy of economic, 
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political, and cultural development of Turkmenistan until 2020”, which focused on 
unity, solidarity and restoration of historical Turkmen values and culture, and the 
creation of higher living standards in Turkmenistan.40 Unity is seen as a counter to 
tribalism-- tribalism has been considered one of the biggest threats to the stability of 
contemporary Turkmenistan, because tribal affiliations are still salient and animosities 
often run deep between tribes. Kuru writes, “Turkmenbashy defines the governmental 
policy on the unity of tribes as ‘national revival’ by returning to the real history and 
spiritual source, rather than ‘nation building’. According to him, what is happening in 
Turkmenistan is only the rediscovery of the forgotten national identity: ‘By forming 
an independent and totally neutral Turkmen state uniting a number of tribes into a 
whole, we did not create a new nation; what we did was to return its national pivot, 
which used to be strong and powerful by has been shattered by blows of the historical 
fate.’”41  
 Before the introduction of the Ruhnama, Turkmen national revival focused on 
several pillars: the development of Turkmen as the vernacular language of state, the 
use of the media to promote the regimes’ symbols and narratives, the revision of 
national histories, and educational propaganda. Culture and art have also been subject 
to national revival. In 1999, Niyazov discouraged the import of foreign films, saying 
“Disgraceful things in these films are a bad example for our young people and they do 
not suit the Turkmen spirit.”42 In 2001, television broadcasts of a presidential speech 
outlined Niyazov’s new policies for culture, media, and education. He did away with 
the current Turkmen television stations and created three new television channels and 
radio channels, where programs of “national flavour” would dominate. Ballet, opera, 
                                       
40 C. Durdiyeva, “Turkmenistan Celebrates a Triple Holiday,” Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, Johns 
Hopkins University, 2004, 2 
41 Ahmed T. Kuru, “Between the State and Cultural Zones: Nation Building in Turkmenistan,” Central 
Asian Survey 21(1): 71-90 (2002), p. 73 
42 Report on Ashgabat Channel One (in Turkmen), television programme evening 12 April 1999 
CREATING DOMAIN CONSENSUS 
 
 202 
and most recently, lip synching have been outlawed and people are encouraged to 
appreciate Turkmen art. Niyazov said “During the 70 years of the Soviet Union we 
have learnt a lot about cultures, we know great Western classics, we are familiar also 
with Shakespeare, French writers, many composers, but we do not know the origin of 
Turkmens, we do not know our writers…. We have forgotten somewhere our national 
and Turkmen flavour…. I always say in my speeches that we need the theatre, but if 
there is no ballet in the blood of the Turkmens, why do you want to give it to them?... 
A nation cannot present itself as cultured people by introducing another art. We must 
study our national culture, we must create our national theatre.”43  
 Perhaps the most widely known of Niyazov’s recent decrees is the national re-
naming of the Turkmen calendar and the creation of stages of life. Turkmen citizens 
reaching the age of 62, the age at which the Prophet Mohammed died, are issued 
payments and given an extra paid holiday. The decree is printed here in full: “In order 
to revive the national values and traditions of their forefathers in the Golden Age, and 
to perpetuate the famous names of Oghuzhan, the forefather of the nation, of Gorkut 
Ata, the symbol of a wise Turkmen elder in the world, of Alp Arslan, who has been 
incomparable in his courage, of Soltan Sanjar, who ruled the Turkmen state for 52 
years, of Magtumguly Pyragy, a singer of the human soul, and to praise our great 
independence and neutrality, to ascribe the names of the days of the week according 
to the Turkmen national spirit, and to put into use the new national calendar, days of 
the week and a 12 year cycle of the human life span… I resolve:  
1. To introduce in Turkmenistan… the national calendar in the following form. 
The national names for the months of the year are to be: the first month—
Turkmenbashy; the second month—Baydak (flag, referring to the Turkmen 
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flag holiday celebrated on 19 February); the third month—Nowruz (name of 
the solar New Year, marked on 21 March); the fourth month—Gurbansoltan 
(the name of Niyazov’s late mother); the fifth month—Magtumguly (medieval 
Turkmen poet and philosopher); the sixth month—Oghuzhan (considered as 
the founder of the Turkmen nation); the seventh month—Gorkut (symbolizing 
a wise Turkmen elder); the eighth month—Alp Arslan (ancient Turkmen 
warlord); the ninth month—Ruhnama; the tenth month—Garassyzlyk 
(independence, referring to Turkmen Independence Day, marked on 27 
October); the eleventh month—Soltan Sanjar (name of a medieval Turkmen 
ruler); the twelfth month—Bitaraplyk (neutrality—referring to Turkmen 
Neutrality Day, marked on 12 December). 
2. The national names for the days of week are to be approved as follows: Bas 
Gun (Main Day, for Monday); Yas Gun (Young Day); Hos Gun (Good Day); 
Sogap Gun (Blessed Day); Anna (Friday); Ruh Gun (Spiritual Day); and Dync 
Gun (Rest Day).  
3. The national life span of our Turkmen people is to be approved in the 
following form: up to 13 years—the age of childhood; from 13 to 25 years—
the age of adolescence; from 25 to 37—the age of youthfulness; from 37 to 
49—the age of maturity; from 49 to 61—the prophetic age; from 61 to 73—
the age of inspiration; from 73 to 85—the age of wisdom; from 85-97 old age; 
from 97 to 109—the age of Oghuzhan.”44  
 Publication of the first volume of Ruhnama (Book of the Soul) in September 
2001 solidified the direction of Niyazov’s legitimating doctrine. According to a Peace 
Corps volunteer based near Dashoguz, “national official ideology can be summed up 
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by the Ruhnama. All moral guidelines are delivered through this pervasive book.”45 
Ruhnama is a comprehensive set of guidelines on how one should live, an 
autobiography of Niyazov, and a dubious narrative on the history and post-
independence politics of Turkmenistan. Ruhnama, in effect, has become the primary 
instrument of cultural policy in Turkmenistan and is propagated in every sector of 
life. It is taught in schools and read in mandatory weekend sessions in industrial 
workplaces. At the medical institute in Ashgabat, the teaching of physics has been 
replaced by courses on Ruhnama.46 According to the U.S. Ambassador to 
Turkmenistan, up to 11 hours per week of elementary school curricula is devoted to 
Ruhnama, and a 16-hour Ruhnama course is a prerequisite to attaining a driving 
license.47 One Peace Corps volunteer claims: “Quotes from this text adorn the hallway 
walls (in schools) and can be found in all classrooms. Each week, students will have 
several hours of formal Ruhnama training, while other classes include biology, 
mathematics, English, Turkmen, art, Russian, and singing. Though Ruhnama is only 
one subject, this would be hard to tell from sitting in on other subjects’ classes. 
Biology classes are interrupted mid-class to recite passages from the book and the 
regional English competition this past year contained no grammatical questions. 
Rather, the winning student was the one who recited the Ruhnama in English with the 
highest accuracy. Basically, all lesson planning contains the book in some form or 
fashion.”48 
Since its initial publication in September 2001, the book has been published in 
many languages, a fact that the regime uses to convey the impression that the tome is 
respected and even revered in other countries, which is largely a falsity—to the extent 
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that knowledge of the book has spread, it is internationally mocked. Ruhnama was 
published in an English edition in March 2002—the Ashgabat Turkmen State News 
Service gave the following report: “the publishers… justly decided that the work of 
genius by the Turkmen leader would meet with a wide welcome by the multimillion 
strong English-speaking audience. Such confidence is based on the unprecedented 
interest shown in many countries of the world in the Turkmen leader’s optimistic 
philosophical system.”49 The report provides quotations from “representatives of the 
world intellectual elite,” from political figures, historians and philosophers—“The 
Ruhnama is a treasure of new ideas with historical and philosophical features,” “This 
is the first ever successful attempt to review the history in its inseparable links with 
the fate of the nation, country and other peoples,” and “The Ruhnama shows the logic 
of human civilization’s progress and overcomes the confusions which lead scientific 
thought to a dead end.”50  
 Although it is unique in some ways, Ruhnama as an ideology shares many 
elements with other post-colonial sultanistic doctrines, including many of its basic 
themes. Ruhnama deals at various points with national unity, an end to tribalism, 
threats to the Turkmen state, the importance of authority and respect, and a 
glorification of Turkmen history and ancient culture and national heroes that will be 
discussed in the following chapter. According to a Dashoguz-based Peace Corps 
volunteer, “the drive to promote and in many ways create a Turkmen culture… does 
provide an identity for the people, but at the same time is used to exclude minority 
groups and severely interrupt a normal educational curriculum. Nationalism and 
history are pushed to an extreme, while unity is preached, but far from practiced….”51  
                                       
49 Report on Ashgabat Channel One (in Russian), television programme 29 March 2002 
50 ibid. 
51 Interview with Peace Corps Volunteer “C”, 2005 
CREATING DOMAIN CONSENSUS 
 
 206 
 Historical national greatness might be the most central theme of the official 
nationalist program in Turkmenistan. “Maintaining and restoring symbols of past 
glories are central to the drive for national revival. The state appreciates the 
importance of challenging Soviet interpretations of Turkmens as ‘backward’ and 
‘uncivilized’ prior to their incorporation into the Russian empire. Attaining national 
self-respect is invariably linked to the historical image of the Turkmen ‘nation.’”52 
Another element of this nationalism, which will be explored further in the next 
chapter, is love of the fatherland (Watan), which now occupies a centre stage in 
official doctrine. Akbarzadeh writes, “Fostering the language-based Turkmen nation 
is ultimately constrained by territorial considerations. The present boundaries of 
Turkmenistan are seen by the state as marking the ancient motherland of Turkmens 
and it is in conjunction with these territorial criteria that the Turkmen identity is 
hoped to be crystallized. For this reason, promoting patriotism and loyalty to watan 
has become critical to state policies.”53 The ubiquitous nature of the slogan Halk-
Watan-Turkmenbashy (People-Fatherland-Turkmenbashy) exhibits the importance of 
this concept—“The state presents itself as the guardian of watan and justifies its 
policies, whether economic, social, or diplomatic, by that criterion. Watan and the 
Turkmen nation are treated as synonyms. In December1994, Niyazov formulated this 
approach: ‘All that we do must be directed at serving the people, in defence of the 
population. Every leader, every citizen must work diligently, and honestly, to carry 
out his duties to the motherland (watan). Today everyone must rise to serve the 
people.”54  
Political religion is a concept very salient in the case of Turkmenistan. A 
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Dashoguz-based Peace Corps volunteer says, “A political religion is definitely 
prevalent in Turkmenistan. The national oath and anthem are treated as “sacred,” as is 
the Ruhnama itself.”55 Turkmenistan’s national oath forms part of the everyday ritual, 
and indeed is endowed with sacred characteristics, and has powerful mortal 
connotations. The oath translates roughly:  
Oh, Turkmenistan, my beloved Motherland 
My dear country, 
My thoughts and my heart belong to you 
May my hand wither if you are maligned 
May my tongue turn numb if you are vilified 
May I stop breathing if my Motherland,  
Saparmurat Turkmenbashy the Great 
And the sacred flag are betrayed. 
“Sacred” and “holy” are words that appear with great regularity in political discourse, 
especially in connection with Ruhnama. Ruhnama, aside from its autobiographical 
and pseudo-historical content, is filled with truisms often cloaked in the form of 
revelations sent to the author from on high, or from Turkmen ancestors and great 
heroes of the past. Denison writes of Ruhnama, “Although its content is a rather 
loosely structured mixture of Turkmen genealogy, history, personal reflection, 
charming homilies and moral injunctions, Ruhnama is undoubtedly intended to be a 
spiritual if not directly religious text.”56  
Turkmenistan’s cabinet, on the 10th anniversary of Niyazov’s presidential 
election, issued a statement: “In writing the sacred book Ruhnama, you have rendered 
not only your beloved Turkmen people but also the entire world community an 
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invaluable service. And we will always love you and be proud that our people had the 
good fortune to have so wise and magnanimous a serdar (leader)—a man of 
outstanding capabilities, whom the people rightly compare with the Prophet.”57 
Members of the Mejilis on the same occasion stated: “The sacred Ruhnama, born of 
your genius, is a veritable treasure house, from which we all now draw spiritual 
strength and knowledge…” and the participants in the conference called “Saparmurat 
Turkmenbashy—Great Politician of the Present Day” wrote “Each citizen of the 
Turkmen state, over with the Great Serdar (Leader), who received the prophetic 
blessing of the Almighty for his being the support of his people, presides. We bow 
before you, our Great Saparmurat-Turkmenbashy.”58 Niyazov stated in 2002: “A 
person can become morally clear and spiritually strong by reading the Ruhnama 
thoroughly, by accepting instructions and exhortations with all his heart and by 
following them….”59  
In 2004, a new mosque (the largest in Central Asia) was opened in Niyazov’s 
home village of Kipjak in Ahal welayat. The minarets are engraved with quotations 
from Ruhnama, and inside this mosque and others, copies of Ruhnama are placed next 
to copies of the Koran. Religious officials, all state-approved, are required to teach 
Ruhnama as part of their religious lessons. On the first Saturday (Ruh Gun) in the 
month of September (Ruhnama) in 2002 (the first year of the new calendar), Turkmen 
clerics preached Ruhnama lessons during regular worship sessions. Reporting on 
events in the Ashgabat Ar Togrul Gazy mosque, a television correspondent said: 
“Clerics, elders, and other people from all regions of our country gathered here. Those 
who gathered praised our beloved leader’s sacred Ruhnama and learnt its lines of 
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pearls and wisdom. They preached brilliant ideas and precepts from it.”60 In 
December 2001, the heads of the council of religious affairs of Turkmenistan met to 
hail the Ruhnama. They stated: “Today the whole world is amazed by its spiritual 
force. This fundamental work created by your genius is your miraculous gift to the 
lovely nation in its golden age. Calling on each person to show cleanliness, kindness, 
charity, generosity, self-control, frugality, patriotism, unity and solidarity, the book 
leads us to understanding forever the great truth, that the further development of the 
state is only possible with the consolidation of the society. The holy Ruhnama is put 
on a level with the holy Koran at all the mosques in Turkmenistan.”61 
 Familial metaphor is also prominent in Turkmenistan. From the adoption of 
the name Turkmenbashy to the promotion of a cult surrounding Niyazov’s mother, 
Gurbansoltan Eje, as the national maternal figure, Turkmenistan provides an extreme 
example of the elevation of a leader to national fatherhood, along with his parents. 
Niyazov’s choice of the designation Turkmenbashy for his official title appears to be 
carefully calculated. Shortly after independence, he was called by the republican press 
“son of the Turkmen people”—this affectionate term reflected his upbringing 
parentless in a Soviet orphanage. Instead, Niyazov selected the title “Father of 
Turkmen,” in the style of Ataturk, which “evokes images of a benevolent ruler in the 
same tradition as the khans of Khiva and Bukhara liked themselves to be known. 
Turkmenbashy demands respect and following among tribal chieftains, and hence 
strives to be the focal point of unity.”62  
 An element of Niyazov’s self-styled paternal image is his ornamental, 
ceremonial “giving of gifts” to the Turkmen people. Niyazov regularly and with much 
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grandiosity bestows large architectural works or basic needs such as foodstuffs upon 
selected segments of the population to mark holidays or special occasions. 
Additionally, electric energy, gas, and drinking water are provided free of charge in 
homes in Turkmenistan and rent is held artificially low. As an example, on the tenth 
anniversary of Turkmenistan’s independence, in an address to an expanded cabinet 
session, Niyazov ordered a ten day holiday and an extra month’s pay for workers, 
construction of a new paper mill, and free flour for the poor. He said, “It seems that 
we should distribute flour for needy people free of charge. Let those who are really in 
need take it for free.”63  
Gurbansoltan Eje and Atamurat Niyazov, the President’s father and also a 
national hero in today’s Turkmenistan, have been elevated to cult-icon status. The cult 
of parenthood in Turkmenistan may have several causes—first, Niyazov’s own 
childhood as an orphan and lack of a close family. Second, unlike a son, brother, or 
possible successor, Niyazov’s deceased parents represent no political threat to his 
regime and can never emerge as rivals. Their worship represents a visual 
reinforcement of ideas on Turkmen family values, a theme that Niyazov develops in 
some depth in Ruhnama. It develops the themes of parental sacrifice, symbolizes the 
suffering of older generations and lends historical depth to the regime—Niyazov’s 
parents passed away in World War II, and the devastating Ashgabat earthquake in the 
late 1940s, tragedies that many older citizens can associate with, and which help 
citizens to sympathize with Niyazov. 
Instruments of Propagation: Symbols and Ritual  
A regime’s control and manipulation of the symbolic world can be a powerful 
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instrument of legitimation and demonstration of power.64 The iconography of the state 
is expressed visually in flags, stamps, coinage, and currency; textually it can be 
explored in anthems, oaths, and pledges of allegiance. It has been noted, “The 
National Flag, the National Anthem, and the National Emblem are the three symbols 
through which an independent country proclaims its identity and sovereignty, and as 
such they command instantaneous respect and loyalty. In themselves they reflect the 
entire background, thought, and culture of a nation.”65 A regime that is seeking 
legitimacy will attempt to “appropriate the shared symbols that infuse everyday life 
with meaning” in order to enhance its power to create and sustain national fictions.”66 
Lane writes, “The power of the symbol… springs from its three basic properties: 
polarization of meaning, condensation of meaning and multivocality (i.e. the 
accumulation over time of layer upon layer of meaning). At one pole of the symbol 
are clustered significata which refer to components of the moral and social order, 
while at the other pole significata are usually natural or physiological and arouse basic 
emotions.”67 Regimes often rely on historical symbols, either symbols that have been 
historically used in that country or symbols that reflect events or personalities from 
the nation’s past.  
Symbolism in Africa 
 Under Mobutu’s rule, a shift occurred in the way national symbols were 
interpreted—traditional symbols became personalized to an extreme degree. 
N’Gambwa argues that “symbols were exploited and manipulated by the Mobutu 
regime to give them a more personal meaning, one that glorified and justified 
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Mobutu’s claim to the right to rule.”68  
Zairian flag 
 1971:  
 For example, in the early years of Mobutu’s rule, the Zairian flag was initially 
just the flag associated with the MPR, a banner of blue, red, and yellow with one star. 
There was nothing linking it explicitly to Mobutu. On the anniversary of the 3Z on 27 
October 1971, a new flag was adopted, depicting a hand in the middle of a yellow 
circle, representing Mobutu’s national reach. A salute to the flag became, in effect, a 
salute to the president. 
 Two symbols most closely associated with Mobutu were the leopard-skin hat 
and his cane, with which he was constantly adorned. These symbols had significance 
particularly in the context of traditional chieftaincy, and the leopard skin was meant to 
reflect Mobutu’s physical strength and his prowess in hunting.  
State Symbolism in Turkmenistan 
Political symbolism is ubiquitous and constantly changing in Turkmenistan. 
That symbols are constantly manipulated underscores their important role as a tool of 
state ideology—the presidential administration goes to great lengths to have every 
sign repainted, newspaper reprinted, and portrait redone each time the presidential 
seal changes shape. Turkmenistan’s major symbols include the state flag, the olive 
branch of neutrality, the Ahal-Tekke horse, the tribal carpet patterns and particularly 
the Tekke tribe’s pattern, the face of the president’s mother, and the presidential seal, 
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not to mention the ubiquitous presidential portraits which have become symbols in 
themselves. The image of the pink and green covered book Ruhnama, and more 
recently, its coupling with the rainbow-coloured Ruhnama II, has also become a 
dominant symbol of the country’s official ideology. These symbols appear daily in the 
state-sponsored media and on books, papers, currency, and billboards. Images of 
newly constructed buildings and monuments in the centre of Ashgabat are also 
symbols frequently employed by the regime, but these deserve separate consideration 
for their architectural style and will be discussed in a later chapter.  
Perhaps the most omnipresent of Turkmenistan’s new symbols is the likeness 
of Niyazov. Officially, the symbol of the president is a golden profile, found in the 
upper right corner of television broadcasts, on the cover of Ruhnama, on lapel pins 
and cufflinks for officials, and on the welcome sign at the international airport in 
Ashgabat. Presidential portraits appear on street-side billboards, above government 
buildings and shopping centres, in shops and market kiosks and on car windshields. A 
Kazakhstan newspaper published an article by former Turkmenistan Foreign Minister 
Avdy Kuliev in 1997 about the growing personality cult, and recounted: “The 
propaganda supporting the cult of Niyazov has flourished especially since 1992, when 
a member of the presidential council hung his portrait in his office. He was followed 
by the governor of Maryyskiiy Oblast, who conferred the name of Niyazov upon a 
peasant union. The President was so flattered by the initiative of the two officials that 
he brought them close to himself, appointing them to responsible posts. Soon 
government functionaries across the entire country (hung presidential portraits)… The 
portraits of Niyazov, which appeared at first in offices, quickly clogged all 
institutions, including vegetable shops. Regional officials begged Niyazov to allow 
them to rename farms and factories in his honour. In the oblast centres, on farms and 
CREATING DOMAIN CONSENSUS 
 
 214 
on the squares of major cities, sculptures of Niyazov began to appear….”69  
In October 1991, with the enactment of the laws decreeing independence for 
Turkmenistan, a special session of the Supreme Council of Turkmenistan 
simultaneously adopted a decree on the establishment of the new state symbols of the 
country: flag, emblem, and anthem. These were chosen as the result of a national 
competition announced by the president, and open to artists, designers, and creative 
collectives. The symbols were to reflect historical and national “peculiarities”—they 
best reflected “the ideas of sovereignty, independence, and national traditions of the 
Turkmen people.”70  
Turkmenistan State Flag 
1953:  1992:  1997:  
 Turkmenistan’s flag, adopted on 19 February 1992—Niyazov’s birthday, 
since 1995 celebrated as National Flag Day—is considered “the symbol of the 
nation’s unity and independence and the country’s neutrality.”71 The flag has a green 
background with a red vertical hoist stripe down the left side, containing prints of five 
ornamental tribal patterns often found in carpet design (known as gul). The guls are 
primarily black, white, and orange. Below the patterns are two crossed olive branches, 
added to the flag after the official declaration of the country’s neutrality. Next to the 
red stripe is a crescent moon and five pentagonal starts, all white. The traditional 
green colour with the crescent symbolizes Islam, but in addition, the colour green was 
selected to lend historical depth to the banner—in a public statement, Niyazov 
described that green “had been the colour of the flag of our ancestors: Oghuzes, 
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Seljuks…” and that “all national sacred things are personified in carpet ornaments 
depicted in our flag. The crescent means the prosperity, five stars—five welayats.”72 
The five patterns, traditional carpet designs or guls, represent the five regions of the 
country (Ahal, Balkan, Mary, Dashoguz, and Lebap) as well as the major tribe of each 
region (Ahal Tekke, Yomut, Salor, Chowdor, and Ersary), and are meant to symbolize 
“the friendship and solidarity of Turkmen people.”73 On 29 January 1997, the crossed 
olive branch motif was added to the state flag. The crossed olive branches are the 
same as on the official United Nations Organization emblem, signifying 
Turkmenistan’s place as the first neutral state in the world recognized by the UN. The 
state flag is permanently posted on the buildings of the Presidential Palace, Mejilis of 
Turkmenistan, Cabinet of Ministers of Turkmenistan, ministries, departments, other 
government bodies, bodies of local executive power and local self-government as 
well as on buildings of enterprises, institutions and organizations.74  
The State Emblem 
1992:   2003:  
 On the same day as the adoption of the state flag in 1992, the state emblem 
(coat of arms) was accepted into the law, although it has undergone shape and symbol 
changes since its announcement. Until August 2003 the emblem consisted of three 
rings, each within another, but in August 2003 an octagonal star replaced the outer 
ring. Today, the emblem is in the shape of an eight-pointed star, with two concentric 
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circles inside—the smallest is blue and the larger circle is red. The background 
colour, as on the national flag, is green. Yanardag, the Ahal Tekke horse that is the 
most prized animal of Niyazov’s collection, is depicted in the small blue circle in the 
emblem’s centre. Yanardag is a symbol in his own right—born in 1991, he is the 
same age as independent Turkmenistan and also represents one of Turkmenistan’s 
national treasures—their famous breed of Ahal Tekke horses. Tall and elegant with 
strong, long legs, the Ahal Tekke horse is well adapted to the harsh dry climate of the 
Turkmen steppes, and since ancient times it was regarded as one of the fastest racing 
horses in the region. Yanardag is also known as Altyn Dag—the “Golden Horse” of 
the golden age, because of the colour of its coat. Five national patterns are depicted on 
the red circular strip. The carpet patterns are placed in sequence, as on the national 
flag: Ahal tekke, Yomut, Salor, Chowdur and Ersary, again symbolizing the 
friendship and solidarity of Turkmen people. The lower part of the large green start 
depicts seven open pentaleaf boxes of white cotton with green leaves framed by 
golden-yellow edging. In the middle part four ears of wheat of golden yellow colour 
are shown on each side; each contains 28 grains. Seven open cotton heads with green 
leaves are also depicted on the emblem. They symbolize the “prosperity and wealth of 
people.”75 The top section of the star also contains, as on the flag, a crescent moon 
and five stars. 
The Presidential Flag 
 
 In addition to the national flag, there is a flag specifically symbolizing the 
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presidency of Turkmenistan. It is the symbol of presidential power, and was approved 
on 15 July 1996. The green-coloured flag portrays the white crescent moon and five 
pentagonal starts from the national flag, and the centre of the flag contains a golden 
five-headed eagle, three heads of which look to the left hand side of the flag and two 
to the right side. The multi-headed eagle is meant to observe historical traditions—
there was, it is claimed, a two-headed eagle on the flag of Oghuz Han, and the number 
five represents again the country’s five regions. 
Official Ritual as a Device of Sultanistic Control 
Ritual, which has been defined as “a stylized, repetitive social activity that, 
through the use of symbolism, expresses and defines social relations,” is of central 
importance in Niyazov’s regime legitimation.76 The literature on ritual largely 
concerns its social control function, although Lane, in her analysis of Soviet ritual, 
cites also the capacities of ritual to “express and canalize individual emotions... and to 
satisfy aesthetic needs through utilizing and uniting the creative arts in ritual form.77 
Many forms of political rule have sought legitimacy through “encouraging 
expressions of popular consent.” Considerable effort is invested into the mobilization 
of mass support for regime activity through rallies, demonstrations, marches, and 
plebiscites.78 Theatrically, as Young writes, “the state represents itself in resplendent 
ceremonial: inaugurations and coronations, parades displaying its military might, 
rituals of national commemoration.”79 “Spectacles demonstrate the regime’s desired 
representation of itself—as loved, representative, and popular—but they also enact 
the regime’s ability to discipline bodies and determine the iconographic content of 
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public space.”80 Wedeen writes, “Treatments of spectacles as texts reveal them to be 
compelling pictures of the tensions, fears, and hopes that define a particular political 
epoch. Spectacles dramatize the aspirations of the regime, but also promote images 
designed to convey certain ideas to spectators.”81  
Ritual expresses the values and norms of its creators, although all of the 
participants might not be fully aware of all of its social and political implications. In 
Soviet society, Lane concluded, ritual was a method used by political elites to gain 
acceptance for what they defined as crucial social relations, and therefore must “be 
viewed as an instrument of cultural revolution or, to indicate less spectacular cultural 
changes, of cultural management.”82 In her consideration of Syria, Wedeen cites 
Foucault’s work in demonstrating the ways in which ritual can be effective for 
political regimes aiming for legitimacy. She points to three ways in which ritualistic 
spectacles directly serve political ends. “First, orchestrated spectacles discipline the 
participants and organize them for the physical enactment of ritual gestures, 
regimenting their bodies into an order that both symbolizes and prepares for political 
obedience. Second, spectacles are not only a preparation for but also themselves 
already instantiations of political power. They dramatize the state’s power by 
providing occasions to enforce obedience, thereby creating a politics of pretence in 
which all participate but few actually believe. Third, spectacles serve to anchor 
visually and audibly politically significant ideas and self-conceptions that might 
otherwise remain fluid and abstract. They ground political thinking in the images and 
symbols the regime puts forth, framing the ways people see themselves as citizens, 
much as advertising offer people a frame in which they imagine themselves as 
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Holiday as Forum For National Ritual 
Holidays provide a common context for ritual, both political holidays and 
holidays of the religious or calendric cycle. Holiday is a much wider concept than 
ritual, generally containing a set of festive activities of which ritual is only one. 
However, writes Lane, “usually ritual is the central activity determining the holiday’s 
special character.”84 Holidays and new rituals are publicized, through something of a 
political advertising campaign, in states aiming to create new legitimating doctrines. 
Massive editions of placards and photographic albums about the new ritual as well as 
brochures stating its scenario bring it to people’s notice. The first performances of the 
new rituals are “given coverage in the press and on television, and discussions of the 
new ritual within various political organizations are encouraged.”85  
 In post-colonial situations, new national holidays are commonly established to 
embed elements of nationalist history and to create independent traditions—under 
patrimonial rule, holidays that glorify the leader and the leader’s programs are also 
celebrated with great fanfare. This was certainly true in sub-Saharan Africa in the 
1960s. Of the experience in Zaire, one of N’Gambwa’s respondents said, “I have 
never been in a country where there are so many holidays, and most of them linked, 
directly or indirectly, to one man’s life.”86 The Creation of the MPR was celebrated 
on May 20th, and preceded in schools by the teaching of the history of the creation of 
the Party and the Party’s role in fostering national unity. This holiday was hugely 
celebrated with ritual prepared months in advance. A Zairian teacher recounts, “For 
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Mobutu, this was absolutely a big deal. Guests were invited from all over the world. 
He wanted to show the world how peaceful and united Zaire had become thanks to 
him and his party. It was also, I guess, the opportunity for him to show to the outside 
world that Zairian people were happy and liked him… People were dressed in special 
uniforms with Mobutu’s face on them and sang all kinds of glorifying songs 
favourable to Mobutu. They danced and paraded. In a nutshell, the country for 24 
hours appeared happy.”87  
Animation and Marches in Zaire 
Zaire’s ritual commonly took the form of animation. Animation politique was 
the “action of education, of transmission and vulgarization of the Party’s message 
through songs…and slogans… in order to exalt and glorify the authentic Zairian 
Revolution and its Guide.”88 Callaghy writes, “Animation groups consist of women 
and men who sing and dance political slogans and messages. A conscious effort has 
been made to adapt traditional music and dances to the new political religion. 
Traditional songs and dances have been systematically collected and adapted to a new 
political medium. Animation is considered to be, however, a traditionally authentic 
form of political expression and glorification: ‘In authentic Zairian culture, the song is 
both a pedagogical tool and a way of symbolizing social harmony.’ Animation is at 
the core of the practice of the political religion of Mobutuism.”89  
Regime monitors carefully controlled the political content of the songs. 
N’Gambwa writes that the concepts expounded through animation reveal two things: 
“their importance in cementing the ideological merit of Mobutuism on the one hand 
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and the nebulous and ambiguous nature of these terms on the other.”90 “Animation 
slogans, songs, and skits glorify Mobutu and his thoughts, actions, and achievements. 
They also stress such things as order, discipline, work, national unity, authenticity, the 
political history of the triumph over chaos by Mobutu, economic independence, 
Salongo, and agriculture….”91 Popular slogans included lines such as MPR= servir et 
non se servir (MPR = to serve and not to serve oneself); Ni a gauche, ni a droite, ni 
meme au centre (neither to the left or to the right, not even in the middle); Fidelite au 
Guide (loyalty to the Guide) and MPR miso gaa (MPR eyes wide open).92 During 
these gatherings, not only were concepts of Mobutuism recited, by they were also 
explained by officials.  
In addition to animation skits, marches in support of Mobutu formed one of 
the core elements of ritual. Known as the marches de soutien, these political activities 
were bigger and more significant in scope than daily animations. All were organized 
from above. Educational groups, which often provided the most lively participants, 
were drawn upon heavily to help enlarge the turnout at these events. “These 
ceremonies, which consisted of long walks, the singing of revolutionary songs, and 
the mouthing out of the MPR slogans, provided the party with yet another channel to 
disseminate the teachings of Mobutuism.”93  
Ritual in Turkmenistan 
Independent Turkmenistan has a huge number of new holidays that have been 
created since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Flag Day, which falls on the 
President’s birthday at the end of February, Memorial Day (after the Goktepe battle), 
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Gurbansoltan Eje’s birthday, a Drop of Water is a Grain of Gold Day, Turkmen 
Muskmelon Day, and Turkmen Horse Day, along with holidays from Soviet times, 
are celebrated with parades, concerts, and presidential speeches. The newspaper 
Adalat even proposed the naming of a holiday to honour the President’s favourite 
horse, Yanardag.94 The resurrection of pre-Soviet celebrations such as Novruz, 
Kurban-Bairam and Oraza has also occurred.   
Holidays in Turkmenistan are ritualized, and mass political-cultural 
demonstrations form the central ritual of most national holidays. In fact, these types of 
demonstrations reflect continuing Soviet-style planning; as in the USSR, “it is 
common knowledge that participation in… the procession-demonstration, is 
organized from above. Each work collective selected for participation in the 
demonstration during a particular year mobilizes as many of its employees as will 
make up a contingent.”95  
Muskmelon Day, celebrated in early August, is one of Turkmenistan’s newly 
created holidays. In 2003, on the occasion of Muskmelon Day, Niyazov sent a 
congratulatory letter to the people of Turkmenistan, and a news commentator 
announced, “This Godsend—the Turkmen melon—has a glorious history that goes 
back centuries. Turkmen melons, which are the product of Turkmenistan’s blazing 
sun, mild weather, productive land and tasty water, as well as peasant’s kindness, 
were considered a miracle by historians, politicians and traders in the early and 
middle ages. Since we became independent, our great leader, who has a great love of 
his nation and country, has brought the name of tasty melons to the level of a national 
holiday. Saparmurat Turkmenbashy the great is paying great attention to Muskmelon 
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Day in line with other state issues, so that this day becomes a real holiday.”96 On that 
date, main festivities were held in the Ashgabat concert hall in Independence Square. 
The hall was surrounded by flowers, greenery, colourful flags, and many sorts of 
melons, as well as songs and lively dancing. Reflecting on the celebration, a 
television commentator reported, “The sweet smell of melons, that is capable of 
making one swoon and making one’s hungry stomach feel full, was in harmony with 
these celebrations. It made the love towards one’s dear homeland, the great leader, 
and kind nation grow even stronger.”97  
Independence Day (October 27th) is celebrated with a large parade through 
Ashgabat, prominently featuring a display of Turkmenistan’s military tanks and a fly-
over of Russian MiG fighter jets. An Ashgabat stadium is filled with teachers and 
workers, who are pressured to attend from all of the welayats, and the day is filled 
with traditional shows of Turkmen dance. A Peace Corps volunteer speculates that 
citizens are forced to attend the spectacles “to make the stadium look fuller for 
filming on national television and to make it appear as though the entire populace is 
happy to no longer live under Soviet rule… but if they were not forced, I am sure the 
stadium would be half-empty.”98 Outside of Ashgabat, the holiday is celebrated 
primarily by the consumption of large quantities of vodka at home. 
A Peace Corps volunteer who attended the Victory Day celebrations last year 
(this is a Russian holiday that originated after World War II) recounts: “hundreds of 
people were forced to wait in the sweltering sun for two hours in an extremely 
disorganized manner until anything official began. In the meantime, people fretted 
and made sure their names appeared on the list that each workplace’s supervisor had 
                                       
96 Report on Ashgabat Channel One television programme, evening 11 August 2003 
97 ibid. 
98 Interview with Peace Corps Volunteer “N”, 2005  
CREATING DOMAIN CONSENSUS 
 
 224 
to turn in to the authorities to ensure that no one present would later be punished by 
the KNB. Once the ceremony began, a loudspeaker crackled a sombre song on a loop 
while we proceeded towards a statue of Turkmenbashy’s father to place flowers…. 
This ‘procession’ involved a lot of pushing and shoving… so the entire procedure 
looked very unprofessional. The path which we walked along towards the monument 
was lined with Turkmen soldiers, all equipped with rifles… Turkmen dresses were 
expected but not absolutely required, and earlier in the morning, some dances were 
performed by students.”99  
 Speeches, songs, dances, costumes, readings and poetry are all parts of 
regional and national celebrations. Huge amounts of money and time are put into the 
celebrations that are typically held in Ashgabat’s stadium. Participants are often paid, 
or promised payment and gifts in exchange for participation. Dancers are taken from 
all over the country, often are drawn from hospitals and schools. When this occurs, 
clinics close and classes are cancelled to support ritual participation. An aspect of 
most celebrations is an extensive fireworks display—as one Peace Corps volunteer 
says, “Some people stare up at them in awe, while others look at them and say, ‘there 
goes our salary for this month.’”100 National costume plays a major role, 
symbolically, in official ritual: people of all ages are required to don national dress. 
Men wear fur hats, boys wear skullcaps, and girls are required to wear Turkmen 
dresses and braids, and women don traditional dresses and huge yakas. 
In Turkmenistan, children comprise the bulk of the participants in official 
ritual dances and parades. These ritual activities take place outside of the holiday 
context, often on the occasion of a presidential visit to a given welayat, program, 
office, or school. “Children are almost always required to participate—usually they 
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recite a poem, or something from the Ruhnama, or perform dances.”101 Officials 
generally select the most physically attractive students, and this can be considered an 
honour. Many, however, “view it as a waste of time because they hold extremely 
disorganized rehearsals for days prior, then sometimes find out at the last minute that 
the President is not even attending the event.”102  
Media in Turkmenistan 
In Turkmenistan, the state-controlled media have become important 
instruments of the governmental policy of national revival and Ruhnama. From 
explicit calls to ideological action, to Presidential cult management and repetition of 
regime symbols, the national newspapers and television programs in Turkmenistan 
are little more than mouthpieces of Niyazov’s regime. Major news programs carry 
almost no daily news apart from the President’s declarations or activities.103 
Television news begins with a prayer and good wishes for the President, and 
nationalist propaganda from costumes to recitations, and song and dance fill the 
programming. Television reporters and commentators praise Ruhnama and use 
epithets such as “compassionate,” “merciful”, and “esteemed” when talking about 
Niyazov.  
Similarly, every day, large photos of Niyazov cover the front pages of all of 
the nation’s daily newspapers. Newspaper banners are filled with words from the 
national oath and presidential quotations, and various symbols of the regime. An 
analysis of the Turkmen newspaper Neytralnyy Turkmenistan (formerly 
Turkmenskaya Iskra) from 1991 to 2001 demonstrates the changes in symbology over 
time. This analysis shows a relatively steady increase in photos and articles relating to 
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Niyazov over time, as well as an increase in these photos and articles as a percentage 
of informational content of the newspaper itself. Whereas, in 1991, the front page of 
Turkmenskaya Iskra contained very little in the way of photographs and only Soviet 
symbolism, by 2001 the newspaper’s cover had turned into a colourful, picture-filled 
page glorifying the president and covered with regime symbols and slogans, with only 








Education as a Vehicle of Sultanistic Propagation 
 
Education, generally, is one of the social institutions most likely to be 
exploited by a regime. Education targets a vulnerable yet central part of a citizenry—
the youth. Schatzberg writes, “if the politically dominant elements of… society wish 
to insure the loyalty of the nation’s youth, effective political and ideological control 
must be maintained throughout the educational system.”104 Education functions in 
three ways as a key element of political development: first, it is the main agent for the 
political socialization of the nation’s youth into the dominant political culture; second, 
educational systems are primary agents in the selection and training of future political 
elites; and finally, education is the main contributor to “political integration and the 
building of national political consciousness.” Schooling, then, is an educational 
mechanism for political functions.105 In cases of sultanistic rule, education can be a 
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prime vehicle for political socialization and regime propaganda, producing 
compliance with the pseudo-ideology and perhaps even the seeds of belief through 
repetition and isolation.  
In sub-Saharan Africa in the post-colonial period, regimes used the 
educational systems left over from the colonial periods as mechanisms for 
transference of new regime philosophies. Simply through the introduction of new 
curricula, schooling became a new mechanism of control. In Zaire, reforms in 
educational curricula became one of Mobutu’s most potent tools for propagating his 
personalist pseudo-ideology in the country. In the late 1960s a new educational 
curriculum replaced the teaching of religion and morals in schools—it was highly 
personalized and promoted Mobutuisme or the views and actions of the President. In 
the early years of Zaire’s independence, a major function of education was to instill in 
young people a sense of loyalty to and identification with Zaire as a nation. The 
nationalist focus, however, gradually shifted to a more overt emphasis on using 
schools as vehicles to “promote the image of… Mobutu as the symbol of hope, peace, 
prosperity and unity in an attempt to legitimate his rule and, ultimately, that of his 
regime.”106  
Education in Turkmenistan 
 Although Turkmenistan inherited a well-developed system from the Soviet 
period that offered free and near-universal education for all citizens, policies adopted 
by Niyazov’s regime in recent years have significantly reduced the length and quality 
of education; at the same time, Niyazov has engineered an educational system that has 
become a major propaganda vehicle for his regime. In Turkmenistan today, in fact, 
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educational curriculum is little more than an extension of the regime’s propagation of 
the pseudo-ideology that it has devised through Ruhnama. The International Crisis 
Group reports “the government perceives (education) as a tool for official propaganda 
and development of the Niyazov personality cult.”107 The degradation of education in 
Turkmenistan is potentially one of the worst social aspects of the regime—the growth 
of a generation of Turkmen who are “increasingly poorly educated, ignorant of life 
outside Turkmenistan, and possess no alternative viewpoints to those of the official 
curriculum and the Ruhnama represents a great danger for society.”108  
On 3 May 1993, Niyazov’s regime launched a comprehensive program of 
educational reform known as Bilim (education). The program was legislated further 
under a decree “On Education in Turkmenistan” in October 1993 and “On 
Ratification of State Program on Implementation of New Education Policies in 
Turkmenistan of President Saparmurat Turkmenbashy in 1993-1997” in November. 
These decrees provided for the reduction of all schools to a nine-year programme, and 
a process of conversion to Latin script for the Turkmen language. Hours allotted to 
certain school subjects were reduced and some disciplines (physical education, for 
example) were eliminated entirely. The number of students enrolled in the institutions 
of higher education has dropped from over 40,000 students before the reforms to a 
current figure of about 3,500.109  
A shortage of textbooks and learning materials is one of the problems that has 
been associated with the transition in Turkmenistan’s educational system. Data 
suggest that only 20 percent of the necessary number of textbooks is available in 
secondary schools,110 and of those, 80 percent are over twelve years old. Primary 
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school children are educated in the new Turkmen alphabet, cutting off their access to 
most books previously printed in Cyrillic that are kept in Ashgabat’s National 
Library—regional libraries have recently been closed by presidential decree. New 
treatises, however, are printed by Niyazov’s publishing services to fill the library and 
bookstore shelves. “Source of Wisdom,” for example, is the name of a new textbook 
published for secondary school libraries by the State Publishing Service—10,000 
copies were printed under orders from Turkmenistan’s Ministry of Education. The 
book’s introduction describes its contents—it “lists in alphabetical order abstracts 
from the three great poetical works of Saparmurat Niyazov, expounding his ideas and 
thoughts on nation unification, loyalty to the motherland, patriotism, courage, 
bravery, moral up-bringing, greatness of spirit, pureness of intentions and doings, etc. 
This valuable anthology of wisdom will be of great help to schoolchildren, students 
and teachers, both in the learning process and extra-curricula activities, such as 
concerts, competitions and exhibitions.”111  
Curricula have been dramatically changed in the period of reforms and 
especially since the publication of Ruhnama in 2001, and the system has become “an 
instrument of mass brainwashing, characterized by low standards, discrimination, and 
widespread corruption.”112 “Initially, the reform of the educational system in 
Turkmenistan appeared to be based on the need to abandon the communist ideology. 
As a result of a struggle with communist ideology, as well as shorter periods of 
education, the depth of mastery in virtually all school subjects has been limited. (In 
2003), President Niyazov suggested excluding humanitarian and natural sciences 
from secondary and higher education curricula completely, calling them “obscure” 
and “disconnected from real life”. Ruhnama has “replaced the bulk of teaching in 
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most schools, particularly in rural areas where the majority of the population lives. 
Since old Soviet textbooks have been banned, and few new ones have been printed, 
students spend much of their time reading and studying the Ruhnama.”113  
 Curricular reform in Turkmenistan represents more than just the 
nationalization of post-Soviet education, something that is anticipated and natural in a 
post-colonial situation. Instead of a new curriculum based on the mastery of national 
Turkmen works and history, education increasingly focuses on the achievements of 
Niyazov himself and his personal interests, and his philosophy as outlined in 
Ruhnama. Many prominent Turkmen writers and poets, such as Berdi Kerbabayev, 
Rakhim Essenov, Beki Seitakov, Tirkish Dzhumageldiyev, Khidir Deryayev and 
Nurmurad Sarykhanov, for example, receive little or no mention in textbooks and 
their pieces have in some cases been purged from curricula. While cutting 
humanitarian and natural science disciplines, such subjects as History of Neutral 
Turkmenistan, Politics of Independence of Saparmurat Turkmenbashy the Great, 
Ruhnama as Spiritual Code of the Turkmen People, as well as the so-called Literary 
Heritage of Saparmurat Turkmenbashy (consisting of a collection of his poems and 
biographies of the President and his parents) were added to the curriculum.  
In Turkmenistan, exams and school curricula are taken from the newspaper. 
Teachers are not encouraged to deviate at all from these lesson plans, and could be 
punished for doing so—they are required to present each of their lessons to school 
officials for review. The Turkmenistan Ministry of Education encourages the policy 
of mastering all school disciplines through the prism of Niyazov`s works. An example 
of a mathematical word problem from the textbook on mathematics for the second 
grade of secondary school developed by the Ministry of Education follows: “Gulnara 
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was reading the book Ruhnama. She read six pages on the first day. On the second 
day, she read four pages more than on the first day. On the third day she read five 
pages less than on the second day. How many pages of Ruhnama did Gulnara read on 
the third day?”114  
The curricula of secondary vocational schools are similarly composed. Here is 
a curriculum in Lyceum №22 of Ashgabat which trains store managers, shop-
assistants, cooks and food technologists: 34 academic hours per week are allocated 
accordingly-- Ruhnama – six hours; Politics of Independence of Saparmurat 
Turkmenbashy the Great - six hours; History of Neutral Turkmenistan - three hours; 
Turkmen language - four hours; Teachings of Saparmurat Turkmenbashy - two hours; 
Turkmen literature – two hours; Disciplines on specialization (1) - five hours; 
Disciplines on specialization (2) - five hours; Vocational –practical training - two 
hours. It is evident that the time assigned for vocational and general disciplines is 
much less than devoted for the ideological subjects.  
This element of Niyazov’s program—the revision of national curricula and the 
introduction of Ruhnama into the classrooms—has great potential to seriously affect 
Turkmenistan’s society and to leave lasting repercussions that outlive Niyazov.  The 
so-called “dumbing down” of society through indoctrination, coupled with the 
isolation of the country’s youth, may create a situation of vulnerability on the societal 
level for years to come. 
Conclusion 
In addition to regime symbols and official ritual, holidays, media, and 
education have all become methods of regime propagation in post-Soviet 
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Turkmenistan. By adopting these channels, the regime effectively has inserted itself 
into the daily habits of its citizenry, and virtually no life is untouched by the pervasive 
reach of state propaganda. Although for many of the older generation, the effect of 
this propaganda is likely more to frighten (through conviction of the regime’s 
omnipotence and ubiquity) citizens into compliance with official ritual, the younger 
generation is slowly internalizing aspects of regime doctrine through schooling. 
 Ruhnama is the catch-all for the various strands of regime doctrine, or pseudo-
ideology, preached throughout Turkmenistan in the contemporary period. Although it 
is unique to its context and country, Ruhnama shares many of its themes with similar 
regimes throughout the world. Its extreme nationalism, sacred characteristics, and 
elements of patriarchal patrimonialism are shared by African post-colonial leaders, 
and specifically by those who have been characterized as sultans. The pronounced 
cult of personality, additionally, is common to sultanistic regimes. In Turkmenistan, 
the personality of Niyazov is inserted into regime doctrine in a way that centrally 
characterizes sultanism—like Mobutu and others, Niyazov has placed himself at the 
epicentre of Turkmenistan’s legitimation doctrine. It is likely that Ruhnama will not 
outlive Turkmenbashy (or at least will decline in importance in a post-Niyazov 
period), in the same way that Mobutuisme did not continue in its original form after 
the end of Mobutu’s reign. Mobutu’s Zaire is just one example of an African sultan 
preaching a pseudo-ideology—Authenticity and Mobutuisme—that can lend a useful 
context for consideration of Niyazov’s doctrine of Ruhnama in Turkmenistan. 
 







NIYAZOV’S PROJECT OF HISTORICAL REVISION 





The creation of new national ideologies in a post-colonial period goes beyond 
just the symbols and rituals of the state. Working to embed these ideologies and these 
new nationalisms, leaders propagate their nationalisms through various channels. One 
important dimension is official historiography. As Lowe has written, “In the creation 
of a national ideology, history plays a valuable if not dominant, role, as perceptions of 
the past are essential for the creation of a national self-consciousness.”1  
National history is a tailored discourse written to institute a particular 
collective memory among a people. Gilbert writes, “National history can be a record 
of a nation’s experience, which supposedly makes of it a community, or a record of its 
actions, which implies its political existence as a corporate body. Yet the difficulties 
of individuating histories are as great as those of individuating nations.”2 National 
histories, though difficult to individuate, are essential to nationalists. As Eric 
Hobsbawm famously remarked, “Historians are to nationalism what poppy growers in 
Pakistan are to heroin addicts: we supply the essential raw material for the market.”3 
Hobsbawm discusses the idea of “invented tradition” as creating historical myth and 
propagating it to support a project of state building. He writes, “Plenty of political 
institutions, ideological movements and groups, not least in nationalism, were so 
unprecedented that even historic continuity had to be invented, for example by 
creating an ancient past beyond effective historical continuity, either by semi-fiction 
or by forgery….We should not be misled by a curious, but understandable, paradox: 
modern nations and all their impedimenta generally claim to be the opposite of novel, 
namely rooted in the remotest antiquity, and the opposite of constructed, namely 
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human communities so natural as to require no definition other than self-assertion.”4  
It is commonplace for a government to use historical symbols and 
historiography to “cultivate patriotism, explain and justify policies, and secure the 
acquiescence and cooperation of the people in times of crises.”5 Employing historical 
symbolism to forward themes such as shared identity, cultural renewal and regime 
legitimation is also common, especially in emerging states. Uzbekistan President 
Karimov emphasized, “Historical memory, the restoration of an objective and truthful 
history of the nation and its territory is given an extremely important place in the 
revival and growth of national self-consciousness and national pride... The deeds and 
feats of great ancestors enliven historical memory, shape a new civil consciousness, 
and become a source of moral education and imitation.”6 Often, however, this 
“objective and truthful” history is anything but-- while every form of history writing 
is biased in some way, in tightly controlled political systems the presentation of the 
historical record takes place either under state patronage, or under the regime’s direct 
control. As Nourzhanov suggests, “historical narrative as a political phenomenon is 
less concerned with uncovering new or suppressed information, or providing a fresh 
angle on events in the bygone times based on professional scholarship, as it is with 
constructing a rounded, systematic, and uniform vision of the past... this is 
propaganda, as much as history.”7  
Historical revision, or even the creation of national histories, is not unique to 
Turkmenistan at all—quite the opposite, as Renan writes, “To forget and—I will 
venture to say—to get one’s history wrong are essential factors in the making of a 
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nation.”8 The objective truth of a nation’s history, in fact, while desirable from the 
academic viewpoint, may be less important for national cohesion than its 
“resilience”—all told, it is better that the national narrative not come into conflict with 
fact on a regular basis in the eyes of the members of the national community or its 
opponents. As Gilbert writes, “True histories are, other things being equal, more 
resilient than false ones; but whether facts do disturb false stories depends on whether 
their audiences have a concern for truth. Often they do not.”9  
Nationalist Historiography in sub-Saharan Africa 
 Nationalist historiography was widespread in the new African states emerging 
from colonial rule in the 1950s and 1960s; in our examples of sultanistic regimes, we 
see this nationalist writing fused with the personality and preferences of the leader to 
contribute to the pseudo-ideologies which provided a window-dressing for power. In 
many cases, a leader positioned himself as the saviour of the nation, the answer to the 
nation’s yearning for freedom and independence, or the historical father (or magical 
father) of the country. While most of the African examples are not drawn from 
countries with claims to empire in antiquity, these leaders take pains to establish the 
lengthy historical importance of their territory and the people that comprise it, in order 
to substantiate claims to unity and nationhood, which underlie their authority. 
 As in Central Asia and other parts of the world, in Africa too “history is… an 
anvil of identity which is vulnerable to distortion by any monopolists of power. In 
Ngugi wa Thiongo’s words, tyrants, whether colonial regimes or their successors, ‘are 
terrified at the sound of the wheels of history… So they try to rewrite history, make 
up official history; if they can put cottonwool in their ears and in those of the 
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population, maybe they and the people will not hear the real call of history, will not 
hear the real lessons of history,’ which teach struggle and change. Much of Africa’s 
written history has indeed taken the part of its rulers rather than that of its people.”10 
This nationalist revision differs in certain ways from what we see today in post-Soviet 
Central Asia. The major difference is the legacy of history writing from the colonial 
period. Whereas in the Soviet Union, serious attention was paid to the development of 
national histories for the titular populations of each of the new Central Asian 
republics, in colonial Africa, the situation differed. There, the superiority of the 
Western colonizers was emphasized in schools, and the histories taught were those of 
the colonial powers and the colonial period. The mantra for the pre-independence 
periods was “Africa has no history.”11 No departments for the study of African history 
and no particular specialists existed in academic arenas, marking a huge departure 
from the Soviet method. After World War II, the situation changed with the 
emergence of African scholarship about Africa. New scholars from abroad took on 
the study of African history, discovering patterns of pre-colonial migration and the 
rise and fall of African empires. Social history, Ekeh argues, became an active arm of 
decolonization, as a reaction to colonial social anthropology.12  
 After independence, African regimes took up the project of constructing 
nationalist historiographies. The ways in which new regimes would approach history 
writing were unclear at first, because it seemed to many that since African states had 
such brief histories (versus the very long histories of most African peoples), to write 
any deep historical enquiry would touch the very foundations of the state’s fragile 
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legitimacy. Accordingly, regimes sought to control the processes of history writing. 
“Conscious efforts have been made by African governments to review educational 
curricula at all levels in order to reorient the history that is taught. Many countries 
have built museums before libraries. Historical journals have been started… and 
children’s books are being written on African historical themes.”13  
Lonsdale suggests that the four major areas of post-colonial African historical 
enquiry are the state, custom, ethnicity, and religion.14 Some of the general themes 
that were emphasized at first were the greatness of pre-colonial African empires (for 
example, the Ashanti or the Zulu), and particularly that their expansion at times was 
forcibly stopped and their empires partly destroyed by Europeans, that “the important 
African achievements went unrealized because of colonial penetration”—a narrative 
of victimization. Whereas the colonial anthropologies considered the principal actors 
in pre-colonial times to be faceless, nameless tribesmen, “the new social history 
celebrated the deeds and lineages of kings and warriors, particularly those challenging 
the European invaders and conquerors.”15 The problem, however, was that greater 
research revealed unpleasant facts. For example, research eventually revealed that 
“when they faced the European scramble in the late nineteenth century, kingdoms 
generally put up a brittle and short-lived show of resistance, by comparison with 
peoples who were not burdened with dynasties and palaces. In their death-throes 
kingdoms broke up along their internal fault lines—through the defection of subject 
provinces, the flight of slaves, and quarrels among princes.”16 Aside from uncovering 
pre-colonial kingdoms, the questions of populations’ origins took on a primary 
importance, particularly for the populations of West Africa—the Akan and the 
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Yoruba among others.  
Many regime historiographies placed heavy emphasis on national “customs” 
and the reintroduction or glorification of national customs—as we have seen, 
Mobutu’s regime called for a return to Zairian authenticity. Africa’s first independent 
leaders used myths of monarchical consensus and tribal reciprocity to legitimate one-
party rule and to initiate programs from above. However, according to Lonsdale, this 
actually represents more a misinterpretation or denial of history—in fact, the customs 
that are being described as “authentic” and pre-colonial were actually products more 
of the colonial era. For example, the ideas of African kingship and chieftaincy, while 
they existed prior to the colonial era, took on their contemporary meanings under the 
Europeans. Colonial officials attempted to establish political alliances with the lords 
of the land to further legitimate their own rule—because of this, they institutionalized 
“custom” and traditional ideas of authority to support their own rule. Lonsdale writes, 
“The formal ideology of custom exalted authority through its insistence that African 
societies had none of that historical complexity and inequality which would render 
political argument essential to their stability. Custom was formalized in the turbulent 
early colonial years, when the powers of chiefs and heads of households were 
threatened by the new freedoms… Colonial conquest had helped the building of 
African power, by its offers of alliance with European violence; but the colonial pax 
and markets also allowed the vulgarization of power in the emergence of new 
occupational and religious associations.”17 In this way, codification of customary law 
acted more as a device of social control than a historical representation.  
Tribalism, or rather ethnicity,18 is another point of interest in African 
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historiographies. Generally, since political tribalism does exist, the strategy of the 
leader is to avoid or transcend it. Lonsdale writes, “It is generally argued that since 
coerced assimilation has so often evoked ethnic revivals rather than built new nations, 
the only way forward is for neutral statesmen to avoid public debate on cultural 
issues. It is difficult to see how public avoidance can be prevented from sliding into 
state suppression.”19 Tribalism, Ekeh writes, “emerged into wide use in postcolonial 
Africa as a term apparently borrowed from the vocabulary of social anthropology and 
then inverted into a despised meaning.”20 Though custom purportedly respects the 
political language of African tribes, “ethnicity is also seen as the bugbear of 
contemporary Africa. Thus, history is plundered for its symbols of authority yet 
feared for its divisive fascination with the corporate embodiments of those same 
symbols in an era when the unity of societies within the state boundaries inherited 
from white conquest is the chief aim of ‘nation-building.’”21 Religion has historically 
been another devisive factor in certain African societies and therefore has been 
handled similarly to ethnicity in certain cases, depending on the makeup of the 
population.  
 As important as the subjects that were covered are the subjects that were 
avoided. Wallerstein writes, “Aspects of history that usually have been avoided thus 
far are the more recent colonial period and the nationalist movements… the authors 
are often too involved in this very history, and find the subjects too delicate.”22 
Lonsdale writes, “the social history of colonial states has scarcely begun to be studied 
with the rigor which their records allow.”23 Nationalist historiography almost always 
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has three distinctive elements- the recasting or redefining of a nation, the rejection of 
other identities, and “selective amnesia”—the omission of certain eras, figures, or 
allies from a historical narrative. These themes, the return to national historical 
greatness, and the historical amnesia surrounding themes of recent political events and 
any element of the national character or history that is perceived as a threat to the 
stability or security of the current regime, are as true in post-Soviet Central Asia as in 
post-colonial sub-Saharan Africa, and additionally, under the sultanistic regimes we 
see a fascinating fusion of this historiography with the background of the leader 
himself, who is tied to the country’s greatness. 
 In Equatorial Guinea, so great was Macias Nguema’s belief in a return to 
custom and African roots that he purged his country of all Western influence, even 
medicine, resulting in the deaths of many among his population. Another good 
example of the type of nationalist historiography under sultanism is found in Dr. 
Hastings Kamuzu Banda’s Malawi. In Malawi, the 1960s marked the beginnings of 
historical research, teaching and public discourse. Banda, an educated man who spent 
most of his young life overseas or outside of Malawi, “believed in the existence of a 
phenomenon called Malawian culture,” which he invented, or allowed to be invented, 
and used to sustain himself in power.24  
The adoption of the name Malawi (for the former colony Nyasaland) was itself 
a correction of colonial representations—Nyasaland was derived from Nyasa, the 
name that explorer David Livingstone had given to the third largest freshwater lake in 
Africa. However, Livingstone had misunderstood the native names when he 
christened the body of water, and actually mistakenly named the lake “Lake”. The 
name Malawi, in contrast, had historical connotations—it was “derived from the pre-
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colonial polity of Maravi, which at its height in the seventeenth century had extended 
between the present Eastern Zambia to the west and the Mozambique-Malawi border 
region in the east.”25 Adopting the word Malawi as the country’s name actually was 
not a completely accurate reading of history—the ancient Maravi only covered a part 
of what became the British Nyasaland Protectorate. However, “the choice of the name 
Malawi was very much in keeping with Banda’s own understanding of the history of 
the region. He always maintained that the present borders of Malawi are not a 
reflection of the historical situation of the area because the Maravi state was much 
bigger than the entity created by the British at the end of the nineteenth century.”26 
Banda was preoccupied with proving that the “ancient Maravi state extended over 
most of modern Malawi, eastern Zambia and a significant section of modern 
Mozambique,” a view that was expected to be integrated into the national 
curriculum.27 
After Banda’s election, Malawi experienced what is now known as the cabinet 
crisis of August 1964, during which the majority of the cabinet ministers who had 
helped elevate Banda to power fell from favour and were exiled, leaving the cabinet 
in control of increasingly sycophantic, ill-educated ministers. One effect of this was 
that free discussion of the recent political history of Malawi was outlawed. “One 
could not mention the names of Henry Chipembere or Kanyama Chiume, the young 
politicians who had been amongst the first African elected members of the colonial 
legislature under the new arrangements of the mid-1950s.”28 Both, now living in 
exile, were considered rebels and mentioning their names was paramount to treason. 
“Their role in the anti-colonial struggle was being deliberately obliterated from the 
                                       








memories of Malawians. During national festivities when the political history of the 
country was expressed and re-enacted on radio, in newspapers, at national and local 
party gatherings and in schools, a version of history was presented that was in keeping 
with the feelings of the post-1964 cabinet crisis Malawi Congress Party.”29 
Banda personally played a large role in the production of history in Malawi in 
the 1960s. In his speeches he would “make definitive statements on the pre-colonial 
history of Africa and Malawi. Teachers would take notes at such gatherings and 
would repeat his version of history in their classrooms; similarly, some college 
students would uncritically incorporate Banda’s renditions in their essays. His 
favourite topic was the mfecane and during lectures on it he would recite Shaka’s 
genealogy and remind his audience of the settlement of the Ndebele north of the 
Limpopo, and also of Zwangendaba’s epic journey into modern Tanganyika and the 
final settling of his main party in the Malawi-Zambia area. Almost always he would 
talk about how his own people, the Chewa, were the only ones to defeat the Ngoni at 
a battle fought at Nguluyanabambe, near Kasungu, Banda’s home district. He would 
then ask a senior party official of Ngoni origins, preferably a cabinet minister, to 
confirm and enact the battle of Kasungu. And whenever he was on a visit to the north 
of Malawi he would be met by Ngoni men dressed in traditional outfit, singing and 
chanting war songs praising him, the conqueror of colonialism.”30  
Although he was always quick to highlight his own ethnic background as a 
member of the Chewa tribe, Banda always emphasized the supremacy of national 
unity over ethnic affinities, a unity that he thought could be obtained by the 
observance of Malawian cultural traditions—hence the strict dress codes and 
censorship. Although Malawi is far from Turkmenistan, Banda and Niyazov’s 
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regimes show striking similarities, as do their efforts in historical revision in an 
independent period. This chapter will outline some of the major themes of the new 
Turkmenistan official historiography and the parallels between the cases will become 
increasingly clear.  
Niyazov’s Nationalist Historiography 
Niyazov’s construction of a Turkmen nation in the post-Soviet period and his 
varied attempts to enhance national cohesion have included the development and 
propagation of a national narrative. A centrepiece of Niyazov’s national narrative has 
been publications in his name that extend a new version of Turkmen history. The 
publication of Ruhnama in 2001 gave a new focus to Niyazov’s nation-building 
efforts. Ruhnama provides a detailed, largely mythical, and very ambitious narrative 
history of the Turkmen nation. Ruhnama, while not intended to be a history book, is 
claimed to be the “only source that will connect Turkmen’s present and their past... 
Ruhnama should place in the hands of Turkmens their unique and whole history, and 
spiritual striving.”31  
Niyazov’s regime, in its historiography, is attempting to forward an agenda of 
national identity based on shared ancestry and myths of origin, historical homeland 
and territoriality, the celebration of ancient glories based on sometimes dubious ethnic 
distinctions, and presentation of an historical “other”-- while contemporary 
Turkmenistan is permanently neutral, Niyazov has defined historical colonialism and 
Soviet control, as well as tribal disunity, as aggressive historical assaults on the 
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Turkmen nation. This chapter will discuss in detail features of each of these elements 
of his strategy-- national icons, territoriality and homeland, ancient statehood, and 
perspectives on colonialism. It considers myth and memory, along with national 
golden ages, national heroes and the myth of origins; territorial homeland and 
attachment to soil; the debate about the historical presence of Turkmen states 
throughout history, and a description of historical confederations of the Seljuk 
Empire. Also, it will consider the idea of “otherness” and the presentation in 
Turkmenistan of the Russian conquest, and the concept of national forgetting—that is, 
an amnesia that goes hand-in-hand with historical factual invention; here, the role of 
tribalism in the nationalist discourse will be described. 
Subjectivity and Historical Bias: A Note on the Sources 
Niyazov writes, “The history of the Turkmens is very glorious... But the 
history of Turkmens has been written as they wish by everybody except Turkmen 
historians.”32 Turkmen history, it is true, has rarely been treated in an unbiased way. 
Early accounts of Russian and British explorers in the region reflect the geopolitical 
tensions between the two nations over who was to dominate the Silk Routes in the 
seventeenth through nineteenth centuries. Russian, and then Soviet histories in 
particular are blatant efforts at historical revision themselves, constructed in order to 
instil first, a sense of nationhood, and then also solidarity to the whole of the USSR.  
Political agendas always play a role in the way that historical events are 
presented, and the history of the Turkmen people has been viewed through various 
lenses over time. The Turkmen, largely nomadic up until the Russian conquest in the 
late 19th century, spread their own history largely through oral tradition, folklore and 
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epic. In the late 18th century several Turkmen literary figures became known, writing 
romanticized portrayals of various events in the history of the region, that serve today 
as sources and inspiration for national historiography in Turkmenistan. In the 19th 
century, accounts of travellers to the regions—often agents of the British or Russian 
empires-- largely form the impressions that we have today of the Turkmen lifestyle at 
that time.  
After the Russian (and shortly thereafter, the Bolshevik) takeover in the region 
of Transoxiana, and the territorial delimitation that formed the Turkmen SSR in 1924, 
Soviet scholars began to produce large amounts of historiography detailing the place 
of the Turkmen nation in history, the lifestyles of the Turkmen in the past, and the 
effects of the Russian conquest on the Turkmen. It was at this time when the term 
“nation” came to be applied to Turkmenistan and a national history was superimposed 
for the first time on the collection of tribes. Also, the nation for the first time was 
attached to a territory—prior to the Soviet period, even during the Russian military 
administration, the territory of the Turkmen had no borders to speak of—its southern 
front, Ashgabat, and Merv were claimed by Persia and the northern region of 
Dashoguz lay within the Khanate of Khiva. 
Turkmen history was taught during the Soviet period as a succession of 
dynasties that, though reactionary and feudal, had long identified themselves as 
Turkmen and as a national community. Soviet theories on history went through a 
number of phases-- adherence to themes such as bourgeois-nationalism, great-power 
chauvinism, pan-Islamism, Pan-Turkism, Pan-Iranianism, cosmopolitanism, nihilism, 
the single stream theory, and others at various points in time. Soviet treatment of the 
theme of Central Asian peoples’ relations to Russia showed particular variation. In the 
1930s the generally accepted theory, propounded by historian M.N. Pokrovskii (later 




purged) was that the incorporation within the Russian Empire of the Caucasus and 
Central Asia was an absolute evil. The theme of imperialist expansion (zavoyevaniye, 
or conquest) was strongly stressed. After the 1930s, the Soviet regime imposed a ban 
on the so-called “Pokrovskii School” and encouraged a brighter interpretation of the 
Russian colonial past, with repercussions for the historiography of Central Asia. In 
1937 Stalin and Shestakov formulated the doctrine of “Lesser Evil”, which claimed 
that Russian colonial rule had more positive effects in the region than potential 
domination by the Turks, Iranians or Brits would have had.  
The theme became one of voluntary incorporation (dobrovol’nye 
prisoyedineniye), and historians stressed the progressive economic and political 
effects of incorporation, calling the Russian conquest an historic turning point in the 
progress of the Central Asian people.33 In 1951, a report concluded that  
The conquest of the Central Asian khanates by Russia, in 
spite of the cruelties of the colonial yoke imposed by 
Tsarism, had for the peoples of these khanates an objective 
and progressive significance. This significance has to be 
considered in the light of a comparison with the hard 
circumstances in which those people had lived previously; 
and also in the light of the lot which would have awaited 
them in the event of the establishment in Central Asia of 
British or German imperialism, or of their pan-Islamic 
elements.34  
 
Under this new interpretation, the common historical fate of the Russians and the 
Central Asians became even clearer. 
By 1954, when a conference on the history of Central Asia was held in 
Tashkent, the party line changed to an even more favourable view of the Russian 
colonial period. It is said by various authors to be “an historically progressive 
manifestation,” “a deeply progressive manifestation,” “of great progressive 
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significance,” “undoubtedly of progressive significance,” “of enormous progressive 
significance,” and “of extraordinarily important objective-progressive significance.”35 
This type of revision of historical doctrine at political conferences is, as Pierce writes, 
“not history but catechism.”36  
Centrality of Historiography to Niyazov’s National Revival 
In the post-Soviet period, nationalist historiography has formed a major part of 
Niyazov’s new national ideology. The rewriting of history assumes the falsehood of 
previous portrayals of the Turkmen people and aims at discovering a historical truth 
that has, until now, been hidden. In Ruhnama, Niyazov strongly condemns the 
misrepresentations of the history of the Turkmen: “Between the 17th and 19th 
centuries, some states diffused wicked propaganda in pursuit of their own national 
interests. They falsely represented the nation of Turkmens as pillagers and merciless 
slaughterers, and described them as a wild community who kill each other, living in 
tents, an ignorant, uneducated and nomadic nation.”37 Previously written histories are 
seen as “political tricks” aimed at eroding the “legendary past of Turkmen people and 
their contribution to the history of the development of the world through many 
centuries, to justify their invasion of its land and to take the Turkmen nation 
captive.”38  
Under the pseudo-ideology of Niyazov’s sultanistic regime, unity is stressed 
as a major element of the program of national revival—historiography is one way in 
which Niyazov promotes this element of the ideological program. As mentioned 
earlier, the regime has developed a policy of “national revival” instead of nation-
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building, drawing on the “great history of the Turkmen nation” and making the 
periods of Russian and Soviet domination seem like just a small backward step in the 
continual glory of that nation. Akbarzadeh writes that “the official designation of 
national revival, to a large extent, is a euphemism for historical forgery; this is an 
attempt to create an image of great antiquity and hence to justify the future existence 
of the Turkmen national community. By tying its fate to that of the eternal Turkmen 
nation, the elite hopes to guarantee its own future. The Turkmen state… has no 
scruples in misrepresenting history to serve its interests and pave the way for its 
continued rule.”39  
Although Niyazov employs Soviet methods in revising and enforcing 
knowledge of the new Turkmen national history, the content of his history marks a 
major deviation from the Soviet treatment. In the post-Soviet period and as far back as 
perestroika, Turkmen historians reject the Russocentric view of the Turkmen past, 
including the concept of Russians as “older brothers” who aided in transmitting 
progress and civilization. However, the mere focus of Turkmen history today on the 
idea of the Turkmen nation could not have taken place without the Soviet influence, 
for it is the Soviets who first determined the bounds of the Turkmen nation. And this 
aspect, the legitimacy of dividing history into distinct national components, not only 
has not been rejected by Niyazov’s regime, but forms the driving force behind it-- 
nationhood is superimposed, in fact, on a past that was in many ways nation-less.  
The consistent focus on the historical Turkmen nation as the topic of study is 
among the most striking elements of this narrative. Edgar writes, “A semi nomadic 
people at the time of the Bolshevik ascent to power in 1917, the Turkmen were 
fragmented into genealogically defined groups that spoke different dialects, were 
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often at war with each other, and were ruled by at least five different states.... 
Although these Turkmen groups claimed common ancestry, they possessed no clearly 
bounded territory, no common political institutions, no uniform language, and no 
mass culture of print and education-- in short, none of the trappings of modern 
nationhood.”40 The superimposition of the modern idea of nation on a nation-less past 
creates an artificially strong continuity between the ancient past and today’s state of 
Turkmenistan. As Segars has written of Kemalist Turkey, “how can one speak of the 
national revival…when the vast majority had never before exhibited a significant 
awareness of, or an affinity to, their nationality? Turkish national identity had not 
been lost at some point in the past, only to be revived during the nineteenth and 20th 
centuries; it had, quite simply, never existed, at least not for the majority of the 
population.”41  
This chapter will explore some of the component parts of the nationalist 
historiography in contemporary Turkmenistan—it is important, in this process, not to 
lose sight of the overall narrative and its significance. The history of the Turkmen 
nation is presented as age-old, firmly rooted in historical  and territorial space, 
historically great, influential and expansive, and also as a state with a solid national 
character that is reflected in its selection of national heroes and in the way of life of its 
people. Golden ages of the Turkmen are emphasized, and taken to have occurred 
before the conquest by the Russians and the later Sovietization, and a return to glory 
is the call of the era of independence, with the 21st century dubbed the “Golden 
Century of Turkmen”. Turkmen history is presented as a nation’s long and glorious 
quest for independent statehood, a crusade led by mythical heroes, warriors and poets 
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and marred by divisive but temporary obstacles such as tribalism, external enemies, 
and colonial rule. The post-Soviet period, then, represents the fulfilling of the age-old 
dream of the Turkmen people for independence. It follows that Niyazov, the figure 
associated with independence, occupies a position of greatness within this conception 
of Turkmen national history, as the man who led his people into the new golden age. 
Niyazov writes, “Independence has changed the fate of the Turkmen nation 
completely and has brought it to the point of perfection.”42 Unity is underscored as a 
major part of the national character, and periods of disunity or external rule are 
ignored or forgotten.  
Myth and Memory: Four Turkmen National Heroes 
In burying its Soviet heritage and recasting its national past, Turkmenistan’s 
current regime has elevated a set of national heroes from mythology and the pre-
Russian period to serve as the icons of national revival. The creation or elevation of 
iconographic national heroes serves to buttress a program of nation building in several 
ways. These figures provide a focal point to a program of new national ideology and 
can be selected and presented in such a way as to legitimize almost any project of 
nation building undertaken by a leader of a newly independent state.   
As a focal point for construction of a national ideology, national heroes can 
serve as the embodiment of different traits of the national character or certain features 
of a nation. The reverence of national heroes, who represent the nation itself, in many 
ways is shorthand for reverence of the nation-- or, of the state, if it is tied to the nation 
as is the Turkmenistani state. National heroes are invoked in everyday “banal” 
nationalism and also heralded at celebrations of nationhood, independence, and 
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historical events.43 They are celebrated through various media: by statues and 
memorials built to honour them, literature dedicated to them, the recounting of 
important events in their lives and the preservation of important places, by television 
programs, films, and books about them, and school classes focused on their lives and 
projects. National leaders might draw upon their experiences or lives in speeches and 
put forward policy programs in their honour or under their inspiration. Anthony Smith 
discusses the role of what he calls national “heroes and messiahs” as part of the 
nationalist discourse of statesmen. The selection of national heroes is part of the 
search for models of the nation’s qualities of authenticity and rootedness; 
embodiments of the national character that are intertwined, historically and 
territorially, with the nation itself. National heroes are meant to serve as “our guides 
in the task of national regeneration.”44 These national figures are “also seen as 
‘authentic’—pure, true, pristine, originary—and as such rooted in the soil of the 
homeland. Their message is still relevant, they provide models of conduct, and their 
exploits are true exempla virtutis, worthy of emulation in each generation.”45 
 Smith argues that it matters less who these heroes really are, and more what 
message they bring to the nationalist discourse. He writes, “irrespective of their 
pedigree, these heroes and heroines, geniuses, prophets, and messiahs embody the 
popular will, the virtues, and the true interests of the nation. Whether historical or 
legendary, they have been elevated by popular memory above everyday power 
politics and the struggles of history, because in some way they revealed the inner 
goodness of the nation, and epitomized its virtues and its hopes…. it is the fact of 
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heroism and genius, and the presence of prophecy, that matter, rather than any 
particular heroes, geniuses, and prophets… Of importance is not this or that 
personage, but the virtues and qualities they embody and the message of hope they 
proclaim.”46  
Niyazov selects his heroes carefully and they help to emphasize a single thread 
running through his historical project-- promotion of and dreams of national unity, 
union of the tribes, and national independence, as well as ties to the historical 
homeland. His selection, therefore, notably overlooks the past several centuries of 
Turkmen history.47 His agenda in selecting the national heroes is fourfold: First, the 
regime promotes certain historical figures to legitimate its rule, by connecting the 
president to the heroic historical figures either through supernatural powers, shared 
personality characteristics, quasi-religious communing with the dead48 and shared 
goals and visions of the nation. As March writes, “Not only is it the rehabilitation of a 
national hero in the attempt to inspire national pride and invent a national history after 
a long period of colonization, but it is the deliberate elevation of values associated 
with a (single) strong leader, centralized statehood and political order achieved 
through the manipulation of an untouchable symbol.”49 His second objective is clear: 
to promote national unity amidst an unsettling climate of ongoing tribal divisions and 
rivalries. Thirdly, Niyazov harkens back to pre-Soviet and pre-Russian eras to 
deconstruct and de-legitimate the Soviet period and the period of Russian conquest 
and the ideas that were promoted during those periods. By avoiding the recent past 
and designating it as a dark period for the Turkmen, he goes back to the idea of 
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ancient Turkmen glory, which he has more flexibility in presenting because it is 
outside of the historical memory for living Turkmen and there are few recorded 
sources of this history other than those provided by the regime. Finally, Niyazov 
propagates both a territorial idea of nationhood and a genealogical vision of nation-- 
the Turkmens are at once a people inhabiting a historical homeland, and a vast and 
widespread group relating back to the same tribe that has overtaken many regions of 
the world and founded many great historic states. 
Drawing on the first volume of the president’s text Ruhnama, this section 
demonstrates the treatment of heroes in the popular discourse. In Ruhnama, Niyazov 
points to two significant subsets of national mythical hero in defining the ancient 
Turkmen national past, state-builders and literary figures. This is likely a conscious 
choice, because Niyazov clearly considers himself both a state-builder and, with the 
publication of several books of poetry along with two volumes of spiritual guidance in 
Ruhnama, a literary figure as well-- he was awarded the distinction of National 
Laureate of the Turkmens. By exploring four of the historical figures that have been 
elevated to the status of national hero in Niyazov’s Turkmenistan-- Oghuz Han, 
Gorogly, Gorkut Ata and Magtumguly, this chapter will trace some of the ways in 
which their officially propagated biographies demonstrate how Niyazov is using them 
to influence Turkmenistan’s people.  
In Ruhnama, Niyazov writes that the souls of his deceased parents see him as 
the inheritor of the four central Turkmen heroes and, by extension, connected to the 
Prophet Mohammed; they told him, “Allah selected the four heroes of the Turkmens--
Oghuz Han, Gorkut Ata, Gorogly and Magtumguly-- as the inheritors of the prophets. 
Today, Allah the Great has designated you as their inheritor. Son, devote your life to 
maintaining the unity of the Turkmen nation and to sustaining the golden life for 




them.”50 The parliament building in Ashgabat displays a visual representation of this 
historical trajectory-- there are five portraits adorning the facade of the building, four 
of the great historical heroes, clustered around Niyazov’s presidential portrait-- the 
implication being that Niyazov is the latest great hero of the Turkmen nation. 
Oghuz Han  
One of the most important aspects of nationhood for the Turkmen is a shared 
myth of ancestry. Many ethnies have a mythical progenitor and a connected myth of 
origin; indeed, this may be considered one of the defining aspects of a nation. This 
helps to anchor the nation, and any traits assigned to that ancestor can be taken as 
signs of how the nation’s people should behave, or indications of a national character. 
Smith writes, “Myths of origins, whether of the genealogical or the territorial-political 
kind, are usually regarded by the members and by many analysts as key elements in 
the definition of ethnic communities. Not only have they often played a vital role in 
differentiating and separating particular ethnies from close neighbours and/or 
competitors; it is in such myths that ethnies locate their founding charter and raison 
d’etre.”51 
Oghuz Han is the mythical progenitor of the Turkmen.52 Niyazov’s rhetoric 
concerning Oghuz Han depicts him as the progenitor exclusively of Turkmen kind-- 
he writes “A new nation was born with Oghuz Han”.53 Today in Turkmenistan, the 
figure of Oghuz Han represents the Turkmen nation, the Turkmen homeland, and the 
union of all the Turkmen tribes. He represents also the antiquity of the Turkmen 
nation, which Niyazov insists traces back to BC 5000. Niyazov, in Ruhnama, writes 
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of the great Turkmen ancestor: “Our Ancestor Oghuz Han is the forefather of the 
Turkmen people, whom Turkmen people assume to be a prophet....Oghuz Han’s name 
means sky and earth,”54 and that the names of Oghuz Han’s six sons—purportedly the 
leaders of the six original Turkmen tribes-- denote the six great things in the world. 
Oghuz Han, according to legend, had 24 grandchildren who were the fathers of the 24 
clans of the Oghuz, who are now spread across the globe.  
The myth of origin for the Turkmens is probably the single most important 
element of their national identity. Common origin was what defined a Turkmen from 
a non-Turkmen, in the consciousness of the Turkmen (if there was any sort of national 
consciousness at all) at the time of the Bolshevik delimitation in 1924. Edgar writes, 
“All those who called themselves Turkmen traced their ancestry back to a single 
individual, the mythical Turkic warrior Oghuz-khan. Individuals and groups who did 
not claim descent from Oghuz were not considered Turkmen, even if they lived 
among the Turkmen and spoke their language. Oghuz Han, then, “formed the ethnic 
core of myth and memory that some scholars argue is essential to the formation of a 
nation.”55  
Niyazov writes of Oghuz Han as an influential and great man: “His ideas and 
opinions were not limited to one country and land, but were so great as to contain all 
the earth. He was such a great man, whose opinions illuminated all the nations of the 
world”56 and often refers simply to that era as the Golden Age; “the golden periods of 
our glorious history illuminate the world. Oghuz Han, armoured in pure gold and 
bearing his quiver on his legendary horse, waits at the beginning of this glorious 
history.”57 Oghuz Han’s epoch, importantly, marks the first historical “golden age” 
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for the Turkmen. Niyazov now calls the 21st century the “Golden Century of the 
Turkmen”, and great emphasis is placed on returning to the great national character 
from the time of Oghuz Han. A golden age in any national historiography is “a time 
of heroes, people whose thoughts and deeds can inspire admiration and hope amongst 
their enfeebled descendants, and whose virtuous example may show the ways to 
remedy contemporary decay. Heroes mirror the best of the community’s traditions, its 
authentic voice in the moment of its first flowering, so sadly silent today.”58 Niyazov 
also states that “The golden age signifies many things, but, above all, it shines forth as 
a cultural model and an inspiration, because it is seen as extraordinary, canonical, and 
sacred. We are not dealing simply with the exploits of particular heroes or the 
teachings of lone sages, influential though they may be, but with a whole period (or 
periods) of the communal past characterized by a burst of collective activity—military 
and political, economic and social, artistic and intellectual, or religious—which 
represents the ‘authentic’ spirit of the community and its moral core.”59 During the 
golden age of Oghuz Han, the Turkmen nation is said to have implemented many 
things that have become essential to the modern world, including a national alphabet 
and the wheeled wagon. These inventions, Niyazov insists, were great contributions 
of the Turkmen people to world civilization. “Undoubtedly, the wagon has lent speed 
to history and to life. The design of our alphabet has changed throughout history; and 
today we see it in the form of the embroidery on Turkmen carpets.”60    
Oghuz Han not only gave birth, mythically, to the Turkmen nation, but also 
endowed it with the character that Niyazov suggests should be continued to this day. 
Niyazov writes, “The style of our nation’s culture and life originates with Oghuz 
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Han”61, whom he calls the first spiritual leader of the Turkmens (in the first age of the 
Turkmen spirit, dating from BC 5000 to AD 600 according to Ruhnama). Oghuz Han 
is presented as a just and strong leader-- “The route led by Oghuz Han is one of 
justice, lawfulness and propriety, and its features are enthusiasm, courage, 
forbearance and endurance.”62 In addition, Oghuz Han is a major symbol of unity for 
the Turkmen nation. In legends about Oghuz Han, he is said to have warned against 
the dangers of divisiveness, and he is always portrayed holding a large bunch of 
arrows—according to legend, Oghuz Han easily broke an arrow against his leg, but 
demonstrated to his followers that it is impossible to break 24 arrows which are bound 
together.  
In raising Oghuz Han to the level of national hero, Niyazov at once creates an 
icon, and also adds additional personal qualities to Oghuz Han, characteristics that are 
general enough to be easily transposed on today’s Turkmen leader. The glorification 
of Oghuz Han by Niyazov, and the implicit and sometimes explicit connection of 
Oghuz to Niyazov, allows Niyazov to tie himself back to the very inception of the 
Turkmen nation, suggesting that he is the natural continuation of a line of great 
leadership that traces back to Oghuz Han. 
Gorkut Ata 
If Oghuz Han is seen as the forefather of the Turkmen nation, then Gorkut Ata 
(or Dede Korkut in Turkish) seems to fill the role of wise grandfather, or national 
prophet. Whereas Oghuz was the spiritual leader of the first era of Turkmens, Gorkut 
Ata was the spiritual leader of the second age, the age of Mohammed, when, under 
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Niyazov’s account, the Turkmens first began conversion to Islam.63  
Like Oghuz Han, he is a mythical figure--the character of Gorkut Ata appears 
in an old epic cycle of twelve pieces. He was a spiritual leader and is presented as 
among the first of his people to accept Islam, visiting Mecca and Medina on the hajj. 
This collection of prose is considered to be “the greatest folk product of the fourteenth 
century… the oldest surviving example of the Oghuz Turkmen epic.”64 The cycle 
recounts the struggles of the time between the Oghuz Turks and the Georgian and 
Abaza Circassians (in the Caucasus) as well as with certain Byzantine groups, 
incorporating stories of relationships and conflict within and between the Turkmen 
tribes. There is no real information conveyed about Gorkut Ata’s personality, and 
there is mystery surrounding the authorship of the stories, and whether it was a single 
or multiple authors. Shaw writes, “the form and the style indicate that some single 
hand must have had a role, although whether simply collecting scattered stories or 
originating them is not yet clear.”65  
The epic was originally written in “a pure and simple Turkish”,66 and in any 
case is considered a major source for both the history and the literature of the time, 
displaying the basic music and style of the language “uncontaminated by foreign 
intrusions as few other Turkish works are.”67 
The lessons that Niyazov draws from the stories of Gorkut Ata are spirituality, 
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devotion to Islam, morality, and of course, national unity. The man is portrayed to 
have been a living person instead of an epic character, with Niyazov dating him and 
placing him territorially within the new historiography of Turkmenistan. In Ruhnama, 
Niyazov writes, “Gorkut Ata converted to Islam of his own volition and discovered 
the new comprehensive space unique to the Turkmen soul. Gorkut Ata established 
new morality that was inspired by his personal faith and philosophy of the afterlife.”68 
Gorkut Ata is presented as a man of miracles, but also teaches lessons of humility:  
In the character of Dali Domrul, Gorkut Ata taught the next seventy-
seven generations how arrogance brought calamity to man: Wealth 
and ease make Dali Domrul vain and arrogant and he starts to 
challenge passers-by to wrestle with him. Looking for an excuse to 
challenge people, he constructed a bridge over a dried-up riverbed. 
He collects a toll from those who pass over the bridge. He takes 
thirty toll-fees from people crossing the bridge and forty from people 
who do not want to cross over the bridge. Of course, he collects the 
toll unfairly by brute force. Dali Domrul becomes world famous. 
One day, he hears the noise of a quarrel coming from a village 
nearby. He goes to find out what is happening there. They said: ‘Oh! 
Our Han, one of the heroes has died.’ Delighted to think he has 
found a worthy opponent, Domrul asks: ‘Who killed your hero?’ 
‘Azrael with the red wings.’ Then, his eyes blurred with malice, he 
searches for Azrael. But Azrael is supported by the divine power and 
never yields to earthly power. A clash between the two ends with 
Domrul begging for mercy. The way to save yourself from arrogance 
is to repent and ask for forgiveness.69  
Gorogly 
The spiritual leader of the third era of Turkmen history, Gorogly, is yet 
another mythical figure endowed with the characteristics and respect of an ancestor. A 
Gorogly (or Koroglu) character exists in the oral traditions of almost all the Central 
Asian societies. The Gorogly-type epic falls under the category of heroic-romantic 
feudal epics, poetic cycles generally known by the Persian term dastan that tell of the 
love of a hero and heroine destined for one another, though their story takes them 
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through adventures and challenges.  
According to the scholar Lois Giffen, the Gorogly cycle is the latest in the line 
of the Turkic oral epic tradition, which was created from the beginning of the 
seventeenth century up until the first half of the nineteenth century. She suggests that 
the cycle gives a “vivid picture of class differences and social struggles in feudal 
society.”70 It was composed and disseminated quite rapidly, which she takes to 
demonstrate the vivacity of the oral epic at that time. Giffen affirms that this myth is 
indeed pan-Turkic and not exclusive to the Turkmens, something that other Central 
Asians are also quick to point out. She writes, “The Koroglu tales have spread in 
varying forms throughout the Caucasus-- in Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia, among the 
Kurds, in Turkey, and in northern Iran, as well as among the Turkmens, Uzbeks, 
Kazakhs, Karakalpaks, Tajiks, and others.”71 Gorogly may have been modelled on an 
existing person—some historical documentation suggests that a man who was given 
the name Raushan and called by the nickname Gorogly or Koroglu (son of the blind 
man) may have been a leader of the Jelali rebellion in Azerbaijan in the early 1580s.72 
The character was adapted to suit various minstrels’ styles and regional traditions and 
circumstance, but generally took the role of a Robin Hood-esque noble bandit. This 
was an attractive character, Giffen points out, for “those under feudal oppression… 
this hero represented the dream of the redress of injustice and the triumph of 
courage.”73  
The stories of Gorogly’s birth and life—or one version thereof—are 
ubiquitous in contemporary Turkmenistan, especially in children’s books. Grandson 
of Jygalybeg, a man who had lost his son and daughter-in-law, Gorogly was the 
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product of a miraculous birth—Jygalybeg was informed by angels in a dream that the 
unborn grandchild lived despite his parents’ deaths. The infant Gorogly, in fact, had 
crawled from a tomb and was being raised by local shepherds; he was named Rowdan 
but friends called him Gorogly, meaning “from the grave”. Gorogly’s fictional 
childhood presents interesting parallels for Niyazov—Gorogly, like Niyazov, is an 
orphaned character who rises to greatness. Niyazov draws connections between 
Gorogly’s birth and his own personal life. “I have borne many difficulties throughout 
my life. I grew up feeling the absence of my father... A sudden and terrible earthquake 
destroyed our home and separated me from my brothers, who were like my eyes, and 
my mother, who was my guide in life….74 Just as Gorogly came into the light of this 
world from the grave, I also came into this world from the ruins.”75 Niyazov was 
orphaned at a young age and in Ruhnama he describes in some detail his troubled 
childhood and how he overcame many obstacles. In tying his biography to that of 
Gorogly, Niyazov again elevates himself above the average man in his public 
portrayals. 
A prominent trait of Gorogly that Niyazov uses as exemplar is his bravery. 
Gorogly’s lesson for Turkmen is that “Today, bravery should underlie the foundations 
of work, life, thought, and awareness of Turkmens as a nation. Turkmens should cope 
with their difficulties and have self-respect. Then we will be able to find our place in 
the balance of the world.”76 Niyazov asks, “How can our nation not be brave and self-
sacrificing, when all our books, epics and talks are related to the homeland and 
bravery?”77  
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Magtumguly, a revered 18th century national poet, is well known among the 
Turkmens and was elevated to the position of national hero before the era of 
Turkmenbashy, during the Soviet period-- marking a measure of continuity between 
pre-Soviet, Soviet, and post-Soviet Turkmen culture. Magtumguly is unique among 
the four Turkmen heroes in the documentation of his existence. Magtumguly is the 
most significant figure in the creation of Turkmen written literature, and was also the 
first poet in historical memory to write in the Turkmen language, significant given the 
literary use of Chagatay Turkish during that time. Feldman writes, “The Turkmen 
language was not employed for courtly literature until the beginning of the eighteenth 
century, at which time written literature appears to emerge quite suddenly among the 
Turkmens.”78 Widespread acceptance of Magtumguly’s greatness among Central 
Asian people lends credence to Niyazov’s claims and helps to buttress his program of 
nationalist historiography. As Feldman writes, Magtumguly “himself has become a 
figure of myth combining great antiquity with moral rectitude.”79  
 Although little is known of Magtumguly’s personal life, it is accepted that he 
was born around 1730 near the Atrak River north of the Iranian city Goran, and was a 
member of the Goklen tribe. Like his father Azadi (also a literary figure), he studied 
in the Khivan madrassa Shirghazi and was trained as a goldsmith. He fell in love with 
his cousin Mengli (writing many of his poems about her), but she was married to 
someone else-- his inability to marry her marked the greatest tragedy of his life. 
Eventually he married another woman and had two children, both of whom died 
young. Besides his love, Turkmen raids against the Iranians (and vice versa) figure 
largely in his poetry. Using two names-- Magtumguly and Piragi (Firagi), he authored 
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some 800 poems. Magtumguly was twice taken into captivity with other Goklens to 
Persia, was witness to the ruinous invasion of his country by Nadir Shah, and died in 
a civil war between the Goklen and the Yomut around 1790. 
Niyazov exalts Magtumguly not only as a literary figure, but also for his 
strong Turkmen nationalism, calls for unification of the Turkmen tribes, and for his 
moral righteousness. Magtumguly promoted national unity and the union of the tribes, 
especially against hostile neighbours. He sadly narrated the internal strife between the 
Turkmen tribes, and pleaded with them to “come together and form a state of their 
own, instead of leading a separate life, which put them in a weak position against their 
enemies....”80 Magtumguly’s specific references to Turkmen people indicate that in 
the 18th century, though Turkmen did not form a nation in the modern sense (and 
indeed struggled fiercely among themselves), there were seeds of ethnic 
consciousness among elements of the Turkmen, including a linguistic distinctiveness. 
At the time of Magtumguly, in fact, there was no unity among the Turkmen and they 
were in conflict, generally, with each other, resulting from their tribal migrations. 
Saray recounts that the migrations of the Tekkes in the 18th and early 19th centuries 
from Manghishlak to Balkhans and Kopet Dag in Ahal and then to Merv “had caused 
problems for the other Turkmen tribes. The Turkmens did not have an organized 
government, in the modern sense of the word, in their political lives as they were very 
disunited amongst themselves up until the late 1850s. They governed themselves 
under the leadership of their respective Chiefs (or Elders) according to the principles 
of their Tore, and led an independent life.”81  
We can see Magtumguly’s nationalism clearly in his poem Turkmening (of the 
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Between the Jeyhun and the Khazar Sea 
Over the desert blows the breeze of the Turkmen 
Its rose-bud is the pupil of my black eye;  
From the black mountain descends the river of the Turkmen 
 
The Lord has exalted him and placed him under His protection 
His camels, his flocks range over the desert 
Flowers of many hues open on his green summer pastures 
Drenched in the scent of basil is the desert of the Turkmen 
 
He is the son of a hero-- a hero his father  
Goroghli his brother, drunken his head;  
Should they pursue him on mountain or plain,  
The hunters cannot take him alive,  
this panther’s son of the Turkmen! 
 
Hearts, breasts, and heads are at one 
When he holds a gathering earth and mountains crumble,  
When food is prepared at one table 
Exalted is the destiny of the Turkmen! 
 
The tribes are brothers, clans are good friends,  
Fate does not oppose him, he is God’s light,  
When heroes mount their horses, facing the battle,  
Toward the foe goes the road of the Turkmen! 
 
This oft-cited poem contains virtually a national program for the Turkmens, 
opening with a clear spatial location of the Turkmen national territory and an 
idealized description of their environment.82 In a later couplet Magtumguly takes a 
bardic tone as he praises the Turkmen warrior by outlining his heroic lineage and 
mentioning the epic hero Gorogly. The final quatrain presents the issue of segmented 
social structure and presents the solution—the unity of the tribes. 
Niyazov presents Magtumguly as a dynamic figure whose lifelong dream, the 
unity of the Turkmen nation, is being realized now for the first time—in this way, 
Niyazov presents his leadership as the solution to the dilemma of Magtumguly’s era. 
He writes, “Today, we have reached the unity, the integrity and the collaboration that 
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our Father Magtumguly desired.”83 “Now this Turkmen tale has become a reality in 
the Turkmen territory. Remember that Magtumguly the Great made great endeavours 
to give unity and integrity to the Turkmens in the eighteenth century. No matter how 
he tried he could not make others heed his words because there was nobody able to 
lead the Turkmens. For the leader of one tribe to unite with another, one of the two 
leaders would have to accept second place, but there was no Han humble enough to 
bear to take second place….84 Independent and Permanently Neutral Republic of 
Turkmenistan! With my whole heart, I desire your development and progress and 
devote my life to you…. Our ancestor, Magtumguly, keeping you in his dreams, 
wrote: Know that what I built, Is the peg of this world. Forever it will stay 
independent, This is the edifice of the Turkmen. It is we who have realized his 
dreams.”85  
Historical Homeland and Territoriality 
One of the central elements of Niyazov’s national program that manifests 
itself in the new national narrative is the concept of historical homeland. 
Contemporary nationalism is generally linked to territory and the concept of 
territoriality, which Jan Penrose defines as representing a “geographic strategy that 
connects society and space.”86 Territoriality is a primary, geographical expression of 
power. There are different ways of constructing territoriality. As Anssi Paasi argues, 
“boundaries may be simultaneously historical, natural, cultural, political, economic or 
symbolic phenomena and each of these dimensions may be exploited in diverging 
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ways in the construction of territoriality.”87  
Territorial attachment is a common theme in nationalist discourse, but not an 
old one. Smith writes, “only in the modern world has this older collective attachment 
to the homeland come to serve as another sacred foundation and cultural resource for 
the maintenance, and reinterpretation, of national identities.”88 Benedict Anderson, for 
example, describes the role played by the creation of national censuses and map-
making for the establishment of a modern concept of national territory and, indeed, of 
nationalism itself. There are two ways in which nationalists employ the concept of 
territory, argues Smith—these are the processes of the historicization of nature, and 
the naturalization of history.  
In Turkmenistan, we see the historicization of nature. This is a term that 
“covers a number of processes by which land or terrain and its natural features 
become part of a community’s history,” writes Smith. The processes involved 
include:  
The interplay between a given land or terrain and the 
development of a particular community in terms of 
ecological support, resources, and security, and the 
attachment resulting from a successful relationship between 
them; The treatment of natural features of the land—rivers, 
mountains, fields, and the like—as intrinsic elements of the 
history and development of the community; The growth of a 
belief in the life-enhancing and nurturing qualities of 
particular landscapes for the community; and the growth of 
a collective attachment to, and sense of possession of, the 
land as belonging historically to ‘us’, as ‘we’ do to it. The 
land is seen as an intrinsic part of ‘our’ history, and a partner 
of our joys and travails.89 
 
 The historical nomadism of the Turkmens left them without a homeland in the 
sense of a modern nation-state (indeed, without a nation, in the sense of a modern 
                                       
87 Paasi, cited in Penrose, 280 
88 Smith, Chosen People, 131 
89 ibid., 136 




nation) until 1924 when the Bolsheviks carried out a national delimitation in Central 
Asia, effectively tying many of the nomads to the territory.90 In order to secure the 
territorial delimitation, the Bolsheviks undertook the first territorialization campaign 
in Turkmenistan, paving the way for Niyazov’s “homeland” rhetoric to resonate with 
today’s Turkmens.  
The Bolshevik planners, in delimiting the Turkmen union republic in 1924, 
were faced also with the (even bigger given its novelty) challenge of giving the 
nomadic Turkmen a feeling of connection with the land. Thus, Niyazov’s 
territorialization is an example of continuity with the Soviet era. The “emphasis on the 
Turkmen homeland in the new state’s nationalist ideology” stems back to the 1920s, 
when “the creation of a national territory under Soviet auspices had brought about a 
dramatic change in the attitudes of the historically nomadic Turkmen toward territory. 
Before the Soviet era, a well-known proverb maintained that a Turkmen’s home was 
wherever his horse happened to stand.”91 Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
“Turkmen state officials and historians spared no effort to prove that the Turkmen had 
inhabited their current territory since time immemorial; some scholars even went so 
far as to deny the nomadic heritage of the Turkmen.”92  
Niyazov, in Ruhnama, stresses that Turkmens have long inhabited their 
territory. He traces the territory of the Turkmens back to the time of the mythical 
progenitor Oghuz Han, in the first era of the Turkmens. Through the figure of Oghuz 
Han, Niyazov introduces the idea of territorial historic homeland of the Turkmen: 
“These lands under the rule of Oghuz Han were known as the Oghuz Homeland. We 
have accurate information about this…. Ancient sources tell us that Oghuz Han’s land 
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stretched from Altyntepe through Anew, Anew, Nusay, Takgala, the entire Merw, 
Koneurgench and Caspian-Belh region, including Seyhun-Jeyhun (and) east to west 
up to the Idil Sea in the north.”93  
Penrose writes that one important aspect of the “emotional power of territory 
is the tendency for human beings to reinforce their connections with specific places 
through history, memory, and myth. This is crucial to maintaining the significance of 
boundaries to those sustained by the territory and, in consequence, to inspiring their 
commitment to the survival of this territory.”94 Niyazov’s efforts at territoriality take 
the form of nationalist claims about historical events and civilizations that existed on 
the territory of contemporary Turkmenistan, regardless of whether these had 
connections to the Turkmen people at the time. Additionally, he extols the glories of 
the land, making an emotional call for attachment to the territory of Turkmenistan, 
describing it at once as the most attractive settlement in the world and the resting 
place of all the Turkmen ancestors. 
Niyazov extols the greatness of the territory of Turkmenistan as though its 
borders were carefully selected by the Turkmen nation and its ancestors, rather than 
given by the Bolsheviks during the delimitation. He writes, “This sacred land with its 
mountains, fields, seas, deserts, and rivers is of God’s grace and favour to our nation. 
If it was said, ‘You are free. Travel around the globe and choose wherever you want 
as your homeland,’ the sons of this nation could not find a more beautiful and 
beneficial land.”95 He presents the land as sacred and introduces a concept of spiritual 
attachment to territory. “If you go around the world, you may find mountains and 
forests that are a hundred times more beautiful than those of the Turkmens, like 
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Paradise. However, those mountains cannot understand you and cannot share your 
sufferings. Outside this territory you cannot find deserts, seas and rains that can blow 
musical instruments and sing songs in Turkmen.”96  
Ruhnama makes the claim that historically, the great sultans of Turkmen 
origin, who founded states across the Middle East and South Asia, all returned to 
Turkmenistan-- the original homeland of the Turkmens-- to settle in the end. Niyazov 
claims that “Our ancestors conquered the most beautiful places in the world but they 
were not fascinated enough by the beauties of those places to settle there. If they had 
wanted to settle in the most beautiful places in the world, they could have done so 
because they were the Sultans of those places. Instead they returned to their own 
homeland, no matter where they had conquered and no matter what they had acquired 
from other places in the world.”97 This dubious claim is proven ill-researched later in 
the Ruhnama, when these different great sultans are profiled-- most of them died or 
were killed in the cities that were the capitals of their states or empires—few on the 
soil of today’s Turkmenistan. 
Penrose writes, “Every society has stories about its origins and its past. These 
stories reflect the uniqueness of the society and this distinctiveness is reinforced 
through the language of communication and through religious and/or historical 
allusions. Moreover, these stories always occur in space and are usually associated 
with specific sites and/or landscapes.”98 Niyazov discusses the natural element of 
Turkmen folklore in Ruhnama, arguing that the material, spiritual and cultural values 
of the Turkmen nation developed so that they are intertwined with the environment 
that they inhabit today. He writes, “Read Oghuznama, Gorkut Ata, or Gorogly and 
                                       
96 ibid.,163 
97 ibid.,178 
98 Penrose, 280 




you see a harmony with nature; this harmony reminds you of the relations between 
father and son. Thus the Turkmen nation calls this country the ‘homeland’. This kind 
of relationship gives the Turkmen spirit naturalness, health, spiritual loftiness, and 
beauty.”99 Interestingly, the story of Gorogly-- this is the story shared by many Turkic 
groups and even the Tajiks-- is set in a lush mountainous landscape-- a landscape 
more closely resembling southern Kazakhstan or Kyrgyzstan than Turkmenistan.  
Archaeology and Civilizations on Turkmen Soil: The Parthians 
The regime’s claim to the histories of all of the civilizations that existed on the 
soil of Turkmenistan allows it to adopt achievements for the Turkmen people that are 
also claimed by other nations as their own, and also allows Niyazov to emphasize the 
age-old dimension of Turkmenistan and the Turkmen nation. Artefacts uncovered 
from ancient civilizations on Turkmen soil provide a better basis for nationalism than 
the non-existent historical Turkmen national consciousness. By connecting recorded 
ancient civilizations to the Turkmen people, Niyazov proceeds with a huge historical 
forgery. He writes, “Anyone who flies over Turkmenistan in a plane, from a birds-eye 
view, will see that a great number of cities were built in ancient times in all corners of 
the country.”100  
The territory of contemporary Turkmenistan, unquestionably, was home to 
many ancient civilizations, a source of great pride to Turkmens today. From southern 
Turkmenistan’s Altyn-Depe civilization to Dekhistan in southwestern Turkmenistan, 
to the more famous Bronze Age agricultural settlement of Margush (Margiana) near 
Merv in the delta of the Murgab, Turkmenistan boasts great wealth in historical 
artefacts and history. The history, however, is largely not that of the people we today 
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call “Turkmen,”—this is where Niyazov’s claims become interesting. Ruhnama 
insists that “When we say homeland our ancestors come to mind and when we say our 
ancestors our homeland comes to our mind.”101 The example of the Parthian state, 
which for a time had a capital at Nisa near today’s Ashgabat, but was not a state of 
Turkmen people, makes clear the extension by Niyazov of historical fact to historical 
forgery.  
Akbarzadeh argues, “The link between Parthians, Seljuks and modern 
Turkmens is far from certain.”102 In Turkmenistan, however, this link is presented as 
strong. While the question of Seljuk connection (a more conventional and 
substantiated connection) will be discussed later, the Parthian connection draws upon 
the idea of national homeland and is addressed here. An ethnic historical link with the 
Parthians-- claimed by the regime-- would call into question the Turkic origins of the 
Turkmen. 
Akbarzadeh writes, “Studies of the Parthian civilization and implicit 
assumptions as to the link between the latter and modern Turkmen culture provide 
clear examples of the prevalent tendency to date Turkmen culture back to antiquity. 
By claiming this ancient civilization as its own, the nationalist elite fosters pride in the 
national community of Turkmens.”103 The links are not merely implicit. In Ruhnama, 
Niyazov claims, “Turkmens in history founded the great Parfiya State.”104 A 
contemporary Turkmenistan history book describes how, “In the first millennium BC 
in the south of modern Turkmenistan along the whole foothill stripe of Kopetdag 
mountains the powerful Parthian state was located. The residence of Parthian kings-- 
the Old Nisa-- was located near Ashgabat. Parthians who were ancestors of Turkmens 
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heavily defeated the powerful army of Roman Empire led by their commander-in-
chief Cruss. In the west Parthia bordered with Girkaniya, in the east with Margiana 
situated in the Murgab’s valley.”105  
The process of promoting links with the Parthians has drawn heavily on the 
contributions of state-sponsored historians and archaeologists. Newspapers in 
Turkmenistan often advertise proudly new archaeological findings at Nisa or at 
Margush. As Akbarzadeh writes, “State-sponsored archaeologists have been occupied 
with questions of Turkmen antiquity. Kh. Yusopov, a Turkmen archaeologist at the 
Turkmen Academy of Sciences, contributed regularly to the republican daily paper on 
this subject in 1994. In July and September 1994, he published a series of articles on 
the Parthian civilization in Nisa and the political and military exploits of the 
Khorezmshahid dynasty. Although Academician Yusopov did not draw a direct line 
joining Turkmen history and these ancient and middle civilizations in his articles, his 
archaeological writings fan the growing fascination with Turkmen history. Such 
‘scientific research’ seems to strengthen the state’s conspicuous nationalist policies. 
Other scholars do not have the subtleties of Yusopov. In July 1994 Albert Burkhanov, 
a candidate in history at the Turkmen Academy of Sciences, wrote about the 
importance of archaeological findings in Nisa for the revival of Turkmen identity.”106 
Perhaps the best known advocate of links between the Turkmens and ancient 
Parthians is historian Marat Durdyev, whose writings on Nisa and Parthia were 
published in the Turkmen press in 1995 in a series of articles on Parthian Nisa. 
Durdyev was promoted to deputy head of the National Administration for the Study, 
Protection and Restoration of Historical and Cultural Monuments of Turkmenistan-- 
this put him in an influential position to push forward his views on links with the 
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Parthians. Akbarzadeh discusses the adoption of certain Parthian symbols by the 
regime to represent the Turkmen state today-- probably due to the influence of 
Durdyev. The ministries of education and foreign affairs are decorated with large 
rhytons, which were the symbol of Parthian civilization. Akbarzadeh concludes that 
this “idea of continuity between modern Turkmens and ancient Parthians, first 
publicized in 1991, must have appealed to the state in search of historical 
legitimacy.”107  
Golden Ages, Innovation, Turkmen Culture’s Impact: Niyazov’s View 
Niyazov’s program of national revival places huge emphasis on the ideas of 
ancient greatness and historical golden ages. By dating the origins of the Turkmen 
nation at 5000 years ago and blurring historical terms, Niyazov claims the 
achievements of great world civilizations for the Turkmen people. In Ruhnama, much 
attention is paid to inventions and the contributions of Turkmen to science and world 
development. Turkmenistan, after the attacks of Gengis Khan, was according to 
Ruhnama, “the most developed country in the world”.108 The Turkmen people devised 
some of the great inventions of human civilization, including the wheel and the first 
type of carriage,109 tool- and sword- making using molten ores of iron and steel, silk 
cloth and silk carpets. Turkmen philosophers, scholars, and artists emigrated all 
through the Middle East and Turkey, passing on Turkmen civilization-- in this way, 
“the scientific achievement of the Turkmen nations became the ferment of European 
scientific advancement. The Turkmen wheel precipitated the scientific progress of the 
world.”110 Turkmenistan “became the home of scientists, scholars, intellectuals, 
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philosophers, artists and poets.”111 “The Turkmen nation has traced marks as 
magnificent as those of Great Britain, of the Great Indian Nation and of the Great 
Chinese Nation.”112 The real history of Turkmen, Niyazov claims, is central to world 
developments. “Turkmenistan which has been the centre of many great 
transformations and a centre of development and progress, had a very special place in 
the history and expansion of Islam into the world. Turkmen people have made 
unlimited contributions to the world.”113 When a Turkmen person is noticed, 
observers exclaim, according to Ruhnama: “That man is Turkmen! They are the 
nation that directed the course of history.”114  
The Origins of the Term “Turkmen” 
Niyazov’s historiography draws freely from Turkish national history, claiming 
many of the same historical events and achievements as do Anatolian Turks. Niyazov 
writes, “When I read and examined the history books, I realized that the word 
‘Turkmen’ has been replaced by the word ‘Turk’ for more than 50 years. In Ruhnama, 
however, I make the word ‘Turkmen’ regain its real meaning in order that today’s 
Turkmens come to know their ancestors and become vigorous with their spirit.”115 By 
most accounts, Turkmen indeed share genealogical connections with the Turks who 
later came to populate parts of the Ottoman Empire; however, the Turks are not so 
quick to include the Turkmen in their historiography. What does the historical record 
(written by non-Turkmens) say about the question of Turkmen and Turkish origins 
and shared ancestry?  
According to all historical records, the term Turk was introduced before the 
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term Turkmen, although the two seem to be closely related. The Turks appear first 
under that name in the sixth century AD, residing in the Altai Mountains on the west 
of the Mongolian steppes. According to Pitcher, their ancestry was obscure, and 
“orientalists are still disputing whether their immediate predecessors, the Hsiung-nu, 
were Turks, or Mongols, or proto-Turks, or the common ancestors of both Turks and 
Mongols.”116 These Turks, in Bosworth’s account, were related to or descended from 
the Hsiung-nu in Chinese sources. The serious history of the Hsiung-nu goes back to 
the third century BC and they were definitely in close contact with Turkish-speaking 
people from the earliest period. They raided Europe in the fourth century AD with a 
horde of Huns that included some Turkish-speaking elements. After that, other waves 
of Turkish-speakers moved west from the Asiatic steppes, including the Bulgar and 
several Oghuz tribes (although in the language of the Bulgar there is a sound change 
from z to r so this group is recorded often as Ogur and distinguished from the 
Oghuz)….The position is greatly complicated by the fact that the Turku had played 
such an important political role during the sixth and seventh centuries that several 
peoples who were neither ethnically Turkish nor Turkish speakers called themselves, 
or were called by their neighbours, ‘Turks’.”117  
The term Oghuz is first mentioned in the Orkhon inscriptions (the oldest 
known Turkish inscriptions), and the name is used “to refer to a tribal federation as 
well as to the ruling khans.”118 The Oghuz (the ancestors of today’s Turkmen in most 
conventional versions) were distinguished from other Turks primarily by language. 
There was a later wave of Oghuz than the ‘Ogur’ of the fifth century; and owing to 
long contact with Iranian-speaking peoples and detachment from their Turkish-
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speaking relatives further east, they had developed dialects sufficiently different from 
the standard Turkish of the Uygur of Sinkiang and the subjects of the Qarazanid 
dynasty to the north and west of the Uygur, for Mahmud al-Kasgari, writing in the 
middle of the 11th century, to make a clear distinction between ‘the language of the 
Turks’ and ‘the language of the Oghuz and Qipchaq.’”119 The Oghuz and the Qipchaq 
have both been described as Turkmen-- the origin of the designation is the subject of 
some historical controversy. Bosworth’s volume suggests that, having regard to the 
fact that the people to whom it was applied were in close contact with Iranians, the 
simple explanation that it is ‘Turk’ with the Persian suffix -man (‘like’), is probably 
correct. The designation Turkmen first appeared in the late tenth century, and was 
probably a term used by the non-Muslim Oghuz to refer to the Oghuz who had 
adopted Islam. 
The Turks slowly migrated from Mongolia. Hostler writes, “In A.D. 745, the 
rule over Mongolia passed from the Oghuz to the Uygurs, while the Oghuz migrated 
west and south. These Oghuz migrations explained the formation of the present group 
of southwestern Turks, to which belong the Turkmen, the Azerbaijanis, and the 
Anatolian Turks.”120 In the eighth century, the confederation of the Oghuz migrated 
from Mongolia westwards toward the Aral Sea and the Syr Darya-- before this, stray 
elements had found their way into the upper Oxus lands and the Karakum and 
Dekhistan steppes-- this major migration from Mongolia, however, was what brought 
the Oghuz as a group to the attention of writers.121 
Despite common origins, Turkic tribes began to differentiate themselves (and 
not only through migrations) as early as the tenth century. “In the early 11th century 
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there was a definite linguistic distinction between a south-western Turkish dialect, 
Turkmeni or Ghuzzi, and an eastern one, Turki.... Kashghari, whilst calling both the 
Oghuz and Qarluq ‘Turkmens’, carefully distinguished the speech of the two groups, 
and outlines some of the sound changes which distinguish the former from the 
latter.”122  
Turko-Persian Tradition and Turkmen Historiography  
 To a large extent, the content of Turkmen nationalist historiography—that is, in 
consideration of pre-Russian, “ancient” historical eras—is a continuation of Soviet 
national historiography. Turkmenistan’s current concern with the origins and glories 
of the Seljuk dynasty is something that was first considered during the early Soviet 
years. Today it has become part of the presidential parlance and an integral source for 
the creation of national heroes and myth, as well as a central feature of Ruhnama. 
Ruhnama and presidential issuances also are greatly concerned with the connection 
between Turkmens today and the older Turko-Persian dynasties from Middle Asia—
the Akgoyunlys and Garagoyunlys, and in particular the Safavids. These eras and 
personalities within them, then, also figure prominently in post-Soviet 
historiography—however, these were not so popularized during the Soviet period. 
Though they were discussed, it was at the level of elite academic specialization, and 
not in the purview of a typical student or citizen.123  
 Post-Soviet Turkmen historiography, which falls completely under the control 
of the presidential administration (the Academy of Sciences was closed in the mid-
1990s) takes topics of Soviet interest and embellishes them, pushing them to the 
forefront of the national consciousness, and skimming over disagreeable details. The 
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purpose is to root the Turkmen state in great antiquity and establish a line of 
continuity between great states and leaders of the past and today’s Turkmenistan and 
its leader, Niyazov. Ruhnama opens with a discussion of the age of the Turkmen state: 
“The Turkmen people whose history goes back 5000 years124 to the period of Oghuz 
Han, contributed to the universal values…. The Turkmen people has a great history 
which goes back to the Prophet Noah.”125 While the idea of the 5000-year history of 
the Turkmens might be the subject of controversy in Western historiography (the term 
“Turkmen” being found only as far back as the tenth century), Niyazov offers “proof” 
that the Turkmen nation is at least 5000 years old: “There was white wheat five 
thousand years ago... The same must be said of the Turkmen horse of Ahal Tekke, the 
Turkmen iti (dog), the carpet and other artefacts. From all this there arises the 
inevitable conclusion that these values are precisely the proof, clear to the naked eye, 
that the Turkmen nation is a nation with a history of five thousand years. So this is not 
a frivolous, vain, fabricated idea.”126 
“Turkmen” States in History 
 These inventions and great discoveries that Niyazov has claimed for the 
Turkmen nation are not generally taken (by other historians and historiographies) to 
be, in fact, so closely related to the contemporary Turkmen people. Niyazov’s 
attempts to capture these glorious histories for the Turkmen work for him because of 
the isolation of his people, and also the way in which he frames the concept of 
historical time—by pinning the origin of the Turkmen people thousands of years 
back, and acknowledging the relationships genealogically between Turkmens and 
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Anatolian Turks, and other Turkic groups throughout Central Asia and the Middle 
East, he lends a greater level of credence to his claims. By attaching the origin of the 
Turkmen state to the same progenitor claimed by, for example, Turks and Uzbeks, 
Niyazov is able to usurp the nationalist historiographies of these nations and to call 
them his own.  
A central piece of Niyazov’s program of nationalist historiography is the 
description of states formed in the Middle Ages that were founded by ancestors of 
today’s Turkmen. By presenting these historical states, Niyazov is providing a basis 
for a revival-- without historical greatness, the Turkmen nation today would truly be 
an invented nation. While Ruhnama’s history is not entirely fabricated, it exaggerates 
and picks over historical record to better fit the nationalist program. While in the 
modern times, the Turkmen tribes had no particular overall political cohesion, they 
did historically have genealogical connections to the founders of the Seljuk Empire 
and arguably also the Ottoman Empire before they split off from the sedenterised 
groups.127 By the 16th century, however, the tribes that we call Turkmen today had 
been partially subjugated by Khiva and Bukhara as well as the Persians. 
Before finally settling in the territory of today’s Turkmenistan, the regime 
argues, the Turkmen nation founded more than seventy great states, principalities and 
sultanates across the globe.128 While the regime for the most part adheres to a 
conventional version of history, tracing the lineage of today’s Turkmen back to the 
confederation of Oghuz Turks, the regime’s adaptation introduces the idea of a 
Turkmen nation into the historical arena, a concept that certainly cannot be said to 
have existed at the time. Niyazov not only refers to all of these past states as creations 
of the Turkmen nation, but he attaches the word “Turkmen” to almost any historical 
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figure, state, or territory-- creating the appearance almost of a textbook taken from 
another country and revised (simply by adding the word “Turkmen” in front of 
everything). Additionally, there are many instances of factual error in Ruhnama’s 
historical narrative.129 While many of the states that Niyazov claims are historically 
Turkmen do indeed have shared ancestry with today’s Turkmens, the role of the 
Turkmen people in the creation or governance of some of these states may not have 
been as extensive as suggested by the regime.  
The Seljuks and the Turkic Origin of the Turkmen 
 The regime’s historiography links contemporary Turkmen with Oghuz tribes, 
and especially highlights the Seljuk dynasty and its achievements as the epitome of 
Oghuz Turkmen state building. Akbarzadeh writes, “‘Uncovering’ Seljuk traditions 
and legacies that are thought to be the legitimate inheritance of the present Turkmen 
nation-state is officially sanctioned by President Niyazov. In his 1992 speech, 
Niyazov gave his state a thousand-year history by defining the present Turkmen state 
as a ‘Seljuk state.’ The Seljuk period has become the most favoured area of historical 
research by the state, due to its obvious political utility and potential for nation 
building.”130  
 In the post-Soviet period, not only do the Seljuks feature in presidential 
speeches and writings, but statues and memorials to heroes of the Seljuk period dot 
Ashgabat’s parks, a month has been named for the Seljuk leader Alp Arslan, and the 
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Seljuk symbol of the two-headed eagle has been modified to inspire the five-headed 
eagle of the Presidential flag. The regime employs heroes from the Seljuk period to 
demonstrate the national character of the Turkmen people. Heroes such as the sultans 
Togrul and Chagri Beg, Malik Shah and Alp Arslan are glorified, and Merv (the seat 
of Sultan Sanjar, relative of Alp Arslan) is held up as an example of a Turkmen 
territory playing host to a very significant historical empire—here again, national and 
territorial elements are fused.  
 While the Seljuks do have historical connections to today’s Turkmen as well as 
to the territory of contemporary Turkmenistan, the regime’s version of Seljuk history 
does not accurately reflect the connections between modern Turkmen and Seljuks, nor 
does it present the dynamics within the historical Seljuk Empire factually—by 
presenting the Seljuks not only as indisputably Turkmen through-and-through, and 
also as internally peaceful and virtually indestructible, the regime uses the Seljuk 
period as a “Golden Age”. The Seljuk period is used to advance claims of Turkmen 
national unity and cooperation, although all historical records point to flaws in this 
representation of the Seljuks. The earliest source of historiography on the Seljuks is 
the anonymous Maliknama, which was probably written for one of the young Seljuk 
princes, Alp Arslan, shortly after the death of his father in 1059—it dates, therefore, 
from the generation of the events which it describes. Other sources, together with this, 
produce a critical account of the Seljuk dynasty, although some elements of the Seljuk 
experience remain historical speculation.131  
The Seljuks, a section of the Oghuz tribal union, descended from the Oghuz 
tribe Qiniq. They seem to have been little more than one family of this tribe, although 
they gradually attracted many followers. Seljuk (the founder of the dynasty) was the 
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son of Dukuk, who was, according to legend, a Khazar army trooper who attracted the 
notice of the Khazar khan—Seljuk was raised under the khan’s powerful protection, 
but in adulthood left to rejoin his kinsmen on the steppes. He and his followers 
migrated southward to the northern border of Transoxiana, where they came into 
contact with the Arab-Persian influence, gave up their shamanist beliefs and adopted 
Islam.132  
After the fall of the Samanids, the Seljuks moved southward again, to the area 
of Bukhara and Samarkand in Transoxiana’s core. This brought them into the storm 
centre of the struggle between the Ghaznavids and the Karakhanids for eastern Iran. 
They eventually accepted the power of Mahmud of Ghazna, in a thinly veiled attempt 
to overthrow him, but then he died, and in 1040 the Seljuks defeated the Ghaznavids 
in an historic battle at Dandarkan near Merv. By the time the emperor Togrul died, the 
Seljuks stood at the Byzantine borders of Asia Minor.133 According to Saray, from 
this point the land around the Syr Darya (their original base) became much less 
important to them as they migrated. Only after 1065 did the Seljuk sultan Alp Arslan 
re-appear in that territory.134  
While the Seljuks indisputably had great power and many military 
achievements, their relationship to the Turkmen tribes and nomads who were their 
vassals is more debatable. Niyazov’s regime presents the Seljuk rulers as Turkmen 
and their followers as Turkmen nomads, and presents the relationship as a very 
cooperative one, based on kinship and respect. This may not have been the case 
historically. Were the Seljuk elite still leaders of nomadic Turkmen, or were they now 
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rulers and protectors of the civilizations they had conquered? What was the nature of 
the relationship between the Seljuks and the Turkmen nomads? 
Shaw writes of “conflicts between the Seljuk rulers and their nomadic 
commanders and followers, who were dissatisfied with the restrictions imposed on 
them to save the settled populations of the area.”135 The Seljuk leader, as sultan, 
assumed most of the caliph’s authority to legislate and rule in matters concerning 
administrative, military, and secular questions not directly regulated in the Muslim 
law. As temporal rulers of the Islamic state the Seljuks took over, restored, and 
elaborated the traditional Persio-Islamic administrative apparatus developed in late 
Abbasid times, relying largely on Persian ministers who emphasized their own 
culture, reviving the Persian language and largely eliminating Arabic in government 
and culture alike, using Persians in most of the administrative positions of the empire, 
even those in areas inhabited mainly by Arabs.”136 In short, the Seljuks became 
separated from the Turkmens—and at times, quite hostile to them. 
Shaw suggests that one of the major questions for the Seljuk elite was “What 
was to be done with the Turkmen nomads who were driving out the settled 
populations of eastern Iran and Azerbaijan to the northwest and establishing their own 
pastoral economy?”137 As the Seljuks conquered territories throughout the Middle 
East, in present day Iran and Iraq, they were confronted with the problem of 
consolidating their rule and restoring order and prosperity in the Middle East while 
providing their nomadic vassals with the booty and grazing lands they demanded. As 
long as the nomads formed the main element of the Seljuk army, their demands for 
booty and fodder could not be entirely ignored. But controlling them was very 
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The Seljuk sultans instituted “a new regular salaried army of mamluk slaves 
brought from the highlands of the Caucasus and of prisoners taken in the conquests. 
Once the new army gave the Seljuks a sufficient military alternative to the Turkmens, 
they solved the remainder of their problem by using it to drive the Tukomans out of 
Iran and Iraq into the territories of their enemies.”138 Under the Seljuk Dynasty, Turks 
and Oghuz filled many different roles, and often did not make up the bulk of the 
region’s population. Bregel discusses the role of Turks as slaves (ghulums) under the 
Ghaznavid and Seljuks. They were brought to sedentary regions as individuals and 
could later marry locals.139 With the new army and bureaucracy organized and 
financed, Turkmens were pushed out of the settled areas of Iran and Iraq as rapidly as 
possible. Although the Seljuks hoped to push the Turkmen nomads against the 
Fatimids in Egypt, the Turkmen preferred to move north and west. The plateaus of 
Iran and Iraq running into the highlands of eastern Anatolia seem to have been far 
more convenient conduits to pastures than were the mountains of southwestern Iran 
and the deserts of Syria and Sinai. In addition, the Byzantine and Armenian states in 
Anatolia “appeared to be much weaker and offered the prospect of much more booty 
than did that of the Fatimids. The Seljuks opposed the Turkmen pushes into Anatolia 
and they made little effort to follow up the early Turkmen onslaughts with formal 
occupation. Eventually, however, the momentum of the Turkmens carried the Seljuks 
along.”140  
  The decline of the Seljuk Empire presents another example of historical record 
contradicting Turkmen regime historiography. Niyazov asserts that the Turkmen did 
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not bring down the Seljuk state, and that the state fell at the hands of the Mongols. He 
writes, “Through all this, the Seljuks did not war with their relatives, the 
Turkmens.”141 This does not seem to have been the case, and there are many histories 
of the Seljuks which portray the relationship between the Seljuk elite and the 
Turkmen nomads as the factor that brought down the Seljuks. WP and Zelda Coates 
write, “the final blow against them was dealt by the nomad Turkmenians who were 
subject to the Seljuks.”142 
The Seljuks finally ended their wanderings in Persia. After the deaths of 
important leaders in 1092, anarchy and dissolution loomed. Sultan Sanjar, the 
Seljuks’ leader, came into some conflict with the Turkmen population of Balkh. 
Unable to repulse them from the territory, he allows them to settle there binds them to 
good behaviour and collects a large annual tax from them. In 1153, the Turkmen 
nomads broke out in rebellion, and in response to the taxation, murdered the tax agent 
and chased away a punitive expedition. Sanjar, in response, took the field against the 
Turkmen himself, and there was a catastrophic outcome--- the nomads routed his 
force, seized Sanjar himself and dashed for his headquarters at Merv. At the sight of 
Merv’s luxurious palaces and dwellings, the Turkmen looted the city, torturing the 
citizens and robbing them of all their possessions, and also captured Sanjar, 
imprisoning him for four years (at which point he escaped and died). The Turkmen 
then marched further into Iran.143  
Bosworth writes, “Even after the Seljuk Sultans had become rulers of a mighty 
empire in the Middle East, they never succeeded in exacting full obedience from their 
own Turkmen followers, and the debacle of Sanjar and the Ghuzz in Khurasan 
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signalized the final failure of the Seljuq family to secure recognition amongst their 
people for their supreme authority.”144 Niyazov contends, however, “The Seljuk 
Sultanate fell in Sultan Sanjar’s period…. Sultan Sanjar refrained from warring with 
the Turkmens who were his relatives, though.”145 In the end, “this great state could 
not resist the invasion of Jengiz Han and collapsed.”146  
The Historical “Other” and National Forgetting: Accounts of Goktepe 
Nationalist historiography proceeds not only from the recasting and redefining 
of what a nation is, but also from the clear statement or indication of what it is not. By 
charting a historical course of independent and unified history for the Turkmen 
people, Niyazov’s regime is certainly making claims contrary to other 
historiographies of these people and this region. In his calls for national unity, 
Niyazov underscores the threats of tribalism and internal divisions, and presents all 
historical events as experiences of unified Turkmen tribes—for example, the fight 
against the Tsarist conquerors in the 19th century. Also notable is his denial of the 
period of Soviet rule and particularly the role of the Turkmen in the carrying out of 
the Soviet domination. These are examples of a trend that we may call “historical 
amnesia,” or a national forgetting.147 Contemporary Turkmen historiography notably 
glosses over the period from 1882 until 1991, with the exception of World War II.148 
Prominent in the new history is the reinterpretation of the Russian conquest of 
Turkmenistan, which was undertaken largely after the 1881 battle at the fortress of 
Goktepe, east of Ashgabat.  
The Soviet perspective on Goktepe changed along with its perspective on the 
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nature of the Russian conquest that, as I have mentioned, underwent several revisions 
in the Soviet period. By the 1980s, however, the union of the Central Asian 
populations with Russia was taken to have been a progressive and positive step 
towards socialism. Many Soviet-era histories of Turkmenistan failed entirely to 
mention the battle at Goktepe—one textbook, for example, only records, “In the 
1880s Turkmenia became part of the Russian Empire. The unification of Turkmenia 
with Russia had great progressive consequences for the Turkmen people. Imperialist 
states, eager to lay their hands on Turkmen oil, were prevented from turning the 
country into a colony of theirs. It also put an end to the destructive raids of foreign 
invaders and to internecine wars. It abolished slavery and slave trading and 
economically linked this feudal country to the advanced capitalist economy of Russia. 
The building of towns, workshops, factories and railways gave birth to the working 
class of Turkmenia, which established close ties with the Russian workers. The most 
important aspect of unification was that it brought the Turkmen people into the 
mainstream of Russia’s economic, political and cultural life. The Turkmen people 
were drawn into the revolutionary struggle which the Russian working class was 
waging against tsarist autocracy.”149 A 1950s-era history recounts: “The Turkmen’s 
life companions were want, uncertainty in what the morrow would bring, the eternal 
spectre of a dearth of fodder for the livestock and death from starvation for the family, 
and the expectation of ill-treatment at the hands of the rich and the nobility. 
Turkmenia’s unification with Russia was a progressive, historic step which influenced 
the further destiny of the Turkmen people.”150 In a fourth grade Soviet textbook for 
students in Turkmenistan published in the late 1980s, again no mention is made of 
Goktepe of any forcible struggle in the Russian conquest of Turkmen territory. 
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 The January 1881 clash at Goktepe had roots in an encounter at the same 
fortress two years earlier, in 1879. Charged with leading a Russian detachment against 
the Ahal Tekke Turkmen, General Lomakin marched on Goktepe in September 1879. 
The entire population of the Ahal Tekke had taken refuge in the hillside fortress of 
Denghil-Tepe in the area of the settlement Goktepe, about 20,000 in all including 
women and children. Lomakin led his 3,500 troops in a bombardment of the fortress, 
which wrought huge losses on the Turkmen, however, after the taking of the outer 
defence works he ordered an infantry advance. This ground assault provided the 
Turkmen fighters (armed only with hand weapons) with their only opportunity to 
inflict casualties and because of their numbers, they prevailed, and Russians lost over 
3,000 men, their largest loss of life to that time in Central Asia. Eventually, the 
Russians retreated and Lomakin was relieved of his command. 
 Embarrassed by defeat, the Russian government planned a new expedition; in 
May 1880 preparations were given to General Skobelev, just back from a glorious 
role in the Russo-Turkish war. Numbering 7,100, the Russians reached the Ahal 
Tekke oasis in late November 1880, and the Turkmens once again clustered their 
entire population in the fortress of Denghil-Tepe. Skobelev’s troops surrounded the 
fortress and began the siege. 
 The Turkmen were poorly armed in comparison with the well-prepared 
Russian troops; of the approximately 20,000 defenders, only 8,000 were armed with 
firearms and the others had only pikes and swords. As before, their only hope lay in 
hand-to-hand combat, but Skobelev was careful not to repeat Lomakin’s mistake. The 
Russians tunnelled into the fortress’ walls and placed mines. On 12 January 1881, 
after preparations were complete, the Russians breached a section of the wall, set off 
the mines and stormed the fortress. The blast reportedly demoralized the defenders, 




many of whom fled from the advancing Russian troops. At Skobelev’s orders, the 
Russians pursued them for up to eleven miles, killing them to the last including 
women and children. Reportedly, 8,000 were killed in this way. Inside the fortress, 
6,500 corpses were found and thousands of survivors, mostly women and children.151 
The Russians reportedly killed all of the surviving Turkmen males, sparing about 
5,000 women and children, and freeing 600 Persian slaves (identified later by the 
fetters on their legs). “Skobelev’s political deliberation was that enduring peace could 
only be established if the Tekke was hit as hard as possible and as long as complete 
submission was reached.”152 During the fighting, the Russians lost 59 and had 254 
wounded, though they lost hundreds more to illness over the next months.  
The battle by all accounts broke the Turkmen resistance and decided the fate 
of Transcaspia. The fall of Goktepe was a  
traumatic experience for Tekke tribesmen, which also 
influenced the relations of other tribal confederacies to tsarist 
rule. Due to their military inferiority, Turkmen survival 
became possible only through submission to tsarist authority. 
Turkmen who escaped from Goktepe and who worried about 
the fate of the women and children left behind had no other 
choice than to accept Skobelev’s call to return and to submit to 
tsarist authority. This was not an easy decision. Makhtum Kuli 
Khan expressed this deep Turkmen aversion to authority after 
he had involuntarily offered his submission in September 
1882: ‘I am driven to offer my submission to the Russian 
government in spite of every desire to the contrary on my part. 
I find no other course open to me.’ It has been noted that 
Turkmen tribesmen became relatively obedient to Russian 
authority.153  
 
The Turkmen, wholly beaten, were forced to submit, and Arminius Vambery, the 
Hungarian recorder of Central Asian affairs, wrote of the defeat of the Tekke 
Turkmen: “The returning Akhal-Tekke Turkmens presented the most pitiful aspect of 
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dreary desolation and bewilderment; the greater portion of their property was lost and 
scattered; more than half their cattle had perished in the desert. The haggard-looking 
and terror-stricken nomads, happy to save the last resources of existence, were 
certainly the best material out of which the first nucleus of Russian peaceful subjects 
in the desert could be formed.”154 In the slaughter at Goktepe, according to Vambery, 
“Russia had almost entirely broken the strength and power of the hitherto mostly 
dreaded nomads of Central Asia.”155 On 18 January 1881, a force led by Colonel A.N. 
Kuropatkin occupied Ashgabat and then Kaakhka and other settlements. From that 
point, Russian hold was firm in the region and on 6 May 1881, Transcaspia was 
declared an oblast. After the fall of Goktepe, leaders of the Turkmen tribes turned in 
vain to the British for protection against Russia, but their requests were met with 
silence. In January 1884, the Tekkes in Merv submitted voluntarily to Russian rule.156 
Finally, in 1885 the Tejen oasis—which had been under Afghan rule for a short 
period of time—was also annexed by Russia, marking the completed conquest of the 
Turkmen territories. 
 One of the most important facets of the historical record is the question of 
Turkmen tribal unity at the time of the Russian conquest. Soviet historians portrayed 
the Turkmen at the time of the Goktepe battles as self-destructive and stricken by civil 
war and internecine strife, whereas Niyazov presents the battle as one of the unified 
Turkmen nation against the vicious and unwelcome colonizers. The reality seems to 
have existed in the space between these two accounts. 
 The major tribal division at that time was the rivalry between the Tekke 
Turkmen and the Yomuts. During the 19th century there was a little progress in 
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unifying the Turkmen tribes when Nur Verdi Khan, a leader of the Tekke tribe, 
managed to unite the Tekke with the Saryk and Salor tribes against the Persians—
Saryk and Salor were tribes that had been hostile to the Tekke since the Tekke 
migration to the Merv area, which pushed the Saryks and Salors south. This union 
allowed the Turkmen to score victories in the 1850s and 1860s against the Persians 
and Khivans, and to enjoy something of a free life, establishing friendly relations with 
certain neighbouring countries for the first time. However, the division remained with 
the Yomuts, a rivalry that was exploited by the Russians in their conquest and which 
worked against the Turkmen. The Yomuts had failed to join the union between the 
Turkmen tribes and were continually pressured by the Persians due to their hostility to 
the other Turkmens and also their internal divisions. Eventually, after years of fierce 
warring, the Yomuts accepted Persian control in the 1860s for several years. 
 When the Russians first occupied parts of Turkmen territory and established a 
base on the Caspian at Krasnovodsk, the reaction of the Turkmen tribes was not 
uniform. The Tekke Turkmen were opposed to the settlement and quite hostile to the 
Russians—although they lived inland, the Tekke opposed any Russian advancement 
towards their territory. However, the Yomut Turkmens, who continued to feud with 
the Tekkes, Salors, and Saryks, were divided internally as to their response to the 
Russian advances. The Jafarbai branch of the Yomuts, who were primarily engaged in 
fishing around the Caspian, had no objection to the Russian settlement, hoping that it 
would increase their trade. The Atabai Yomuts, mostly a nomadic group, were 
opposed to the Russian occupation, but were unable to put up any real resistance 
because their tribal elders had been bribed by the Russians with money and gifts, and 
persuaded by Russian propaganda, which assured the elders that there was no 
intention of permanent Russian settlement, but that the move was only intended to 




promote trade.157 In the 1880s, the Yomut elders issued the following statement 
recounting their persuasion by the Russians:  
Some ten years ago, the Russians landed a force at 
Krasnovodsk. They told the Turkmens that they came as 
preceders; that their object was to build a road to Herat and 
Afghanistan in order to promote their trade; that if the Yomuts 
would assist them, they would be amply rewarded and that 
everything that was taken in the way of food and camels 
should be well and punctually paid for; and that the inhabitants 
of the country which they passed through would remain calmly 
independent, and no interference whatever should take place in 
their affairs. The Yomuts soon discovered that they had been 
deceived. The object of the Russians became plain. Their 
design was to compel not only the Yomuts, but all the other 
tribes to submit to their rule. The Yomuts found this out when 
it was too late to offer any resistance.158  
 
Eventually, the Atabai Yomuts approached the Tekke tribal leader Nur Verdi Khan to 
aid them in attacks against the Russian camps in the 1870s. 
In the late 1870s, as the Russians prepared to force the Turkmen tribes into 
final surrender, General Lomakin attempted to exploit the old hostility between the 
Tekke and the Yomut Turkmen in order to more quickly conquer the tribes. In 
February 1877, Lomakin asked the Yomuts for assistance and provisions for the 
Russian tribes marching against the Tekke areas. After the Russians’ first attack upon 
Goktepe in 1879 (when they were pushed back by the Turkmen, who nonetheless 
sustained harsh losses), Nur Verdi Khan again managed to bring some of the tribes 
together to strategize for the defence of Goktepe in the event of another strike by the 
Russians. Two Yomuts—Musa Khan and Mulla Dungdor—were discovered to be 
guides to the Russian forces and were turned in by supporters of Nur Verdi Khan.159 
Even the previously disagreeable Jafarbai branch of the Yomuts agreed to place some 
fighting men under his command. In a turn of events very unfortunate for the 
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Turkmen, however, in May of 1880 before the final Russian siege, Nur Verdi Khan—
the unifier of the Turkmen tribes who had for the first time established some type of 
authority among them, though short-lived, died of illness, “leaving his country and 
people at a most critical time in their history. His death was no less disastrous for the 
Turkmens than the Russian bombardment.”160 After the death of Nur Verdi Khan, 
Russian General Skobelev decided to restore relations with the Yomuts and to obtain 
their assistance no matter what the cost. He invited Koshlu Khan of the Atabai 
Yomuts, and Irali Khan of the Jafarbai Yomuts, to his headquarters in Chikishlar, 
where he persuaded them through bribery and promises to assist him with 
transportation of his troops.161 After general discussions to consider the offer, some of 
the Yomuts decided to meet the Russian demands, and others who refused to 
cooperate emigrated to the Persian side of the Atrek. In this way, tribal rivalry was 
exploited by Skobelev and quickened the conquest of the Tekke stronghold. The fact 
that the Yomut Turkmen did not come to the aid of the Tekke defenders of Goktepe 
remains a point of hostility between members of the Yomut and Tekke tribes even 
today. 
Turkmen historical revision in the post-Soviet period has reinterpreted the 
conquest and the battle of Goktepe. In schools, Turkmen history books teach students 
that the battle was a terrible slaughter of all the Turkmen tribes by the Russians. The 
tribes are often said to have banded together during the battle; other times the 
tribalism of the Turkmen is acknowledged, but said to have been the factor that 
brought down the fortress. In this way, the history of Goktepe contributes to the new 
doctrine of national unity. Citizens of Turkmenistan, however, continue to remember 
this battle as a point of tribal division—because certain tribes did not come to the 
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assistance of the Tekke, they are viewed as traitorous or as cowardly and are not to be 
trusted—divisions from the 1880s in this way colour tribal relations to the present 
day.162 This follows from Niyazov’s assertion that “The idea of tribe is temporary; it 
constitutes a lower stage in the progress towards national integrity… Debates on 
tribes should be a thing of the past; each Turkmen should make an effort not to turn to 
tribal debates.”163 
One of the most interesting examples of historical revisionism in the context 
of Turkmen national holidays is the creation by Niyazov of Memorial Day (January 
12) to commemorate the massacre of 1881 committed by Russian troops at the battle 
of Goktepe. Aside from underscoring the importance of the battle to the modern 
historiography, this holiday demonstrates the extent to which the cult of personality 
dominates official ritual and official holidays. Messages are delivered to the President 
from all sectors of society on the occasion of Memorial Day, and pilgrimages are 
made by Niyazov and religious leaders to the site of the battle, today a large memorial 
mosque. In 2000, for example, Turkmen clergymen pledged devotion to the President 
on the holiday, stating: “Our Esteemed Leader! You are our only protector chosen by 
God the almighty for the prosperity of the Turkmen people. You are a supreme source 
of pride for our courageous people because their lofty dreams and hopes are linked 
with you. Your genuine wisdom and generosity, your pure soul and your courage 
have brought to the courageous Turkmen people the great independence…. On the 
day of 12th January, Memorial Day, one of the sacred dates for all Turkmens, all of us 
pledge to do our best and will not even spare our life for the sake of fulfilling the 
superior tasks you put before us.”164  
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 A large mosque was constructed on the site of the Goktepe fortress in 1995, 
representing not only a holy type of respect for the lost lives, but also the 
independence of the people of Turkmenistan and a return to Islam, the religion loosely 
followed by the people in the pre-Soviet era. Niyazov uses Goktepe’s new mosque—
Haji Saparmurat Turkmenbashy-- as a symbol for his regime. It is often portrayed in 
photographs, in the media and on souvenirs of the country. In these ways, Goktepe 
represents both the regime’s construction of a historical “other”—the fact of Russian 
colonialism and Soviet rule-- and the denial of tribalism as it existed then and as it 
continues to play a role in Turkmen society. 
Conclusion 
 
 The construction of a new national narrative in the post-Soviet period has been 
one of the most dominant elements of Niyazov’s campaign for legitimation. While the 
revision of the national history operates generally within Soviet-era parameters, the 
content and reasons for this revision are different and show hallmarks of sultanism. 
The nationalist historiography, a large part of the pseudo-ideology Ruhnama, is 
designed to promote nationalism and unity, to place Niyazov squarely at the centre of 
national affairs and at the zenith of historical Turkmen state building, and to boast a 
role for Turkmenistan in world history that has not been expressed in other sources. 
Chehabi and Linz write, “The sultanist ideology often exalts the nation’s ancient 
glories and draws on an ‘invented tradition’ to demarcate the nation from its 
neighbours.”165 Niyazov’s historiography is strikingly similar to the revisions of 
national history in other countries, but the personal aspect of the historical revision is 
particularly shared by other countries with sultanistic regimes, such as Malawi under 
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Dr. Hastings Banda.  
 National narratives are not only written, however. They can be projected into 
the very image of the country itself through the use of architecture and public space. 
Ancient glories can be revisited through the use of historical symbols and by 
monuments to leaders of the past, both mythical and historical. This is certainly true 
of Turkmenistan, where the capital city Ashgabat has undergone a major facelift in 
the post-Soviet period, becoming an outward projection of some of the elements of 
the regime’s legitimation program. The next chapter will consider Niyazov’s use of 
the physical environment as a mode for expressions of his power and his version of 
the history and culture of the Turkmen people. 
 
 







SULTANISM AND PUBLIC SPACE 





Niyazov’s more recent architectural endeavours have made international 
news—parodied in the West as among the most comical of urban planners, Niyazov 
has received particular attention for his planned desert ice palace, his Turkmen fairy 
tale heroes theme park in Ashgabat, and for Turkmenbashy Lake, a lake in the middle 
of the desert that is costing billions of dollars and will divert water from Uzbekistan. 
Despite the perceived ridiculousness, there is a deliberate strategy of the regime—to 
manipulate public space and urban design in order to buttress Niyazov’s rule and to 
secure an image of permanence, monumentality and national unity. Over the past 
decade, Niyazov has undertaken an almost complete facelift of Ashgabat, 
transforming it from a mid-sized, typically Soviet town to a world-class example of 
monumental architecture. This rapid urban development marks one of the most visible 
post-Soviet changes for Turkmenistan and the new Ashgabat has become a symbol, to 
the Turkmen people, of the new leadership and the post-Soviet era.  
Architecture as a Political Vehicle 
 Architecture has long been a vehicle for rulers attempting to express their 
power and to secure and embed their rule through symbols and ritual. Many new 
rulers undertake to build or to rebuild public spaces, cultural and government 
buildings. Architecture is one important way in which rulers engineer so-called 
“invented traditions”—national architecture becomes closely associated with 
institutional rituals, and together these play a large role in the creation of traditions 
and national popular symbols. Anthony King writes, “I would maintain that the built 
environment is more than a mere representation of social order (i.e. a reflector), or 
simply a mere environment in which social action takes place. Rather, physical and 




spatial urban form actually constitute as well as represent much of social and cultural 
existence: society is to a very large extent constituted through the buildings and 
spaces that it creates.”1 Crawford Young writes, “States tackle the task of 
transforming their mundane reality into symbolic splendour with remarkable 
ingenuity. In the monumental architecture of their capital cities, states affix the 
signature of power.”2  
Political regimes can make especially powerful symbolic use of the physical 
environment, buildings, and urban design. Vale writes, “Throughout history and 
across the globe, architecture and urban design have been manipulated in the service 
of politics.”3 The use of architecture and public space, writes Andrew March, 
“conveys numerous substantial messages about the nature of the political community, 
and this in itself is a significant act of legitimation, but it also conveys a more basic 
message about the power, stability and permanence of the state and ruler as such. 
Symbols are meant to awe and inhibit as much as they are meant to identify: The 
statement of the fact of state power clearly serves as a normative act of legitimation.”4 
Particularly for sultanistic rulers, architectural symbolism is a significant way to 
legitimate their rule by imposing their presence into everyday popular imagination. 
As Clifford Geertz writes, “At the political centre of any complexly organized 
society... there is both a governing elite and a set of symbolic forms expressing the 
fact that it is in truth governing.”5 Architecture and the design of cities can be 
important vehicles for the procurement of regime legitimacy. Sultanistic regimes such 
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as Niyazov’s manipulate urban design and architecture to embed their pseudo-
ideologies, promote themselves, and to gain international recognition.  
Much has been written on the questions of architectural meaning, from urban 
and public spaces to the design of specific buildings, public and private. The work 
spans a variety of disciplines, from psychology and environmental studies, to 
architecture, art, and history. While certain studies have dealt with very specific 
questions of architectural-political meaning—Paul Goodman’s 1952 essay on 
legislative seating or John Hazard’s 1962 work on courtroom design and symbolism, 
for example—more general ideas can be taken from across the fields. Foucault has 
inspired a range of studies of prisons and structures of governance, and the use of 
architecture to achieve social control. Structuralism, in its various forms, is one theory 
that has been adopted in studies of political architecture, particularly when scholars 
deal with questions of symbolism in shapes or colours in building design. Charles 
Goodsell writes, “In recent years, several writers on architecture have been attracted 
to semiotic theory. A building or city is considered a ‘text,’ which can be ‘read’ 
through application of appropriate deciphering codes. ”6 Ideas about iconography are 
adopted from art history, and ceremonial ritual and symbolism from sociology. 
More useful for this thesis are studies specifically concerned with the interplay 
between politics and architecture. Goodsell notes that examination of public rites and 
political ceremonies as a means of studying political history is a relatively new 
movement in historiography,7 and that “Historians of this school seek to analyse the 
rhetoric of these rites so as to uncover the ‘master fictions’ that uphold particular 
political orders. A more traditional viewpoint would dismiss these ceremonies as 
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constituting the mere clothing of power. But Sean Wilentz asks, ‘Could it be... that if 
people find some sort of meaning in the symbols of power, the clothing, then these 
mystifications might truly represent the deeper human reality that they are supposed 
to mask?”8 Christel Lane’s book from the 1970s on the rituals and holidays of the 
Soviet Union as political symbolism is a work that speaks well to the study of post-
Soviet symbolism from a sociological point of view. 
Murray Edelman is the premier theorist of symbolism and politics in political 
science, and he has discussed political stage setting in general terms. “The physical 
characteristics of political stages, he says, invariably include massiveness, ornateness, 
and formality. The degree to which the physical setting is emphasized in political 
performances depends on (1) the importance of impressing large audiences, (2) the 
need for legitimizing acts and for securing compliance, and (3) the need to establish 
or reinforce an official’s definition of self. Clearly, all three requirements are 
frequently critical in modern political life.”9 In the book The Signature of Power, 
Harold D. Lasswell considers how buildings as a whole, in addition to being features 
of urban design, express political values. The height of buildings in a city’s skyline, 
for example, might reflect the power of different economic or political sectors in 
society.10 The “degree to which governmental authority wishes to share power with 
outsiders is expressed in the extent that it operates in closed, versus open, spaces.”11 
In this view, despotic regimes favour greater exclusion. “Other writers on politics and 
architecture stress how structures that governments build express the values and 
ideology of the prevailing political regime. These authors refer principally to 
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facades.... David Milne contends that public buildings enshrine each civilization’s 
code of law and order and thus perform a conservative, stabilizing function for the 
society.”12 “‘The political demand,’ states Milne, ‘is that architecture shall make 
edifices befitting the importance and power of these institutions, that it shall make 
these institutions appear mighty and durable, and that it shall, in its symbolism and 
expressive form, state dramatically something of these institutions’ idea of the 
world.’”13 Flavio Conti has written on “shrines of power,” and Helio Pinon contends 
that “the geometry, the proportions, and the hierarchical organization of interior space 
are capable of inferring a divine order, which in turn legitimizes systems of corrupt 
authority and social control.”14 Lawrence Vale’s book Architecture, Power, and 
National Identity explores elements of urban design and capitol complex construction 
in several post-colonial capitals, discussing the ways in which regimes of newly 
independent countries use architecture to consolidate new ideologies and promote 
national identity. 
Architecture can be a very symbolic art form, and a particularly politically-
charged one, especially the architecture of buildings within a capital city or of 
buildings with political functions. Our task is to select which buildings were 
constructed with primarily political purposes, and to interpret the ways in which the 
architecture is meant to convey meaning to the public audience. Nelson Goodman, in 
his essay “How Buildings Mean,” undertakes to “consider how such works may 
mean, how we determine what they mean, how they work, and why it matters.”15 
Buildings, Goodman points out, have been said to do many things—to “allude, 
express, evoke, invoke, comment, quote; [buildings can be] syntactical, literal, 
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metaphorical, dialectical; that are ambiguous or even contradictory!”16 Buildings can 
have meanings closely connected with their particularly architectural elements or 
design, or meanings that are created quite separately, through historical meanings 
associated with the site, or for its designated use. While any mausoleum can 
symbolize death, and any expensive courthouse might represent government 
extravagance, these meanings are separate from architectural meaning—as Goodman 
writes, “To mean in such a way is not thereby to function as an architectural work.”17 
Meaning, or representation, does however occur “in salient ways in some architectural 
works.”18 Buildings can alter environments very visibly—as a work of art, a building 
“may through various avenues of meaning, inform and reorganize our entire 
experience. Like other works of art—and like scientific theories, too—it can give new 
insight, advance understanding, participate in our continual remaking of a world.”19  
 Architecture, particularly in capital cities or areas with political significance 
and function, can be used either to reflect or to help create the trappings of 
charismatic leadership. The architecture and design of certain cities can be closely 
intertwined with the images of political leaders, and many cities come to be 
associated quite closely with a regime or one leader in particular. Cities designed by 
leaders can become lasting representations of those men—can turn men into legends. 
This is particularly true of capital cities and capitol building complexes, where the 
identification between a particular leader and a building or structure is often very 
close. Using visual symbols and public space—and architecture as a demonstration of 
political power—are ways of “collapsing time and identifying the ruler himself with 
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the transcendental icon.”20  
Colonialism and post-colonialism are fascinating eras in which to explore the 
political significance of architecture. European colonial powers very often used urban 
design and construction to control and manipulate native populations, their 
economies, and their political lives (e.g. British Cairo, the French throughout 
Morocco). Leaders of postcolonial and newly independent countries have, 
historically, used architecture and urban design, particularly the design of capital 
cities, to represent national unity, national independence, and to symbolize the 
legitimacy of their rule. Elleh writes, “There are several methods of cleansing the 
collective memories of communities. Architecture is one of the most powerful 
methods by virtue of its visibility, stability, multiple functions, history, and of course, 
visual representations.”21 Vale writes,  
The perceived need to make architecture and urban design 
serve politics is most salient in those countries where the 
form of politics is new and the forms of architecture are old, 
though the phenomenon has a long and global pedigree. In 
the emerging post-colonial world of the middle and late 
twentieth century, the leadership of newly independent states 
has frequently attempted to use architecture not only to house 
a new form of government but also to proclaim the 
worthiness of the new regime and advance its status.22  
 
Particularly in post-colonial settings, constructing new buildings and cities can help 
with embedding a new nationalism. Building a new national identity can involve 
removing reminders of old regimes (either by moving the capitol, capital, or by 
rebuilding or redecorating it), as well as constructing new symbols and 
representations of the new regime and new national identity.  
Sultanistic regimes can have a field day with architecture as a tool for 
                                       
20 March, “Use and Abuse of History,” 377 
21 N. Elleh, Architecture and Power in Africa (Westport and London: Praeger Publishers, 2002), p. 162 
22 Vale, 10 




embedding their rule, deepening their pseudo-ideologies and attempting to construct 
an air of charisma to surround the leader. The absence of independent economic or 
political power holders means that the state has complete control over new 
construction if it chooses to exercise that authority. This chapter concerns several 
elements of architecture and urban design: pseudo-ideology (how architecture reflects 
nationalist programs of sultanistic leaders), created charisma (pictorial and 
architectural representations of the personality cult), as well as international image 
and monumental architecture. How does Niyazov use architecture and capital design 
to buttress his pseudo-ideology and legitimate his rule?  
 This chapter will explore postcolonial capital city architecture as a 
phenomenon and its implications for constructing a new national identity and 
legitimating postcolonial regimes. It will review typologies of European colonial 
cities, and the theories behind the Soviet city-- Soviet urban design will be considered 
as a starting point for a discussion of contemporary Ashgabat, one of the most unusual 
capitals in the post-Soviet space. Through a discussion of Niyazov’s changes in the 
construction and design of Ashgabat, this chapter will demonstrate the ways in which 
Niyazov uses architecture—from mosques and hotels to monuments to parliament 
buildings—to legitimate his rule, promote his variant of Turkmen national identity, 
and promote an external image of grandeur.  
Capitalizing on Capitals  
 The capital city is a natural starting-point for architectural or urban re-design 
by a new regime, particularly in a postcolonial setting. A capital symbolizes power in 
more ways than one—it is the city whose skyline becomes the international image of 
a nation, the city in which government buildings are placed and the country’s political 




and economic leaders tend to reside, and it is often strategically located in naturally 
significant zones—areas with access to major ports or that are well-connected to allies 
and isolated from enemies. A capital is very often the wealthiest of a country’s 
regions. “Government buildings are... an attempt to build governments and to support 
specific regimes. More than mere homes for government leaders, they serve as 
symbols of the state. We can, therefore, learn much about a political regime by 
observing closely what it builds.”23 Vale writes, “From ancient citadel to modern 
capital, cities have focused on the place of rule. Increasingly, politicians have moved 
to claim the privileged urban heights reserved in an earlier age for the gods. Promoted 
as a means to advance national unity and consolidate national identity, these capital 
cities have more obviously served to demonstrate the power of their sponsoring 
regimes. They convey, through urban design, the desired image of political 
impregnability.”24 “A capital city, more than most other cities, is expected to be a 
symbolic centre. As such it is not so distant from the primal motivations that inspired 
the first cities... (as ceremonial pilgrimages points).”25 There are several ways in 
which the design of capitals, and particularly government buildings, can represent a 
regime’s effort at legitimation. Urban areas may denote a regime’s propaganda 
through explicit use of text and iconography, may “exemplify certain architectonic 
properties which invite or repel, may express through metaphor a regime’s desired 
association with some other kind of favoured environment, and may, through the 
process of mediated reference, encourage connection to certain broader concepts 
(such as democracy or nationalism) which may well stray far afield from strictly 
architectural units of meaning.”26  
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Both politicians and architects (often reflecting current, and sometimes 
culture-specific, architectural styles) leave their marks on design and construction. 
Vale suggests that every design solution is to some extent an idealization of the 
political realm. “To ask how a designer chooses certain spatial forms as appropriate to 
accompany a given political idea or preferred model of cultural pluralism raises an 
even more fundamental question: who decides which ideals are to be pursued?”27 One 
must analyse both ideals and their architectural depiction carefully. A capitol complex 
is always a kind of crude diagram of power relation, but there is no direct correlation 
between a particular diagram and a particular form of political organization.28 
Architects, and those awarded commissions for urban design, can leave their mark on 
the final product. In most situations, an authoritarian regime will maintain strong 
controls over what type of product is finally constructed, but the architect’s style 
makes a mark. The selection of architects and firms to construct these capitol 
complexes can reflect a ruler’s hope for the end product of the design.  
Architecture and Sultanism in Africa 
 African sultans have left behind many striking examples of capital city 
reconstruction and architectural symbolism that exemplify this type of political 
legitimation in cases of extreme personalism. From huge, expensive palaces, to 
basilicas and royal courts in the style of King Louis, African sultans have run the 
gamut in terms of architectural style. Across the board, however, their design 
decisions reflect their cults of leadership, their desire to create charisma, and their 
attempts to embed their pseudo-ideology in material ways to further legitimate 
themselves and give their regimes a more permanent dimension. 
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 One of the most fascinating examples from the sub-Saharan region, and one 
that is very salient as a comparison with Turkmenistan in terms of post-colonial 
religious architecture, comes from a regime that, while not always considered as 
sultanistic, certainly falls within the category of patrimonial personalism. This is the 
regime of Felix Houphouet-Boigny in the Ivory Coast. His decision to build a basilica 
in his home village of Yamoussoukro, inspired by St. Peter’s in the Vatican and 
intended to be the largest basilica in Africa, is an interesting parallel and predecessor 
to Niyazov’s decision in 2004 to build the largest mosque in Central Asia in his home 
village of Kipjak. In the book Architecture and Power in Africa, Elleh considers the 
“manner in which the object functions as a consolidator of the president’s image as 
‘great leader.’ Yamoussoukro [the city] and its edifice seem to have been planned as 
the centre from which images of the president would circulate and dominate the 
country’s offices, shopping plazas, civic centres, public parks, television, radio, and, 
most important, public opinion.”29 Portraits of the president adorn the entrances, and 
the construction of the basilica (and the invitation to the Pope to participate in its 
inauguration) seem to support the idea that the basilica was largely a public relations 
and personality cult-buttressing idea for the President himself and not a project for the 
country, as the majority of the citizens of Ivory Coast are not even Catholic.30 
 Yamoussoukro was officially declared the political capital of the Ivory Coast 
in 1983, although the former French colonial capital, Abidjan, is still the largest city 
and indisputable cultural, economic, and political centre for most of the country’s 
people. Elleh writes, “Like many newly created capital cities around the world, 
Yamoussoukro is an isolated place.”31 The transfer of the capital from Abidjan to 
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Yamoussoukro has very little to do with a development-driven narrative and much 
more to do with the biography of President Houphouet-Boigny. 
 Malawi also experienced a capital city relocation in the post-colonial period, 
from Zomba to Lilongwe. In the case of Malawi, as in the Ivory Coast, scholars argue 
that the move was made primarily for “personal prestige” of the leader rather than as a 
real attempt at equitable restructuring of Malawi’s economy.32 Deborah Potts argues 
that Banda’s stated desire to move the capital to Lilongwe (formulated during his time 
in jail prior to independence) was the driving factor behind the relocation. She writes, 
“His choice of Lilongwe as the new capital could be related to the regional planning 
needs of Malawi; but to assume that this was a primary objective for the move may be 
no more than post-hoc rationalization. As the initial stimulus for the project came 
from the president, his personal motives obviously cannot be ignored. To some extent 
his motives would parallel those of any government, in as much as he also had need 
of popular support and an effective location for his administration. But some 
individual motives can be suggested. Connell, for instance, has speculated on whether 
Lilongwe was chosen partly as the result of regional or ethnic loyalty, as it is located 
near Kasungu where Banda was born, and it is also near the core area of his ethnic 
group, the Chewa. However, Lilongwe must also be a source of personal gratification. 
The president associated himself directly with its establishment, and his key role in 
master-minding both the initial decision to move and the actual construction of much 
of the new part of the city has been emphasized. Banda’s almost unique decision-
making power within his own country makes viable the notion that Lilongwe began as 
more of a personal prestige symbol than as a rational element of an attempt to 
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restructure Malawi’s space economy more equitably.”33 One reason for the move to 
Lilongwe was, Schatz argues, to consolidate power against rival ethnic groups. 
Moving a capital city can help leaders to undermine rival patronage networks and to 
bolster their own. Capital relocation is “an act replete with symbolic import. New 
capitals are designed to highlight the state’s place in the international system.”34 
 Turkmenistan’s post-Soviet regime made no move to relocate the capital city; 
however, certain comparisons are very salient with the cases above regardless. The 
changes that have been made in post-Soviet Ashgabat are akin to constructing a new 
city—although the location remains the same, the nature of the city and its planning 
have changed significantly. 
Colonial Capitals and the Socialist City 
 Because this chapter concerns a modern capital of a newly independent nation, 
Turkmenistan, it serves to discuss briefly the roots of post-colonial capital cities in 
colonialism, in order to better understand the nature of recent changes. Colonial 
cities—that is, cities that are created or developed primarily to be the capitals of 
colonized countries by the imperial power—have historical significance mainly in 
that they have provided some of the major links (economic, political, and cultural) 
between cores and periphery during periods of imperialism, “articulating the flow of 
capital, people, commodities, and culture that flowed between them.”35 Spatial 
politics of modern colonial cities is a vast subject—each imperial power exhibited 
particular traits and a detailed depiction is beyond the scope of this paper. But, as 
Vale writes, “If we are to understand the politics and symbolism of the location of 
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capitals and capitols in postcolonial situations… some discussion of the colonial 
capital experience is undoubtedly necessary.”36 This section briefly outlines some of 
the typologies of colonial cities (used to depict cities under European colonial rule) 
and demonstrates the ways in which cities in Central Asia and specifically Ashgabat, 
exhibited many of these characteristics both after Russian conquest and also under the 
early years of Soviet rule.   
The major characteristics of cities in colonized countries, according to King, 
fall into seven categories that broadly refer to geopolitical, functional, 
political/economic, political, social/cultural, racial/ethnic, and physical/spatial 
features of the city. King concludes that some unique features of the colonial city are 
(1) that power is principally in the hands of a non-indigenous minority; and the rights 
of the colonized are restricted; (2) the minority is superior militarily, technologically, 
and economically, and as a result, in social organization; and (3) the colonized 
majority are racially (or ethnically), culturally, and religiously different from the 
colonists.37 These characteristics are all applicable to Turkmenistan’s capital city, 
Ashgabat, which was founded as a military outpost by the Tsarist Russian 
government; they are arguably also applicable to the Soviet period in some respects—
Soviet socialist capital design, however, has some elements that are unique, and these 
will be discussed below. 
Although Soviet cities in far-reaching provinces such as the Central Asian 
republics can be said to exhibit elements of colonial cities, there are, without 
argument, elements of these cities that were more Soviet than European-style 
colonial. Whereas colonial cities featured a strong division of wealth and class, the 
socialist city was designed precisely to counter that capitalist urban structure. While 
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the dissolution of class and wealth distinctions may or may not have been realized in 
practice, and ethnic separation never completely disappeared in the Soviet Union, 
Soviet cities were designed with these goals and therefore the urban design was 
supposed to change the way people organize themselves, and not to reinforce old 
class divisions (although in some ways, it did and also created new class divisions).  
A debate remains in the literature as to what constitutes a socialist city—or, 
indeed, if there are enough significant categorical differences between socialist and 
“capitalist” cities that a serious distinction can be made. However, several 
characteristics set socialist city-planning apart, and in general socialist cities tend to 
have a distinctive appearance. “Urban living has a particular significance in Marxism, 
as a progressive force encouraging collective rather than individual identity, and city 
planning was viewed as an important means of achieving political purposes.”38 
“Central planning along with state ownership of land meant that urban development 
could be subjected to much greater control than under capitalism. The internal 
structure of the socialist city was supposed to be planned to facilitate the delivery of a 
wide range of social services as means of collective consumption, in addition to 
facilitating the planned development of the productive forces in the interests of the 
efficient operation of the economy.”39 The ideal of the socialist city, as discussed by 
Demko and Regulska, is:  
The abolition of private property, removal of privileged 
classes, and application of equity principles espoused by 
Marxist/socialist leaders should radically alter urban patterns. 
In the housing arena, the expectation would be one of non-
discriminatory, non-spatially differentiated housing in 
general. No social or occupational group would have better 
or more favourably located residential sites so that one would 
find a randomly distributed housing pattern. Similarly, public 
services of all kinds, including transportation, should be of 
                                       
38 D. Smith, 71-72 
39 ibid., 72 




equal quality, availability and accessibility, commuting to 
work... would be minimised and no group would be more 
dependent on or penalized by such travel than others. Such 
amenities as high quality physical environment, including 
recreational environment, would be equally accessible to all. 
All such urban conditions would be similarly equitably 
arranged and available.40  
 
Elements of urban design that were emphasized in the Soviet Union were 
cheap public transport, public provision of housing, and the “apartment blocks which 
came to predominate which give such a special character to the urban landscape.”41 
After World War II, the mikroraion (micro-region or district) became the basic 
building block of the Soviet city. The mikroraion “Comprised a neighbourhood unit 
of living spaces in the form of blocks of flats, along with associated services, for 
perhaps 5,000 to 15,000 people. Pedestrian precincts linked restaurants, nurseries, 
kindergartens, club rooms, libraries and sports facilities, as well as educational, 
health, retail and cultural services.”42 Thus, people were to have a wide range of day-
to-day needs satisfied within their immediate locality. Smith writes, “This, together 
with per capita norms within similar identical blocks of flats, suggests something 
approaching equality in living standards....”43  
 Socialist cities, of course, are not all historically the same. David Smith makes 
a distinction between “partially-changed cities” and new cities—the former being in 
his conception old European cities that retained some elements of pre-Soviet design in 
the Soviet period. Soviet Central Asia offers examples of both types of cities—
partially changed and new. In formerly nomadic areas, that is, present day 
Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan, which before Russian contact had no real 
towns, “military strong points like Vernyy (Almaty), Pishpek (Frunze), or Ashgabat 









served as starting points for new cities. Their layout corresponded to the general 
conception of Russian colonial cities at that time. They were characterized by a 
regular pattern of chessboard or radial design; wide streets were lined on either side 
with rows of trees and small irrigation ditches, behind which stood almost exclusively 
one-storied, colour-washed houses in gardens separated from each other by low mud 
walls. The exterior of municipal buildings was hardly different from that presented by 
simple dwellings.”44 It was not until the beginning of the twentieth century, under the 
influence of rising real estate costs, that a change to multi-storied buildings set in. 
Giese writes, “The wide space allotted to back gardens and open parks is noteworthy. 
Being primarily designed as garrison and administrative cities, the Russian town 
quarters are provided with the usual military institutions, barracks, drill squares, 
parade squares, and an officers’ mess, in addition to various administrative 
facilities.”45  
In the old cities of Central Asia—for example Bukhara and Samarkand (both 
historically Islamic centres and designed in that way) the epochs of Russian and then 
Soviet rule are easy to observe on maps. The populations before the Soviet era were 
very separated—Islamic population of Uzbek and Tajik natives from the Russian 
colonizers. But as the Soviet prefabricated housing developments, educational 
institutions, and factories came into place, structures changed slowly. Also, the 
development of different types of commerce and trade took some of the focus away 
from the bazaars and gave it first to the Russian univermag stores and shopping 
streets, and then when those seemed insufficient, to the semi-private kolkhoz markets 
that sprang up in response to popular demands and wants.  
Stated Soviet urban planning is the first and most obvious reason for the 
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changes undertaken architecturally and in capital city design. New, overarching 
obligatory principles of city planning took hold after the Revolution—Giese writes, 
“Leitmotiv of the principles proclaimed is the expression of power held by the State 
and Party and, also, the visualization of the sought-for transformation of society in 
cities. Visible expression of the need for representation and self-assertion of Soviet 
government and Communist Party are the large Central Square for Party 
manifestations and national festivities, the wide Main Street, the Prospect of 
Boulevard for parades and public festivals, representative buildings for purposes of 
the Party and cultural requirements, as well as large, conspicuous administrative 
offices in dominating positions in the centre of the city.”46 Traditional Islamic old 
towns, known for narrow, blind-alley street systems and closely interwoven cell 
structure of living quarters, were transformed, and large open squares—previously 
foreign to Islamic urban areas-- became “the dominating functional and stylistic 
elements of the socialist city.”47  
Economics eventually prompted large changes in urban layout of Central 
Asian cities, both those designed by Russians as military strongholds and those 
Islamic cities that predated Russian conquest. In all cities, “the importance of 
traditional crafts and home industry decreased. The home-industry products were 
steadily replaced by Russian imports, especially due to a marked decline in the quality 
of handcraft production. As a result, the bazaar lost its attractiveness and business... 
steadily shifted to the Russian town.”48 Additionally, segregation—practiced earlier 
between the Russian and native populations—dissolved and new norms of social 
interaction took hold.  
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The Building of Ashgabat 
 Prior to the 20th century, most Turkmen did not live in cities. The mobility of 
the nomadic lifestyle was seen as their guarantee of independence and autonomy, and 
Turkmen “looked down on neighbouring peasant peoples as weak and easily 
victimized.”49 Turkmen, before the Russian conquest, had a strong cultural preference 
for nomadic pastoralism. Edgar writes, “It was considered ‘more Turkmen’ to migrate 
with one’s flocks than to plough one’s fields.”50  
In contrast to seats of Islamic learning and well-established old towns such as 
Samarkand and Khiva, Ashgabat was from the beginning a construction of the 
colonialists. First founded as a Russian military outpost in 1881, Ashgabat was 
mainly inhabited by Russian settlers filling military and administrative roles, and only 
gradually expanded to include various industrial sectors and to attract an influx of 
indigenous population. In contrast to older Central Asian cities, in Ashgabat there was 
no division between the areas inhabited by Russian settlers and the areas inhabited by 
the Turkmen natives. All of the city’s neighbourhoods, basically, were newly 
constructed.  Though Ashgabat provides no examples of the separation between 
Russian new and Islamic old towns, it is an excellent forum for the study of colonial 
capital construction, Soviet development, and the creation of a new national capital in 
Niyazov’s image. This section presents a historical context in which to understand 
Ashgabat’s contemporary changes—at its core, Niyazov’s project of modern capital 
reconstruction is meant to divorce post-Soviet Ashgabat from its Soviet architectural 
roots.  
The composition and layout of the new city reflected its function as a military 
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stronghold. Ashgabat’s first buildings, therefore, were the fortress (on a high hill, 
built of unbaked brick), the Transcaspian Province military administrative buildings,  
the provincial administration, and the officers’ quarters. After construction of the 
administrative buildings for the military, homes were built for functionaries, the 
clergy, and their merchants, followed by living quarters for skilled workers who came 
from Russia, Persia and the Caucasus.  
Three centres eventually emerged in the city, centring on the fortress, the 
railroad station, and the trading centre. The fortress, and the broad esplanade 
encircling it (now Neutrality Square) became the town’s aristocratic centre. The 
square was surrounded by solid, thick-walled homes with grills on the windows and 
abutments on the corners, among which stood the splendid home in which the head of 
the Transcaucasian Province lived. Historically, today’s central squares were the city 
centre both from the points of view of planning and composition.51  
The 1885 extension of the Transcaspian railway to Ashgabat brought a 
compositional change to the city-- the railroad station and its environs became a major 
focus of the city. The area around the station was inhabited by railway labourers and 
craftsmen, whose houses were squat and crowded together, with smaller gardens than 
in the aristocratic neighbourhood.52 The fortress and railroad areas were separated by 
a broad, straight east-west street, which formed a symbolic boundary between the 
civil servants and military, on the one hand, and the craftsmen and workers on the 
other (this street in the Soviet period was renamed Freedom Street). Not far from the 
fortress’ residential area, a grim building called the Russian Bazaar was built. It 
“overflowed with small and medium-sized shops, stalls, living quarters for traders, 
                                       
51 A. Esenow, Architecture in the Epoch of Saparmurat Turkmenbashy the Great (Ashgabat, 2003), p. 
67. See also Esenow, History of Architecture in Turkmenistan (Ashgabat: Rukh, 2001), especially the 
final chapter on contemporary architecture. 
52 I. Pasevyev, Ashgabat: A Guide (Moscow: Progress, 1982), p. 11 




and caravanserais.”53 “Manufacturing concerns began to appear: cotton ginneries, a 
sweets factory, a factory for the manufacture of construction materials–bricks and 
lime, soft-drink factory, and other enterprises. There were already more than fifty 
such concerns before the First World War. . . . Apart from the railway depot, printing 
works, electrical plant, and wine-making factories, all the other concerns together 
employed only slightly over two hundred workers.”54  
The city’s western region was constructed in a different way than the rest of 
the city. The western area—which adjoined the fortress on the hilltop—was built on a 
radial ring plan.  Here, the streets emerged into a broad esplanade, which was the 
setting for military parades and drills, inspections, and ritual changing of the guards.  
The buildings in this area were attractively designed and branchy plane-trees, slender 
cypresses, and leafy maples were planted along both sides of the street. The rest of the 
city was built on a checkered-rectangular pattern that remained throughout the Soviet 
period.55  
 The Russian Revolution marked the first major change of power in this 
colonial capital’s history and began an era in which Turkmen people slowly 
urbanized. Ashgabat, renamed Poltoratsk (in honour of one of the fallen Bolshevik 
revolutionaries) after 1919, became the capital of Turkmenistan after the 1924 
demarcation. At the time of the Revolution, most of the urban areas in Transcaspia—
Ashgabat included-- were so heavily dominated by Russians that proposals arose 
suggesting that Turkmen should govern the rural areas and Russians the urban areas. 
These, along with declarations of autonomous Turkmen government, were dismissed 
by the Bolsheviks. For the Turkmen, the early Soviet period was a time of serious 
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identity crisis, as the Soviets attempted to engineer a nation-state out of nomadic 
tribes. Edgar writes, “The making of a modern nation-state requires a shift from a 
local conception of territorial belonging– the view that one’s village is one’s 
homeland, in essence– to a broader understanding of the ‘national space.’ But the leap 
required of the Turkmen was larger still. Like many other historically nomadic 
groups, the Turkmen conceptualized community boundaries in terms of genealogy 
rather than territory. Instead of a spatial landscape of interconnected villages and 
towns, they conceived of a network of interconnected kin groups and ancestors, a 
genealogical tree whose branches had no necessary relationship to specific 
geographical locations.”56 The first decade of Soviet rule saw the beginning of this 
shift from a genealogical to a territorial conception of Turkmen identity. Under Soviet 
rule, Turkmen quickly urbanized as city life was deemed the most Soviet style of life, 
and Ashgabat grew into an exemplar Soviet city. Completely reconstructed after a 
devastating earthquake in 1948, Ashgabat by the 1980s was a city almost entirely 
Soviet in style and one which epitomized a new Soviet design—although certain 
aspects of the original Tsarist layout were preserved in the reconstruction schemes, 
the city’s aesthetic post-1948 was purely Soviet.  
 Ashgabat developed relatively quickly under the Soviets. The layout changed 
and it was divided, like many Soviet cities, into mikroraions. Streets were named for 
Soviet heroes, schools and hospitals constructed, and prefabricated housing 
developments constructed. There was enormous expansion in Ashgabat during the 
1930s, although most of the construction from that period did not survive the 1948 
earthquake. Another period of construction and expansion occurred between the 
1950s and 1970s, and many of the buildings constructed at that time still stand in 
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Ashgabat.  In the 1950s the government introduced the “semi classic monumental 
style. In the 1960s the city grew significantly, and several districts of four-and five-
story apartment buildings were built of red bricks or concrete in the faceless 
“Khrushchevki” style. At the same time with the arrival of the much needed Karakum 
Canal, the city administration ordered planting of numerous trees and bushes.”57  
The earthquake in 1948 devastated most of Ashgabat and surrounding rural 
areas. Ashgabat’s reconstruction began immediately, resulting in an architectural 
rebirth. Almost every building in the city needed to be rebuilt. Even some buildings 
that had survived, but needed fundamental repairs, were razed to the ground. The 
government considered moving the capital to a new site, sparing some expense 
involved in immediate site clearing and reconstruction, but this idea was unpopular 
and ultimately rejected. Ashgabat’s plans were changed in some respects, although 
the city was rebuilt along its former planning outlines because certain parks, 
pavements, and municipal communications were undamaged. Large changes 
occurred; streets were made broader and straighter, squares designed as single 
ensembles, and dozens of green belts, boulevards, public gardens, and flowerbeds 
penetrated the city’s neighbourhoods. Cautions were taken to construct buildings 
more suitable for a seismic area, as well as to relocate certain sectors, including 
constructing residential areas further from the earthquake zones. The costly 
rebuilding, carried out “according to modern urbanity conceptions,” “deeply modified 
its urban plan, lending to Ashgabat the appearance of a pleasant modern city, with 
wide avenues and stately buildings that recall in their style ornamental patterns 
characteristic of Turkmen traditional architecture.”58 The reconstruction resulted in a 
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truly Soviet city, reflected in its residential central public space and monuments.  
Soviet cities were designed to emphasize the socialist ideal of equality in 
housing, and this was visible in residential areas of Soviet Ashgabat. First, the 
grouping of the residential areas into defined mikroraion neighbourhoods ensured a 
better provision of services. Prior to the earthquake and reconstruction, residential 
neighbourhoods or microraions did not exist, and their creation expanded the city to 
three times its previous size. Before 1948, Ashgabat had 540,000 square meters of 
residential accommodation, all of which was levelled by the earthquake. By 1980 
there were 3,380,000 square meters, comprising three administrative districts—the 
eastern Soviet district, the central Proletarian district, and the Lenin district in western 
Ashgabat. Each neighbourhood contained services for its residents—barber shops, 
pharmacies, cinemas, laundries and social clubs.59 Residential buildings in Soviet 
Ashgabat generally were constructed between two and four stories, all with balconies 
and verandas. Due to the harsh summer climate, residential buildings were somewhat 
different from other Soviet cities—with large walls and few windows, covered in the 
summer to protect from the sun. In addition to considerations of climate, residential 
buildings must be resistant to seismic shocks—large block buildings were regarded as 
especially durable. Combined, these factors increased the cost of construction in 
Ashgabat compared with construction in other Soviet cities.  
Aside from the residential areas, which lent a Soviet style to the city due to 
their uniform construction, public spaces and the city centre gave Ashgabat some of 
its Soviet look. By the 1980s, in fact, Ashgabat was considered to epitomize cutting-
edge Soviet modernist architecture. Soviet architects discussed at that time the 
creation of a so-called “Ashgabat School” of architecture, incorporating a broad 
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approach to urban design best seen in the design of Soviet Ashgabat’s central Karl 
Marx Square and the attached esplanade, which stand out in comparison to the layout 
of traditional Central Asian cities. Fountains and the trademark iron-concrete blocks 
were elements of this Ashgabat architectural style.  Pasevyev writes, “The overall 
appearance of Ashgabat and other Turkmen cities is not that of stylised architecture in 
a pseudo-Eastern style, but a result of the creative striving to combine the technical 
achievements of Soviet architecture and modern aesthetic principles, taking into 
account the specific features of Turkmen nature and climate.”60 
 The city’s centre—Karl Marx square—which best reflected these ideas, was 
dominated by the Karl Marx library, the administrative offices for the construction of 
the Karakum canal, and other distinctive buildings, along with drooping willow trees 
and ponds. The square, envisioned by architects A. Akhmedov, F. Aliev, and B. 
Shpak, was said to have evolved a new “architecture of the earth.” The library was 
built of large cement blocks, and was considered to be “to Ashgabat what the 
Admiralty Spire is to Leningrad, or the Eiffel Tower for Paris, or the Kremlin for 
Moscow.” Soviet architects believed that “this building [would] undoubtedly have a 
marked influence on the further development of Soviet architecture. It [was] for good 
reason that its designers were awarded one of the country’s highest distinctions, the 
State Prize. As for Ashgabat, the Library’s determining influence on the formation of 
the city centre [was] visible. It… determined a new scale for buildings, new planning 
axes in the structure of Turkmenia’s capital, and [gave] it a new appearance 
altogether.”61 The library was built of simple, undecorated concrete, as opposed to 
expensive marble or granite, and the richness of the building was meant to lie not in 
the materials of construction but in the proportions and multi-levelled space. The 
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library contained 16 reading halls, periodical rooms, research rooms, and particular 
reading rooms for “foreign literature, technical literature, agricultural literature, halls 
for reading microfilms, for rare and precious books, a general reading room, and a 
conference hall with a film projector.”62 
 From the late 1970s there were plans to rebuild central Ashgabat to better suit 
the needs of the population and to expand the city southward. These plans never came 
to fruition, however, due to the collapse of the Soviet Union. The general plan, 
adopted in the late 1970s, envisaged an expansion eastwards, southeastwards, and 
westwards, with development of a broad forested belt along the shores of the 
Karakum Canal. Plans were developed for the creation of a large, new city centre to 
better suit the needs of the residents. The axis of the planned centre was to run from 
the major square—Karl Marx Square, southwards towards the mountains. Although 
the rebuilding did not take place under the Soviets, in the post-Soviet period the 
capital has been reconstructed yet again—with the central squares gaining a position 
of significance, both as recreational areas and the location of the governing 
complexes. 
Architecture in the Epoch of Saparmurat Turkmenbashy: Facades of Power 
 
One of the most noticeable changes in Turkmenistan in the post-Soviet period 
is its outward appearance in the capital city. Ashgabat, to the international visitor, 
betrays its Soviet heritage– unlike capitals in neighbouring Central Asian republics, 
Ashgabat more closely resembles Dubai or Las Vegas than a former Soviet outpost. 
Its marble and glass buildings gleam and large, newly paved roads and public squares 
lead into clusters of government buildings, constructed as shrines of power that reflect 
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Niyazov’s vision of himself and his role as the father of independent Turkmenistan. 
The regime is quite proud of its architectural accomplishments. The State Information 
Agency of Turkmenistan in a recent statement commented, “The best works of the 
modern architecture of Ashgabat, the fantastically beautiful White City, are in the 
focus of thousands of cameras. Professionals and amateurs shoot these wonderful 
creations of the human spirit, refined taste and well-thought town-planning ideas for 
their descendants. The pictures of Ashgabat sights have been published in many 
illustrated magazines and journals in different countries of the world; they appear on 
many pages of the major newspapers and magazines of Europe, Asia, and America. 
They continue inspiring the artists, who find more and more new perspectives for 
their creative works.”63  
The appearance of post-Soviet Ashgabat has several dimensions– on the one 
hand a reflection of Niyazov’s vision of self-importance and megalomania, the city’s 
buildings also reflect the influence of foreign architects and architectural firms, a 
desire for international prestige and to impress outsiders with a rich facade, and a 
mission to create a city that is a symbol of independent statehood that captures the 
pride and hearts of Turkmenistan citizens. From presidential buildings to hotels, 
sports complexes, and religious buildings, each piece of recent construction in 
Ashgabat reflects some aspect of Niyazov’s pseudo-ideology. The architecture is 
infused with symbols of his power and indeed becomes a symbol in itself, with 
monumental buildings and statues featuring prominently in regime propaganda. 
Ashgabat is a shrine to Niyazov– beyond the golden statues and ubiquitous portraits 
of the man lies a general attempt to manipulate perceptions through architecture and 
urban environment, sharing the techniques (although not the style) of post-colonial 
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regimes in other corners of the globe. Niyazov’s redesign of Ashgabat is an attempt to 
signify his power domestically, to embed his nationalist pseudo-ideology, and to give 
an aura of international grandeur to his capital. This section will explore each of these 
three elements in its architectural incarnation-- the city’s layout and the changes in the 
city centre (formerly Karl Marx square); the development of new monument 
complexes, including Ruhnama Park and the Independence Monuments, and the 
growth of commercial and hotel buildings, particularly in the new Berzengi area.  
Public reaction to Niyazov’s building projects throughout Turkmenistan—and 
particularly the essential rebuilding of the capital city—appear to have received a 
mixed reaction from citizens in Turkmenistan.  During informal interviews conducted 
with Turkmen citizens during visits over the 2003-2004 period, respondents showed 
both huge admiration for and pride in their revitalized capital, and scepticism about 
expenditure of public funds.  For example, several respondents expressed 
dissatisfaction at Ashgabat’s huge number of fountains when the country’s population 
has difficulty locating sources of drinking water.  In addition, housing demolitions 
that parallel the rebuilding (which have not been accompanied in all cases by 
compensation to the families who are displaced) have caused a great deal of hardship 
for both displaced families and the relatives or friends who provide them shelter 
following the destruction of their neighbourhoods.  At the same time, however, most 
families seem to enjoy visiting the public parks throughout Ashgabat, and school 
groups, visitors from other regions of Turkmenistan, and wedding parties regularly 
visit and photograph the various monuments and public spaces. 
Street Layout and Street Names 
 
One noticeable difference is in the design, layout, and even the names of 




Ashgabat’s streetplan and roadways. Ashgabat’s streetplan, at a basic level, has an 
axial orientation—the roads are “not simply paved open spaces; they are paths.”64 The 
centre of the city is clearly dominated by the Presidential Palace and Neutrality 
Square, and the roads lead toward these areas.  With the numbering and renaming of 
the streets, the axiality became even more apparent.  On the 10 March, 2001, the 
newspaper Neytralnyy Turkmenistan published Niyazov’s decree that abolished street 
names—under the law, only six streets in Ashgabat would retain their names, and the 
rest would be numbered.  The general scheme of the numbering is that the centremost 
numbered street is 2000, marking the first year in the new “golden century” of the 
Turkmen.  Moving to the north, the streets increase at odd-number intervals—2001, 
2003, 2005 and so on.  To the west, the numbers increase on the even-number 
intervals—2002, 2004, and so on.  The southern streets run in the negative direction 
on odd-number intervals (1999, 1997, etc.) and to the east, negatively on even 
intervals (Refer to Appendix B for maps and diagrams depicting the numbering of 
streets).65 The street 2000 and the named streets that form the city’s centre also are the 
centres for government buildings and political activity—emphasizing the central role 
of the presidential administration in Ashgabat. 
The streets that are named (not numbered) reflect the new historiography and 
the cult of personality and parenthood, and contribute to their embedding—
Saparmurat Turkmenbashy, Atamurat Niyazov, and Magtumguly Street are three of 
the major thoroughfares, along with Galkynysh Shayoly (Independence Street), and 
Bitarap Turkmenistan Shayoly (Neutral Turkmenistan Street). In common parlance, 
however, many Ashgabat residents continue to refer to the streets by their Soviet 
names.  
                                       
64 Molly Glenn, “Architecture and Power,” 32 
65 Article, “Tsifrovoye obozhacheniye ulits v Ashgabate,” Neytralnyy Turkmenistan, 10 March 2001 




The renaming of the streets, and the creation of new streets running out to the 
Berzengi district and out of Ashgabat to the village of Kipjak (where Niyazov was 
born), lends an image of development to the capital. It is largely a Potemkin image, 
however, as the repaving of roads ends where Niyazov’s international visitors’ route 
ends, and the beautiful gilded city gates leading out of the eastern side of Ashgabat 
(which Niyazov drives through on his way to work each morning) is not mirrored by a 
gate on the western side at all, which is in serious disrepair. The renaming of the 
streets after the new heroes of independent Turkmenistan furthers the concept of the 
new national hero (as part of the nationalist historiography) that was introduced in the 
previous chapter.  
The displacement of many residents is a tragic by-product of the capital 
revitalization. In order to expand the roadways and construct grand entrance gates for 
the capital, families are moved and their homes demolished to make room for the new 
developments.  BBC reported, “Many of the families forced to leave their homes in 
this way are not offered compensation or alternative accommodation because they 
cannot prove their title to their original dwellings.”66 
Ashgabat’s streetplan is an example of an axial plan that directs people to a 
goal—the squares and buildings in the city centre that represent the power of the 
president.  This power is visually depicted by the monumental architecture of the 
central squares and the capitol buildings.  
Central Squares: Presidential Square and Neutrality Square 
 
 Town planning generally centres around city squares, and Ashgabat’s has 
changed significantly since independence. The city centre, formerly Karl Marx 
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Square (also known as Azadi square), today is broken into two adjacent squares—
Presidential Square and Neutrality Square—which contain the capitol complex and a 
monumental area. In the period since 1991, Niyazov has demolished most of the old 
buildings from these squares (although he retained the Karl Marx Library), and 
constructed a new presidential palace, government rostrum, and many new 
monuments. Construction of these squares has entailed an enlargement in scope of 
surrounding buildings and structures, the creation of new building facades for the 
buildings around the squares, and the broadening of streets.  
 The city has largely been restructured around these squares. Buildings of low 
value were demolished in the city centre, and small blocks of houses were abolished. 
New arterial roads were broken from the centre: Bitarap Turkmenistan Shayoly leads 
to the new airport terminal complex; Galkynysh Shayoly—to the east of the city; 
Garashsyzlyk Shayoly—to the south towards the hotel complexes in Berzengi district. 
These major roads, along with a large complex of governmental office buildings in 
the centre, have imparted a metropolitan feel to the city.  
Presidential Square 
Visitors to Ashgabat are immediately aware of where power is centred—
Presidential Square, the newly-refurbished central square in the capital—catches the 
eye of any passer-by with its huge, neo-classical Presidential Palace, massive parade 
lanes, and marble and gold finishing. Presidential Square is an area that is meant to 
visually display the wealth and power of Niyazov—from the ubiquitous patrolling 
guards to the spotlessness of the walkways. Presidential Square, which stretches north 
to south along the parade lane, and borders the Presidential Palace to the east, 
Rukhyyet Palace to the south, and the governmental rostrum to the west, is home to 
the capitol complex. The north side of the square opens to the central esplanade and is 




spatially connected with Neutrality Square’s earthquake monument and Arch of 
Neutrality.  
Architecturally, the Presidential Palace dominates the square—the entrance 
portico with a main staircase is the planning axis of the square—this is stressed by its 
arrangement in the centre of a fountain and the division of the square by different 
types of road surfacing. Access roads lead into the square for ceremonial purposes 
from Galkynysh and Karl Marx streets. The pavement covering the square is granite 
block and has different patterns and colours—light gray granite in the form of square 
netting and lines of white stones. It is surrounded by trees and greenery, as well as 
fountains and pools. The parade lane around which the square is constructed is 30 
meters wide and allows all ceremonial events to take place against the backdrop of the 
Presidential Palace. 
The governmental rostrum is a decorative viewing platform, a space for 
government officials and the president to sit during the ritual parades and ceremonies 
that take place in the Presidential Square.  The rostrum, which is marble and mirrors 
the Presidential Palace, is an oblong single storied façade with no hind premises—this 
expands the space of the square. Its design—a centric composition edifice—has a 
two-storied central area for the positioning of the governmental box and lateral single-
storied galleries. Again, the rostrum functions not only to visually demonstrate the 
president’s power, but to create a theatre out of the square area—providing, in effect, 
a seating area for the administration to take in displays of obedience from its 
citizenry. 
Ashgabat’s capitol complex falls neatly into Presidential Square and 
comprises the Presidential Palace, the Rukhyyet Palace, and the governmental 
rostrum, along with the ceremonial parade route that opens onto Neutrality Square. 




All of this has been constructed in the period following independence and it should be 
seen as a showing of power by Niyazov, who wishes to emphasize his power and 
grandeur. As Vale writes, government buildings are “necessarily infused with 
symbolism and are revealing cultural products.”67 The plot for the capitol complex 
falls within the borders of Galkynysh Shayoly (formerly Atabayev), Bitarap 
Turkmenistan Shayoly (formerly Podvoiski), and Karl Marx Street, embracing the 
historical centre of the city from the pre-Soviet time (Refer to Appendix C for 
photographs and diagrams depicting the central squares). 
Presidential Palace 
Glenn notes, “much about the nature of political power in any society, 
especially the relationship of the ruler to the people and where his power is thought to 
originate, can be discerned by looking at the physical symbols it produces in its 
architecture.”68 The Presidential Palace, where the offices of the President are located, 
serves as the city core and figures prominently in the Presidential Square design. 
Previously the central square contained no capitol buildings, so the construction of the 
Presidential Palace can be seen as a demonstration of power by a new regime. The 
Presidential Palace is Ashgabat’s highest building in the city centre—its spire and 
dome dominate the skyline. The former Central Committee building had these 
elements as well, surely an influence upon the design decisions. The palace has a 
centric composition, with the main entrance facing the square, and the back side 
facing a large garden with pools and fountains. The building is constructed of white 
marble and gold domes—Esenow highlights that it is “plain in volume, restrained 
décor, proportionality of building’s parts as a whole, originality and elegant 
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The massive golden dome of the Presidential Palace distinguishes it as the 
focal point of the city’s centre.  Thomas Markus writes, “it is precisely because a 
circular, domed building is a celebration of a rather unique kind of a holiday from the 
ubiquitous grid that it is so memorable and striking.”70  Although other capital 
buildings are domed in Ashgabat—including the Rukhyyet Palace described below, 
this huge gilded dome stands out among the other government buildings.  Combined 
with its location at the epicentre of the central squares, the architecture of the palace’s 
exterior and its landscaping leave no room for questions about where power is located 
in contemporary Ashgabat. All eyes are drawn to the offices of the president. 
Rukhyyet Palace 
The southern part of Presidential Square, facing towards the Kopetdag 
mountains, is closed by Rukhyyet Palace—another large domed building where the 
parliamentary bodies meet. Rukhyyet Palace borders three streets, and in the plans 
parts of the building were higher even than the Presidential Palace. Esenow writes 
that, “to some extent the building in the striking volume and length prevails in the 
space of the city centre.”71 The building is flanked by the Palace of Fairness (the new 
name for the Ministry of Justice) and the Ministry of Defence, which enhance its 
centric composition. The building’s solemn nature, and its supposed social 
significance are architecturally accentuated by the building’s raising on a high 
stylobate. The building was constructed by the French firm Bouygues, a selection that 
underscores Niyazov’s desire to build an internationally designed neo-classical 
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structure.72  A smooth ascent starts on the pavement of Galkynysh Street by the main 
entrance in the centre and lateral wings, and ends with broad flights of stairs 
approaching the entrance.73 Openness prevails in the building’s architecture. The front 
is covered with column intervals and an open column wing with a small dome. 
Architectural restraint is evident through the intervals of columns—which produce a 
reiterating rhythm. The cornice, crowned by expressive entablature, coordinates with 
the basic element of the square and capitol complex—the Presidential Palace. At the 
same time the form of the dome, partition of the drum and the architectural ornament 
to some extent almost precisely repeat the method applied in the building of the 
Presidential Palace, causing a certain uniformity that brings the square together 
visually. 
Neutrality Square and its Monuments 
 Neutrality Square provides an excellent architectural segue into discussion of 
national monuments, as it contains two of the city’s most distinctive new 
monuments—the Arch of Neutrality and the earthquake victims’ memorial. The 
square itself is connected to Presidential Square and covers the plot of the old Karl 
Marx Square beside the National Library. The main part of the square contains the 
Arch of Neutrality and fountains, and it is connected via underground passageway to 
the earthquake victims’ memorial and the museum of Ashgabat. Surrounding 
buildings have been architecturally renewed—fitted with white marble faces and 
glazed with toned glass, and the pavement is made of special tiles with different 
patterns and colours. 
 During the Soviet era, this section of the main square contained a small 
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collection of five graves, those of famous Soviet heroes from Turkmenistan. These 
included at least one First Secretary and, according to legend, the first woman to 
publicly burn her yashmak in Turkmenistan.74 In the late 1990s, these were moved 
without notice to an undisclosed location to make room for the newest monument to 
independent Turkmenistan—the Arch of Neutrality.75  
The Arch of Neutrality is the finalizing element in the architectural-spatial 
composition of Ashgabat city centre. Spatially, it takes the main point of the city 
centre, fixing the intersection of two perpendicular west-east axes (Neutrality 
Square—esplanade—memorial—2nd World War memorial) and the starting point of 
spatial development of the centre northward (Arch of Neutrality—parade lane—
Bitarap Turkmenistan Street).76 The Arch of Neutrality was constructed in 1997 
following the December 1995 UN resolution declaring permanent neutrality for 
Turkmenistan. The design of the Arch of Neutrality, which holds some resemblance 
to the Eiffel Tower, was the result of a design competition held between 1995 and 
1996 in Turkmenistan. Its upper levels are formed by the combination of horizontal 
circles-tiers, the diameters of which gradually reduce in height. Supporting vertical 
ribs that are stabilizing features narrow as the circular tiers get smaller.  
The legs of the towers are decorated with copper engravings depicting events 
in the history of Turkmenistan.  Additionally, round bas-relief strips on the legs depict 
carpet patterns of the five major tribes in Turkmenistan—the same carpet patterns 
depicted on Turkmenistan’s flag.77 The monument has several viewing platforms, that 
can be reached by two funiculars which ascend on the pylon’s ribs to the first level, 
and a panoramic elevator that takes visitors to an upper viewing deck, which also has 
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a poorly-stocked and under-staffed bar/restaurant area.78 The total height of the arch is 
75 meters, and the highest viewing gallery is at 29.5 meters. Atop the Arch of 
Neutrality is a rotating golden statue of Niyazov, which makes a full circle on its axis 
each day, so that the face of the president—with his arms outstretched—is always 
facing the sun (See Appendix C for photographs of Ashgabat’s monuments). 
 The earthquake memorial, which stands in the very centre of Ashgabat and 
stands on top of a museum commemorating the rebuilding of Ashgabat after the 
earthquake, is an intriguing statue. The statue represents a bull with his back arched 
holding a globe upon his horns—representing the jostling of the world in the time of 
the 1948 earthquake. This representation draws upon an historic Turkmen legend 
which posited that the earth rests upon a sleeping bull, which periodically wakes, 
causing the earth to shake. A figure of Gurbansoltan Eje, Niyazov’s mother who 
perished in the earthquake, sits atop the globe, holding in outstretched arms a golden 
statue of a baby—her son Saparmurat, who she offers to the country.  The golden 
figure of Niyazov, which faces the Arch of Neutrality, is visually depicted as a leader 
not only with mortal powers, but one almost religious in his rise from the natural 
disaster and human tragedy. The eye is immediately drawn to the figure of the baby 
Niyazov due to the contrast in colouring (Appendix C).  
Ruhnama Park and the Monument to Independence  
 
 On each anniversary of Turkmenistan’s independence, the regime has decreed 
the construction of a new memorial to commemorate the steps that the country has 
taken in the post-Soviet period. Referred to by residents by their appearances—for 
example, “three-legs”, “five legs” and “eight legs” (three legs being the monument to 
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the third anniversary of independence, which is a tower resting atop three pillar-like 
legs, five legs the fifth anniversary monument with five supporting pillars, and so on), 
these monuments form central elements of parks and squares across the city. The 
most recent creation in Ashgabat is the Ruhnama Park of Saparmurat Turkmenbashy 
the Great. It is a giant statue of the book Ruhnama, which opens on national holidays 
to reveal holographic pictures of the president and national historical heroes.  
Perhaps the most significant of the independence monuments is the so-called 
Monument to Turkmenistan’s Independence, situated in its own Park of 
Independence, next to the park honouring the tome Ruhnama in the southern outskirts 
of the city on the road to the Berzengi district. The independence monument was 
constructed in 1993 on the second anniversary of Turkmenistan’s independence and 
has become an icon of Ashgabat, appearing on stamps, postcards, notebooks and other 
Ashgabat souvenirs, as well as on billboards and television programs as a backdrop 
for Niyazov’s speaking appearances. The monument is comprised of a hemispherical 
foundation that it 60 meters in diameter, upon which a 95-meter-high column stands 
with a flagstaff and a Presidential standard. The monument has a sighting terrace 
inside, which can be reached via an elevator. There are five main entrances, each 
marked by a sculpture of an historical hero of Turkmenistan—Oghuz Han, Gorogly, 
Gorkut Ata, and Magtumguly are represented, although with some of the major pre-
Soviet literary figures and some of the Seljuk sultans. A north-south ceremonial lane 
commences on the main arterial road, the 10 Years of Welfare Street—and leads to 
the monument, and this road is marked by a grand golden sculpture of Niyazov sitting 
on top of an octagonal fountain. A fountain and a circle for mass performances 
complete the park—the performance circle has a six-meter high collapsible stage and 
2500 open-air seats (Appendix C). 




The construction of the Ruhnama Park and the Monument to Independence 
(and the surrounding statues, fountains, and park area) serve an important function for 
the cult of personality: they further infuse Niyazov’s portrait and the image of his 
book into the personal lives of his citizens. In Turkmenistan, couples follow the 
Soviet traditions of photography during wedding ceremonies at landmarks and 
monuments around their city that are significant and beautiful. In post-Soviet 
Turkmenistan, the monuments to Turkmenbashy, the Neutrality monuments and the 
Ruhnama monument are all among the favourite places for wedding photography. As 
a result, countless couples throughout Ashgabat have Niyazov’s image and his book’s 
intertwined with their marriage festivities. Additionally, citizens from across 
Turkmenistan, when visiting the capital, tour the monuments of Turkmenbashy as part 
of their visit, taking photographs and absorbing the cult of personality—a visit to the 
capital is almost a pilgrimage taken to the shrine of their living ruler. And finally, on 
weekend days in Turkmenistan, citizens flock to the parks and fountains to cool 
down, stroll on the paths, and play with their children, and so the landscape created by 
the regime works itself into the very patterns of daily life. 
Religious Architecture  
 
 Sultanistic and personalistic regimes have historically often used religion or 
religious iconography to support their leadership. Earlier discussions of political 
religion speak to this, but it is a phenomenon that finds a great deal of resonance in 
consideration of the regime’s architectural undertakings as well. Construction of 
religious shrines, churches, mosques and temples on a large scale, as well as 
employment of religious art in sculpture, fountains, and official ceremonies, is 
common among many personalist leaders.  




 Niyazov takes pride in the gifts he bestows upon his population, and since 
independence, he has given new mosque buildings to many cities throughout 
Turkmenistan. The construction of a massive mosque at Goktepe as part of the 
memorial for those who died during the Russian conquest was part of this project. The 
capstone of this project of mosque construction was the creation of the mosque at 
Kipjak village, Niyazov’s birthplace, outside of Ashgabat.  
 At the site of the old fortress at Goktepe where the Turkmen were defeated by 
General Skobelev and the Russian troops in 1881, a large mosque known as the 
Memorial Saparmurat-Haji Mosque was constructed. In a 1993 Presidential decree 
“On Perpetuation of the Blessed Memory of the Perished in Goktepe Battle for the 
Independence of the Turkmen People”, Niyazov outline the goal of spiritual revival 
and the return of cultural and spiritual values to the nation. A year later, the 
resolution, “On the Construction of Goktepe Mosque and a Fortress Wall” outlined 
the plans for the construction of the mosque at the old battle site. Because this was the 
first mosque to be built since independence in Turkmenistan, there was little domestic 
experience with the construction of religious edifices. Therefore, the architects turned 
to the scheme of Turkish mosques built in the Osman style, and reshaped this style 
taking into consideration local building materials and the town-planning situation.79 
The two Turkmen architects, a husband and wife team Durly and Kakajan Durdyew 
from the Politeknik Institute, were joined by a French architect from the Bouygues 
firm, and the construction costs reached about $50 million.80 
The architecture of the façade is festive, with “arched apertures and gently 
sloping curvature. Colour tones harmonize with generally-accepted architectonics of 
the edifice… secular principles prevail in the architectural image of the building, 
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instead of religious closeness and mass typical to the primary image.”81 The mosque 
has a centre dome about 40 meters high, with four minarets that are each 60 meters 
high in the outer corners. Like many mosques, Goktepe’s is non-axial—that is, 
without any dominant orientation, which generally denotes equality before the 
divine.82 This message is somewhat undermined by the presence of copies of 
Ruhnama at the front of the mosque, which stresses that none are equal politically to 
Niyazov. A high elliptical dome replaced the original hemispherical flat dome. There 
is a belt of windows under the dome, around the sides of the mosque and a turquoise 
coloured facing of the dome that adds lightness to the building’s appearance. The 
mosque consists of two parts—a central hall under the dome that has 500 seats for 
worshippers and an adjoining open rectangular yard that is surrounded by an arched 
gallery with square columns. A large chandelier, weighing two tons and holding 216 
lights,83 illuminates the hall’s spacious interior. The total capacity of the mosque is 
said to be 12,000 worshippers (including both the mosque and the madrassa).84 
Interestingly, the materials for the mosque are mainly imported from Europe—the 
dome is from Germany, and the marble used in constructed is imported from Italy, 
Spain and France (Appendix C).85 
To replace a small mosque (the Saparmurat Turkmenbashy Mosque) that was 
constructed in 1994 in Niyazov’s home village of Kipjak outside of Ashgabat, a 
massive mosque, considered the largest in Central Asia, was constructed in 2004 in 
the same village. It has four 90-meter high minarets. Built by the French company 
Bouygues, the mosque was inaugurated with great pomp on 22 October 2004. It has 
the capacity to hold 10,000 worshippers and it was constructed at a reported cost of 
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$100 million. Kipjak, a small village, does not have the population to support such a 
large number of worshippers, and the mosque is used more frequently for official 
visits and functions than for religious services, although in the future it may become 
more functional.86 
 The architecture of this mosque strongly reflects the regime’s personalism. On 
the minarets, in place of Koranic quotations, are lines from the presidential tome 
Ruhnama.87 The reflecting gardens surrounding the religious edifice are dedicated to 
the memory of the President’s parents. The mosque itself has been decorated with 
quotations from the Ruhnama and up to a quarter of the book stands in the mosque 
meant for copies of the Koran are filled with presidential publications, including 
Ruhnama. A copy of Ruhnama is placed prominently at the entrance to each of 
Turkmenistan’s mosques, and believers are expected to touch it as if it was a sacred 
object. The Kipjak mosque stirred some controversy in the Muslim communities 
because of the decoration with Ruhnama quotations. To enter the mosque through the 
main door, visitors walk through a gateway over which is written (in Turkmen) 
“Ruhnama is a holy book; The Koran is Allah’s book”. On one side of the gate is the 
text of the oath of allegiance to the president, carved in stone, and on the other is the 
text of the national anthem. 
 Niyazov’s religious architecture represents some interesting elements of his 
power propagation. First, Niyazov distinctly separates himself from the Soviet leaders 
(and indeed, from his former role as a Soviet leader) by welcoming the new role for 
Islam in his country and co-opting religious elites, allowing only a state-sponsored 
version of Islam to operate. This complements his cult of personality particularly 
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because it presents another alternative to Soviet ideology in the post-Soviet 
ideological vacuum, but one that is under the control of the state and therefore (at 
least for now) does not represent a threat to Niyazov. Images of Niyazov in Islamic 
dress, undertaking the hajj to Mecca, and praying during religious ceremonies at the 
mosques he constructs, all help to support and legitimize his rule—as mentioned in 
Chapter 4, a sort of political religion has taken hold in independent Turkmenistan.  
 Niyazov is further able to infuse his personalism and his pseudo-ideological 
program Ruhnama into the new religious architecture, which allows for a legitimation 
of the cult of personality and a greater acceptance of Niyazov as a leader. Citizens are 
grateful for the gifts of new mosques given to their villages by Niyazov and many 
overlook the Ruhnama quotations engraved upon the minarets. Religious leaders, 
appointed by the government and subject to official review and dismissal, read from 
the Ruhnama during their services. Niyazov’s portrait hangs in many mosque 
entrances, and his name is given to the mosques, and the mere fact of mosque 
construction in his birthplace of Kipjak is an example of an entrenchment of the 
cult—one that strikingly resembles the basilica construction in the Ivory Coast.  
 In addition, Niyazov hopes to enhance his international image as a religious 
leader through the construction of these grandiose religious buildings. The mosque in 
Kipjak, for example, was for a time only opened to foreign guests and not local 
believers—the construction project was intended to serve as a conduit for Niyazov to 
become one of the world’s sponsors of large scale Islamic building projects.  
Berzengi Development  
 
 The development of the Berzengi neighbourhood is an undertaking that 
reflects Niyazov’s attempt to construct an international image for Ashgabat. 




Berzengi—the more modern, and newly constructed, southern quarter of Ashgabat, 
has hotels and gleaming buildings which “considerably improved the receptive 
capacity” of Ashgabat, “adapting it to international standards.”88 Hoping that 
international investors and traders would flock to Ashgabat in the post-Soviet period 
to make a bid for his country’s natural resources, Niyazov set out to construct a 
world-class area of luxury hotels, restaurants and conference facilities so that his oil 
and gas rich nation would become something of a new Dubai. The result has been the 
construction of a strip of hotels that resembles Las Vegas in colour and scale. 
Ironically, however, most stand empty because investors and tourists alike have been 
deterred from visiting due to harsh visa regimes and a shadow economy that makes 
business dealings for Westerners in Turkmenistan unprofitable.  
 During the Soviet period, Ashgabat had only a few low-level hotels. On the 
26th of February 1992 Niyazov invited the heads of each of the ministries within the 
government to a meeting and charged each man with the design of one hotel complex, 
to be erected at the minister’s own expense, in the southern part of Ashgabat at the 
foothills of the Kopetdag mountains. Esenow, the national architect, oversaw 
construction of each hotel to ensure that design and documentation was sound. Local 
ministers, who previously operated under a system of Soviet central planning, had 
little experience in building design. Sites for the construction of the hotels were 
provided and prepared by the Khyakimlik of Ashgabat (the mayoral staff, or city 
executive committee), often at great expense to residents in that area, who were 
cleared from their homes and relocated (often at their own expense) while their 
buildings were demolished.  
Presidential rules mandated certain design elements—for example, each of the 
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hotels was required to have a light marble façade. The hotels are placed equidistant 
from the highway and the complexes were required to embrace a “yard theme,” with 
fountains to enrich the architectural space. Each hotel complex consists of ten rooms, 
two luxury apartments, and many services, such as swimming pools and restaurants. 
The designers of the hotels best loved by Niyazov were awarded the Magtumguly 
International Prize in 1994 for architectural achievements. As of autumn 1999, there 
were 25 new hotels in the Berzengi neighbourhood (Appendix C).89 
The hotels, which look very futuristic and stand, fresh and bright white, in 
contrast to the desert space they inhabit, stand vacant for the most part, with 
occasional occupancy during energy conventions. Berzengi hotels each feature 
expensive restaurants and fitness centres which are generally unused—there might be, 
on a given night, ten waiters for each table in an Italian restaurant.90  Restaurateurs 
and hoteliers have been selected from Milan and other parts of Europe at the 
president’s request to establish hotel-restaurants in some of the Berzengi 
developments.91 These restaurants are generally only visited by government officials, 
the occasional diplomat or visitor, and conference attendees. Ashgabat, by the end of 
the 1990s, was well-prepared for a business and tourism boom that is yet to come. 
Conclusion 
 
 Power can be propagated in many ways—architecture, and the political use of 
public space, can be one of the more outward expressions of governance. Particularly 
in capital cities and complexes of government buildings, but also in monumental 
architecture and grandiose building projects, new regimes can underscore their 
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authority and push that authority into the public view, becoming a part of a citizen’s 
everyday living experience and thereby establishing itself as the overarching, far-
reaching power.  
 Turkmenistan’s capital architecture has changed significantly, and several 
times, since Ashgabat’s founding as a military outpost—but in all cases the changes 
directly represented the regime charged with the rebuilding and the construction. 
When Ashgabat was first settled, it was a Russian colonial outpost through and 
through—from the officer’s houses to the bazaars catering to the needs of the new 
soldiers, and with little to no native presence. Under the Soviets, and particularly after 
the catastrophic earthquake in the 1940s, the city was rebuilt as a model Soviet city—
with mikrorayons, canteens and shopping centres, monuments to Soviet heroes, and 
the Karl Marx library which became a hallmark of the new style of Soviet 
architecture.  
 In the post-Soviet period, Ashgabat has undergone yet another facelift. 
Niyazov’s regime, determined to drastically change Ashgabat’s aesthetic to make it 
represent the regime’s outward face, has undertaken huge construction projects, 
employing foreign firms and using imported materials to create entirely new city 
centre squares, parks and monuments, religious buildings, and tourism complexes. 
While the development of the country has not matched in pace or expense the 
development of the capital’s aesthetic, and the regions continue to suffer from an 
absence of new development and the continuing, and increasingly rapid, deterioration 
of Soviet-era buildings and edifices, Turkmenistan’s citizens generally take pride in 
the beautification of Ashgabat and see Ashgabat as a symbol of the path of 
development for Turkmenistan. In this way, the regime’s employment of the 
Ashgabat reconstruction as an instrument of power propagation has been a successful 





 Ashgabat’s facelift again likens Niyazov’s regime to other sultanistic regimes 
and personalist regimes throughout the world, and namely those that emerged in 
postcolonial Africa. In his rebuilding and redesign of the national capital, Niyazov—
like other sultanistic rulers-- has actually infused himself into the capital design. From 
ubiquitous portraits to countless gilded statues, Niyazov has become almost a theme 
of the capital. By inserting himself this way into the daily experience of his citizens 
through the structural imposition of his image into their lives, Niyazov gains both a 
















This thesis outlines the major strategies employed by sultanistic leaders as part 
of their legitimating discourses. It examines the ways in which leaders—specifically, 
Turkmenistan’s Niyazov—use regime symbol and ritual, national narratives, and 
public space to propagate doctrines of legitimation intended to produce a domain 
consensus among his population, or at least to secure normative compliance. Through 
pointed references to legitimation methods under African cases of sultanistic 
leadership, the thesis situates Turkmenistan’s contemporary regime in a context that 
allows for historical analysis. This study is intended to further the cross-regional 
comparisons between Central Asia and post-colonial sub-Saharan Africa, in order to 
provide a basis for analysis and prognosis for contemporary Central Asian states. 
 In many ways, the methods of legitimation employed by Niyazov’s regime in 
Turkmenistan approximate the examples found among the historical cases of 
sultanism in sub-Saharan Africa. Through symbols and rituals of dominance, 
historiographies that fuse nationalism with cults of leadership, and architectural 
endeavours that lend an element of material permanence to the regime’s undertakings, 
sultanistic regimes in both regions forge their rule using many of the same tools and 
methods. Some of the similarities are striking and exact, while others allow only 
general comparisons, but the comparisons seem salient. Despite variance in 
demography, environment, history, and culture, these leaders have a common mode of 
producing normative compliance. 
Turkmenistan’s Legitimation Campaign 
 
 This thesis has attempted to locate Turkmenistan in a comparative context, to 





examine different aspects of the legitimation process. Propaganda and political 
legitimation in Turkmenistan present a fascinating area of study due to the 
pervasiveness of the official propaganda—nearly all of the information forwarded in 
Turkmenistan through educational and media outlets in some way reflects the 
interests of the regime and Niyazov’s program of Ruhnama. 
 The first three chapters introduce the case of Turkmenistan with reference to 
the body of literature on personalist regimes that emerged from the studies of post-
colonial Africa. Turkmenistan’s regime differs enough from other post-Soviet 
regimes (with the possible exceptions of Belarus and Azerbaijan) that it serves to 
consider it apart from those cases and, in particular, to consider it using the literature 
on similar historical regimes. Africanists have developed a rich literature concerning 
post-colonial personalism that draws on Weberian concepts of legitimate authority, a 
literature that speaks well to scholars of personal regimes in Central Asia.  
Enough similarities exist across the cases to consider these regimes with 
reference to one another, and enough historical and contextual similarities exist 
between the regions to provide an interesting comparison that lends insight as to the 
factors that contribute to the rise of sultanistic leadership.  Rule by colonial powers—
and similarities in the type of and length of imperial domination—may be a 
contributing factor to the rise of dysfunctional authority. Both the European powers in 
Africa and the Russians and Soviets in Central Asia left a legacy of bureaucratic 
authoritarianism under which the leaders of the independence generation were 
cultivated. Though differences are clear, dysfunctions in post-colonial authority and 
leadership in this thesis exemplify the many similarities in the post-colonial 
experiences of the two regions.  





benchmark concept of sultanism is a useful starting place for its consideration. 
Sultanism, the most obviously personalist of the types of non-democratic rule, seems 
to better describe Niyazov’s regime than does the concept of authoritarianism.  
Niyazov’s regime entirely undercuts pluralism, allows no room for political 
mobilization (or even for non-official civic mobilization), and exhibits strong leader-
centric tendencies. Most interesting for the purposes of this thesis, Niyazov’s program 
of Ruhnama very closely mirrors Chehabi and Linz’s description of a sultanistic 
“pseudo-ideology.”  
 Sultanistic regimes, Chehabi and Linz write, are not characterized by 
pervasive ideologies of a totalitarian type, nor with a set of “mentalities” like 
authoritarian regimes, but rather with by pseudo-ideologies, which are constructed in 
the aftermath of the regime’s coming to power (and therefore have nothing to do with 
the rise to power itself, as is true of totalitarian ideologies).  A pseudo-ideology is 
often considered to be mere “window dressing” for the regime but can be all 
pervasive, is closely intertwined with the personality of the leader himself, and often 
bears his name. 
 In Turkmenistan, Ruhnama exhibits many of these characteristics.  Since the 
publication of the book of the same name, Ruhnama has become the catch-all for 
Niyazov’s earlier projects of national revival and nationalist historiography, and has 
also become a convenient vehicle to further propagate Niyazov’s cult of personality. 
Chapter four laid out many of these qualities and also juxtaposed Niyazov’s national 
program atop Mobutu’s programs of Authenticity and Mobutuisme in Zaire.  A 
comparison of sultanistic pseudo-ideology in these two states demonstrates many 
strong similarities between the cases on the level of legitimation—studies of 





contemporary period.  Like Mobutu, Niyazov has taken control of the state’s 
educational and media outlets, turning them into vehicles of Ruhnama and channels 
for official ritual and symbolism.   
 The revision of the national narrative and writing of a nationalist 
historiography that fits Niyazov neatly into the centre of history and at the pinnacle of 
his nation’s achievements is a striking element of Niyazov’s campaign of propaganda.  
Many chapters of his expansive volumes of Ruhnama are dedicated to an exploration 
of Turkmenistan’s history, genealogies of the Turkmen ancestors, and mythical 
musings about the origins of the Turkmen people and the glorious golden ages of the 
past.  History combines with fantasy as Niyazov recounts ancestors appearing in his 
dreams, speaking to him from the skies, and calling him to lead the Turkmen into the 
next golden age.  All of this is part of a comprehensive campaign of national history 
revision that closely resembles (in style if not in content) the revisions of national 
history in other parts of the world—and particularly under sultanistic regimes 
emerging from colonial situations.  African sultans, like Niyazov, are careful in their 
nationalist historiographies to place themselves squarely at the centre of events, to 
make themselves necessary to realizing the dreams of the nation’s ancestors.  
Niyazov’s accounts, which have become the only accounts allowed inside 
Turkmenistan, of the country’s history notably miss the period of Soviet rule, 
discount the role of Turkmen in the colonial apparatus, and deny the existence of 
tribalism in Turkmen society.  Through the elevation of national heroes of the past 
(and, by association, of himself in the present), Niyazov not only raises himself to the 
level of national icon but also presents traits of the culture that are to be mirrored by 
good citizens. 





of the sultanistic legitimation campaign. From capital relocation to capitol building 
redesign, sultanistic leaders seize on the post-colonial moment to capture the design 
of their nation’s centre city for themselves.  By inserting themselves into every part of 
the physical environment—with billboards, posters, statues and monuments bearing 
their names and faces—these leaders are able to construct a public environment that 
leaves no question as to the sources of power and its personification in the president.  
Architectural endeavours can speak volumes as to the location of power in a particular 
polity, and this is also true (and sometimes drastically so) in sultanistic regimes that 
emerge in a post-colonial context.  Colonial architecture is often rejected in the wake 
of independence, and oftentimes capital cities are moved, or old buildings razed and 
rebuilt, to reflect not only the fact of regime change but also the personal style and 
preferences of the new regime.  
Utility of the Sultanistic Regime Typology 
 Although Niyazov’s regime does not adhere perfectly to the ideal-typical 
sultanistic regime as defined by Linz and Chehabi, sultanism does appear to provide a 
very useful benchmark from which to assess developments under the post-Soviet 
regime in Turkmenistan.  Niyazov’s Turkmenistan appears to appromiximate—in 
style of governance and methods of legitimation—various examples of sultanistic 
governance throughout the post-colonial space, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa.  In 
fact, cases of sultanism in Africa—described in detail in this thesis—lend greater 
insight into the Turkmen case than do studies of other Central Asian countries, which 
share Turkmenistan’s location and Soviet experience—for example, Kyrgyzstan. 
 There are other examples of regimes that approximate sultanism in the post-
Soviet space, for example Lukashenko’s Belarus or Aliev’s Azerbaijan (an excellent 





post-Soviet regions, the three most explicit examples of personalist rule appear to 
come from three different regions—Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia.  
Uzbekistan under Islom Karimov is the Central Asian case most similar in 
governance to Niyazov’s Turkmenistan, although differences in the style of regime—
including the broader governing coalition in Uzbekistan—are salient.  Although this 
thesis did not explicitly examine similarities in circumstance among the post-Soviet 
sultanistic cases, such a comparison would be an open avenue for future research on 
the subject of sultanism and personalist rule and would provide an interesting window 
into the comparative politics of post-Soviet regimes. 
Paths Out of Sultanistic Regimes 
 Over the past year, three of the former Soviet states—Ukraine, Georgia, and 
Kyrgyzstan, experienced revolutions—from their initial post-Soviet phase into a new 
period that might show greater steps towards democratization. In the aftermath of 
Kyrgyzstan’s so-called Tulip Revolution, many asked if Kyrgyzstan was just the first 
Central Asian domino to fall—if revolution and democratization there would spill 
over to its neighbours, for example, to Turkmenistan. Research points to a simple 
answer: no—although the reasons are many and complex. Turkmenistan’s current 
regime is very different from the former regime of Kyrgyzstan’s Akaev, and is more 
like Belarus’ Lukashenko or Azerbaijan’s former President Haidar Aliev, both of 
whose countries (and Aliev’s son’s regime) showed remarkable resistance to any sort 
of spillover from Ukraine and Georgia in their respective regions.1 Additionally, 
society in Turkmenistan, unlike in Kyrgyzstan, has shown little mobilization for 
political purposes in the post-Soviet period. Although Kyrgyzstan’s society was 
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considered politically passive in the 1990s, a strong north-south divide, ethnic 
hostilities, and the reaction provoked by the government’s attack on protestors in the 
Kerben and Jalal-abad regions over the past several years have prompted increased 
mobilization. In Turkmenistan, as we have seen, domestic mobilization is very low. 
One of the most useful aspects of a comparative approach to studies of 
political regimes is the element of prediction—by studying patterns of behaviour and 
leadership that occurred in the past, perhaps we can foresee potential outcomes for the 
future. Embedded within every state “is the latent possibility of deflation of its power 
and authority, of loss of its legitimacy, of decay of its institutional structure.”2 
Because the cases of African sultanism are historical, their experiences with transition 
might lend some insight to the potential for transition from sultanism in 
Turkmenistan. The African cases experienced various types of transitions away from 
sultanism. Africa has experienced revolutions, bloodless coups, and peaceful 
handovers of power. In some cases, there has been dynastic succession following a 
leader’s natural death. African sultanistic regimes have experienced many different 
types of transition; notably, however, none of these cases experienced a transition to a 
democratic regime.  
Variables for Comparing Potential Outcomes of Transition 
 
 Richard Snyder has written on the potential outcomes of transition from 
neopatrimonial dictatorships—many of which are cases of sultanism—mainly in Latin 
America, sub-Saharan Africa, and Southeast Asia. He analyses three important 
variables across the cases: “the institutional autonomy of the military, the strategies 
and relative organizational strengths of moderate groups opposed to the dictator, and 
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the strategies and relative organizational strengths of revolutionary groups opposed to 
the dictator.”3 These take the form of three critical relationships: the relationship 
between the ruler and the military, the relationship between the ruler and domestic 
elites, and the relationship of domestic actors (be they the military, the rulers, or the 
opposition groups) to foreign powers. 
• Relationships with the military. Military relations are important to analyse 
because of the high incidence of military coups in overtaking neopatrimonial 
regimes historically. Snyder writes, “the degree to which the ruler has 
undermined the autonomy of the armed forces (for example, by subverting 
their organizational hierarchy and replacing it with a hierarchy based on 
loyalty to his person and by dividing the officer corps) is a critical variable 
which differentiates the revolutionary and nonrevolutionary cases.”4 The 
military’s level of autonomy includes its control over materiel supply, the 
officers’ abilities to predict their career paths and communicate their 
discontent to one another, the “degree to which the officer corps is divided 
along ethnic or regional lines, and the dictator’s capacity to purge elements of 
the armed forces whose loyalty he questions.”5 
• Relationships with domestic elite. The relationship between the ruler and the 
domestic elite is another important relationship in predicting transitional 
outcomes. The level of political exclusion often influences the levels and 
potential growth of revolutionary and moderate opposition. In some cases, 
however, where organization amongst domestic elites is low, the likelihood of 
revolutionary opposition will also be low. The level of repression internally 
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and the communication and unity of potential oppositional factions must also 
be considered, and in an intensely repressive situation with low organization, 
domestic elites may not be motivated to join the revolutionary or moderate 
opposition, or to form them. 
• Relationships with foreign powers. The third factor examined by Snyder is 
the role of foreign powers. Foreign powers can strengthen to varying degrees 
the capacities of potential successors to capture state power in the event of 
regime transition, whether that successor be another dictator, the military, 
civilian moderates, or revolutionaries. Economic dependence of a sultanistic 
ruler on foreign powers may work for or against the sultan. Historically, many 
sultanistic regimes have fallen to revolutionary coups due to their excessive 
dependence on foreign economic aid, which is resented by members of the 
population. In other cases, however, “the extreme dependence of a 
neopatrimonial ruler on a foreign power does not necessarily encourage, and 
may even inhibit, revolution. The impact of extreme dependence on a single 
patron on the course of political development, while important, is mediated by 
the configuration of domestic actors (that is, the presence or absence of viable 
moderate opposition groups, the degree of military autonomy) and by the 
willingness of these domestic actors (especially the incumbent dictator) to 
participate in the schemes of foreign powers.”6 During the Cold War, 
especially, it was also possible for superpower patrons to actually inhibit the 
course of revolution by defusing crises that might provide avenues to power 
for oppositionist radicals.  
 Snyder, writing in the early 1990s, highlighted Mobutu’s Zaire as an instance 
                                       





of a sultanistic regime that was characterized—to that point—by political stability, 
and so he also suggests reasons for a lack of transition—or factors that might 
encourage longevity of the sultanistic regime. He writes,  
Mobutu’s longevity is a consequence of the cooptation of 
elites, repression, and the exacerbation of ethnic and 
regional divisions by state patronage, all of which 
effectively inhibited the growth of radical and moderate 
opposition; the undermining of the armed forces’ 
institutional autonomy; and his ability to extract vital 
military and economic assistance from foreign patrons while 
limiting the leverage these patron had over him by 
diversifying his sources of external support. As a result, 
would-be revolutionaries, moderate opponents, and the 
military were all similarly limited in their capacities to 
challenge Mobutu; hence stasis.7  
 
Mobutu, like other sultanistic leaders, had an extensive patronage network binding 
elite members of the political class to the regime. Members of this elite stood to 
benefit from playing by Mobutu’s rules, and so it was considered better to profit while 
possible and to assure one’s family security when they would fall from power. Snyder 
writes, “In addition to inhibiting elite opposition, state patronage worked against the 
solidarity of opposition groups when they did arise by exacerbating regional and 
ethnic identities, thereby fragmenting civil society and impeding broad-based 
mobilization against Mobutu.”8 Mobutu, in his relationship with the military (he was 
formerly a military officer), effectively fostered and exploited rivalries among 
factions of officers, purged the officer corps frequently, maintained his supremacy of 
the military’s command structure. Mobutu received vital financial assistance from a 
variety of foreign powers (including at various times China, France, Morocco, 
Belgium, North Korea, Egypt, Israel, South Africa, and the United States), and “was 
able to take advantage of the patronage of foreign powers without incurring the ‘cost’ 
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of extreme vulnerability to the policy preferences of a specific backer.”9 
In Turkmenistan, Niyazov has to a large extent undermined the autonomy of 
the military. Turkmenistan’s military is poorly funded and trained, and very small, 
more ceremonial than functional. Niyazov has ordered military draftees to report for 
duty to regions away from their hometowns to further cut down on kinship- and clan-
based patronage within the military structure. In place of the military, for the first 
decade of independence it appeared that Niyazov was relying heavily on the 
institution of the MNB, the national intelligence service. However, in 2002 the MNB 
was purged and Nazarov, then head of the MNB, was fired for shortcomings on the 
job—an unanticipated move that demonstrated Niyazov’s continued control over that 
structure and his increasing paranoia about the potential for coups from within it. 
Niyazov now appears to rely to a large extent on his Presidential Guard instead of on 
the military or intelligence service, and his financing and support for this institution 
has also cut into the autonomy of the military.  
It is not an invariable outcome of an exclusionary neopatrimonial regime that 
it will be toppled by a revolution. This was the case in Haiti under Baby Doc—“First, 
they (the regimes) do not necessarily confront significant revolutionary or moderate 
opposition. Organizational difficulties and effective state repression can block the 
emergence of potent opposition movements even in an exclusionary environment…. 
Second, even if radicals have not been killed and have been able to organize, they 
may choose not to pursue a strategy of armed confrontation.”10 Therefore, the fact that 
a sultanistic regime excludes elites from patronage benefits alone cannot be a 
predictor of whether the regime will move toward revolution, military coup, or 
transition to civilian rule. Below, Turkmenistan’s potential for revolution or palace 
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coup will be considered as transition scenarios. 
Certain sultanistic regimes are able to limit the influence of foreign powers by 
diversifying sources of aid and not exclusively relying on one foreign backer. 
Niyazov has taken a different approach with his policy of “positive neutrality”—
avoiding regional entanglements and initiatives from Central Asian neighbours.11 
Niyazov has successfully played different states and organizations against each other.  
Russia is his most influential partner because almost all gas exports pass through its 
pipelines but its response to repeated humiliations of Russian government officials 
and overt discrimination against ethnic Russians has been remarkably weak.  A few 
parliamentarians have spoken out against Niyazov but mostly the lure of cheap gas 
has kept Moscow silent about the worst abuses.  
What Lies Ahead for Turkmenistan? 
 
Consideration of the historical experiences of sultanistic regimes and their 
transitional periods allows for some informed speculation on the potential for 
transition away from sultanism in Turkmenistan. Given the nature of the Turkmen 
regime, of course, political prognoses are highly problematic. Niyazov holds 
significant levers of power—political, security and economic, and could stay in 
control for several years. But economic decline, growing dissatisfaction in society, 
and wider opposition both inside and outside the country make him much less secure.  
The danger of a palace coup, or an open explosion of popular frustration (perhaps 
aided from abroad), should not automatically be discounted. The African cases 
considered in this thesis experienced various types of transition, and it will be useful 
to outline some of the scenarios (and to assess their likelihood) in the case of 
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• Overthrow by Palace Coup. This scenario seems unlikely for Turkmenistan 
due to the severe increase in government controls over officials in the 
aftermath of the 2002 assassination attempt, which would inhibit formation of 
a conspiracy within the presidential administration.  Additionally, because of 
the huge rewards reaped by those in power, little incentive exists to attempt a 
coup because of the very high likelihood of failure.  It is difficult to assess the 
level of elite dissent in Turkmenistan, although dissatisfaction did lead to a 
series of official defections (particularly among ambassadors) in 2000-2002.  
Movement of officials is more strictly controlled now, however, especially 
foreign travel. Also, officials are inhibited by the regimes’ practice of taking 
revenge on family members left behind. 
• Externally Orchestrated Popular Revolution. This scenario also seems 
highly unlikely in the case of Turkmenistan, due to low organizational 
potential and the serious isolation of the population. The repressive context 
makes it hard to assess the public mood; however, without real oppositional 
leadership within the country—or access to external opposition in exile 
through media or the Internet, it is difficult to imagine the orchestration of a 
popular revolt.  Enough fear exists, and security presence is ubiquitous 
enough, to deter an uprising. Additionally, there are no real organizations—in 
religious or civil society—for people to coalesce around in opposition to the 
state, although there have been some recent reports of unofficial channels for 
Islamic believers in Turkmenistan.  
• Death and Succession. There are some concerns about Niyazov’s health, and 





down in 2010. However, there is no precedent for real elections in 
Turkmenistan and there is no indication of who might be allowed to make a 
bid for the presidency.  In the most likely case, Niyazov will retain official 
control as the head of the Halk Maslehaty and appoint a puppet president to 
serve as a figurehead. In the event then of Niyazov’s death, the weak 
figurehead would be a vulnerable target for rivals.  In the event of sudden 
death, without a consolidated political elite to pact a succession, there would 
be a high risk of violent struggle, increased by the fragmented nature of 
society. Another possibility is the emergence of a new dictator after some 
political struggle, who would adopt Niyazov’s methods of control but would 
be more likely to resort to terror in the short term, given the absence of a 
cultivated personality cult. A peaceful transition might occur if agreements 
could be reached by the top officials who would all receive a share of the 
political prize—under this scenario, the personality cult would decline in 
importance although life for the average citizen would likely be similar. 
However, rivalry among the top players and the likelihood of intervention 
from exiled oppositionists make this peaceful pacting a more unlikely 
outcome.  Any of these scenarios would probably draw in outside players, 
including Russia and the Turkmen diaspora. 
• Continuance of Niyazov’s Rule. The most likely scenario is perhaps the 
endurance, indefinitely, of Niyazov in the presidency.  The isolation of rural 
masses who are increasingly uneducated, the balancing and co-opting of elites 
through fear and rewards, and the promised benefits of natural resource 
production all contribute to the security of the regime.  





political liberalization in the near-term. Snyder writes, “Direct leaps from 
neopatrimonialism to democracy are infrequent, and, consequently, the path of 
transition from neopatrimonialism that seems most likely in the short run is the 
continuation of nondemocratic rule in the form of either a military or a revolutionary 
dictatorship.”12 Given the historical experience of sultanistic regimes, then, it does not 
seem that democracy will be coming soon to Turkmenistan.  
Continuance of Niyazov’s rule will mean a prolonged crisis for Turkmenistan, 
with an increased potential for long-term social problems, a bloated and ineffective 
state bureaucracy, and serious economic decline. Already, poverty, unemployment, 
and the drastic changes to the systems of education and health care have brought 
about a decline in standards of living. Further rule by Niyazov has the potential to 
produce a dangerously isolated generation, unable to govern the country in a changing 
world. The state, which will be increasingly weak and dysfunctional, will continue to 
provide huge opportunities for large-scale corruption, potentially allowing criminal 
and terrorist organizations to act unhindered—Turkmenistan has already become a 
major drug transit state. Further decline will increase Turkmenistan’s risk of 
becoming a failed state, posing a serious threat to regional and international interests 
and security. 
                                       






APPENDIX A: Changing Media Symbolism—Front Pages of “Neytralnyy 
Turkmenistan (formerly Turkmenskaya Iskra) Newspaper  
 
 
Figure 4: October 1991 
 






Figure 6: January 2001 
 
 


















Figure 8: Chart from newspaper article detailing the renaming of the streets. 10 March 2001 








APPENDIX C: Buildings and Monuments of Contemporary Ashgabat 
 
 







Figure 10: Presidential Palace in Presidential Square 
 






Figure 12: The Memorial to the Earthquake Victims in Neutrality Square 
 







Figure 14: Layout of Independence Park. Esenow, 344. 
  
 

















Figure 18: Interior of Mosque Saparmurat Haji, Goktepe. Esenow, 403. 
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